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Summary and conclusions
As in previous years, this report provides a quantitative overview of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows and examines these capital flows by destination economic sector and geographical 
area of origin. It describes the pattern of FDI originating in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, focusing on the international expansion under way at some of the region’s 
major companies, the so-called trans-Latins. 
 The main theme of the report is the operations of European companies in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Because the European Union economic bloc is the leading origin of inward FDI 
in the region, the main characteristics of European FDI are reviewed, identifying the leading 
investor countries and their preferred destination economies and sectors in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The report examines the behaviour and strategy of the major European 
transnationals and, in search of a more thorough understanding, takes a detailed look at two 
sectors where foreign capital, especially from Europe, plays a substantial role: commercial 
banking and power.  
10 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
A. Overview of foreign direct investment in  
 Latin America and the Caribbean
In 2011, US$ 153.991 billion in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flowed into Latin America and the Caribbean —28% 
more than in 2010. It was the second year of growth after 
the decline triggered by the 2009 financial crisis. Latin 
America was the region that recorded the highest percentage 
increase in FDI inflows, which brought its share of global 
inward FDI to 10%. In contrast to 2010, global FDI flows 
jumped 17% and also rose in the developed countries, which 
had posted the sharpest drops in the two previous years.
The region’s sustained economic growth (albeit slower 
than in 2010) continued to attract investments seeking to 
tap into dynamic domestic markets. High international 
prices for raw materials spurred investments in natural 
resource extraction and processing. And the economic crisis 
in the developed economies continued to prompt business 
restructurings, relocation of operations and offshoring of 
manufacturing operations and remote business services.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, all of the 
subregions and most of the countries received more 
investment than in 2010 (see figure 1). Brazil accounted 
for most of the increase, reaching US$ 66.66 billion 
—nearly half the region’s total. Generally speaking, 
most of the countries of South America saw rising FDI 
inflows, with record highs posted in countries such as Chile 
(US$ 17.299 billion), Colombia (US$ 13.234 billion) and 
Uruguay (US$ 2.528 billion).
Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT INFLOWS AND INFLOWS BY SUBREGION, 1990-2011






















































South America Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean Total
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
In Mexico, inward FDI was 6% below the figure for 
2010. Central America overall recorded a 36% increase; 
all of the economies of this subregion saw gains. Inward 
FDI to the Caribbean rose after falling for two years in a 
row, thanks above all to an increase in investment projects 
in the natural resources sector. Inward FDI increased in the 
Dominican Republic (US$ 2.371 billion) and Suriname 
(US$ 154 million). Overall, the real estate and tourism 
sectors continued to show the effects of the international 
financial crisis. In the Bahamas, though, with financial 
support from Chinese investors, construction has begun 
on the largest hotel complex in the Caribbean.
Over the past two decades of rising FDI flows, 
transnational companies have consolidated a robust 
presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially 
in the more capital-intensive sectors. As a result, the high 
profits garnered by foreign companies in the region are a 
key variable for examining the impact of inward FDI and 
FDI income on the balance of payments of the economies 
of the region. Reinvested earnings as a percentage of total 
FDI have been growing steadily since 2002 and hit 46% 
in 2011. And there has been a leap in the repatriation of 
profits to parent companies, from an average of some 
US$ 20 billion between 1998 and 2003 to a high of 
US$ 93 billion in 2008 (see figure 2).
Figure 2 














2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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There are two main reasons behind the rising share 
of reinvested earnings and the increase in repatriation of 
FDI profits from 2003 on. First is the sharp rise in the 
region’s FDI stock as a natural outcome of the nominal 
increase in earnings on these investments. Second, the 
increase in reinvested and repatriated earnings between 
2004 and 2007 was situational, boosted by favourable 
economic conditions in many of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, rising raw materials prices, 
new business opportunities and the growing purchasing 
power of the middle class. All of these factors fed the 
profitability of many transnationals operating in the 
region. Situational factors aside, the level of cumulative 
FDI in the region continues to fuel the outward flow of 
income associated with these capital flows, showing that 
FDI is not a one-way flow of resources. This makes it 
even more pressing to assess qualitative aspects of FDI, 
such as its ability to spur the development of strategic 
sectors, transform the production structure, accumulate 
knowledge and contribute to job creation and job quality.
The ability of FDI to transform the production structure 
of the economies of the region largely depends on the 
pattern of investment destination sectors. For most of the 
economies of South America, which are heavily reliant 
on natural resources, the bulk of FDI still flows into the 
natural resources sector. In 2011, Brazil was an exception 
in that investment in natural resources dropped because 
there were no major acquisitions in the hydrocarbon 
sector as there had been in 2010. By contrast, in Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean only 8% of total FDI 
went to natural-resource-related activities; services (53%) 
and manufactures (40%) still accounted for the bulk of 
inflows. For the region overall, FDI to the manufacturing 
sector went mostly to medium-high-tech industries, whose 
share of greenfield FDI projects grew while the percentage 
going to high-tech projects fell to just 3%. 
As for the origin of FDI, the Netherlands was the 
leading investor in the region, basically because it is a 
conduit for investments from third countries. It is followed 
by the United States, at 18% of received FDI, Spain (14%) 
and Japan (8%). Japanese investment in the region surged 
in 2011. Despite the sharp rise in investment from Asia 
over the past two years, most inward FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is from European Union countries.
The flow of outward FDI from the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean totalled US$ 22.605 billion in 
2011, well below the US$ 44.924 billion posted in 2010. 
This decline came in a context of high volatility for these 
capital outflows in recent years because the number of 
countries and companies involved is small. Nevertheless, 
there is indeed a long-term expansionary trend in FDI 
by trans-Latin companies. Moreover, as was the case in 
2009, the drop may be attributed to the pattern followed by 
Brazilian companies. In 2011 Brazil recorded a negative 
FDI position of US$ 9.297 billion, essentially because of 
loans that foreign subsidiaries of Brazilian firms made to 
their parent companies (see figure 3). Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that Brazilian companies have abandoned 
their strategy for expanding internationally —rather, it 
shows that securing funding abroad was an advantageous 
option in recent years and that in 2011 they preferred to 
invest in their own market.
Figure 3 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as of 16 April 2012.
a
 Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Chile was the country of the region accounting for 
the most outward FDI in 2011, at US$ 11.822 billion, 
followed by Mexico (US$ 9.640 billion) and Colombia 
(US$ 8.289 billion) (see figure 3). Overall, the trans-Latins 
continued to focus on expanding in their home region and 
in neighbouring countries: Mexican companies tended 
to invest in the United States and Latin America and the 
Caribbean; Chilean companies focused on Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru; and Colombian companies 
have established a solid presence in Central America. 
Argentina’s outward FDI rose to US$ 1.488 billion. 
Beyond this overall trend, in 2011 trans-Latin companies 
stepped up their acquisitions of assets held by European 
and United States companies. This is still an incipient 
development, but for many of these groups it could mark 
the beginning of a global expansion.
Despite the situational decline in 2011, the long-term 
uptrend in outward FDI from Latin America and the 
Caribbean held, in a global context where the emerging 
economies are increasingly relevant players. It is in this 
setting that the governments of the larger economies 
of the region, home to some of the major trans-Latins, 
have begun to weigh targeted policies for supporting the 
international expansion of their leading companies.
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Projections of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 2012 are based on two conflicting situations. On the 
one hand, it is clear that the region will continue to attract 
transnationals thanks to strong growth prospects amid 
considerable international uncertainty. On the other hand, 
the crisis in Europe could deepen, pushing up finance 
costs and limiting the availability of credit, with adverse 
effects on investment in the region, especially by European 
transnationals. In any case, if commodity prices remain 
high and the region continues to show macroeconomic 
stability, investment in the primary sector and in domestic 
market products and services will likely grow. In view of 
long-term trends in flows and the preliminary information 
available, ECLAC estimates that FDI inflows to Latin 
America and the Caribbean will vary by between -2% and 
8% compared with 2011 flows. FDI flows will therefore 
remain high in the region in 2012, at around US$ 150 billion. 
B. Foreign direct investment between the European  
 Union and Latin America and the Caribbean
Over the past decade, the European Union sent an average 
of US$ 30 billion per year in FDI to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. At nearly 40% of total FDI inn the region, this 
makes the European Union the leading origin of inward 
FDI to Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure 4). 
European transnational companies have a diversified presence 
in the economies of Latin America, spanning extractive, 
manufacturing and service sectors; they are major players 
in strategic industries such as banking and energy. While the 
European Union still ranks as the largest investor, over the 
past 10 years Latin America and the Caribbean has seen a 
decline in its share of overall investment flowing from the 
European Union. For example, Spain, the largest European 
investor in the region, is shifting its investment focus to 
other countries inside the European Union bloc and to other 
developing regions.
Figure 4 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures from the central banks of Latin America and 
Caribbean countries. 
In absolute terms, European FDI towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean surged during the second 
half of the 2000s but the increase was not evenly 
distributed among the subregions. European FDI was 
concentrated in South America; Brazil received the 
largest share, followed by Argentina, Colombia and 
Chile. In this subregion, rising commodity prices and 
growing domestic economies attracted new investment 
seeking to exploit natural resources and tap into brisk 
local markets, especially for manufactures. By contrast, 
European FDI towards Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean held fairly stable. This subregion was 
impacted by the economic slowdown in the United 
States and its substantial effect on investment overall, 
including from Europe. In this scenario, the European 
Union’s share of FDI flowing into the countries of 
South America increased.  
The destination sectors of European FDI have 
been determined by the production structure of the 
countries sending and receiving these capital flows. 
Spanish and Italian transnationals have concentrated 
on service sectors and have a broad footprint in the 
region; companies based in Germany, Great Britain 
and the Netherlands have focused on manufacturing in 
the larger economies (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina). 
In the receiving economies, European investment in 
the countries of South America has flowed above 
all into the service sectors and into natural resource 
exploration, exploitation and processing. In Brazil, 
the largest share of European investment is in 
manufacturing industries. In Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean, European companies have a larger 
footprint in services and manufactures and a markedly 
smaller one in natural resources. 
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Recent years have seen a surge in investment by 
European transnationals in search of natural resources; 
this is especially the case in mining, where British 
companies account for the largest share. New investment 
has flowed into the hydrocarbon sector; here, the most 
active companies are based in the United Kingdom and 
Spain and often operate in cooperation with the region’s 
major State-owned oil companies. The positive impacts of 
such investments include increased exports, job creation 
in non-urban areas and higher tax revenues. The main 
issues are that many involve enclave operations or a very 
limited amount of local processing. 
European manufacturing firms have been very active 
in Latin America, especially German, French and Italian 
ones in the automotive industry; German companies in 
electronics; companies based in Great Britain, Italy and 
the Netherlands in food and beverages; and German and 
French companies in the chemical industry. These firms 
have benefited from the good economic performance and 
lower volatility of many of the countries of the region 
and from the growing purchasing power of broad sectors 
of the population. However, the international financial 
crisis has slowed or halted some of the investments that 
had been announced, owing above all to the funding 
difficulties that some transnationals are facing. The positive 
impacts of such investments include increased production 
capacity and exports, job creation, enhanced production 
linkages and, in certain cases, technology transfer and 
capacity building. 
In the services sector, European companies have 
consolidated their presence after streaming into Latin 
America in the mid-1990s drawn above all by State-
owned asset privatization programmes. With a long-
term vision, many European companies in areas like 
telecommunications and power have entered a phase of 
greater stability in which the priorities are to leverage 
economies of scale and increase market share, with profit 
margins that enable them to maintain and enhance their 
global position. In the telecommunications and energy 
sectors, Spanish and Italian companies are major players, 
as are Spanish and British ones in banking and French 
and Portuguese retail chains. 
Operations in Latin America have become essential 
for these companies’ worldwide business —especially for 
Spanish companies. With the current situation in Europe, 
operations in Latin America considerably help parent 
companies balance their consolidated balance sheets and 
weather adverse circumstances. Moreover, the region’s 
sound economic performance in recent years and the 
growth potential of its markets, along with its serious 
and persistent infrastructure gaps, have encouraged new 
companies to set up operations. This has happened in 
sectors where European companies were already present 
and in other sectors not as extensively explored. As a result, 
the European presence has grown more diverse in recent 
years and the number of companies with operations in 
the region has increased.
European investment in Latin America significantly 
impacts recipient country production structure in several 
ways. First, European transnationals account for a large 
share of greenfield investment in the manufacturing 
sector, which is the main driver of increased production 
capacity. Second, of all the foreign companies present 
in the region the ones based in Europe have been the 
most active in R&D, especially in Brazil and Argentina. 
Brazil is the only country that has positioned itself as 
a prime location for European transnationals seeking 
to internationalize their R&D activities. European 
corporate R&D centres in Brazil have an increasingly 
high profile in these companies’ global innovation 
networks and are yielding substantial positive local 
impacts in terms of technology transfer, production 
capacity building and innovation. Obviously, market 
size is a key determinant, but industrial structure (the 
most diversified in the region) and robust production 
and industrial development policies have also been 
significant factors. 
On the flip side, trans-Latin companies have stepped 
up investment in the European Union in recent years. 
At present, this involves a handful of companies whose 
operations mirror the production structure of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in sectors where the leading 
companies (mostly from Brazil and Mexico) have carved 
out global competitive advantages. Investment by trans-
Latins in the European Union has centred on the basic 
industries (oil and petrochemicals, mining, cement and 
steel) and on consumer goods such as food. The economic 
situation in Europe can bring new business opportunities 
associated with potential acquisitions. 
Expectations are that over the short run the flows 
of European FDI to Latin America will be shaped 
by at least two opposing factors. On the one hand, 
the European crisis is opening new opportunities for 
transnational firms. High profitability and business 
opportunities in Latin American markets point to an 
increasing presence. And the difficult situation in Europe 
could force some companies to relocate operations to 
lower-cost destinations, among them some countries of 
the region. On the other hand, the situation in Europe 
could slow or even reverse the flow of FDI if the crisis 
deepens and financing becomes more difficult to secure 
and more costly. In any event, a wave of disinvestments 
seems very unlikely, although some projects could be 
put on hold or postponed. 
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In an increasingly globalized world, the European 
Union has economic, social and cultural characteristics 
that are especially useful for the development of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. And the region itself can 
become a source of stimulus for the European economies 
(particularly as they face the financial crisis) and for 
their major transnational companies. Both regions 
therefore need to enhance their investment cooperation 
programmes in terms of production policy, technological 
cooperation and innovation so as to better leverage the 
array of complementarities between them. Latin America 
should supplement its policies for promoting FDI with 
greater efforts in the industrial policy area to boost the 
permanent and dynamic benefits of these capital flows. 
They need to move from policies targeting FDI to policies 
that focus on what transnational companies do in areas 
such as human resource development, technology transfer 
and innovation and R&D.
Latin America and the Caribbean could thus draw 
greater benefit from the stock of knowledge, quality 
investments and broad potential of European companies 
in the region. 
C. The international financial crisis, the banking sector  
 and foreign direct investment in Latin America  
 and the Caribbean
Over the past few decades, financial systems (a linchpin 
of economic development) have undergone profound 
transformations spurred by deregulation and technological 
progress, generating new credit and saving opportunities 
for individuals, households and businesses. In the 
advanced economies, the proliferation of financial 
innovations helped broaden business options (some of 
them speculative in nature) that relied on high levels 
of leverage and thus made it possible to diversify and 
transfer risk. The burgeoning industry went through 
an accelerated process of concentration and grew ever 
more integrated at the local, regional and global level. 
Latin America was not on the sidelines of these 
changes. Ambitious reforms launched in the 1980s 
sought to open the capital account and liberalize local 
capital markets and the banking system. Among the 
more significant measures were easing interest rate 
controls, privatizing State-owned and development 
banks, lifting restrictions on the entry of foreign banks 
and allowing banks to engage in multiple activities. The 
goal was to encourage domestic saving, complemented 
by foreign saving, and foster the efficient allocation of 
resources. But macroeconomic instability and external 
vulnerability laid bare the fragility of Latin America’s 
financial systems. In response to serious and recurring 
bank crises, new legal and institutional reforms geared 
towards prudence were rolled out and helped strengthen 
the financial system.
On a global scale, financial institutions and transactions 
grew so large and complex that they overwhelmed weak 
regulatory and oversight regimes and the evaluation 
capacity of private risk rating agencies. So, when the 
conditions changed they set off a colossal financial 
crisis as national, regional and multilateral authorities 
launched substantial efforts to mitigate its impacts 
and contain the contagion. Nevertheless, the financial 
crisis that began with subprime mortgages and the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and was made worse by 
the European sovereign debt crisis has still showed no 
clear signs of remission, keeping many industry actors 
in a precarious situation. 
While the international financial crisis hit Latin 
America and the Caribbean hard, with some differences, it 
was unlike previous meltdowns in that the local economies 
recovered quickly and banking systems remained stable 
and sound. Indeed, banks are now better regulated and 
capitalized, and they are more efficient. This could lay 
the groundwork for more orderly, sustained development 
in the future. Despite brisk growth, though, the financial 
systems of Latin America still lag somewhat behind, 
especially when compared with the advanced economies. 
With few exceptions, the degree of bank access and use 
is lower than in other counties with similar per capita 
income levels, and it is skewed towards short-term credit 
—even more so following widespread adoption of updated 
consumer loan administration practices (see figure 5).
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Figure 5 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME 
LEVEL AND BANK SECTOR DEEPENING, 2010




































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Throughout this process the international dimension of 
the banking business has become increasingly important. 
As markets matured and became more competitive, some 
major banks in the advanced economies set out in search 
of new opportunities outside their home countries. They 
were spurred by burgeoning trade and transnational 
corporate operations, the growing need for financing to 
cover global payment imbalances and the advance of 
emerging economies. Cross-border loans managed from 
the parent company began to increase, and subsidiaries 
were established or local institutions purchased to offer 
banking services in foreign markets. Over the past few 
decades, many developing countries saw a growing influx 
of foreign banks. More recently, many financial sectors 
in developed countries, especially in Europe, have been 
the setting for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
In the mid-1990s, the presence of foreign banks 
in emerging economies began to swell. Latin America 
became a prime destination, on the strength of economic 
reforms, the privatization of State-owned assets and the 
weakness of the local banking sector. Foreign banks now 
have a market share of nearly 20% in developing Asia, 
35% in Latin America and 90% in Eastern Europe. This 
process was limited to a few financial institutions from 
Europe and the United States and Canada, some with a 
long-standing global vocation (Citigroup and HSBC) 
and others that in just a few years have gained a strong 
foothold in selected countries or regions (Santander and 
BBVA). The Spanish banks are at the forefront in Latin 
America; Italian and Austrian ones were the major players 
in Eastern Europe (see figure 6).
Figure 6 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from banking institutions.
Over the past two decades, the growing presence of 
foreign banks has become one of the key factors shaping 
Latin America’s banking industry. Local authorities 
expected that the influx of international institutions would 
recapitalize local banks, encourage modernization, make 
the industry more competitive and limit the potential for 
further financial crises. The share of banking industry 
assets held by foreign banks went from 11% in 1995 
to 31% in 2000 and neared 35% in 2010 (see figure 7). 
For the handful of international institutions operating in 
the region, this has become a central part of their global 
business, especially in the case of the Spanish banks.
Figure 7 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from BankScope and Stijn Claessens and others, Foreign Bank 
Presence in Developing Countries 1995-2006: Data and Trends, March 2008.
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Overall, the entry of foreign banks in Latin America 
and the Caribbean galvanized the regional financial 
market. Foreign banks stiffened domestic competition, 
forcing the sector’s margins and costs down. They 
helped modernize the Latin American banking system 
by improving internal processes, perfecting risk rating 
systems and broadening the supply of services. They 
furthered social inclusion and reached new, growing 
segments of society that before then were mainly served 
by national banks. But foreign banks are still markedly 
biased towards higher-income segments of the population, 
which are usually less risky.
With the relative maturity of the market, the efficiency 
and productivity indicators of domestic and foreign banks 
have started to converge. The regional and global turmoil 
of the early 2000s and the international financial crises 
after 2007 might have influenced the pull-back and greater 
caution on the part of foreign banks. Domestic banks 
responded quickly, made substantial improvements in 
efficiency and productivity and took back much of the 
market share lost during the previous decade. 
Recently, the global financial crisis has led to concern 
over the large share of the Latin American banking 
system that is in the hands of European banks. Strong 
pressure associated with sovereign funding could trigger 
massive losses for these entities overall, and limits on 
recapitalization could force banks to deleverage in order 
to restore their capital ratios. But while these institutions 
were not unaffected by the credit crunch and deteriorating 
interbank market liquidity, they have exhibited resilience 
and stability and are thus less likely to become a channel 
for the transmission of external shocks. These outcomes 
may be attributed to the high degree of operating autonomy 
that Latin American subsidiaries have from their parent 
companies: much of their lending is denominated in local 
currency and is funded with local deposits. Foreign banks 
depend very little on foreign-currency funding from their 
parent companies or international interbank markets to 
fund their lending operations. 
In short, foreign banks were drawn to Latin America 
by two principal factors. First, developed-country banks 
were searching for new options in the face of shrinking 
income in mature and very competitive domestic markets. 
Second, Latin America’s revamped institutional framework 
and improved macroeconomic context after the series of 
profound economic and financial crises of prior decades 
enabled them to enter markets with low levels of bank 
access and use and high growth potential.
The power sector is a strategic one for all countries 
because it impacts the economy directly, influences the 
competitiveness of the other sectors and can drag along 
construction companies and components manufacturers. In 
all of the countries, the State exerts control over the sector 
through regulatory agencies and, often, through State-owned 
companies. In Latin America and the Caribbean, FDI has 
streamed into the power sector over the past 20 years, 
giving the corporate strategies followed by transnational 
power companies a good deal of influence over power 
system development in many economies.
 Foreign investment was especially sizable between 
1996 and 2001, when most of the countries of the region 
conducted profound power sector reforms and privatized 
many State-owned power companies. FDI in the power 
sector neared US$ 5 billion in 1999 and US$ 10 billion 
in 2000, accounting for 6% and 13%, respectively, of 
total received FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In the 1990s, European companies were in a better 
position to seize the opportunities opening in the region, 
thanks to their size and financial capacity and the competitive 
pressure sparked by the creation of the European Single 
Market that drove them to turn their sights abroad. That is 
why four of the five major transnational power companies 
operating in the region are European: the two Spanish 
companies (Iberdrola and Gas Natural Fenosa); Endesa, which 
was originally Spanish, and is now part of the Italian group 
Enel; and France’s GDF Suez, which also took advantage 
of privatizations and still operate in the region (along with 
the United States company AES). This group of companies 
still comprises the leading private power companies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; their footprint spans many 
countries and a range of industry segments.
Incoming European and United States companies 
focused on the acquisition of existing assets. Although this 
involved heavy FDI inflows it did not necessarily increase 
D. Foreign direct investment in the power sector in  
 Latin America and the Caribbean
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total investment in the power sector. In many cases, the 
reforms did not appropriately address the structure of the 
power industry, especially where the production chain 
was segmented into too small markets. The result was a 
sector split between public and private companies; the 
vast majority of the latter were transnationals. In many 
economies (especially the smaller ones in the Caribbean, 
where the power sector is of necessity small and there is 
not much scope for segmenting), State-owned companies 
completely dominate the industry. The situation is similar in 
Ecuador, Paraguay, and, to a large extent, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
From 2001 on, the end of privatizations and overlapping 
energy crises, macroeconomic instability and regulatory 
uncertainty in a number of countries drove power sector 
FDI down. Many of the transnational companies mentioned 
above were hit hard and took heavy losses that forced them 
to restructure their assets in the region. Although they 
eased off on investment they did not divest themselves of 
their assets in Latin America, with the notable exception 
of France’s EDF.
Since 2006 there has been renewed interest in investing 
in Latin America, sparked by sustained market growth and 
stable regulatory environments that have been changed 
slightly to favour private investment in the power sector. 
In this setting, major transnational power companies 
have announced organic growth projects in the markets 
where they operate in the region, seeking a higher profile 
in emerging economies and a lower one in the markets 
of Europe, the United States and Japan where there is 
virtually no growth.
In recent years, European and United States transnationals 
established in the region since the 1990s have been joined 
by new actors, many based in countries of the region. Trans-
Latin power companies include Colombia’s ISA and EPM 
and Brazil’s Eletrobras, all of them State-owned and with 
a long history in their home countries but that have only 
recently ventured into international expansion and have 
kept it within the region. Asian companies have entered 
the scene as well, among them Japan’s Mitsui, Korea’s 
Kepco and China’s State Grid and Sinohidro.
 This dynamic has boosted private-company investment 
in the electric power system (see figure 8). In Brazil, 
private companies did not even account for one third of 
generation capacity in 2003 and now make up more than 
half. In 2010 their share of power output was 63% in 
Central America and 45% in Mexico. The bulk of private 
investment in the power sector in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is from transnational companies. But this 
investment boom does not extend to all of the economies 
of the region, and in some segments and countries there 
is an investment shortfall that does not cover the demand 
fuelled by economic growth. 
Figure 8 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official data from the World Bank.
Companies specializing in renewable and non-
conventional energies such as wind and solar power 
have ventured into the sector in recent years. This is 
the fastest-growing segment, both worldwide and in 
the region; while its share of power generation is still 
marginal (in the area of 1%), in Brazil it now accounts 
for 10% of all greenfield power generation investment. 
Wind power has soared in the past two years. By late 2011, 
installed capacity in Brazil had grown to 1500 megawatts, 
with another 6700 megawatts in the development stage. 
Mexico has 569 megawatts online and another 2,609 
megawatts under construction. Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Uruguay are also making great strides 
in installed wind power capacity. Latin America has 
drawn on available wind resources in these countries and 
improved techniques, especially in solar photovoltaic 
power, to build on earlier development of these energy 
technologies in Europe. One factor has been FDI from 
European companies that built up their competencies in 
their domestic markets. Second, declining investment in 
Europe freed production capacity and sent the price of 
components spiralling down. And last, countries in the 
region managed to avoid the often unsustainable direct 
subsidies used in Europe to promote renewable and 
non-conventional energies by using indirect assistance 
such as tax exemptions or preferential treatment in 
distribution. As a result, Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico 
have started construction of numerous wind projects 
which will offer electricity at prices comparable with 
other energy sources. In the second half of 2011, solar 
photovoltaic power projects also started to take off, 
although to a much lesser extent than wind projects.
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Although they have not used direct subsidies, the 
governments of the region have supported renewable 
and non-conventional energies in order to reduce the 
degree to which many economies depend on foreign 
sources of energy and to help cut CO2 emissions from 
fossil-fuel-driven power plants. Latin America already 
produces more than 50% of its electric power from 
renewable sources (thanks to hydropower plants) and 
could increase this percentage by developing other 
renewable power sources. Some governments provide 
incentives for renewable and non-conventional energies 
as a way to support the incipient industry that supplies 
components and support services for these energy 
sources. Noteworthy in this regard is Brazil’s local-
content policy, which has attracted 12 of the world’s 
leading producers of components for the wind industry 
to set up production facilities in the country.
In addition to building more sustainable power systems, 
the challenge for the region is to ensure an appropriate 
level of investment that guarantees quality service at a 
reasonable cost that is not a drag on the competitiveness 
of the economies. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) estimates that the region needs to invest some 
US$ 404 billion in generation and US$ 313 billion in 
transmission and distribution by 2035 (not including 
Mexico). The region should take advantage of its draw for 
international investors (which are no longer just European 
companies), and it should also allow the State-owned power 
companies that are present in all of the countries except Chile 
to contribute to the development of their power systems. 
E. Final considerations
FDI inflows into Latin America and the Caribbean reached a 
record high in 2011, following significant surges in the two 
preceding years. Within this trend, investment flows match, 
and reinforce, the production structure of the countries of 
the region: projects in high technology sectors are few and 
far between and concentrated in just a handful of countries. 
Repatriated earnings have soared in some countries to levels 
similar to inflows, a reminder that FDI is not unidirectional 
and that the focus must be on the quality of investment in 
order to promote structural change and knowledge transfer 
or boost local capacities. With capital flows buoyant and 
profitability high for transnationals, there is scope for 
promoting productive development policies, increasing 
reinvestment of profits and assessing mechanisms for 
generating higher fiscal revenues in support of development 
of the region’s economies. 
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Chapter I
Regional overview of foreign  
direct investment
A. Introduction
In 2011, US$ 153.991 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed into Latin America 
and the Caribbean. At 28% more than in 2010, these capital flows grew more rapidly than 
those for any other region in the world, and the region’s share of total world FDI rose to 
10%. The bulk of the increase in inward FDI for the region went to Brazil, which received 
US$ 66.66 billion, but all subregions and almost all the leading economies benefited from 
stronger inflows. Outward FDI (direct investments made abroad by companies based in the 
region) fell to US$ 22.605 billion and were impacted by the trend in Brazil, where the FDI 
outflow turned negative.
Despite global financial market uncertainty, the economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean continued to attract a 
growing volume of FDI and other capital flows in 2011. 
The deteriorating situation in the advanced countries 
(particularly in Europe) during the third quarter of the 
year had but a very limited impact on the region (ECLAC, 
2011c): despite a slight slowdown compared with 2010, 
GDP in the region continued to grow at the rate of 4.3%. 
Commodities, which make up a significant percentage of 
exports for many of the region’s economies, saw prices 
that remained high and did not fluctuate much during the 
year. This encouraged inward FDI towards the primary 
sector. Thus, economic growth and high international 
prices for natural resources boosted transnational corporate 
operations in the region and, therefore, inward FDI, which 
even topped the levels recorded in 2008 before the worst 
moments of the international financial crisis.
The favourable economic environment boosted 
returns on FDI, enabling transnationals to finance a 
large proportion of their investments with subsidiaries’ 
earnings and led to a surge in the transfer of earnings to 
parent companies. It is therefore quite likely that for the 
region as a whole FDI will not be a net capital contributor.
This should be borne in mind when looking at FDI 
as a potential source for knowledge and technology 
transfer and a way to build local capabilities (by fostering 
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national innovation systems, creating production linkages, 
developing human capital and developing local businesses, 
among other factors), especially in strategic sectors. 
Investments in technology-intensive industries and in 
research and development still account for a modest 
percentage of inward FDI in Latin America, and they are 
highly concentrated in the region’s two largest economies: 
Brazil and Mexico.
It is useful to look at the upward trend in inward FDI 
(measured in current dollars) to the region over the past 
two decades in the light of what these flows mean for 
the region’s economy as a whole (see figure I.1). After 
the flood of inflows between 1996 and 2001, when FDI 
surpassed 4% of GDP, the percentage has stabilized in 
the area of 2.5% over the past few years.
Figure I.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT  
INVESTMENT FLOWS, 1990-2011 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a 
 FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus disinvestments 
(repatriation of capital) by foreign investors. The FDI figures do not include the flows 
received by the main financial centres of the Caribbean. These figures differ from those 
contained in the editions of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 
published in 2011, as the latter show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, 
direct investment in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward FDI.
On a global scale, the emerging economies have 
been gaining importance in the production of goods, the 
provision of services, international trade and the exchange 
of capital flows. Latin America is not on the sidelines of 
this trend. Other emerging economies are increasing in 
importance as a source of inward FDI for the region, and 
trans-Latin companies are expanding internationally at 
a steady pace despite the drop in aggregate outward FDI 
last year. The governments of the larger economies of the 
region, where some of the leading trans-Latin companies 
are based, have begun to weigh targeted policies for 
supporting the international expansion of these companies.
The uncertainty that has prevailed for nearly five years 
now has not eased, but the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean have continued to show responsible 
macroeconomic management and resistance to external 
turbulence. If sovereign debt problems and drastic fiscal 
adjustments do not lead to any further worsening of 
conditions in Europe, and if the robust pattern of growth 
in China does not diminish, the countries of the region 
should see no significant deterioration in their current 
position. It is thus highly likely that FDI flows will remain 
high in 2012. 
The present chapter is divided into five sections. 
Following this introduction, section B gives an overview 
of FDI worldwide. Section C comprises three parts. The 
first describes FDI patterns in Latin America and the 
Caribbean on the basis of official balance-of-payments 
statistics. The second reviews the strategies pursued by 
transnational companies by looking at FDI destinations, 
sources and mechanisms. The third part outlines new 
FDI projects according to technology and R&D content. 
Section D describes the key characteristics of the region’s 
countries as foreign investors and the expansion of trans-
Latin companies. It also takes up the incipient policies for 
supporting outward FDI that are being deployed in the 
region. The final section sets forth the main conclusions.
B. Overview of foreign direct investment worldwide
In 2011 worldwide FDI climbed 17% over the previous 
year, going from US$ 1.29 trillion to US$ 1.51 trillion 
and marking the second consecutive year of increases 
in these capital flows after the declines in 2008 and 
2009 triggered by the international financial crisis. 
But despite this recovery, worldwide FDI is still far 
from the record high of US$ 1.96 trillion seen in 2007.
FDI growth worldwide has been uneven, with 
patterns varying from one destination region to another. 
In 2011, FDI flows into the developed economies were 
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up by 18.5% over 2010, going from US$ 0.64 trillion to 
US$ 0.75 trillion, outpacing the increase in the developing 
economies and driving their share of global FDI up slightly, 
from 49.3% to 49.9% (see table I.1). Nevertheless, this 
increase was far from enough to offset the plunge that the 
advanced economies have seen in their share of FDI over 
the past decade. In 2000 the developed countries received 
81% of the global flows; by 2007 it had fallen to 66%.
Net FDI inflows to developing and transition economies 
increased by 15.5% in 2011, from US$ 0.65 trillion to US$ 
0.75 trillion. Within this group, South-East Europe and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union posted the largest gains 
(30.6%), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (up 
27.8%) and Asia and the Pacific (10% increase). Flows 
into Africa and the countries of the Middle East declined.
Figure I.2 
GLOBAL FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  




















































Developed economies Developing and transition economies
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2011. Non-equity modes of international 
production and development (UNCTAD/WIR/2011), Geneva, July 2011; and 
Global Investment Trends Monitor, No. 8, Geneva, January 2012.
The United States was the largest individual recipient; 
at US$ 210 billion, it was down by 7% compared with 
2010. The countries of the European Union reached 
US$ 414 billion —a 32% increase over the previous 
year but still less than half of the total inflow for 2007. 
Japan’s net inflow was virtually zero. Noteworthy 
among the developing countries were China, with 
inflows of US$ 124 billion, and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China, at US$ 78.4 billion, 
followed by Brazil, with US$ 66.66 billion, the Russian 
Federation, with US$ 50.8 billion, and India, with 
US$ 34 billion.
In 2011, surging cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
were once again the main factor behind higher global 
FDI flows. The latter rose by US$ 219 billion; the former 
increased by US$ 168 billion (see figure I.3).
Most of this increase seems to have taken place in 
the developed countries, where the economic crisis and 
financial instability would have encouraged corporate 
restructuring aimed at rationalizing operations and 
cutting costs, as well as acquisitions seeking to take 
advantage of favourable currency and stock market 
movements. The trend in the developing economies 
(Latin America and the Caribbean in particular) was 
the opposite: the flow of mergers and acquisitions 
ebbed, and greenfield investment rose in both regions 
(UNCTAD, 2012). 
Table I.1 
FLOW, VARIATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY REGION, 2007-2011
(Billions of dollars and percentages) 
Region Investment flows Variation rate Share
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 a 2008 2009 2010 2011 a b 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 a
World 1 971 1 744 1 185 1 290 1 509 -11.5 -32.1 8.8 17.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Developed economies 1 307 965 603 636 753 -26.1 -37.5 5.4 18.5 66.3 55.3 50.9 49.3 49.9
South Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States c 91 121 72 70 92 32.8 -40.8 -2.0 30.6 4.6 6.9 6.0 5.4 6.1
Developing economies 573 658 511 584 664 14.8 -22.4 14.4 13.7 29.1 37.7 43.1 45.3 44.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 117 137 82 121 154 17.2 -40.4 48.2 27.8 5.9 7.9 6.9 9.4 10.2
Financial centres  
in the Caribbean d 53 70 59 40 63 32.4 -14.8 -32.8 57.7 2.7 4.0 5.0 3.1 4.2
Africa 63 73 60 55 54 16.3 -18.0 -9.1 -0.5 3.2 4.2 5.1 4.2 3.6
Middle East 78 92 66 58 50 17.1 -27.9 -11.8 -13.4 4.0 5.2 5.6 4.5 3.3
Asia and the Pacific 262 286 243 310 343 9.2 -15.0 27.4 10.4 13.3 16.4 20.5 24.1 22.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report 2011. Non-equity modes of international production and development (UNCTAD/WIR/2011), Geneva, July 2011; and Global Investment Trends 




 Given that some Latin American and Caribbean countries did not provide data for 2011, the growth rate was based on the 12-month variation for the most recent period available.
c
 Includes the Russian Federation.
d
 Includes Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands.
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Figure I.3 



























































Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) Mergers and acquisitions
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2010. Investing in a 
Low-Carbon Economy (UNCTAD/WIR/2010), Geneva, July 2010. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.II.D; World Investment Report 2011, 
Non-equity modes of international production and development (UNCTAD/
WIR/2011), Geneva, July 2011; Global Investment Trends Monitor, No 8, 
Geneva, January 2012.
a
 The FDI and mergers and acquisitions data are not strictly comparable owing to the 
nature of the information. However, the values of mergers and acquisitions provide 
background for interpreting their share in total FDI flows.
Another factor behind rising FDI flows was the marked 
increase in the reinvestment of earnings by subsidiaries of 
transnational companies. In the developed countries, this 
component of FDI jumped relatively sharply in 2010 and 
2011 after plunging in 2008, the first year of the crisis. 
Financial market uncertainty grew after August 2011 
as volatility and sovereign risk, while far from the levels 
seen in late 2008, soared in several European countries. FDI 
flows were not affected by this situation, but fewer mergers 
and acquisitions were announced in the second half of 2011 
although the pace remained strong on the momentum of a 
natural backlog. In other words, the surge in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in 2011 was due to operations agreed 
during the closing months of 2010 and first half of 2011, and 
it is to be expected that the uncertainty seen in the second half 
of 2011 will impact the transactions to be finalized in 2012. 
In short, global FDI trends were up slightly, although 
announcements of new cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
saw a period of stagnation in the closing months of the year. 
While flows to developed countries picked up, in relative 
terms, during 2011, the trend towards a larger share for the 
developing economies did not change. Nevertheless, FDI 
and other capital flows towards the developed countries 
have been more volatile since the onset of the global 
economic crisis in 2008.
C. Foreign direct investment inflows and transnational  
 companies in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Trends and characteristics of foreign direct investment flows  
 into Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011
In 2011, FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
maintained the previous year’s upward trend and 
reached US$ 153.991 billion (28% more than in 2010 
and 12% above the historical high of 2008), erasing 
the 40% drop triggered by the global financial crisis 
of 2008-2009.
Brazil, which accounts for 43% of the region’s 
GDP and inbound FDI, absorbed 54% of the increase 
in the flow of FDI to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
This increase in flows to Brazil, combined with the 
smaller increases posted by almost all of the economies 
of South America, drove inflows to that subregion up 
by 35% (see figure I.4). Mexico and Central America 
received 4% more than in the previous year. FDI to 
the Caribbean rose by 20% in 2011 after falling for 
two years in a row (see table I.2).
Figure I.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL INFLOWS OF FOREIGN 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures and estimates at 16 April 2012.
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Table I.2  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS BY RECEIVING  
COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 2000-2011
(Millions of dollars and relative difference in percentages)







South America 38 004 43 539 71 877 92 868 55 492 89 911 121 500 31 631 35
Argentina 4 296 5 537 6 473 9 726 4 017 7 055 7 243  188 3
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)  350  278  362  508  426  672  859  187 28
Brazil 19 197 18 822 34 585 45 058 25 949 48 506 66 660 18 154 37
Chile 5 047 7 426 12 572 15 518 12 887 15 373 17 299 1 926 13
Colombia 3 683 6 656 9 049 10 620 7 137 6 899 13 234 6 335 92
Ecuador b 839 271 194 1 006 321 158 568 410 259
Paraguay b 48 95 202 209 95 228 149 -37 c -20 c
Peru 1 604 3 467 5 491 6 924 5 576 7 328 7 659 331 5
Uruguay 393 1 493 1 329 2 106 1 620 2 483 2 528  45 2
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2 546 - 508 1 620 1 195 -2 536 1 209 5 302 4 093 339
Mexico 23 301 20 119 31 492 27 140 16 119 20 709 19 554 -1 154 -6
Central America 2 578 5 756 7 400 7 564 4 529 6 044 8 246 2 203 36
Costa Rica  626 1 469 1 896 2 078 1 347 1 466 2 104  638 44
El Salvador  325  241 1 551  903  366  117  386  269 231
Guatemala  334  592  745  754  600  806  985  179 22
Honduras  418  669  928 1 006  523  797 1 014  217 27
Nicaragua  219  287  382  626  434  508  968  460 91
Panama  656 2 498 1 899 2 196 1 259 2 350 2 790  440 19
The Caribbean 3 612 5 694 6 317 10 049 5 623 4 996 4 690  748 c 20 c
Anguilla  60  143  120  101  37  26  12 -14 -55
Antigua and Barbuda  127  361  341  176  85  101  64 -37 -37
Bahamas b  383  843  887 1 032  753  960  840  260 45
Barbados  118  298  394  470  303  344 … ... ...
Belize  56  109  143  180  112  101  98 - 3 -3
Dominica  26  29  48  57  42  25  25  1 2
Dominican Republic
 932 1 085 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 896 2 371  475 25
Grenada
 65  96  172  148  104  63  43 -21 -32
Guyana
 50  102 110  179  122  198 247 49 25
Haiti
 12  161  75  30  38  150  181  31 21
Jamaica
 595  797  752 1 361  480  170 … ... ...
Montserrat
 2  4  7  13  3  3  3  0 -3
Saint Kitts and Nevis  84  115  141  184  136  122  142  20 16
Saint Lucia
 76  238  277  166  152  115  81 - 34 -30
Saint Vincent and  
the Grenadines  43  110  132  159  98  103  135  32 31
Suriname  143  323  179  124  242  113  154  42 37
Trinidad and Tobago d  842  883  830 2 801  709  549  293 -3 -1
Total 67 494 75 107 117 043 137 623 81 821 121 704 153 991 33 476 28
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of preliminary figures and official estimates as at 16 April 2012. The figures for years 
prior to 2010 might not coincide with previous reports because of the adjustments made by some countries.
a
 Simple average. 
b
 Official figures available to third quarter.
c
 Bahamas, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago have not reported final data for 2011; accordingly, the absolute change and the growth rate for these countries and for the regional 
aggregates were based on the 12-month variation for the most recent period available.
d
 Official figures available to second quarter.
After FDI plummeted 40% in 2009 owing to the global 
financial crisis, flows to the region have increased two 
years in a row. The factors behind this uptrend (a relative 
return to confidence on the international scene and the 
good performance of the economies of the region) held 
stable during the period.
Despite uncertainties in the developed economies 
leading to an uptick in financial instability from August 
2011 on, transnationals as a whole have resumed their 
global expansion plans. This relative rally can be seen 
in a slight rise in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
in the region during 2011. Investment in the extraction 
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of hydrocarbons, minerals and other natural resources 
has increased on the strength of higher international 
prices spurred by sustained demand in China and other 
expanding emerging economies. And the economic 
crisis in the developed economies could be prompting 
business restructurings, the relocation of operations to 
other countries and more offshoring of manufacturing 
operations and remote business services.
Continued economic growth in the emerging 
economies, including several in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, is seen as also favouring South-South 
investment by increasing the size and number of 
transnational companies in emerging countries. As 
seen last year with the inrush of FDI from China (the 
third largest direct investor in the region), international 
expansion strategies followed by major corporations 
based in emerging economies pose new opportunities 
for Latin America and the Caribbean.
In the region, responsible macroeconomic management 
and sustained economic growth, albeit at a slower pace 
than in 2010, have continued to encourage investment 
seeking to tap into dynamic domestic markets. Against 
this backdrop of steady economic growth, with private 
consumption growing faster than GDP (ECLAC, 2011a), 
broad sectors of the population are gaining access to 
consumer goods and services provided, in many cases, by 
transnationals. They include some durables (automobiles), 
telecommunications and financial services. 
Confidence in the economies of Latin America and 
the Caribbean on the part of investors worldwide can be 
seen in all capital flows, not just FDI. Macroeconomic 
stability and the demonstrated ability to weather the 
impacts of the global crisis of 2008-2009 have increased 
portfolio and other investment flows1 to the point that, 
between 2007 and 2011, they surpassed FDI (see figure 
I.5). The rise in portfolio investment is attributable to 
the buoyancy and financial robustness of domestic 
markets and to low returns at the international level, 
which has spurred investment in emerging markets 
(ECLAC, 2011b). In 2010, portfolio investment totalled 
US$ 136.154 billion, followed by FDI at US$ 120 
billion and other investments at US$ 76.909 billion. 
Estimates indicate that portfolio investment in 2011 will 
1 Portfolio investment is the purchase of negotiable securities (public 
or private) such as stock and bonds, as well as money market 
instruments. It does not include investments with a significant 
degree of involvement in the management of the investee (in 
practice, when the equity stake exceeds 10%), which are regarded 
as FDI. “Other investments” essentially refers to loans not included 
in negotiable securities.
amount to US$ 78.797 billion while other investments 
will total US$ 80.795 billion. FDI has been a major 
source of capital for the region over the past two decades 
and has never recorded a negative balance, but net 
portfolio investment fell to nearly zero between 2000 
and 2004. Furthermore, although portfolio investment 
has increased sharply in Mexico and South America, 
FDI is the main component of the financial account in 
the smallest economies.
Figure I.5  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INWARD CROSS-BORDER 
CAPITAL FLOWS (FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, PORTFOLIO 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a
 The data on portfolio and other investment flows for 2011 have been estimated on 
the basis of information from the following countries: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
A look at the FDI-to-GDP ratio shows that, in 
the region, these flows are far more important for the 
smaller economies. In 2011, FDI inflows to Saint Kitts 
and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were 
the equivalent of 19% of GDP (see figure I.6). Many 
other countries of the Caribbean and Central America 
also received FDI in excess of 5% of GDP. Among 
the medium-sized and large economies, inward FDI in 
Chile accounted for as much as 7% of GDP, followed 
by Uruguay at 5%. For the largest economies in the 
region, FDI accounted for a far smaller proportion: 
Mexico and Argentina received flows equivalent to 
less than 2% of GDP. For Brazil, the ratio was only 
3%, despite the sharp rise in FDI in 2011. On average 
for the region, the FDI-to-GDP ratio in 2011 was 5.8%, 
slightly above the level for the previous year but still 
below the 8% posted in 2007. 
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Figure I.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INFLOWS OF FOREIGN 































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a
 The FDI-to-GDP indicator normalizes FDI figures according to the size of the economy.
(a) Brazil
FDI inflows to Brazil jumped by 37.4% in 2011 
compared with 2010, to US$ 66.66 billion. Capital 
contributions made up 82.2% of total FDI; intra-company 
loans accounted for 17.8%.2 
In 2011, the already-high share coming from European 
transnationals (in particular, from the Netherlands,3 Spain 
and France) rose again, to 64.4% of total FDI flows. Asian 
transnationals, led by companies from Japan, consolidated 
their position as the second largest investors in the Brazilian 
economy, accounting for 13.6% of these capital inflows. 
In the Americas, companies from the United States and 
Canada accounted for 10.4% of the investments; trans-
Latins made up 5.1%. The remaining 6.6% was from 
companies based in Africa and Oceania, as well as in 
Israel, the Russian Federation and other countries.
By sector, the manufacturing industry consolidated 
its position as the main recipient of FDI in Brazil, at 46% 
of the total. The metallurgical sector stood out (US$ 7.802 
billion), thanks to construction of a new integrated plant 
by Germany’s ThyssenKrupp at an estimated cost of 
US$ 6.75 billion (ECLAC, 2010), followed by the food 
2 Brazil’s official statistics on FDI do not include reinvested 
earnings, so 100% of FDI in Brazil refers to capital contributions 
and intra-company loans. FDI in Brazil is therefore understated. 
3 According to data from the Central Bank of Brazil, only 8% of inward 
FDI registered as being from the Netherlands is from companies 
based there. The rest refers to investments by companies in third 
countries transferred through subsidiaries in the Netherlands that 
were set up specifically for this purpose (see box II.2). 
and beverage industries (more than US$ 5 billion each). 
Other sectors receiving more than US$ 1 billion in FDI 
were the fuel, automobile, cement, chemical, electronics 
and plastics industries. While the ThyssenKrupp plant is 
designed for exporting steel to Europe, the transnationals 
that invested in the other sectors were mainly seeking 
access to the growing domestic market in response to 
government policies that protect local content in many 
industries. Inputs for the growing oil industry are subject 
to substantial local-content requirements;4 other examples 
are the electronics,5 automobile6 and power sectors (see 
chapter IV). FDI flows to the service sector accounted 
for 44% of the total, owing above all to investments in 
commerce and telecommunications. Investment in the 
primary sector, at 9%, was down from previous years.
(b) Other South American economies
In 2011, FDI flows to the other economies of South 
America rose 33%, to US$ 54.658 billion. Paraguay was 
the only one to see a drop compared with the previous 
year. Some economies that had already posted record 
highs in 2010, such as Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, 
received still higher flows in 2011.
FDI flows to Chile rose by 13% in 2011 to a new 
record high of US$ 17.299 billion, confirming the country’s 
draw for transnational companies. It is one of the South 
American economies with the largest presence of foreign 
capital. By sector, direct investments have focused on 
services (33% of total FDI) and the primary sector (61% 
of the total).7 In the former, financial services and the 
power sector account for the largest share, as does copper 
mining in the latter. The manufacturing industry received 
just 5% of FDI. Several transnational companies, like 
Australia’s BHP Billiton and Freeport-McMoRan from 
the United States, embarked on greenfield and expansion 
projects in the metal mining industry. In the mining sector, 
Japan’s Mitsubishi Group acquired a 25% stake in Anglo 
4 The consulting firm Wood Mackenzie estimates that 100 new 
oil platforms will be needed in Brazil over the next 10 years. In 
2001 only four Brazilian shipyards had the capacity to build them. 
See Financial Times [online] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
fbaba8a2-a341-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1R9E3477S. 
See also Business News Americas [online] http://www.bnamericas.
com/news/energiaelectrica/BNDES_respalda_contenido_local_ 
en_plataformas_de_Petrobras).
5 See [online] http://www.mzweb.com.br/positivo/web/conteudo_en
.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=21962.




7 Information relating to foreign direct investment subject to 
decree-law 600.
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American Sur at a cost of more than US$ 5 billion;8 
the Sumitomo group acquired a 45% interest in Minera 
Quadra Chile for nearly US$ 700 million. These cases 
illustrate the role that a number of Japanese consortia 
are playing in financing mining operations in Chile, thus 
securing access to mining resources as an input for other 
8 This transaction is not formally regarded as FDI because it is a 
transfer of assets between foreign companies. This transaction is 
caught up in a major legal battle between Anglo American with 
the world’s largest copper producer: Chile’s State-owned National 
Copper Corporation (CODELCO). The dispute has to do with 
CODELCO’s call option over 49% of Anglo American Sur, one of 
Anglo American’s subsidiaries in Chile. The dispute has had wide 
media coverage; the outcome of the legal battle and its potential 
repercussions are yet to be seen.
operations. In the service sector, Chilquinta Energía was 
purchased by Sempra Energy from the United States; 
Autopista Central was acquired by Canada’s Alberta 
Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo). These 
transactions were valued at more than US$ 700 million 
each (see table I.3). 
Table I.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 20 LARGEST CROSS-BORDER MERGERS  
OR ACQUISITIONS BY COMPANIES FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION, 2011
(Millions of dollars)
Company or asset acquired Host country of 
company acquired
Country where 
transaction took place Sector Buyer
Home country  
of buyer Value
Anglo American Sur (25%) United Kingdom Chile Mining Mitsubishi Japan 5 390
Vale’s assets in aluminium 
companies
Brazil Brazil Mining Norsk Norway 4 948
Shincariol Brazil Brazil Beverages Kirin Holdings Japan 3 877
Telemar (25%) Brazil Brazil Telecommunications Portugal Telecom SGPS Portugal 3 786
Peregrino Project (40%) Norway Brazil Oil and gas Sinochem China 3 070
Elektro United Kingdom Brazil Energy Iberdrola Spain 2 897
Occidental Argentina United States Argentina Oil and gas Sinopec China 2 450
SK do Brasil South Korea Brazil Oil and gas Maersk Denmark 2 400











Oil and gas TNK-BP Russian 
Federation
1 800
Vopak Bahamas Netherlands Bahamas Infrastructure Buckeye Partners United States 1 642
Drummond Colombia (20%) United States Colombia Mining Itochu Japan 1 524
Companhia Brasileira  
de Distribuição (43%)
Brazil Brazil Commerce Groupe Casino France 1 174







United Kingdom Chile Energy Sempra Energy United States 875
Assets of GDF Suez France Trinidad  
and Tobago
Oil and gas China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)
China 850
Santander Seguros Spain Brazil Financial ZS Insurance America Switzerland 840
Autopista Central (50%) Sweden Chile Infrastructure Alberta Investment Canada 736
Puras do Brasil Brazil Brazil Hotels and 
restaurants
Sodexo France 735
Minera Quadra Chile Ltda. 
(45%)
Canada Chile Mining Sumitomo Japan 724
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
8 This transaction is not formally regarded as FDI because it is a transfer 
of assets between foreign companies. This transaction is caught up in 
a major legal battle between Anglo American with the world’s largest 
copper producer: Chile’s State-owned National Copper Corporation 
(CODELCO). The dispute has to do with CODELCO’s call option over 
49% of Anglo American Sur, one of Anglo American’s subsidiaries 
in Chile. The dispute has had wide media coverage; the outcome of 
the legal battle and its potential repercussions are yet to be seen.
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Inward FDI to Colombia increased by 92% to a 
record US$ 13.234 billion. As in recent years, the natural 
resources sector attracted most of the investments. 
Investment in the mining sector fell between 2010 and 
2011, to 20% of total FDI, but inflows to the oil sector 
were up sharply, to 40% of the total. The largest acquisition 
in this sector, with Japan’s Itochu purchasing assets held 
by Drummond for US$ 1.524 billion, did not involve 
inbound FDI but rather a change of ownership between 
transnationals. BHP Billiton and Xstrata announced a US$ 
1.3 billion investment to expand their coal mines. Other 
than natural resources, the sectors receiving the most 
FDI were commerce, transport and telecommunications, 
with DHL announcing a US$ 1.3 billion investment 
for a regional logistics centre in Bogota. Other major 
transactions included the acquisition of Protabaco by 
British American Tobacco for US$ 452 million and 
the acquisition of the remote business service provider 
Computec by Ireland’s Experian, for US$ 408 million. 
Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom and Chile 
are among the largest investors in Colombia, behind the 
Netherlands and Panama, which chiefly act as conduits 
for the flows. 
FDI flows to Peru were 5% higher in 2011 than 2010 
and totalled US$ 7.659 billion. In addition to confirming 
the upward trend over the past decade, this new high was 
well above the US$ 3.492 billion average for the period 
2000-2010. Reinvested earnings made up 65% of total 
FDI; net loans with parent companies accounted for 
31%; capital contributions made up 4%. While there are 
no official data disaggregated by sector, other sources 
indicate that mining is still the main destination for FDI. 
The Government of Peru estimates that there is a pipeline 
of investment projects worth some US$ 9.115 billion for 
the expansion of existing operations and US$ 18.016 
billion (99% of which is from foreign investors) in new 
initiatives with environmental impact studies already 
approved (Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2011). Most 
of the large cross-border acquisitions were in this sector; 
examples include South Africa’s Gold Fields increasing its 
stake in La Cima for US$ 379 million and the acquisition 
of Minera Corona SA by Canada’s Dia Bras Exploration 
Inc. for US$ 286 million.
FDI inflows into Argentina increased slightly in 
2011, to stand at US$ 7.243 billion, of which new capital 
contributions accounted for 55%; reinvested earnings for 
31%; and intra-company loans for the remaining 14%. 
The largest corporate acquisition was the purchase of 
the Argentine subsidiary of the United States company 
Occidental Petroleum by China’s Sinopec, for some 
US$ 2.450 billion. This acquisition, and the entry of the 
state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) the previous year, has made Chinese companies 
key actors in Argentina’s hydrocarbons sector.9 The most 
noteworthy development in this sector was the exit of the 
Spanish firm Repsol, following expropriation of most 
of its assets in April 2012. Other major transactions had 
occurred in 2011. They included the purchase of Interbaires 
(an operator of duty-free shops) by Switzerland’s Dufry 
for US$ 285 million and the acquisition of Allus Global 
BPO Center (a provider of remote business services) by 
Brazil’s Contax for US$ 206 million.
In 2011, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela attracted 
US$ 5.302 billion in FDI flows, more than three times 
the figure for the previous year. Over the past 10 years, 
inward FDI to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had 
been low for the size of its economy. In 2009 and 2006, it 
even posted negative flows owing to the nationalization 
of subsidiaries of transnational companies.10 In 2011, as 
in 2010, all FDI was in the form of reinvested earnings 
and intra-company loans because the balance of capital 
contributions remained in negative territory —disinvestments 
by transnational companies exceeded new contributions. 
The oil sector received 65% of inward FDI; 20% went to 
financial operations.
FDI in Uruguay continued the uptrend seen in recent 
years and totalled US$ 2.528 billion in 2011 up 2% over 
the previous year. The wood and pulp plant in which 
Chile’s Arauco (Copec group) invested an estimated 
US$ 2 billion will come on line in 2013. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia received foreign 
direct investment flows totalling US$ 859 million in 2011, 
28% more than in 2010 and far more than the US$ 390 
million average for the previous decade (2000-2010). 
FDI was concentrated in the primary sector, which, 
according to preliminary data, accounts for 40% of FDI 
(hydrocarbons, 35% and mining, 5%); industry received 
39% while the services sector received 21% of the total.
Ecuador drew in FDI totalling US$ 386 million, 
more than twice the figure for 2010 but less than flows 
received between 2000 and 2005. The natural resources 
sector received 61% of the total. This relative stagnation 
may be attributed to new oil sector regulations giving 
preferential treatment to State-owned Petroecuador, thus 
prompting the exit of several foreign oil companies in 
2010. Nevertheless, new investments in the sector in order 
to expand output are being announced. Besides natural 
resources, Germany’s tyre company Continental announced 
9
 This transaction is not included in net FDI because it involved the 
simultaneous entry and exit of foreign capital.
10
 A 2011 coverage adjustment in oil sector activities prompted a 
substantial retrospective revision of FDI figures for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. The data for 2010 went from a negative 
flow of US$ 1.404 billion to a positive US$ 1.209 billion.
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that it will invest US$ 104 million in a retreading plant. 
Switzerland’s Holcim, a cement company, is to invest 
US$ 120 million in expanding its plant. Korea’s POSCO 
bought the engineering firm Santos for US$ 72 million; 
ACE from the United States acquired the insurance arm 
of Banco de Guayaquil for US$ 55 million. 
FDI flows into Paraguay totalled US$ 186 million, 
31% less than in 2010.11 The vast majority of investment 
was concentrated in the service sector, chiefly finance 
and commerce. 
(c) Mexico and Central America 
Mexico was the region’s second largest recipient 
of FDI in 2011, at US$ 19.554 billion, which was 6% 
lower than the 2010 figure. Reinvested earnings from 
subsidiaries accounted for 35% of total inflow; capital 
contributions made up 45%, and intra-company loans 
accounted for 20%. 
The United States regained its position as the main 
investor in Mexico (52% of total flows) after losing that 
status in 2010 when the Netherlands headed the list. Spain 
ranked second; its 16% share was concentrated above all 
in telecommunications, financial services and non-metal 
mineral products. In third place was the Netherlands 
(7%), followed by Switzerland (6%), Japan (4%) and 
Canada (3%). The main recipient sector was banking, at 
US$ 2.333 billion. Forty-six percent of total investment 
went to manufacturing, particularly the food industry 
(US$ 1.939 billion), followed by the chemical industry 
(US$ 1.913 billion). 
Investment in the manufacturing sector was boosted 
by a number of acquisitions including the purchase of 
GEUSA by an alliance formed by the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela’s Empresas Polar (US$ 315 million) and 
the Mexican subsidiary of PepsiCo Inc-Beverage (US$ 
625 million). Another acquisition was the purchase of 
Convemex (a maker of plastic utensils) by the Colombian 
group Carvajal for US$ 180 million. Among the firms 
announcing substantial greenfield investments (which 
will be executed over several years) are Japan’s Honda 
(US$ 800 million), Mazda (US$ 500 million) and Hitachi 
(US$ 310 million); Korea’s Hyundai (US$ 100 million); 
Nestlé (US$ 700 million); and a number of companies 
providing capital for wind-power generation projects 
(see chapter IV). 
The services sector received 49% of inward FDI, 
with the financial sector accounting for 13% of the total. 
Within this sector, Colombia’s Grupo SURA acquired 
the Latin American pension, insurance and investment 
11
 The figures for Paraguay are estimates based on data available up 
to the third quarter.
fund assets of the Netherlands firm ING in a transaction 
amounting to US$ 3.614 billion —the largest corporate 
acquisition of 2011. This transaction exemplifies the 
expansion of Colombian companies abroad and the slide 
of some European groups, but it does not impact total 
FDI in Mexico because it is between two transnationals.
Natural resources attracted just 4.3% of inward FDI 
in Mexico; this small share is still slightly above the 
average for the past decade. State-owned PEMEX has a 
monopoly on hydrocarbon extraction; mining is controlled 
by private Mexican firms like Grupo México, Peñoles 
and Grupo Frisco. Despite this, foreign firms, Canadian 
ones in particular, conducted 20 minor acquisitions in the 
mining sector in 2011.
Central America received US$ 8.246 billion in FDI 
in 2011, 36% more than in 2010 and slightly above the 
pre-crisis figure for 2008. Panama and Costa Rica are 
still the main destinations for FDI; between them they 
receive 59% of total FDI to this subregion (see figure I.7). 
Figure I.7 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
The Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic have made FDI one of the essential pillars 
of their international insertion and export promotion 
strategies. Manufacturing, chiefly export-oriented sectors 
seeking efficiency gains receives 35% of inward FDI 
in the subregion (not including Guatemala or Panama), 
turning it into a major export platform, mainly towards 
the United States. To this end, the subregion devised 
incentives for attracting FDI and promoting the creation 
of special export zones and free trade zones. While 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) regards some 
of these incentives as export subsidies that should 
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be dismantled or replaced, those countries that have 
approved reforms of their incentive regimes (Costa 
Rica and Panama) have kept the main tax exemptions 
but no longer link them to business export performance 
(Martínez Piva, 2011).
FDI in Panama totalled US$ 2.79 billion in 2011, 
up 19% from 2010. The special regime for establishing 
and operating headquarters for multinational companies 
(Law No. 41, which came into force in 2007) continued 
to attract investments, as did infrastructure projects 
such as expanding the Panama Canal and building a 
subway in Panama City. These projects, executed by 
transnational companies like Spain’s Sacyr Vallehermoso 
and Brazil’s Odebrecht, do not directly involve FDI 
inflows but they do draw suppliers like Germany’s 
tunnel boring machine manufacturer Herrenknecht 
AG to set up operations. Construction is still one of 
the most attractive sectors for foreign investors. In the 
manufacturing sector, Colombia’s Casa Luker acquired 
Café Durán for US$ 75 million; the Colombian firm 
Consalfa bought Intercoastal Marine for US$ 32 million. 
With these transactions, Colombian companies are 
enhancing their presence in Panama, which has been 
considerable for several years.
Box I.1 
THE CHALLENGE OF MINING IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Mining and hydrocarbons do not figure 
as heavily in the economies of the Central 
American countries as they do in most 
South American countries and some 
Caribbean nations. The percentage of 
FDI destined for extractive industries 
in the subregion is low, too; Nicaragua 
is the only country to post substantial 
growth in the past few years, to 12% of 
its total for 2011. 
In recent years, the high price of 
metals has drawn the interest of investors 
in this sector and prompted a response 
from Governments and civil society. And 
improvements in the region’s infrastructure, 
especially in access to power, have 
enhanced the viability of mining projects. 
Mining company interest in initiatives 
in Central America has come up against 
renewed awareness of social and 
environmental rights on the part of affected 
communities and sparked heated debate in 
some countries. In 2011 the Government of 
Panama approved allowing foreign States 
to participate in mining activities, either by 
providing financing or through partial or 
full ownership of companies. This would 
open the door to investments by State-
owned mining companies (Chinese or 
Russian ones, for example) or by private 
companies (like some in Brazil) supported 
by funding from public banks. This reform 
angered a number of groups, including 
indigenous communities —especially the 
Ngöbe-Buglé. Protests have continued, 
focusing on adding a provision to the 
law that would set stricter environmental 
standards for mining and hydropower 
projects. In March 2012 the government 
agreed to cancel mining concessions in 
Ngöbe-Buglé territory.
Legislation has changed in Costa 
Rica as well, but the objective in this 
case was to restrict mining operations in 
order to protect the environment. In 2010, 
the Government of Costa Rica placed a 
nationwide moratorium on open-pit and 
underground gold mining. This did not block 
the purchase of assets already in operation, 
such as the takeover of Compañía Minera 
del Guanacaste by the United Kingdom’s 
Ascot Mining.
In Honduras, the general mining 
law of 1998 is still in force but debate 
over amending it has swirled since 2004, 
when the Civic and Democratic Alliance 
was created to advocate for reforming 
this piece of legislation. As the debate 
in Congress continues, consensus has 
been reached on issues such as citizen 
participation, stricter environmental 
controls, a 100% municipal tax hike, the 
use of mineral resources for projects in the 
public interest and for emergency support, 
the definition of exclusion and protected 
cultural heritage areas and the creation of 
a fund for restoring affected areas.
In Guatemala, the law enacted in 
1997 is still in force, but the reform of 
mining legislation has been a matter of 
debate over the past few years. As in other 
countries, the issue is how to reconcile 
business interests with regard to the 
calculation of royalties with environmental 
interests relating to water use and the 
interests of indigenous communities, 
which require mandatory community 
impact consultations. 
It is in Guatemala that mining 
recovered the most on the strength of 
rising international prices. In 2011, Russia’s 
Solway Group bought nickel mines that 
had not been operated for more than 30 
years. Solway has experience in restarting 
abandoned projects and expected that 
after the first 18 months output could 
reach 35,000 tons of ferro-nickel a year, 
rising to 150,000 tons by year four or five 
and becoming one of the largest ferro-
nickel operations in Latin America. The 
company has two projects under way: 
the Fénix project, where infrastructure 
is being built, and the Montúfar project, 
which identified the mining resources 
30 years ago.
Mining in Central America will expand 
if the current metal price cycle continues 
and the countries achieve sustainable, 
consensus-driven resolution of the issues 
concerning social and environmental impact 
and distribution of revenues. It is worth 
mentioning that Guatemala and Honduras 
have both fiscal regimes in this sector 
that are extremely favourable to investors 
(ECLAC, 2012). Given the size of the 
economies and the scant mining tradition 
in the area, most of this development is 
expected to come from FDI.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Panama politics: Mining conflict in uneasy truce” 
13 March 2012 [online] http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=displayVw&article_id=1528882537&geography_id=440000044&region_id=&rf=0; and ECLAC, “Renta de recursos no 
renovables en América Latina y el Caribe: Evolución, 1920-2010” paper presented at the International Seminar on Governance of Natural Resources in Latin American Countries, Santiago, 
24-25 April 2012.
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In 2011, Costa Rica received US$ 2.104 billion in 
FDI, 44% more than in 2010. Investments in companies 
in free trade zones accounted for 30%. The largest 
inflows were concentrated in the service sector as the 
market opened in activities previously under the purview 
of the State (telecommunications and insurance were 
opened up to private investment in 2011). Noteworthy 
were the investments announced by the Danish logistics 
and transport conglomerate AP Moller-Maersk, Italy’s 
Enel and Spain’s Acciona. Liberalization of the 
telecommunications market for providing Internet and 
mobile telephone services (approved in 2008) has attracted 
companies like Spain’s Movistar, Mexico’s América 
Móvil and Colombia’s Metrowireless. The Japanese 
firm Bridgestone has announced new investments in 
the manufacturing sector. 
FDI flows into Honduras totalled US$ 1.014 billion 
in 2011, 27% more than the figure for 2010. These 
flows break down into reinvested earnings (66%), and 
equity (28%) and other capital (6%). In 2011, transport, 
warehousing and telecommunications were once more the 
main FDI recipients (with 31%), owing to the expansion of 
telecommunications companies. Manufacturing (excluding 
the maquila industry) ranked second, at 24% of the 
total, as coffee processors stepped up the reinvestment 
of earnings, distribution centres expanded and beverage 
companies purchased transport equipment. The maquila 
industry, the third largest recipient of FDI flows, saw a 
decline of 39% as several textile companies closed when 
their contracts were not renewed. The largest investor 
in Honduras was the United States (28.6% of the total), 
followed by Canada (18.4%) and Mexico (15%). 
FDI flows to Guatemala rose by 22% to US$ 985 
million; reinvested earnings accounted for most of this 
figure. The largest transaction was in the power sector 
with the change in ownership of Deorsa and Deocsa, 
which Spain’s Gas Natural Fenosa sold for US$ 449 
million to the investment fund Actis based in the United 
Kingdom. In 2011, Walmart announced plans to invest 
US$ 84 million in 25 new stores.
Inward FDI in Nicaragua reached US$ 968 million, 
almost twice the figure for 2010. Inflows rose for all 
sectors, but the sharpest increases were in mining (US$ 114 
million) and commerce and services (US$ 118 million). 
Canada (26.4% of the total) and the United States (16.4%) 
are still the main investors, followed by Mexico and Spain 
at 11.9% each. The Electrobrás investment in the Tumarín 
hydropower plant was the largest announced this year: some 
US$ 1 billion over the next few years. In the services sector, 
Ireland’s online staff recruitment firm Saongroup started 
up operations. 
El Salvador received US$ 386 million in FDI, thus 
returning to the average for the past decade after the decline 
in 2010. The main recipient sectors were manufacturing 
(63%), commerce (19%) and communications (10%). 
(d) The Caribbean
FDI flows into the Caribbean subregion totalled US$ 
4.690 billion in 2011. This was 20% more than in 2010 
but still less than half the figure for 2008. This increase 
after two years of decline was mainly driven by higher 
flows to the Dominican Republic (US$ 2.371 billion, 
25% more than in 2010). 
The economies of the Caribbean as a whole have 
been the hardest hit by the economic crisis since 2008. 
Investment in the tourism sector —which is especially 
important for members of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS)— and in financial services, in 
the Bahamas, has borne the brunt over the past three years. 
The natural resources sector (which has tradtionally 
figured heavily owing to metal mining in the Dominican 
Republic, hydrocarbons in Trinidad and Tobago and 
bauxite in Jamaica) has, since 2008, been attracting more 
and more FDI. The biggest investment projects are in 
gold mining, including a US$ 800 million undertaking by 
Canada’s IAMGOLD and the US$ 400 million venture 
by United States-based Alcoa and Newmont —both in 
Suriname. Alcoa announced a US$ 200 million investment 
in bauxite mining in Suriname; oil exploration projects 
are under way in Guyana.
After growing by 43% between 2000 and 2007, FDI 
into the rest of the region fell off by 8% in the wake of the 
international financial crisis as inflows to the services sector 
sagged. Smaller investments in manufactures and services for 
export were concentrated in free trade zones in the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti and in a number of call centres.
FDI inflows to the Dominican Republic jumped by 
25% in 2011, to US$ 2.371 billion, boosted above all 
by the mining sector, which received 40% of the total, 
followed by electric power and commerce. Investment 
in tourism and real estate rose slightly over 2010 but was 
still far short of the levels seen at the end of 2007. The 
largest investors in the Dominican Republic were the 
United States, Canada and Spain, in that order. 
FDI in the Bahamas also increased considerably to 
US$ 840 million in the first nine months of 2011, equivalent 
to 45% more than in 2010. This was largely the result of 
the Baha Mar major tourism project (see box I.2). The 
economies that posted higher FDI flows included Suriname 
(US$ 154 million), which received significant investment 
in gold and bauxite mining; Guyana (US$ 247 million); 
and Haiti, which registered record high inflows of US$ 181 
million in 2011. The other Caribbean economies for which 
data are available posted more moderate growth in FDI or 
even a reduction.
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Box I.2 
CHINA FINANCES AND EXECUTES THE LARGEST TOURISM PROJECT IN THE CARIBBEAN
The 400-hectare Baha Mar resort complex 
in the Bahamas will include six hotels with 
2,250 rooms and apartments (among them a 
700-room Grand Hyatt resort), a convention 
centre, the largest casino in the Caribbean, a 
golf course, 24 restaurants, 3 spas, a water 
park and other attractions. At an estimated 
total cost of US$ 3.5 billion, this project 
alone will double the hotel capacity of the 
Bahamas when it opens its doors in 2014. 
A local consortium will own the complex; 
international hotel chains will manage the 
hotels. However, the project is only possible 
with financing from China Exim Bank, which 
offered a US$ 2.5 billion loan in March 
2010. Under the same agreement, the 
bulk of the construction work will be done 
by China State Construction Engineering 
Corporation (CSCEC), one of the largest 
construction companies in China. At a time 
when the fallout from the real estate and 
financial crisis in the United States is making 
it hard for tourism projects in the Caribbean 
to secure financing, funding from a State-
owned Chinese bank was, no doubt, key 
for moving ahead with such an ambitious 
initiative. It is a good example of the foreign 
expansion model followed by Chinese 
companies based essentially on financing 
from State-owned banks (see ECLAC, 2011a, 
chapter III).
The project will have a major impact 
on the local economy, above all by creating 
jobs; between 6,000 and 7,000 will be 
permanent. Another 4,000 local jobs will be 
created during construction, but in keeping 
with the tradition followed by many Chinese 
construction firms, CSCEC expects to hire 
up to 8,000 Chinese workers. Once the 
project is complete, the economy of the 
Bahamas will be even more dependent on 
the tourist industry.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by Baha Mar Resort.
Trinidad and Tobago attracted US$ 293 million in FDI 
in the first half of 2011, in line with the same period in 2010.
As a whole, the member countries of the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) 
recorded a 7% reduction in FDI in 2011, which was the 
fifth consecutive year that FDI inflows had fallen since 
2007. FDI inflows to these countries are directed mainly 
at the tourism sector.
2. Patterns of origin and destination of foreign direct investment
The United States and the countries of the European Union 
are still the main investors in Latin America. In 2011 the 
Netherlands was the largest source of FDI flowing into the 
region, although it is estimated that most of these flows 
originated from companies based in other countries (see 
box II.2). United States transnationals accounted for 19% 
of FDI flows to the region (a lower share than during the 
previous five years). Spain’s share rose to 14% (see figure I.8).
Japanese investment jumped to 9% of the total in 2011, 
boosted by major acquisitions. The first and third largest 
of these in 2011 were by Japanese companies. Another 
six purchases made by Asian companies, above all from 
China, were on the list of the 20 largest transactions (see 
table I.3). Investment originating in China in 2011 did not 
match the US$ 15 billion posted in 2010 (ECLAC, 2011a), 
but there were acquisitions such as Sinochem’s in Brazil and 
Sinopec’s in Argentina, along with greenfield investments 
like the Minmetals and Chinalco mining operations in 
Peru and the major tourism project in the Bahamas (see 
box I.2). In the automobile sector, Japanese and Korean 
firms already installed in the region announced investment 
projects, as did recent arrivals such as China’s Chery. In 
the power sector, Korea’s KEPCO ventured into Mexico 
and Jamaica (see chapter IV). Other investments by Asian 
countries include those by India in wind energy in Brazil 
and by Viet Nam in the telecommunications sector in Haiti.
Figure I.8 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a
 FDI shown by origin in this figure accounts for 63% of total FDI in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
FDI from other countries in the region, whose share 
of the total had been rising steadily in recent years, fell 
slightly to 5% in 2011. The main reason was declining 
outward FDI for the region overall (examined in the 
following section), followed in second place by the rising 
share of trans-Latin company expansion projects in the 
United States, Europe and other regions. 
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In terms of the region as a whole, in 2011, FDI was 
concentrated primarily in the services sector, which received 
45% of inflows, followed by manufactures with 38%, and 
natural resources with 18%. The pattern of distribution by 
sector differs significantly from one country or one subregion to 
another. In 2011, the percentage of FDI received by the natural 
resources sector in Brazil fell sharply, with corresponding 
increases in the shares of services and manufactures (see 
figure I.9). In the other South American countries, on the 
other hand, 57% of the FDI received in 2011 was channelled 
into the primary sector. The pattern of distribution by sector 
in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean was much 
the same as in previous years, with 53% of FDI going to 
services, 40% to manufactures and 8% to natural resources.
Figure I.9 
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A. South America (excluding Brazil)
B. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
C. Brazil
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
Beyond official figures for FDI, data on mergers and 
acquisitions provide a more detailed picture of which 
countries are investing in the region and in what sectors. 
Overall, cross-border mergers and acquisitions with Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a destination totalled | 
US$ 82.786 billion, similar to last year’s figure.12 By 
sector (see figure I.10), in 2011 the larger share went to 
services, with 53% of the total. Acquisitions of primary-
sector companies accounted for 37%, down slightly 
from 2010. Just 12% of the mergers took place in the 
manufacturing sector. This is a lower percentage than 
the one yielded by official data on FDI, indicating that 
greenfield investments play a larger role in this sector.
Figure I.10 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
In 2011 there was no repeat of the unusually large 
transactions seen in 2010, when three topped US$ 5 
billion. The only one in excess of that figure in 2011 
was Mitsubishi’s purchase of a 24.5% interest in Anglo 
American Sur in Chile, for US$ 5.39 billion (see 
table I.3). As mentioned above, the region is still a strong 
draw because of its natural resources and the degree 
of domestic market growth. That is why mergers and 
acquisitions centre on the mining, oil and gas sectors 
and on non-tradable sectors like telecommunications and 
infrastructure. At the country level, 7 of the 10 largest 
transactions were in Brazil, in the form of acquisitions in 
mining and hydrocarbons (where Brazil has substantial 
resources), in non-tradable industrial sectors such as 
beverages and in services like telecommunications, 
12
 Data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions are not strictly 
comparable with official FDI figures because the methodologies 
for obtaining them are different. 
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commerce and finance. For large corporations, then, 
Brazil is, in addition to a major producer of raw materials, 
a large and expanding market. 
Asian companies are moving well up on the list of 
major acquisitions as they considerably expand their 
operations in the economies of the region. This is taking 
place as major European transnationals pull back, in a sort 
of buyback of strategic assets moving from ownership 
by European companies to Japanese or Chinese control. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that major Japanese 
conglomerates are positioning themselves in the economies 
of Latin America: Japan has had a substantial presence 
in the region for years. But 2011, as 2010, saw a marked 
inflow of Chinese capital. While the geographical 
distribution of Asian companies is fairly uneven (they 
are taking positions in different countries in the region), 
they are heavily concentrated in natural-resource based 
sectors, that is, mining, oil and gas.
3. Capital income and reinvested earnings
Over a period of 20 years, growing FDI flows from 
transnational companies have become a determining 
presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially 
in the more capital-intensive sectors. While there 
are substantial differences among countries, foreign 
companies tend to be heavily involved in sectors like 
mining, hydrocarbons, steel, electrical utilities, banking 
and commerce, and they almost completely dominate 
others such as electronics, the automobile industry 
and telecommunications services. On the whole, the 
high profitability of companies with foreign capital 
operating in the region is a determinant variable for 
analysing FDI flows and the balance of payments of 
the economies of the region. 
When transnational company earnings are reinvested 
in the same country where they are generated, they are one 
more component of FDI, along with capital contributions 
by parent companies to subsidiaries and intra-company 
loans. Almost all of the economies of the region compile 
information on all three components, with the notable 
exception of Brazil, which does not count reinvested 
earnings. However, not all of the countries of the region 
record the components separately. Figure I.11 shows 
changes in the three components for the major economies 
of the region.
Capital contributions are the most variable of 
the three components, since most are from corporate 
mergers or acquisitions. Intra-company loans are a 
flexible way of allocating resources among subsidiaries 
and represent 20% of total FDI flows in the past five 
years. Since 2002, reinvested earnings have emerged 
as a major component of total FDI flows; indeed, 
over the past five years they have become the largest 
component, accounting for 42% of total FDI flows. 
This is principally because levels of cumulative foreign 
capital in the economies of the region are constantly 
rising, especially in comparison with annual inflows. 
In addition, the expansionary phase of the business 
cycle underway in the region and high prices for raw 
material exports have boosted the returns on capital. 
The impact of these two factors is particularly evident 
in Chile, a country with considerable FDI stock, a 
sound economic performance, and an export product 
(copper) that commands high prices in international 
markets. Reinvested earnings have therefore been 
especially high in the past decade in Chile (69% of all 
inward FDI). 
Figure I.11 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a
 The distribution of FDI by component accounts for 50% of total FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Brazil is not included, because it does not record data on reinvested 
earnings.
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Earnings of the subsidiaries of transnational companies 
that are not reinvested in the host economy but are 
transferred to the parent company are called FDI income 
and are a component of capital income, as are portfolio 
investment income and other investment income. All of 
these components surged in recent years and peaked at 
nearly US$ 153 billion in 200813 (see figure I.12), thanks 
especially to soaring direct investment income. While 
portfolio investment income and other investment income 
held relatively steady, direct investment income climbed 
from averages in the area of US$ 20 billion between 1998 
and 2003 to a high of US$ 93 billion in 2008 (see figure 
I.12). FDI remittances rose in absolute terms throughout the 
decade in all of the major economies of the region, except 
for Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In 
Mexico, the crisis impacted subsidiary profitability; in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, besides the crisis, 
measures were deployed to restrict the ability of transnational 
companies to remit their profits abroad. Chile, which averaged 
US$ 17 billion in direct investment income payments over 
the period 2008-2010, accounted for 20% of the total sent 
from Latin America and the Caribbean during this time.
Figure I.12 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official sources as at 16 April 2012.
There are two main drivers of rising FDI income from 
2003 on; one is structural and the other is situational. On 
the one hand, the sharp rise in the region’s inward FDI 
stock starting in the 1990s naturally boosted the repatriation 
of earnings on those investments. Figure I.13 shows the 
high correlation and similar uptrends for FDI stock in 
the region and earnings on direct investments, both as a 
share of GDP and as an index. 
13
 This figure was US$ 50 billion higher than Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s total foreign exchange earnings from services, including 
tourism, and it accounted for 3.5% of the region’s GDP that year.
Figure I.13 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012 and United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
a
 FDI stock as a percentage of GDP, index 1990=100; repatriated FDI earnings as a 
percentage of GDP, index 1990=100, and percentages of FDI stock.
The situational factor is that the repatriation of 
earnings associated with FDI and the operations of 
transnational companies surged in 2004-2008, chiefly 
because of favourable economic conditions in the 
region, rising raw materials prices and new business 
opportunities as the purchasing power of the middle 
class increased. All of these factors together pushed 
up the profits of many transnational companies in the 
region. This was particularly the case for transnationals 
seeking natural resources or internal markets. So, during 
2005-2009 repatriated earnings rose proportionately 
more than FDI stocks did, hitting a high of 9% in 
2008. From 2009 on, the profits of transnationals in 
the region were impacted by the international crisis, 
but the repatriation of earnings has begun to edge up 
again in recent years owing in part to the good economic 
performance of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Beyond the fluctuations associated with the business 
cycle, the ratio of FDI income to FDI stock averaged 
6% between 1990 and 2010.
Situational factors aside, the level of FDI stock in 
the region is such that the outward flow of FDI income 
from Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to 
be high, demonstrating that FDI is not a one-way flow 
of resources. FDI volume is only part of the story; the 
region needs to work on promoting FDI with a high 
technology content directly linked to potential benefits 
in terms of production diversification, technology 
transfer, innovation, new capacity building and broader 
opportunities for joining global production chains. As has 
been said on other occasions, the development impact of 
FDI should be assessed both quantitatively and, above 
all, in qualitative terms.
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4. Technology intensity and transnational companies’ involvement  
 in research and development
Beyond the volume of investment flowing into the 
region, FDI projects can differ qualitatively in terms of 
their capacity to make a sustainable contribution to the 
development of the host economy. Investments in the 
highest technology content sectors of the manufacturing 
industry and in research and development have the 
greatest impact in this regard.14 Such investments 
contribute the most to knowledge creation, absorption 
and dissemination and so generate dynamic impacts 
that contribute to structural change (ECLAC, 2007). 
This section uses information as of 2011 to update 
the analysis contained in the two most recent reports 
(ECLAC, 2010 and ECLAC, 2011a).15
In 2011, 61% of investment projects in Latin America 
and the Caribbean were in low- and medium-low-technology 
sectors, with medium-low-tech sectors receiving 43% and 
low-tech sectors receiving 18% (see figure I.13). Most 
of these projects were in the metal, oil refining, food, 
textile and pulp and paper sectors. The high percentage 
of projects in low- and medium-low-tech sectors in the 
region stands in contrast to other developing regions, such 
as Asia (in particular, China), where 80% of the projects 
are in high- or medium-high technology content sectors 
(ECLAC, 2011a).
In 2011 the proportion of FDI projects in medium-
high-tech sectors continued to trend up, going from 15% 
in 2003-2005 to 26% in 2008-2010 and 36% in 2011. 
Many of these medium-high-tech projects are in the 
chemical, automobile and machinery and equipment 
sectors. In the automobile industry, European companies 
such as Renault, PSA and Volkswagen have expansion 
initiatives in the pipeline, particularly in Brazil but also 
in Mexico and Argentina (see chapter II). PSA Peugeot-
Citroën announced that it will invest US$ 960 million 
in Brazil between 2012 and 2015. Renault’s expansion 
plans call for investing US$ 285 million between 2012 
and 2016. Volkswagen announced projects in Mexico 
for some US$ 400 million and plans to invest more than 
14
 The classification of manufacturing sectors into high-, medium-
high, low- and medium-low technology intensity is explained in 
annex I.A-1.
15
 The information used refers to announcements of new FDI projects. 
Some might not have been actually implemented, or implementation 
might span several years. Nevertheless, an examination of what 
happened in previous years shows that information on projects 
announced is a good indicator of projects effectively executed. 
US$ 4 billion in its four production plants in Brazil, and 
it has announced a new production line in Argentina that 
will manufacture gearboxes. However, the proportion 
of cross-border projects in high-technology-content 
sectors (pharmaceuticals, office machinery, medical 
instruments) in the region slipped in 2011, to just 3% 
(see figure I.14).
Figure I.14 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of investments announced in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
While R&D-associated projects flowing into the 
region rose from 3% of the worldwide total to 6% (see 
figure I.15); only Brazil (at 5% of the worldwide figure) 
can be regarded as a major destination for such projects. 
A number of United States electronics companies (IBM 
and Motorola, for example) are working on new R&D 
operations in Brazil, as are European companies in the 
automobile industry (including Fiat and Volkswagen) 
and in its steel (Foseco) and chemical (Rhodia) sectors 
(see chapter II). Several R&D projects in Brazil 
are directly associated with the primary sector. BG 
Group has plans for a new R&D centre; Siemens is 
to install an oil and gas R&D facility to be operated 
in partnership with the Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro. Other countries involved in such projects 
were Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. In Uruguay, 
Finland’s pulp and paper company UPM-Kymmene 
is expanding its R&D operations at its Fray Bentos 
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pulp mill, to focus on wood fibre and its impact on end 
product properties. 
An examination of information on the technology 
content of manufacturing operations and R&D thus 
shows that the region is still receiving greenfield 
investments heavily skewed towards low- and medium-
low-tech sectors. This is despite the relative increase 
in the volume of medium-high-tech projects, which 
are concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. Moreover, 
Brazil is the region’s only major destination for the 
internationalization of transnational company R&D. The 
other Latin American and Caribbean countries have not 
managed to position themselves as a preferred destination 
in this area. 
Figure I.15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISTRIBUTION OF SUMS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
PROJECTS RELATED TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES, 2008-2010 AND 2011
(Percentages)







































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of investments announced in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
D. Outward foreign direct investment and  
 the trans-latins
1. Outward investment flows
In 2011 outward FDI flows from Latin America and 
the Caribbean fell by 51% compared with 2010, to 
US$ 21.911 billion as flows from Brazil dropped into 
negative territory (see figure I.16). As explained below, this 
decline does not signal a reversal of the internationalization 
of Brazilian companies. In addition to Brazil, outflows 
from Mexico (another major investor abroad) were down 
34%. By contrast, Chile, whose outflows climbed 28%, 
became the region’s largest investor country abroad; 
Colombia posted a 26% gain. Other economies of the 
region, such as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Peru, have very low levels of investment abroad, 
although outbound investment from Argentina increased to 
US$ 1.488 billion in 2011 (see figure I.18).
37Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2011
While outward FDI from the region has been 
trending up and averaged more than US$ 30 billion 
over the past six years,16 FDI still represents a smaller 
proportion of the capital account of the countries of the 
region than loans and deposits, which are grouped in 
“other investment” (see figure I.17). Although they are 
more volatile, “other investment” flows have topped 
outward FDI almost every year since 2000 and stood 
at US$ 103 billion in 2010 —more than twice outward 
FDI. This trend holds for most of the countries of the 
region with the notable exception of Colombia, where 
outward FDI has been higher than “other investment” over 
the past decade. Portfolio investment as a cross-border 
capital flow is relatively small in the region, averaging 
US$ 10.155 billion between 2008 and 2010; this is one 
third the amount of outward FDI. Chile accounted for 
the bulk of outward portfolio investment, owing to the 
portfolio diversification of its pension system and the 
accumulation of resources in its sovereign fund. This 
country accounted for 82% of the net outflows from 
Latin America between 2000 and 2010.
Figure I.16 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
16
 The uptrend in outward FDI flows from the region mirrors the 
global trend, where developing economies have made strides as the 
origin of FDI flows —even more so since the most recent global 
financial crisis. In 2007 the developing and transition economies 
accounted for 16% of global outbound FDI; by 2010 (the latest 
year for which complete data are available) they had climbed to 
29% (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Figure I.17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CAPITAL OUTFLOWS AS 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
Figure I.18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
a
 Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Despite the drop in outflows in 2011 (owing above 
all to the pattern in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico), 
there is no reason to expect a reversal of the recent trend 
towards greater international expansion of the major trans-
Latins. Because there are relatively few large trans-Latin 
companies, their individual expansion projects trigger 
variations in aggregate flows and contribute to the high 
volatility of outward FDI. Business internationalization in 
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the region is still very concentrated. Table I.4 shows the 
main companies in the region with outward FDI, based 
on 2011 sales volume. Some of these companies, such 
as Petrobras and PDVSA, are quite large but concentrate 
almost all of their assets in their home country. Others 
have operations across several countries in the region, 
such as América Móvil, or even worldwide, like CEMEX. 
Many others are just beginning to internationalize: several 
major companies after a strategy shift, like Mexico’s 
PEMEX, and others as part of a natural growth process. 
Some trans-Latins have internationalized operations in 
Europe (see chapter II).
Table I.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES WITH INVESTMENTS  
AND EMPLOYMENT ABROAD, BY SALES, 2011
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Company Country Sales Investments abroad Workers abroad Sector
Petrobras Brazil 130 171 32 18 Oil/gas
PDVSA Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 102 500 5 5 Oil/gas
Vale Brazil 55 014 51 27 Mining
América Móvil Mexico 47 690 36 34 Telecommunications
JBS (Friboi) Brazil 32 944 67 62 Foods
Odebrecht Brazil 32 325 57 49 Engineering/construction
Gerdau Brazil 18 876 61 48 Iron and steel/metallurgy
Femsa Mexico 14 502 18 36 Beverages/liquors
Cencosud Chile 13 971 49 57 Retail commerce
Cemex Mexico 13 546 69 66 Cement
Brazil Foods Brazil 13 486 16 16 Foods
Grupo Alfa Mexico 13 053 73 27 Autoparts-petrochemicals
Marfrig Brazil 11 548 32 42 Foods
Bimbo Mexico 10 463 61 53 Foods
Tenaris Argentina 9 973 82 72 Iron and steel/metallurgy
Camargo Corrêa Brazil 9 610 15 17 Engineering/construction
Falabella Chile 9 044 40 40 Retail commerce
Andrade Gutierrez Brazil 8 400 8 10 Engineering/construction
TAM Brazil 6 927 9 8 Airlines
Grupo Modelo Mexico 6 539 16 3 Beverages/liquors
LAN Chile 5 718 78 48 Airlines
Votorantim Brazil 5 680 50 36 Cement
Sudamericana  
de Vapores
Chile 5 152 38 63 Shipping
Embraer Brazil 5 141 27 12 Aerospace
Grupo Casa  
Saba (FASA)
Mexico 4 670 54 68 Retail commerce
CMPC Chile 4 613 31 30 Forestry
Grupo Televisa Mexico 4 487 22 11 Media
Arauco Chile 4 451 24 24 Forestry
Gruma Mexico 4 104 19 63 Foods
Elektra Mexico 3 730 29 17 Retail commerce
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of América economía, No. 72, April 2012.
The geographical destination of outward Latin 
American investment in 2011 cannot be determined on 
the basis of the official data. But an examination of the 
strategies followed by the major trans-Latins shows that 
most of the investments go to neighbouring countries 
in the region; for Mexican companies that includes the 
United States as well. This overall pattern is true for 
Brazilian companies, too, although the size and financial 
capacity of some of them are such that there are several 
examples of expansion on a global scale. Chile is perhaps 
the country whose outward FDI is most concentrated in 
neighbouring countries: of the 20 largest Chilean trans-
Latins, 16 have all of their foreign subsidiaries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; the operations of most of 
these are concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru (Pérez Ludeña, 2011). Much of the foreign 
expansion of Colombia’s trans-Latins is focused on 
Central America (see box I.3).
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Box I.3 
COLOMBIAN COMPANIES EXPAND INTERNATIONALLY
Over the past few years Colombia has 
become one of the largest sources of 
outward foreign investment from Latin 
America and the Caribbean: 38% of the 
region’s outward FDI between 2009 and 
2011 was from Colombia, compared with a 
mere 8% between 2000 and 2005. Like most 
trans-Latins, Colombian companies have 
concentrated their international expansion 
efforts in other countries in the region. 
However, while the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Panama received 47% of 
Colombia’s outward investment during the 
1990s, flows to both countries (especially 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
fell sharply from 2001 on. Deteriorating 
economic relations with the latter were one 
of the reasons that Colombian companies 
began to expand towards other countries 
in the region. A particular focus has been 
on Central America, where they now 
have a strong presence in a number of 
economic sectors.
FDI by Colombian companies is 
driven mainly by a search for markets. In 
recent years, Colombia’s good economic 
performance has helped boost profits at 
major companies, and appreciation of 
its national currency with respect to the 
currencies of Central American countries 
has helped spur investment in the latter. 
The main target sectors have been natural 
resources, financial services, power and 
the food and cement industries. 
In the financial sector, Colombian 
companies have gained a significant 
foothold in Central America over the past 
few years. Grupo Aval operates in all of 
the countries of the subregion, principally 
through its 2010 acquisition of BAC-
Credomatic GECF in Panama for US$ 
1.92 billion. In 2011 Grupo SURA bought 
Costa Rica’s Compuredes for US$ 18.7 
million; ProSeguros in the Dominican 
Republic for US$ 23.5 million; and, in El 
Salvador, Fondo de Pensiones Crecer for 
US$ 103 million and Seguros Asesuisa for 
US$ 98 million. Grupo SURA also played a 
leading role in the largest ever acquisition 
by a Latin American company, when, in 
2011, it bought the pension, insurance and 
investment fund assets of the multinational 
firm ING in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Uruguay for US$ 3.614 billion. In early 
2012 Sociedades Bolívar announced 
its intention to acquire HSBC’s Central 
American banking operations for US$ 
801 million in a transaction that has yet 
to be settled and would include 29 offices 
in Costa Rica, 57 in El Salvador and 50 
in Honduras. 
At the forefront of the power companies 
have been Empresas Públicas de Medellín 
(EPM), which has focused on expanding 
in Central America; Interconexión 
Eléctrica Sociedad Anónima (ISA), with 
its investments in Brazil, Chile, Peru and 
other countries; and, to a lesser extent, 
Empresa de Energía de Bogotá, with assets 
in Guatemala and Peru (see chapter IV). 
The extractive industries accounted for 
68% of outward FDI between 2008 and 
2010, mainly through the State-owned 
Ecopetrol. Other firms in this sector with 
investments abroad were Promigas, 
Pacific Rubiales, Petrominerales, Tepma 
and Tethys Petroleum.
A major player in the industrial sector 
is Cementos Argos, which has a significant 
footprint in the United States that will be 
further enhanced upon completion of its 
announced US$ 760 million acquisition 
of the United States-based assets of 
France’s Lafarge. Argos has clinker 
plants and concrete businesses in the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama and 
Suriname. The food company Nutresa 
produces meat in Panama since it bought 
Panama’s Ernesto Berard in 2008, as well 
as chocolates following its purchase of 
Nutresa México (2009) and ice cream 
after buying Helados Bon in the Dominican 
Republic (2011). 
Construction service companies have 
focused their international operations 
on Panama. In 2010, Conconcreto and 
Odinsa participated in the US$ 77 million 
expansion of Tocumen International Airport 
near Panama City. Since 2006 Conalvías 
has carried out several urban infrastructure 
projects awarded by Panama’s Ministry 
of Public Works; early 2012 brought the 
announcement that Conconcreto has 
been awarded a US$ 30 million contract 
for phase three of the Multiplaza Pacific 
Mall in Panama City. 
Other sectors where Colombian 
company operations in Central America 
are concentrated are aviation, with the 
Avianca-Taca merger (ECLAC, 2011a, box 
I.3); the textile industry, with production 
and distribution firms like Totto, Cristal, 
Leonisa and Olímpica; and metal parts 
for the automobile industry, with Fanalca’s 
recent investment in Panama.
These companies have posted rapid 
international expansion over a short 
period of time that has propelled many 
of them to leadership positions in their 
new markets, as is the case with EPM 
in power distribution in Central America. 
This shows how important outward FDI 
from Colombia is for the countries of 
Central America. It is also contributing to 
the development of Colombia itself, where 
in 2010 promoting these investments was 
included for the first time in the country’s 
National Development Plan (see part 2 
of section D). 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
As for the sectors that attract Latin American 
investment, there have been major acquisitions in the 
service industry (specifically, in financial services, as 
well as in telecommunications and energy) and, in the 
primary sector, in oil and gas (see table I.5). Despite 
lower outward FDI flows from the region in 2011, 
several trans-Latin companies took advantage of the 
opportunities that arose when a number of European 
companies were forced to sell assets in the region in 
order to recapitalize and face the difficult economic 
situation in Europe (see chapter II). This can be seen 
in the list of major mergers and acquisitions by trans-
Latins abroad: 5 of the 10 largest transactions involved 
European company assets. 
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Table I.5 
TEN LARGEST CROSS-BORDER MERGERS OR ACQUISITIONS BY TRANS-LATIN COMPANIES, 2011
(Millions of dollars)
Company or asset acquired Country Sector Acquiring company Country Announced value
ING Pensiones y Seguros  
América Latina a
Mexico Financial Grupo Sura Colombia 3 614
NET Serviços de Comunicação Brazil Telecommunications Telmex Mexico 2 544
Jantus Spain Energy CPFL Energia Brazil 987
Portugal Telecom SGPS Portugal Telecommunications TNLP Brazil 961
Magotteaux Belgium Engineering Sigdo Koppers Chile 794
UNX Energy Corp. Canada Oil and gas HRT Brazil 711
Repsol (9.8%) Spain Oil and gas PEMEX Mexico 500 b
Banco Patagonia Argentina Financial Banco do Brasil Brazil 480
BRT Escrow Corp. United States Financial Inversiones Alsacia Chile 464
CEMEX Southeast United States Cement CEMEX Mexico 360
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
a
 ING Pensiones y Seguros América Latina is a Mexican subsidiary of the Netherlands firm ING.
b
 Estimates indicate that acquiring this share will cost US$ 1.6 billion, although only US$ 500 million was paid in 2011.
Brazil, because of its size, is the country that most 
influences the trend in outward FDI from the region. 
In 2011 Brazil posted a negative FDI outflow of 
US$ 9.297 billion after recording a positive outflow of 
US$ 11.588 billion in 2010 (see table I.6). The reasons 
for this trend reversal can be seen in the two components 
of Brazil’s outward FDI: intra-company loans and capital 
contributions (see figure I.19).17 The flow of loans to 
17
 Brazil does not report data on reinvested earnings, which is the 
third component of FDI. 
subsidiaries was negative for the third consecutive year 
(this time, by US$ 21.163 billion), owing in part to the 
39% jump in loans from foreign subsidiaries to parent 
companies in Brazil facing high interest rates on the 
local financial market. And capital contributions in 
2011 totalled US$ 11.866 billion; this is 58% less than 
in 2010 but still above the US$ 8.227 billion average 
for 2000-2010. 
17
 Brazil does not report data on reinvested earnings, which is the 
third component of FDI. 
Table I.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OUTFLOWS BY COUNTRY, 2000-2011
(Millions of dollars and relative difference in percentages)







South America 7 040 35 481 14 536 35 141 3 197 31 134 12 579 -18 555 -60
Argentina  532 2 439 1 504 1 391  712  965 1 488  523 54
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  1  3  4  5 - 4 - 53 - 8  46 86
Brazil 2 513 28 202 7 067 20 457 -10 084 11 588 -9 297 -20 885 -180
Chile 1 988 2 212 4 852 9 151 7 233 9 231 11 822 2 591 28
Colombia 1 156 1 098  913 2 254 3 088 6 562 8 289 1 727 26
Paraguay  5  4  8  8 ... ... ... ... ...
Peru  22  0  66  736  398  215  111 - 104 -48
Uruguay  15 - 1  89 - 11  16 - 44  1  45 102
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)  809 1 524  33 1 150 1 838 2 671  173 -2 498 -94
Mexico c 3 491 c 5 758 8 256 1 157 7 019 13 570 8 946 -4 624 -34
Central America  66  113  389  37  58  129  158  29 22
Costa Rica  16  98  262  6  7  24  56  32 131
El Salvador  15 - 26  100  16  23  80  78 - 2 -3
Guatemala  31  40  25  16  26  24  17 - 6 -27
Honduras  4  1  1 - 1  1  1  7  5 379
The Caribbean  233  644  345 1 021  195  91  238  206 659
Bahamas d -  136  141  172  89  88  227  198 689
Barbados  3  44  82  63  41 ... ... ... ...
Belize  0  8  7  10  4  3  5  2 84
Jamaica  84  85  115  76  61 ... ... ... ...
Trinidad and Tobago e  146  370  0  700  0  0  6  6 ...
Total 10 830 41 996 23 526 37 356 10 470 44 924 21 911 -22 954 -51
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
a
 Simple average. 
b
 Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago have not reported complete data for 2011; accordingly, the absolute change and the growth rate for these countries and for the regional 
aggregates were based on the 12-month variation for the most recent period available.
c
 For 2000-2005, corresponds to the average for 2001-2005.
d
 Official figures available to third quarter.
e
 Official figures available to second quarter.
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Although Brazilian companies have not stopped 
expanding abroad and have not made major disinvestments, 
they are placing greater emphasis on their investments 
in the domestic market because investment prospects in 
Brazil are good. For example, the main reason for the 
two largest cross-border acquisitions made by Brazilian 
companies (see table I.6) was not to expand their business 
in other countries but rather to gain control of the assets 
that the foreign firms had in Brazil. CPFL bought Spain’s 
Jantus, whose only assets were wind farms in Brazil, for 
US$ 987 million. TLNP acquired a 10% stake in Portugal 
Telecom in a US$ 961 million transaction arising from 
the reorganization of Brazil’s telecom market, where 
Portugal Telecom is a major actor.
Chile was once again the country of the region 
with the most outward FDI: US$ 11.822 billion. Chile’s 
major trans-Latins tended to focus on the retail, forestry 
products and transport sectors (Pérez Ludeña, 2011); their 
subsidiaries remained concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru. The largest investment in 2011 was 
for some US$ 950 million to build the Montes del Plata 
pulp mill in Uruguay in a joint venture between Chile’s 
Arauco and the Swedish company Stora Enso. Chilean 
companies are slowly beginning to internationalize 
outside the region: Sigdo Koppers acquired the Belgian 
engineering firm Magotteaux for US$ 794 million; the 
wine producer Concha y Toro bought Fetzer Vineyards 
in the United States for US$ 239 million.
Figure I.19 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
Mexico also saw a decline in its outward FDI. The 
2011 figure of US$ 8.946 billion was one third less than 
the sum posted in 2010 and marked a reversal of the 
upward trend in Mexican FDI that began in 2000 and was 
broken only once (in 2008). There are no official data 
on destination countries or sectors, but announcements 
of acquisitions and greenfield investments suggest that 
Mexican companies continued to pursue a strategy of 
expanding towards the United States and other countries 
in the region. Among the former are Alfa, which acquired 
Eastman Chemical’s plastic (PET) and purified terephthalic 
acid (PTA) manufacturing businesses for US$ 600 million; 
CEMEX, which increased its interest in its subsidiary 
CEMEX Southeast (US$ 360 million); and Bimbo, which 
increased its stake in its subsidiary Sara Lee Corp. (US$ 
157 million). Among the latter are investment initiatives 
announced by Grupo México (US$ 934 million in its mines 
in Peru); Industrias CH in Brazil (US$ 500 million); and, 
especially, América Móvil in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
the Dominican Republic and Peru (US$ 5.837 billion) 
to be executed over a period of several years to bring its 
infrastructure into line with the requirements of fourth-
generation (4G) mobile telephone networks and digital and 
high-definition television (ECLAC, 2011a, chapter IV).
In addition to investments in Latin American countries, 
some major Mexican companies have announced new 
plans outside the region. Alfa, through its high-tech 
aluminium auto parts subsidiary, Nemak, has opened a 
plant in India in order to capitalize on the latter’s domestic 
market potential. It has also enhanced its presence in 
Slovakia. PEMEX has opened a representation office 
in Singapore for centralizing its exports of crude oil 
to emerging markets, especially China and India. And 
CEMEX has announced a number of investments in 
European Union countries, where it has had subsidiaries 
for years. One involves opening a new premixed concrete 
plant in southern France (see chapter II). 
Outward FDI from Colombia jumped 26% in 2011, 
to US$ 8.289 billion. These flows have surged in recent 
years; a number of the country’s trans-Latins positioned 
themselves in other countries, especially in Central America 
(see box I.3). In 2011, Colombia’s Grupo SURA acquired 
ING Pensiones y Seguros América Latina, the Mexican 
subsidiary of the Netherlands firm ING. The purchase, 
valued at US$ 3.6 billion, was one of the largest in history 
to be carried out by a Latin American company. Grupo 
SURA will handle financial operations associated with 
pension and insurance fund asset administration in Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
Argentina saw its outward FDI grow by 54%, to 
US$ 1.488 billion. Argentine firms have not made major 
corporate acquisitions abroad, but they have participated 
in greenfield investment projects and in non-traditional 
sectors like software and digital services. The technological 
solutions companies Baufest and Grupo ASSA are 
opening new centres in the United States and Mexico, 
respectively, to meet the needs of the North American 
market. Outward FDI from the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela totalled just US$ 173 million. This sharp 
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drop from the US$ 2.671 billion posted in 2010 is due to 
the strategy adopted by the country’s largest company, 
PDVSA, to repatriate earnings from subsidiaries. One of 
the largest transactions is the pre-merger agreement in 
Mexico entered into by Grupo Embotelladoras Unidas 
(Geupec) and PepsiCo (United States) with Empresas Polar, 
the leading food and beverage company in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, for creating a nationwide bottler 
and distributor. The agreement is that Empresas Polar is 
to be a major shareholder in the new company. 
Income from investments abroad by trans-Latin 
companies has soared in recent years, with capital 
income on direct investment going from an average 
US$ 4.6 billion between 2000 and 2007 to more than 
US$ 8 billion in 2008-2010. This is a natural outcome 
of the international expansion of trans-Latins. Income 
from FDI totalled US$ 10 billion 2007 and 2008 and 
fell back to US$ 7 billion in 2010,18 so it seems that the 
international crisis did have some impact on the remittance of 
earnings from trans-Latins abroad to their parent companies. 
18
 Portfolio and direct investment income has grown the most, while 
interest on other investments has been more volatile even though 
volume was up sharply throughout the period. The share of the 
region’s financial income from investment abroad coming from 
loans and deposits (other income) has increased substantially. 
Diversification towards portfolio and direct income has been a 
recent develpoment as capital flows from the region increase. 
2. Latin American and Caribbean policies supporting foreign 
 direct investment
Virtually all of the countries of the region have policies for 
promoting exports and attracting foreign investment, but 
measures supporting the internationalization of domestic 
companies (outward direct foreign investment) are still but 
embryonic. Only in the past few years have some countries 
of the region responded to the outward FDI boom that 
began in 2004 by weighing specific measures such as 
providing information and technical assistance, incentives 
and subsidies and financing for companies. This attitude 
stands in contrast with the solid support that companies 
from other countries receive for expanding internationally. 
China’s “go global” strategy adopted in 2000 is seen as 
the main factor behind the rapid international expansion 
of Chinese companies, thanks above all to the financing 
for foreign investment that they receive from State-owned 
banks (ECLAC, 2011a).
There is much room for discussion as to whether it 
is appropriate to use public funds to boost FDI (Tavarez 
and Young, 2005). Among the arguments in favour are 
higher yield and productivity, acquisition of knowledge, 
enhanced technology capacity at the company level and 
an improved production structure at the country level 
thanks to externalities. It can also be argued that business 
internationalization can stimulate the capital markets and, 
by increasing competition, encourage R&D. On the other 
hand, arguments against hold that these companies, which 
are leaders in their home countries, should not receive 
special support because they are not at a disadvantage 
for competing in global markets and have no problems in 
accessing financing, especially when compared with SMEs. 
And it is hard to guarantee that the benefits of business 
internationalization will spill over into the economy. 
It is in this setting that the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean are starting to deploy instruments to 
support business internationalization. Brazil has made the 
greatest strides in the past few years. The main lines of 
support are provided by Brazil’s National Development Bank 
(BNDES) and have been enhanced by the new production 
development policy put in place in 2008 (BNDES, 2008). 
This policy aims specifically at positioning Brazilian 
companies among global leaders in their sectors, targeting 
the aviation, oil, gas, petrochemical, bioethanol, mining, 
pulp and paper, steel and meat industries. BNDES has 
opened a number of support windows; providing financing 
is the most important one. BNDES can take an ownership 
stake in Brazilian trans-Latins making new acquisitions, 
provide financing with performance requirements that seek 
for BNDES to share in future profits and grant special 
lines of credit to certain companies (Sennes and Camargo 
Mendes, 2009). Over the past five years, BNDES has 
offered financing in the amount of 40.8 billion reais to six 
companies: JBS, Marfrig, Oi, BRF, Fibria and Ambev.19
BNDES purchased 100% of the US$ 1.26 billion 
in notes issued by Marfrig to acquire Keystone Foods, 
as well as a large part of the bonds issued by JBS Friboi 
in compliance with the guarantees for the purchase of 
Pilgrim’s Pride for US$ 800 million.
19
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BNDES currently has a 14% interest in Marfrig and 
a stake of nearly 17% in JBS Friboi (ECLAC, 2011a). 
BNDES granted a special loan to Itautec for buying 
Tallard (United States) and has opened special lines of 
credit for leading software and pharmaceutical firms like 
Prosoft and Profarma, respectively (Sennes and Camargo 
Mendes, 2009).20 Other instruments for promoting business 
internationalization in Brazil are technical assistance and 
information, especially as channelled through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Department of Trade Promotion and the 
Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-
Brazil). There are other efforts that, while neither systematic 
nor institutionalized, promote internationalization. 
So far, the forceful foreign expansion of Mexican 
companies has taken place without robust and targeted 
policy support for internationalization. However, initiatives 
in this regard are beginning to take shape. In 2010, the 
government export promotion agency ProMéxico opened a 
support window for internationalizing Mexican companies. 
According to ProMéxico, this policy is warranted because it 
helps promote exports, encourages the transfer of technology, 
can have a positive effect on the balance of payments by 
means of repatriated earnings, boosts the development of 
human capital and investment in innovation and R&D 
and enhances Mexico’s image abroad. The instruments 
are essentially the same as for promoting exports, but they 
are also available to companies seeking to locate their 
production operations outside Mexico. Support includes 
specialized advisory services, assistance for business trips, 
staff training and internships abroad. Unlike Brazil, there is 
no financial support, nor are there target sectors or countries. 
Support is aimed at medium-sized companies that want 
to start investing abroad, not major Mexican trans-Latins. 
This policy is in the experimental phase, with several pilot 
projects under way; the instruments are yet to be assessed. 
20
 BNDES is considering granting a broad credit facility for the 
internationalization of Grupo Pão de Açúcar (http://www.valor.
com.br/arquivo/195809/bndes-estuda-credito-de-2-bi-de-euros-
para-pao-de-acucar). 
Like Mexico, Colombia (whose economy ranks fourth 
in the region in terms of outward FDI) has only just recently 
considered providing support for foreign investment. The 
new National Development Plan specifically provides for 
actions promoting Colombian investment abroad. It includes 
providing trade information to Colombian investors through 
Proexport, the government agency charged with promoting 
exports, tourism and FDI. In addition (and unlike Mexico), 
the Government of Colombia does encourage outward 
FDI through three of the major Colombian trans-Latins 
(Ecopetrol, ISA and Empresas Públicas de Medellín), 
which are State-owned. But policies for supporting 
internationalization are still in early stages, and there is 
no experience on which to assess their potential scope. In 
Chile, through technical bureaus at the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, 
discussion has begun on implementing new instruments 
for supporting business internationalization. 
So, business internationalization policy efforts are 
emerging in the region; Brazil has made the most progress in 
this regard. But government measures for internationalization 
are still in the development stage. Among the specific goals 
already defined are the creation of world-class companies, 
focusing on financing new acquisitions and targeting priority 
sectors. Mexico and Colombia are at even earlier stages 
of policy development and are beginning to tackle issues 
that will over time be important for policy maintenance 
and for deepening and expanding policy impacts. It is 
important to assess these policies and develop mechanisms 
for feedback and the requisite institutional framework. It 
should also be borne in mind that public policy for promoting 
internationalization can have information failures or create 
perverse incentives. The complex decisions involved and the 
growing importance of business internationalization open 
a research agenda with major challenges for the region.
20
 BNDES is considering granting a broad credit facility for the 




In 2011, FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean rose 
for the second straight year; at US$ 153.991 billion it 
is 12% above the historical high recorded in 2008. This 
increase mirrors the recovering global flows after the 
drop in 2008 and 2009 that impacted developed countries 
and developing economies alike. In recent years, flows to 
Latin America and the Caribbean have grown more than 
in any other region of the world as its share of global FDI 
flows rose from 6% in 2007 to 10% in 2011.
The economies of the region have leveraged renewed 
confidence at transnational companies to attract capital 
to the region in a larger proportion than elsewhere in the 
world. They have done so on the strength of the area’s 
sustained economic growth and commodity prices in global 
markets. Brazil is out in front on both factors: its inward 
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flows have soared over the past two years. Moreover, 
the crisis and uncertainty in the developed economies 
are feeding the secular trend towards production process 
efficiency-seeking, which involves relocating certain 
operations to lower-cost economies.
 The region’s good economic prospects stand in 
contrast to stagnation in the developed economies, 
especially in Europe, which is the origin of the largest 
share of the inward FDI towards Latin America and the 
Caribbean (see chapter II). This has driven an increase 
in capital flows to the region that are not limited to FDI. 
Indeed, during the past five years FDI has accounted 
for less than 50% of the region’s balance of capital; it 
has been surpassed by the combined total for portfolio 
investments and loans.
The growing flows of FDI to Latin America and 
the Caribbean over the past 20 years have positioned 
transnational companies as key players in many sectors, 
especially capital-intensive ones like mining, hydrocarbons, 
automobiles, steel, electronics, power, banking and 
commerce. This stock of foreign investments, which 
is present to a greater or lesser degree in almost all of 
the economies of the region, in turn yields income that 
is also proportionally high. Over the past few years 
the region’s sound economic performance and high 
commodity prices have positively impacted the bottom 
lines of the transnational companies operating in the 
region and thus boosted FDI dividends for the countries 
of origin to an average of US$ 85.567 billion between 
2007 and 2010. And in many economies, more than half 
of the FDI flows is in the form of reinvested earnings 
from subsidiaries, so FDI does not yield a net inflow of 
capital to Latin America and the Caribbean. This being 
the case, the developmental impact of FDI for the region 
will come in the form of potential knowledge transfers, 
the capacity to develop new industries and integration 
in global value chains. 
Despite the drop in total outward flows from 
the region, trans-Latin companies have continued to 
expand. The purchase of European assets by trans-
Latins surged in 2011. Europe is still the main origin of 
FDI for the region (see chapter II); for most European 
transnationals their assets in Latin America have 
more strategic value than ever before. However, if the 
current economic climate continues there is reason to 
expect that the relationship between Latin American 
and European countries will grow more balanced in 
the coming years, with asset acquisition and strategic 
alliances in both directions.
 Against this backdrop of abundant capital and good 
economic performance, the priority should be to make 
strides towards production transformation that extends 
the high productivity of certain sectors out to the rest of 
the economy. The countries of the region need to view 
FDI as support for developing those sectors that they 
regard as strategic. 
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Annex
Table I.A-1 
CLASSIFICATION OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES BY TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY
Technology 
intensity Industry ISIC Rev.3
High Pharmaceuticals 2 423
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 30
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 32
Manufacture of medical, optical and precision instruments and watches 33
Medium-high Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (except pharmaceuticals) 24 menos 2 423
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock, and  
other transport equipment n.e.c. 352 más 359
Medium-low Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 25
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 27 y 28
Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
Low Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 15-16
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur, tanning  
and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness  
and footwear
17-19
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 20
Manufacture of paper and paper products, and publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 21-22
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling 36-37
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009.
Note: n.e.c., not elsewhere classified.
Table I.A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
INFLOWS BY COUNTRY, 2000-2011
(Millions of dollars)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Anguilla a  43.0  34.7  38.2  34.4  91.8  117.3  143.2  120.1  100.8  37.5  25.7  11.5
Antigua and Barbuda a  66.6  111.9  79.7  179.4  95.2  221.0  361.0  340.5  176.2  84.6  101.3  63.9
Argentina 10 418.3 2 166.1 2 148.9 1 652.0 4 124.7 5 265.2 5 537.0 6 473.0 9 725.6 4 017.1 7 055.0 7 243.1
Bahamas b  469.1  492.6  312.4  641.7  632.4  911.5  842.8  886.8 1 031.6  753.1  960.2  840.0
Barbados  19.4  18.6  64.6  121.7  24.0  127.6  297.8  394.2  470.3  303.5  344.0 …
Belize  23.3  61.2  25.4 - 10.9  111.5  126.9  108.8  143.1  179.9  112.5  101.0  98.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  733.9  703.3  674.1  194.9  82.6 - 290.8  277.8  362.3  507.6  425.7  671.8  858.9
Brazil 32 779.2 22 457.4 16 590.2 10 143.5 18 145.9 15 066.3 18 822.2 34 584.9 45 058.2 25 948.6 48 506.0 66 660.0
Chile 4 860.0 4 199.8 2 550.0 4 333.7 7 246.0 7 096.4 7 426.3 12 571.6 15 518.2 12 887.5 15 373.0 17 299.0
Colombia 2 436.5 2 541.9 2 133.7 1 720.5 3 015.6 10 252.0 6 656.0 9 048.7 10 619.6 7 137.1 6 899.3 13 234.2
Costa Rica  408.6  460.4  659.4  575.1  617.3  861.0 1 469.1 1 896.1 2 078.2 1 346.5 1 465.6 2 104.1
Dominica a  20.3  20.6  20.7  31.9  27.5  19.2  28.9  47.9  56.8  41.9  24.9  25.5
Dominican Republic  952,9 1 079,1  916,8  613,0  909,0 1 122,7 1 084,6 1 667,4 2 870,0 2 165,4 1 896,3 2 371,1
Ecuador b  720.0 1 329.8  783.3  871.5  836.9  493.4  271.4  194.2 1 006.3  321.5  158.1 567.8
El Salvador  173.4  279.0  470.2  141.7  376.3  511.2  241.1 1 550.6  903.1  365.8  116.6  385.5
Grenada a  39.4  60.8  57.4  90.5  66.3  70.2  95.6  172.4  148.1  104.0  63.4  42.9
Guatemala  229.6  498.5  205.3  263.3  296.0  508.2  591.6  745.1  753.8  600.0  805.8  984.6
Guyana  67.1  56.0  43.6  26.1  30.0  76.8  102.4 110.0  179.0 222.0  198.1 246.8
Haiti  13.3  4.4  5.7  13.8  5.9  26.0  160.6  74.5  29.8  38.0  150.0  181.0
Honduras  381.7  304.2  275.2  402.8  546.7  599.8  669.1  927.5 1 006.4  523.2  797.4 1 014.4
Jamaica  468.3  524.9  404.9  604.4  541.6  581.5  796.8  751.5 1 360.7  479.8  169.5 …
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Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mexico 18 110.0 29 926.3 23 882.7 18 654.7 24 826.7 24 407.2 20 119.2 31 492.3 27 140.5 16 119.3 20 708.6 19 554.4
Montserrat a  2.3  0.6  0.6  2.1  2.8  0.8  4.0  6.9  12.7  2.6  3.4  3.3
Nicaragua  266.5  150.1  203.8  201.2  249.8  241.1  286.8  381.7  626.1  434.2  508.0  967.9
Panama  623.9  467.1  98.6  770.8 1 012.3  962.1 2 497.9 1 898.6 2 196.2 1 259.3 2 350.1 2 789.8
Paraguay b  104.1  84.2  10.0  25.0  27.7  35.5  95.0  201.8  208.5  94.6  227.8  148.7
Peru  809.7 1 144.3 2 155.8 1 335.0 1 599.0 2 578.7 3 466.5 5 491.0 6 923.7 5 575.9 7 328.0 7 658.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis a  99.0  90.3  81.1  77.9  53.1  93.0  114.6  140.8  183.9  136.0  122.4  142.0
Saint Lucia a  58.2  63.0  57.1  111.8  81.0  78.2  237.7  277.5  166.2  151.9  115.3  81.1
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines a  37.8  21.0  34.0  55.2  66.1  40.1  109.8  132.0  159.3  97.8  103.1  135.3
Suriname - 148.0 - 26.8  145.5  200.7  286.2  398.5  322.7  178.6  123.7  241.6  112.8  154.4
Trinidad and Tobago c  679.5  834.9  790.7  808.3 1 001.0  940.0  883.0  830.0 2 800.8  709.1  549.0  293.0
Uruguay  273.5  296.8  193.7  416.4  332.4  847.4 1 493.5 1 329.5 2 105.7 1 619.9 2 483.1 2 527.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 4 701.0 3 683.0  782.0 2 040.0 1 483.0 2 589.0 - 508.0 1 620.0 1 195.0 -2 536.0 1 209.0 5 302.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a 
 The amount shown for FDI in 2011 is an official estimate.
b 
 The data shown for 2011 correspond to the cumulative amount at the third quarter. 
c 
 The data shown for 2011 correspond to the cumulative amount at the second quarter. 
Table I.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
INFLOWS BY DESTINATION SECTOR, 2000-2011
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Anguilla a
Natural resources  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Services  60  72  78  39  27  21 …
Other  31  0  0  0  0  0 …
Antigua and Barbuda a
Natural resources  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  1  1 …
Services  75  259  238  78  33  25 …
Other  108  31  16  29  5  5 …
Argentina b
Natural resources 2 043 2 756 2 586 1 550 1 103 3 143 1 541
Manufactures 2 680 3 049 3 408 5 760  156 4 945  784
Services 1 803 1 590 1 889 3 549 2 216 2 303 1 283
Belize
Natural resources  8  12  9  37  7  13  29
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Services  114  83  101  127  97  83  64
Other  5  14  34  16  9  5  5
Brazil
Natural resources 1 722 1 835 4 806 15 085 7 503 18 358 6 296
Manufactures 5 411 7 851 16 074 15 791 12 810 20 416 31 664
Services 7 521 8 950 13 163 13 785 6 162 12 332 30 243
Chile c
Natural resources  595 3 384 6 607 4 625 7 013 6 203 2 545
Manufactures  199 1 149 - 431 1 616  460  341  218
Services 1 003 2 766 6 358 8 939 5 229 8 040 1 377
Other …  244  215  256  525  511  0
Colombia
Natural resources 3 288 3 786 4 474 5 267 5 481 4 603 7 836
Manufactures 5 513  803 1 867 1 748  621  656  533
Services 1 451 2 067 2 709 3 605 1 035 1 641 4 865
Table I.A-2 (concluded)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Costa Rica 
Natural resources  37  62  1  448  68 - 6  53
Manufactures  375  436  722  574  412 1 003  680
Services  449  971 1 174 1 056  867  469 1 372
Other - 1  10  4  26  22  23  1
Dominica d
Natural resources  0  0  9  8  6  4 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Services  4  0  15  20  14  9 …
Other  12  24  12  17  12  7 …
Dominican Republic
Natural resources  31  107  30  357  758  298  965
Industria e  199 - 168  184  574  280  466  305
Services  893 1 146 1 453 1 938 1 128 1 132 1 102
Ecuador f
Natural resources  222 - 69 - 77  265  45  168 343
Manufactures  75  90  99  206  128  123 101
Services  196  250  173  535  148 - 134 124
El Salvador
Natural resources  0  29  10  5  1  1 - 1
Manufactures  317  17  21  28  56 - 58  243
Services  191  182 1 315  480  165  147  143
Other (maquila)  4  0  101  26  72 - 1  0
Grenada d
Natural resources  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  1  0  4  3  2  1 …
Services  37  48  94  101  56  21 …
Other  9  19  36  8  22  18 …
Guatemala
Natural resources  150  69  70  174  139  120 …
Manufactures  131  175  210  175  51  299 …
Services  219  328  437  369  401  363 …
Other  9  20  28  36  9  23 …
Haiti
Natural resources  3  1  9  4  6  13 …
Manufactures  5  7  7  3  4  5 …
Services  2  151  56  20  26  129 …
Other  1  2  4  2  2  3 …
Honduras d
Natural resources  53  44  11  5  12  3  46
Manufactures  270  227  384  215  103  368  392
Services  263  359  515  681  408  426  577
Other  14  38  18  0  0  0  0
Mexico d
Natural resources  229  454 1 832 4 801  875 1 286  844
Manufactures 11 067 10 102 13 608 7 851 5 674 11 590 9 080
Services 13 111 9 563 16 053 14 489 9 570 7 833 9 631
Nicaragua
Natural resources  0  15  11  49  15  39  114
Manufactures  87  63  121  122  70  108  226
Services  155  109  250  447  313  322  522
Other g  0  101  0  8  36  38  105
Panama
Natural resources  0 - 108  1 - 59 - 28 … …
Manufactures - 62  105  129  161  48 … …
Services 1 693 2 531 1 765 2 106 1 755 … …
Other - 696  19  2 - 11 - 3 … …
Paraguay e
Natural resources - 2 - 36 - 2  3  8 - 5 - 1
Manufactures - 16  60  8  149 - 109  53  1
Services  53  70  196  56  195  179  148
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Peru h
Natural resources  283  735 3 923 3 783 3 965 … …
Manufactures - 78  433 1 361 1 026  570 … …
Services - 272  345 4 695 5 527 1 969 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis a
Natural resources  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Services  1  0  37  69  43  34 …
Other  40  24  7  12  8  6 …
Saint Lucia a
Natural resources  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Services  27  174  167  106  73  58 …
Other  28  1  21  13  9  7 …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines a
Natural resources  2  0  0  0  0  0 …
Manufactures  0  0  0  0  0  0 …
Services  11  48  52  56  39  55 …
Other  1  4  23  18  14  6 …
Trinidad and Tobago
Natural resources  857  795  763  589  647  501 …
Manufactures  15  16  21  16  13  11 …
Services  67  72  46 2 196  49  38 …
Uruguay
Natural resources  264  328  338  604  253 … …
Manufactures  26  96  263  261  254 … …
Services  248  594  592 1 003 1 014 … …
Other i  310  476  136  238  71 … …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Natural resources 1 021 -1 958 -1 728 -1 163  371 2 785 3 424
Services  492  358  123  96  52  102  361
Other j 1 076 1 092 3 225 2 262 -2 959 -1 678 1 517
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
Note: Data may not correspond to those reported in the balance of payments.
a 
 Does not include the sale of land or reinvested earnings.
b 
 Data from the Central Bank of Argentina.
c 
 FDI in 2005 and in 2011 corresponds to investments made under Legislative Decree 600.
d 




 Data for 2011 correspond to the cumulative total at the third quarter.
g
 Includes the construction, financial, fishing, forestry, agricultural and transport sectors.
h 
 Data from 2007 onwards correspond to the sectoral breakdown of long-term foreign capital, taking into account foreign direct investment, disbursements of long-term loans and 
bonds (according to data from the Central Bank of Peru).
i 
 Includes companies that were alone in their division according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), with a view to maintaining 
statistical confidentiality
j 
 Includes manufactures. 
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Table I.A-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS  
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 2000-2011 a
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Anguilla b
United States  62  68  68  40  27  21 …
Argentina c
Brazil 1 231  443  862 1 601 - 407 1 678 …
Chile  609  520  490  869  273 1 290 …
United States 1 273  820  720 2 051  905 1 179 …
Spain  953 2 397 1 759  722 1 206 1 176 …
Switzerland  282  39  274  735  197  748 …
Germany  72  255  471  370  339  548 …
Luxembourg  251  890  234  483 - 10  245 …
Netherlands 1 054  123  601 1 139  108  208 …
Brazil
Netherlands  979 3 317 7 634 3 916 4 260 2 736 17 908
Spain - 582  749 1 787 2 572 3 262  313 9 779
Japan  572  826  81 4 316 1 709 2 426 7 387
United States 4 034 2 784 3 744 5 007 1 963 5 348 5 572
France 1 383  555 1 015 2 231 2 231 3 029 4 383
United Kingdom - 68  144 1 682  375 1 938 1 334 3 315
Luxembourg - 44  397 5 864 6 292 - 483 9 132 2 452
Chile d
Japan  47  159  236 - 28  179  477 1 360
Canada  86  498 2 612 1 667  841 1 611 1 180
Spain  207  822 1 088 2 210 1 756 1 243  795
United States  9  111 3 726 2 272 2 278 2 802  210
Netherlands - 21  327  805  824  556  397  54
Colombia
Netherlands  319  25 - 818 - 130 - 109 - 158  810
Spain  599  492  289  564 - 327  44  733
Panama  208  240  477  760  337  426  650
United States 1 410 1 524 1 064 1 215 1 198  401  507
United Kingdom 3 747  17  35  200  386  194  390
Anguilla  0  0 1 195 1 111  790  257  184
Costa Rica
United States  532  695  940 1 301 1 022 1 025 1 282
Spain  14  10  54  76  78  28  244
El Salvador  21  33  41  65  21  0  38
Canada  55  336  96  63  33  49  36
Netherlands  0  26  266  24  26  8  30
United Kingdom  13  21  20  16  28  15 - 8
Dominica b
The Caribbean  0  0  9  8  6  4 …
Taiwan Province of China  0  0  2  2  1  1 …
Dominican Republic
Canada  111  142  113  383  773  329 1 067
United States  457  662  536  360  455  307  459
Spain  215  308  605  181  151  299  192
Mexico - 1  84 - 124 1 055  273  369  73
Cayman Islands - 59 - 41  4  1 - 44  35  66
Ecuador
Canada  29 -252  49 44 53 79 217
China -20 12  85 47 56 45 79
Spain 3 7  85 128 68 16 38
Costa Rica 9 34 1 0 -6 2 37
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
 2 0 16 20 8 14 32
Panama 76 67 77 73 120 136 26
Italy 0 0 11 17 1 11 25
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El Salvador
United States  332  13  499  129  74  112  111
Costa Rica … … … … …  7  69
Panama  42  68  841  321  80  81  54
Guatemala
United States  192  198  326  229  151  343 …
Canada  3  4  25  54  74  114 …
Mexico  26  83  76  76  50  97 …
Republic of Korea  43  45  13  4  23  63 …
Spain  56  56  42  66  64  50 …
United Kingdom  9  13  63  66  58 - 25 …
Honduras e  
United States  303  339  460  339  347  325  291
Canada  17  107  139  37  24  117  187
United Kingdom  48  49  103  71 - 89  58  84
Costa Rica - 2  2  8  2  6  37  45
Guatemala  25  17  15  40  13  39  43
Ireland  0  0  0  214  19  33  22
Mexico
United States 11 770 12 938 12 885 11 368 7 338 5 632 10 073
Spain 1 693 1 436 5 402 4 941 2 686 1 445 3 074
Netherlands 4 013 2 807 6 630 1 855 2 074 8 924 1 409
Switzerland  324  578  606  224  87  246 1 158
Canada  166 -1 422  395  143  218  225  686
Japan  480  628  482 3 070 1 631 1 513 664
Brazil  46 50  25  93  128  379 324
Nicaragua
Canada  43  14  32  69  51  167  256
United States  51  53  84  126  88  88  159
Spain  17  10  45  59  25  33  116
Mexico  36  53  128  164  48  90  115
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  0  0  47  132  147  29  45
Panama
Spain  172  271  188  371 … …
United States  121  230  492  343 … …
Mexico - 28  79  68  69  199 … …
Colombia - 283  102  407  49  170 … …
Nicaragua  101  151  205  137 … …
Switzerland  282  190 - 122  128 … …
Argentina  19 - 152  66  58  94 … …
United Kingdom 1 594 - 13  460  31 … …
Paraguay
United States  20  84  107  190  111  264  92
United Kingdom - 7 - 1  1 - 2  3  2  17
Luxembourg - 22 - 66  69  23  13 - 46  17
Argentina  14  22 - 17  6  23  8  12
Italy  2  4  6  11  0  5  9
Mexico  0  0  0  0 - 8 - 18  6
Peru f
Chile - 82  62  32  591  181 … …
France  0  0 - 30  148  4 … …
Italy - 504  65 - 22  414  0 … …
South Africa
 268  467  0  405  0 … …
Norway
 5  15  0  276  0 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis b
United States  15  0  10  16  10  8 …
United Kingdom  0  0  4  8  5  4 …
The Caribbean  2  0  0  0  0  0 …
Table I.A-4 (continued)
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines b
United Kingdom  14  50  74  73  53  61 …
Trinidad and Tobago
United States  694  627  574  403  469  363 …
United Kingdom  165  150  159  146  152  118 …
Germany  41  38  43  30  32  25 …
India  16  27  21  16  17  13 …
Canada  1  3  3 2 194  4  3 …
Uruguay
Argentina  106  282  373  534  464 … …
Bermuda  0  0  0  7  223 … …
United States  35  67  43  144  167 … …
Brazil  20  56  86  183  112 … …
Netherlands  29 - 18  10  14  110 … …
Spain  203  81  153  232  55 … …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Spain  40  274  295  237 … … …
Netherlands  53 - 74  203  84 … … …
Panama  38  29  53  29 … … …
Colombia  2  9  22  3 … … …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
a 
 The data may not correspond to those reported in the balance of payments. No data are available by country of origin for Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Plurinational State of Bolivia or Saint Lucia. Information is available only on the main investor countries. For data prior to 2005 
please see the reports on foreign direct investment prepared by ECLAC for previous years.
b 
 Does not include the sale of land or reinvested earnings.
c 
 Data from the Central Bank of Argentina.
d 




 From 2007 onwards, corresponds to the break-down by country of long-term foreign capital considered foreign direct investment, disbursements of long-term loans and bonds 
(according to data from the Central Bank of Peru).
Table I.A-4 (concluded)
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Table I.A-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
BY COMPONENT, 2005-2011 
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Anguilla
Capital contributions
 90  72  78  39  20  17  3
Inter-company loans
 27  67  39  53  17  8  8
Reinvested earnings
 2  4  3  9  1  0  0
Antigua and Barbuda
Capital contributions
 178  272  255  106  38  30  25
Inter-company loans
 46  80  74  58  42  67  34
Reinvested earnings
 13  9  12  12  5  5  5
Argentina
Capital contributions 3 813 1 939 2 297 3 839 2 133 2 298 3 984
Inter-company loans
 296  490 2 126 5 491 -1 010 2 484 1 045
Reinvested earnings 1 156 3 108 2 050  396 2 894 2 273 2 214
Bahamas a
Capital contributions
…  578  452  669  532  786  767
Inter-company loans
…  265  435  362  222  175  73
Reinvested earnings
…  0  0  0  0  0  0
Barbados
Capital contributions
 25  3  68  77  18  34 …
Inter-company loans
 187  268  308  362  283  283 …
Reinvested earnings
 19  27  18  30  2  27 …
Brazil
Capital contributions 15 045 15 373 26 074 30 064 19 906 40 117 54 783
Inter-company loans
 21 3 450 8 510 14 994 6 042 8 390 11 877
Reinvested earnings
… … … … … … …
Chile
Capital contributions
 781 1 980 2 622 7 775 1 905 4 854 5 479
Inter-company loans
-223 -1 697 -232 1 146  463 2 655 2 231
Reinvested earnings 6 539 7 143 10 182 6 597 10 519 7 863 9 589
Dominica
Capital contributions
 5  5  27  36  19  7  7
Inter-company loans
 11  19  10  12  17  15  15
Reinvested earnings
 16  5  10  9  6  3  3
Ecuador a
Capital contributions
 119  136  151  229  278  265  176
Inter-company loans
-26 -260 -368  479 -213 -320  8
Reinvested earnings
 400  395  411  298  256  213  202
Guatemala
Capital contributions
 18  87  260  197  94  265  226
Inter-company loans
 118 -21 -30  75  19 -26  53
Reinvested earnings
 372  526  515  482  488  568  705
Grenada
Capital contributions  39  55  118  111  78  37  17
Inter-company loans  24  28  39  25  21  21  21
Reinvested earnings  11  12  15  12  5  5  5
Honduras
Capital contributions … … … …  163  103  284
Inter-company loans … … … …  12  255  56
Reinvested earnings … … … …  348  440  674
Mexico
Capital contributions 12 976 6 195 17 312 11 596 7 524 13 783 8 806
Inter-company loans 7 400 6 175 6 101 7 748 4 211 4 275 3 978
Reinvested earnings 4 032 7 749 8 080 7 796 4 385 2 651 6 770
Montserrat 
Capital contributions  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Inter-company loans  5  3  6  12  2  3  3
Reinvested earnings  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
Panama
Capital contributions … …  755  881  898  931 1 025
Inter-company loans … …  342  146  105  540  426
Reinvested earnings … …  802 1 170  257  879 1 338
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Paraguay a
Capital contributions  47  60  43  20  173 -10  135
Inter-company loans  3 -11  129  132 -102  128  171
Reinvested earnings -15  46  30  57  23  110 -158
Peru b
Capital contributions -145  874  733 2 981 1 531 1 533  270
Inter-company loans -  240  924  656 -906  64 2 403
Reinvested earnings 2 724 2 353 3 835 3 287 4 951 5 731 4 986
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Capital contributions  38  19  41  78  49  39  47
Inter-company loans  63  93  98  103  85  76  88
Reinvested earnings  3  2  2  2  2  7  7
Saint Lucia
Capital contributions  50  168  179  98  69  52  27
Inter-company loans  7  58  83  58  79  59  50
Reinvested earnings  25  11  15  11  3  4  5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Capital contributions  12  49  67  66  50  59  83
Inter-company loans  17  48  54  84  45  34  42
Reinvested earnings  12  13  11  9  2  10  10
Suriname
Capital contributions … … …  0  99  0  0
Inter-company loans … … …  121  140  110  151
Reinvested earnings … … …  3  2  3  4
Trinidad and Tobago
Capital contributions  664  497  554 2 322  426  309 …
Inter-company loans -16 -20 -21 -16 -12 -11 …
Reinvested earnings  292  406  297  495  296  251 …
Uruguay
Capital contributions  231  576  550 1 012 1 059 1 429 1 563
Inter-company loans  484  699  448  540  104  276  102
Reinvested earnings  133  219  331  554  457  778  862
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Capital contributions  502 -134 -1 004  490 -3 239 -1 182 -673
Inter-company loans 2 086 1 949 1 694 1 116 1 118 1 828 3 345
Reinvested earnings  1 -2 323  930 -411 -415  563 2 630
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as at 16 April 2012.
a 
 Data for 2011 correspond to the cumulative total at the third quarter.
b 
 Data from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. Information on capital contributions for 2005 includes net loans from parent companies.
Table I.A-5 (concluded)
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Table I.A-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
OUTFLOWS BY COUNTRY, 2000-2011 
(Millions of dollars)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Argentina  901.0  160.9 -627.1  773.8  676.0 1 311.0 2 438.7 1 504.2 1 390.7  712.0  965.0 1 488.0
Bahamas a ... ... ... ... ... ...  136.4  140.6  171.5  89.1  88.3  227.1
Barbados  1.1  1.1  0.5  0.5  3.9  9.1  44.0  82.0  63.0  41.0 ... ...
Belize  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  1.0  7.7  7.2  10.4  4.3  2.5  4.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.0  4.0  5.0 -4.0 -53.4 -7.7
Brazil 2 281.6 -2 257.6 2 482.1  249.3 9 807.0 2 516.7 28 202.0 7 067.0 20 457.0 -10 084.2 11 588.0 -9 297.0
Chile 3 986.6 1 609.7  343.2 1 606.3 1 563.1 2 182.7 2 211.9 4 851.6 9 151.3 7 233.1 9 230.9 11 822.1
Colombia  325.3  16.1  856.8  937.7  142.4 4 661.9 1 098.3  912.8 2 254.0 3 088.1 6 561.7 8 289.0
Costa Rica  8.5  9.5  34.1  26.9  60.6 -43.0  98.1  262.4  5.9  7.5  24.4  56.4
El Salvador -5.0 -9.7 -25.7  18.6 -2.7  112.9 -26.0  100.0  16.0  23.0  79.8  77.6
Guatemala …  10.3  22.1  45.7  41.2  38.2  40.0  25.4  16.4  26.3  23.5  17.2
Honduras  6.5  2.8  6.5  12.2 -6.2  1.0  1.0  1.0 -1.0  1.0  1.4  6.7
Jamaica  74.3  89.0  73.9  116.3  52.2  101.0  85.4  115.0  75.8  61.1 ... ...
Mexico … 4 404.0  890.8 1 253.5 4 431.9 6 474.0 5 758.5 8 256.3 1 157.1 7 018.9 13 570.0 8 946.0
Paraguay  5.7  5.8 -2.0  5.5  6.0  6.4  4.0  8.0  8.0 ... ... ...
Peru  0.0  74.0  0.0  60.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  66.0  736.0  398.0  215.0  111.0
Trinidad and Tobago b  25.2  150.0  106.4  225.2  29.0  341.0  370.0  0.0  700.0  0.0  0.0  6.0
Uruguay -0.6  6.2  13.7  15.1  17.7  36.3 -1.0  89.4 -10.9  16.4 -43.9  0.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
 521.0  204.0 1 026.0 1 318.0  619.0 1 167.0 1 524.0  33.0 1 150.0 1 838.0 2 671.0  173.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 16 April 2012.
a 
 Data for 2011 correspond to the cumulative total at the third quarter.
b 
 Data for 2011 correspond to the cumulative total at the second quarter.
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Chapter II
Foreign direct investment between the 
European Union and Latin America  
and the Caribbean
A. Introduction
Over the past decade the European Union was the origin of an average US$ 30 billion per year 
in foreign direct investment to Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for nearly 40% 
of all FDI flowing to the region and making it the main investor there. This chapter looks at 
the principal patterns and characteristics of FDI flows between the European Union and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as well as the strategies followed by the transnational companies 
that are behind these investment flows. It also refers to some of the specific microeconomics of 
European FDI, its importance for greenfield investment in manufacturing and its contribution 
to innovation and research and development (R&D) in the region.  
Investment flows and transnational companies from the 
countries of the European Union have a long history in 
the region.1 During the early stages of export development, 
transnationals were major players in the primary sectors 
1
 The European Union currently has 27 member states: Austria (1995), 
Belgium (1952), Bulgaria (2007), Cyprus (2004), Czech 
Republic (2004), Denmark (1973), Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), 
France (1952), Germany (1952), Greece (1981), Hungary (2004), 
Ireland (1973), Italy (1952), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), 
Luxembourg (1952), Malta (2004), Netherlands (1952), Poland (2004), 
Portugal (1986), Romanía (2007), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), 
Spain (1986), Sweden (1995) and United Kingdom (1973).
and some infrastructure areas, such as railways. Later on, 
during the import substitution model decades, European 
direct investment had to negotiate high trade barriers; 
companies focused on investing in manufacturing (the 
automotive, food and beverage and chemical industries) 
and above all on the larger economies (Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina). Indeed, before the economic opening of the 
1990s, nearly 75% of the total stock of European FDI in the 
region was in these three countries; the leading investors 
were the United Kingdom, Germany and France and, to a 
lesser extent, Italy and the Netherlands (ECLAC, 2002). 
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During the 1990s the historical context was particularly 
favourable to direct European investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The region was deploying 
profound structural reforms to speed up international 
insertion, using FDI as a source of funding and a tool 
for modernizing production. FDI saw an unprecedented 
surge, and transnational companies, many of them 
European, ventured into a wide range of operations in 
the region (ECLAC, 2002; Calderón, 2002; Chudnovsky, 
2001). European companies substantially diversified 
their presence in the region’s economy as many of the 
limitations on foreign ownership in extractive sectors 
(such as hydrocarbons and mining) were lifted or, in 
the case of the service sector, disappeared in a wave of 
privatizations. From then on, countries like Spain and 
Portugal swelled the European presence in the region. 
And reforms in Europe aimed at forging an economic 
and political union put increasing pressure on European 
companies to scale up in order to compete in European 
community and international markets (ECLAC, 2002). 
It was in response to the need for companies to expand 
in order to compete that the European Union became the 
main source of cross-border acquisitions both worldwide 
and in Latin America (Vodusek, 2002). 
By the second half of the 1990s, then, the European 
Union had become the main source of FDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Companies from Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
increased their footprint in Latin American markets; 
the evolving situation enabled new actors, essentially 
Spain and Portugal, to enter the picture. Latin America 
and the Caribbean thus became the main destination 
for European investments in emerging and developing 
economies and ranked second among extraregional 
destinations after the United States and Canada. More 
than 80% of Spanish and Portuguese investments in 
emerging markets went to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. For Germany and the Netherlands the share 
ranged between 40% and 50%; for the United Kingdom, 
France and Italy the percentage was lower, in the area 
of 20% (ECLAC, 2002; Dunning, 2002). 
Previous editions of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Latin America and the Caribbean looked at European 
investment in the region from several different angles. For 
example, the 2001 report examined FDI from the European 
Union and, especially, how the creation of that economic 
bloc helped boost FDI flows towards Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Over the past few years there have been 
chapters on specific European Union countries (Portugal 
and Spain) and sectors where European transnationals 
have a large footprint (the automobile, steel, tourism, 
telecommunications and software industries).2 
Against this backdrop, this chapter describes 
European FDI towards the region over the past decade.3 
In an increasingly globalized world, the European Union 
has cultural, social and economic characteristics that are 
especially useful for Latin America and the Caribbean at 
this stage of the region’s development, and the region is 
in a position to be a source of stimulus for the European 
economies (particularly in the current economic crisis) 
and their principal productive agents: transnational 
companies. This chapter looks at European FDI in the 
aggregate (with information from the balance of payments) 
and from a microeconomics viewpoint taking business 
strategy into consideration. It explores an area that is not 
always covered by the literature on foreign investment: 
R&D activities conducted by subsidiaries of transnational 
companies. This is a key issue because of the growing 
internationalization of transnational corporate R&D and 
the major role that European transnationals play in R&D 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Section B of this chapter looks at FDI outflows 
from the European Union to the rest of the world and 
to Latin America and the Caribbean in particular over 
the past decade —both in terms of overall patterns and 
at the country level. Section C discusses the business 
strategies followed by European transnationals in the 
region, focusing on the distinguishing features of these 
strategies and the factors behind them. Section D examines 
the internationalization of innovation and R&D on the part 
of subsidiaries of European transnationals and explains 
how the region (above all, Brazil) has positioned itself 
in the process, generating substantial impacts in terms of 
innovation and capacity-building. Section D also shows 
that looking at R&D and, more broadly, the nature of 
subsidiaries, is crucial for understanding the permanent 
impacts of FDI and transnational corporate operations. 
Section E describes the main patterns of still-incipient 
Latin American investment in Europe and the strategies 
being followed by the principal trans-Latins involved. And 
section F sets out the main conclusions for the chapter 
and discusses prospects for the next few years.
2
 For an analysis of Portuguese FDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, see ECLAC (2007). FDI and business strategy in the 
steel and automobile industries are examined in ECLAC (2010); 
telecommunications in ECLAC (2011 and 2008); and tourism and 
software in ECLAC (2009 and 2011, respectively).
3
 For a more historical take on European investment in the region, 
see ECLAC (2002), Vodusek (2002) and Chudnovsky (2001). 
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B. European Union Foreign Direct Investment  
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. The European Union as a source of global FDI outflows
Global flows of FDI have, traditionally, been concentrated 
in developed economies as the chief senders and receivers 
of global movements of capital. The larger economies of 
the European Union have thus been major sources and 
destinations of these capital flows. Indeed, nearly half 
of the global stock of FDI originated in European Union 
countries (see figure II.1). Their share of inward FDI is 
somewhat lower, at about 40%. Obviously, a large portion 
of these capital flows is between countries in this economic 
bloc, particularly between the larger economies; several 
European Union economies are among the largest FDI 
sending and receiving countries worldwide. Among them 
are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, 
Spain and the Netherlands (see figure II.2).
Figure II.1 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
The main actors behind these investment flows are large 
transnational companies. The major European transnationals 
(and small and middle-sized ones, as well) are among the 
most internationalized in the world and surpass their peers 
in the United States and Japan in several indicators of 
economic activity (Dunning, 2002; European Commission, 
2011). And just in terms of extraregional investment, 
European transnationals are highly internationalized; 
many are global industry and sector leaders. As a result, 
the investment behaviour of European companies largely 
shapes the pattern of global FDI flows. 
Until the 1980s the United States and Western Europe 
dominated the global FDI pattern. The subsequent entrance 
of Japan completed a trio that accounted for most of the 
worldwide flow of FDI. But the developing countries have 
been gaining ground, especially over the past 10 years, 
both as receivers and as senders of foreign investment 
(ECLAC, 2011). Even more recently, they have positioned 
themselves as the main receivers of FDI, with more than 
50% of the worldwide total (ECLAC, 2011). Noteworthy 
among them are the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russian Federation, India and China). FDI outflows from 
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developing countries are seeing unprecedented growth. 
In 2000, these countries were the source of just over 10% 
of global FDI outflows, climbing to 15% in 2005 and 
nearly matching the European Union’s 30% in 2010 (see 
figure II.A-1). Obviously, the past few years have been 
especially challenging for the European Union because of 
the financial crisis and, recently, the substantial sovereign 
debt problems that some of its economies are facing.  
 Figure II.2 
WORLD (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS, 2010 
(Trillions of dollars) 







































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
[online] www.oecd.org/investment/statistics.
Traditionally, the European Union countries that 
have led investment in the region have been the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany; Spain and Portugal 
followed later on. Generally speaking, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands and German transnationals are the most 
globalized; Italian and French transnationals tend to be 
more regional in scope. Spanish and Portuguese companies 
began to transnationalize later and used Latin America 
as their chief springboard for international expansion 
(Calderón, 2002; Dunning, 2002; ECLAC, 2002). As for 
Spain, aggressive internationalization did not start until 
the 1990s; its ratio of outward FDI stock to GDP went 
from 3% in 1990 to 20% in 2000 and nearly 47% en 2010.
Latin America and the Caribbean was one of the 
prime destinations of European Union investment during 
the 1990s, but it became less so during the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. This stagnation has been 
due, in part, to the accession of new European Union 
member States, the growing relevance of the Middle 
East and North Africa on Europe’s foreign agenda and 
the severe financial crisis that hit some member States 
particularly hard. In addition, the region has been less 
welcoming to FDI than Asia, largely because there 
has been less of an effort to boost the technology and 
innovation content of the production structure in the 
countries of Latin America, which is still very natural-
resource oriented.
Figure II.3 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(EUROSTAT).  
Investment outflows from the European Union over 
the past decade have therefore focused on countries within 
the economic bloc itself and on other advanced economies. 
Intra-European-Community investment accounted for some 
60% of the total between 2000 and 2010 (see table II.1). FDI 
towards new European Union member States has been, above 
all, through businesses in search of lower production costs. 
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European Union investments flowing to the United States 
accounted for some 12%. Latin America and the Caribbean 
was the prime destination of extra-European Community 
investments during the 1990s (ECLAC, 2002) but has 
slipped over the past decade, with its share falling to just 3%. 
The situation during the 1990s was indeed an unusual one 
marked by a flood of privatizations in the region that sent 
Spanish companies heading for the exit. During the 1990s, 
an average of 12% of European Union FDI outflows went 
to Latin America and the Caribbean; it fell to 9% between 
2000 and 2005 and 6% between 2006 and 2010. 
In this context, other developing regions gained as 
a draw for European investment. Such is the case with 
the developing countries of Asia, especially China, as 
well as Africa (see table II.1). Over the past five years, 
FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean from the 
European Union have been comparable to those going 
to the countries of Africa, at some 3% of total European 
Union FDI outflows. The stock of European Union FDI 
in Latin America and the Caribbean currently stands at 
nearly US$ 500 billion, which is 9% of the total stock of 
outward European Union FDI (see table II.A-1).   
Table II.1 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS AND STOCK BY DESTINATION, 2000-2010 
(Percentages)
Destination
FDI flows FDI flows outside the  European Union FDI stock 2009 a
2000-2005 2006-2010 2000-2005 2006-2010
European Union 61.9 57.2 - - -
United States 11.5 13.3 30.3 31.1 35.2
Europe outside the European Union 10.1 10.5 26.6 24.6 24.1
Africa 1.9 2.5 5.0 5.9 5.7
Developing countries of Asia 4.8 5.4 12.6 12.6 15.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.3 2.6 8.7 6.1 17.1
Others 6.4 8.4 16.8 19.7 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
a
 Unlike the information on FDI flows, the breakdown of the stock of outward FDI is for the European Union as a whole without considering the stock of FDI that the member States 
have in other European Union countries. 
2. FDI flows from the European Union to Latin America  
 and the Caribbean
(a) Overview
Historically, European investment has centred on the larger 
economies in the region, with European transnationals 
operating in a wide range of manufacturing and service 
sectors.4 The pattern of investment flowing towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been procyclical, especially 
over the past decade, as can be seen in information from 
EUROSTAT and from the central banks of the countries 
of the region.5 
FDI flows towards the region dropped off sharply early 
in the 2000s and hit a low in 2003 (see figure II.4). Several 
4
 Table II.A-1 shows the FDI stock of the principal countries of 
the European Union in the economies of the region. Brazil has 
the largest stock of European outward FDI, followed by Mexico, 
Argentina and Chile. 
5
 When analyzing FDI it is important to bear in mind that the statistics 
are imprecise, with inconsistencies among countries and among 
the agencies that compile and publish them (see box II.1).
global and regional factors were behind the fall in European 
investment. The global international environment turned 
less favourable when stock markets began to slide in 2000 
amidst liquidity crunches and funding constraints faced by 
transnational companies, sending major acquisitions down 
from the levels seen in prior years (ECLAC, 2003). The 
accession of new European Union member States opened 
opportunities for investment within that economic bloc, 
drawing the attention of European businesses away from 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America saw an 
easing of the sweeping privatizations that had attracted 
substantial FDI flows, and economic growth slowed in 
the face of the adverse international scenario. European 
companies —Spanish ones in particular— were hit hard by 
the crisis in Argentina. In 2003, then, European investments 
stood at just US$ 12 billion, the lowest in a decade.
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Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ORIGIN OF FOREIGN 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures from the central banks of the Latin America and 
Caribbean countries.
    From 2003, flows from the European Union to the 
region followed a cyclical pattern, albeit with an upward 
trend. According to official sources in the countries of the 
region, FDI from the European Union rose from some 
US$ 12 billion in 2003 to more than US$ 25 billion yearly 
after that, peaking at US$ 45 billion in 2007 and standing 
at US$ 36 billion in 2010 (see figure II.4). Uptrending 
European FDI outflows to the region during the second 
half of the decade made the European Union the main 
source of FDI in the region. This was, as seen in the 
preceding section, despite the latter’s declining position 
as a destination for international investment from Europe. 
Surging European FDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the second half of the decade, and soaring 
FDI overall in the region, was not evenly distributed among 
the subregions. Rising levels of European investment 
were due essentially to flows towards South America 
(see figure II.5), with Brazil receiving 53% of total FDI 
in 2006-2010. Countries like Argentina, Colombia and 
Chile were also among the main receivers (see figure 
II.6). Rising commodity prices and vibrant economies 
in this subregion were a significant factor in attracting 
new investments on the part of European companies in 
search of natural resources and markets for manufactures, 
especially in Brazil (see section C), where the flow of 
FDI from the European Union has burgeoned since 2002 
(see figure II.7). 
By contrast, European FDI towards Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean held relatively stable in the 
area of US$ 10 billion to US$ 12 billion per year (see 
figure II.5). These economies bore more of the brunt of 
the crisis in the United States and financial turmoil in the 
global arena. The strongest impact was seen in investment 
(even European investment), especially where the strategy 
had been to seek export efficiency. Mexico is by far the 
main destination in the subregion; during the second half 
of the decade it received 24% of European FDI towards 
the region (see figure II.6). European FDI in Mexico 
reached a high of some US$ 13 billion in 2010, owing 
above all to major acquisitions in the beverage, banking 
and steel industries (see figure II.7).6 
Figure II.5 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS TO 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures from the central banks of the Latin America and 
Caribbean countries. 
In aggregate terms, the European Union accounted for 
43% of FDI to the region between 2000 and 2005, and 40% 
between 2006 and 2010 (see figure II.8). But these figures 
mask substantial differences among countries. Generally 
speaking, the European Union has exceeded the regional 
average in countries of South America such as Argentina and 
Brazil (see table II.2). But the United States has the larger 
presence in Mexico and Central America. In any event, the 
drop in FDI flows from the United States led to an increase 
in the European Union’s share of FDI towards Mexico over 
the past five years, to 43% of the total. Although the United 
States has been the largest investor in many countries, Spain 
was for many years the main source of FDI to countries 
like Chile and Argentina. Nevertheless, the higher profile 
of new actors as a source of FDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as active internationalization strategies 
being pursued by companies in developing countries such 
as China, could be seen as a warning sign for the European 
Union’s position in the region. 
6
 Ranking FDI flows according to the size of the economy changes 
the order of the principal receivers. Taking the European Union 
FDI-to-GDP ratio for 2010 as an indicator turns Chile into the 
largest receiver in the region (see figure II.A-2). 
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Figure II.6 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  




























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
Figure II.7 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS TO 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(EUROSTAT).
The countries of the European Union and of Latin 
America and the Caribbean have expanded the legal 
guarantees for cross-border investments. International 
investment agreements have improved the provisions of 
domestic legislation in the countries and created a stable, 
transparent climate. Such agreements (especially, bilateral 
investment treaties) have begun to multiply worldwide.7 
The member States of the European Union, led by the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands, 
have been very active in signing international investment 
agreements —especially bilateral investment treaties— with 
third countries. During the 1990s the European countries 
signed many such agreements with most of the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Chile, 
Peru and Uruguay have bilateral investment treaties in 
force with most of the principal European economies 
(see table II.A-4). European Union-Mercosur Free Trade 
Agreement negotiations are expected to conclude in 2012. 
7 The world’s network of international investment agreements is 
growing more atomized and complex. Current agreements are not 
coordinated at the international level and often overlap, address 
related issues (trade, intellectual property and industrial policy) 
and have changing substantive provisions and dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Efforts aimed at establishing multilateral investment 
agreements have been limited in scope. A noteworthy example is the 
Energy Charter Treaty signed by some 50 countries, including those 
of the European Union, to promote investment in the energy sector. 
Other, larger-scale initiatives, such as the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment, were unsuccessful.
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Table II.2 

























Latin America 37.8 43.2 5.3 2.6 11.1 100 28.2 40.0 8.5 6.2 17.1 100
Argentina 13.5 47.6 21.5 0.0 17.4 100 16.3 41.4 24.9 1.5 12.7 100
Brazil 22.2 53.9 3.9 4.7 15.4 100 14.4 44.6 5.3 13.6 22.2 100
Chile 31.9 51.9 5.0 2.1 9.1 100 29.3 35.7 6.2 0.1 28.7 100
Colombia 25.5 41.8 12.9 0.6 19.2 100 38.2 6.5 43.9 0.6 10.8 100
Costa Rica 64.3 13.6 17.3 0.0 4.8 100 60.4 13.6 8.7 0.5 16.8 100
Ecuador 24.0 10.5 34.8 1.4 29.3 100 -9.4 33.3 71.5 14.6 -10.0 100
Mexico 58.9 33.7 1.2 2.0 4.2 100 49.4 43.3 1.4 0.9 5.0 100
Paraguay 53.7 56.7 -22.6 16.7 -4.5 100 87.4 10.9 17.3 -17.9 2.4 100
Dominican 
Republic 47.1 34.7 4.0 -3.1 17.2 100 43.1 30.7 23.3 3.1 -0.2 100
Uruguay 6.0 28.5 17.3 0.0 48.2 100 6.5 16.3 34.2 0.9 42.1 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates from the central banks of Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
But international investment agreements and bilateral 
investment treaties do not have a substantial impact on FDI 
flows; these streams of capital are driven more by other 
factors such as economic growth and market size. Indeed, 
Brazil, which has virtually no investment agreements in 
force with European Union member States, is the one 
with the largest inflow of FDI. 
The European Union is currently discussing the future 
of the international investment agreements signed by its 
member States with a view to establishing a common 
investment policy. When the Treaty of Lisbon entered 
into force in December 2009, the European Union took 
on sole responsibility for FDI under the common trade 
policy umbrella. While there is political will, implementing 
it in practice is a challenge because there are so many 
agreements in force and the countries continue to negotiate 
on an individual basis. Consolidating European policy 
concerning investment agreements has been the subject 
of debate, and the outcomes are likely to have significant 
consequences for the architecture of the global international 
investment agreement regime. 
(b) The pattern in European countries
Over the past 10 years Spain consolidated its position 
as the main European investor in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, accounting for 52% of total FDI during the 
first half of the decade and 45% in the second half (see 
figure II.8).8 During that period, Spanish investment 
was heavily tilted towards energy, telecommunications, 
infrastructure, banking and other services, as well as oil 
and gas extraction industries. Between 2000 and 2010, 
86% of Spain’s FDI in the region went to services; the 
manufacturing sector (chiefly in Brazil) and the primary 
sector received 12% and 2%, respectively (Arahuetes, 
2011). This process was spearheaded by a small 
number of companies.9 Large Spanish companies in 
the services sector were involved in some of the largest 
acquisitions that the region has seen, propelling them to 
the top of the markets where they operated. The preferred 
destination countries were Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Argentina. For Spain, unlike other European countries, 
operations in the region are a key part of the drive for 
internationalization: 65% of Spanish assets abroad are 
located in Latin America and the Caribbean (see table II.A-1). 
8
 Spanish companies began to position themselves in the 1990s as 
sweeping privatizations gave them an opportunity to meet the needs 
created by shifting patterns of competition after Spain joined the 
European Union (ECLAC, 2002). Spanish companies acquired 
many of the highest-value assets in the region, displacing some of 
the largest global operators in services and infrastructure. Spain 
rapidly became the second largest source of FDI in the region, 
behind the United States. 
9
 One of the characteristics of Spanish investment in the region 
is that it is concentrated. According to estimates, Telefónica, 
Endesa, Repsol, Iberdrola and the banks Santander and BBVA 
account for 95% of total Spanish investment in the region (The 
Economist, 2009). 
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  Figure II.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1999-2010 
(Percentages)




























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
Until the early 2000s, most Spanish investment went 
to Latin America and the Caribbean. But the turn of the 
century brought troubled times for Spanish companies. 
The political and economic crisis in Argentina that put 
an end to the convertibility regime dealt a strong blow to 
companies operating in service subsectors. This, coupled 
with factors having to do with the shaping of the European 
Union itself, helped shift the focus of Spanish investment 
to other countries in the bloc (see figure II.9), and Spanish 
investment in the region fell off sharply in the last few 
years (see table II-A.2). This did not mean the end of 
operations in the region, though, and there are companies 
that have retained their leadership in services and extraction 
sectors. The companies that inserted themselves in the 
1990s maintained their positioning through concessions. 
Throughout that decade the door to the region was through 
joint or consortium acquisitions; stand-alone acquisitions 
were more predominant in the 2000s.
While 2001-2003 may have marked the end of the 
Spanish investment boom in the region, subsequent 
investments began to take shape in new sectors as new, 
smaller companies ventured into the region (García-Canal 
and others, 2008) in new sectors (including construction, 
tourism, financial activities such as insurance, and even 
manufacturing). The amounts invested by Spanish 
companies during the second half of the decade were far 
smaller, but their business footprint became more diverse 
and trended more towards services. Most Spanish FDI 
went to Brazil, and greenfield investments became more 
common (García-Canal and others, 2008).10 
10
 At present, 20% of Spanish assets abroad are in Brazil.  
Figure II.9 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by the General Directorate of Foreign Trade of 
the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism of Spain, and Observatory of 
Spanish Multinational Companies (OEME), “La multinacional española ante 
un nuevo escenario internacional”, second annual report, June 2010.
a
 Three-year averages.  
Spanish investments have dropped off in the past 
few years, for both structural and situational reasons. 
Among the structural factors are the end of privatizations 
and Spain’s renewed interest in other European Union 
member States and other developing regions. As for the 
situational factors, the adverse impacts of the crisis for 
Spain’s economy affected its investments in the region 
as well. Nevertheless, their operations in the region have 
helped some Spanish companies weather the financial 
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crisis. Many are seeing high profits in the region that are 
offsetting their performance in Europe and helping them 
balance their consolidated balance sheets (see section C). 
Germany is one of the traditional European investors in 
the region, but during the 1990s German companies were not 
quick to seize the new opportunities afforded by economic 
opening. Over the past decade, German investments accounted 
for 4% to 7% of flows from Europe (see figure II.8) and were 
quite volatile (see table II.A-2). Nevertheless, the figures do 
show that German investments in the region are growing, from 
US$ 6 billion in 1999-2004 to US$ 10 billion in the second 
half of the decade. German investments are concentrated in 
terms of destination sectors and countries. In keeping with 
their traditional positioning, the focus has been, above all, 
on Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, in capital-intensive sectors 
where Germany has significant competitive advantages and 
German companies are global leaders (such as the automobile, 
chemical and machinery and equipment industries). Their 
strategy combining a search for markets for manufactured 
goods with horizontal FDI enabled them to take advantage 
of the region’s favourable economic climate over the past 
few years (see section C). While the amount of German FDI 
is not significant and the share going to the region is low 
(only 7% of German assets abroad are in Latin America), 
innovation and R&D on the part of German companies are 
very important for the region (see section D). 
French investment also has a long history and is 
linked to the manufacturing sector in the larger economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. Unlike Germany, 
though, French companies were actively involved in 
the privatization processes and gained a foothold in a 
number of services sectors. Some of the companies that 
participated in privatizations subsequently withdrew; such 
was the case with the telecommunications sector. French 
investment surged starting in 2004 and has been upwards of 
US$ 5 billion a year since 2008. France’s share of European 
FDI in the region thus rose from 9% in 1999-2005 to 16% 
in 2006-2010 (see figure II.8). Over the past few years, 
French transnationals have made major acquisitions in the 
telecommunications and energy sectors (see chapter IV) 
and in some manufacturing sectors, such as the chemical 
industry, chiefly in Brazil: 75% of French assets in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are in Brazil (see table II.A-1). 
The United Kingdom’s investment exposure in the 
region is lower; only 3% of its assets abroad are located in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Its share of the flow of 
European investment to the region has held steady at about 
12% and is concentrated in mining, some manufactures 
(such as food and beverages) and financial services. British 
companies were only marginally involved in privatizations. 
Italy has had a historical presence, as well, especially in 
traditional manufactures such as food and automobiles. 
Italian investment has seen substantial growth over the past 
decade, going from US$ 4 billion during the first half of the 
decade to more than US$ 22 billion in the second half (see 
table II.A-1) and venturing beyond traditional manufactures 
to enter some service sectors. Italian transnationals with 
market-seeking strategies made major acquisitions in 
telecommunications and infrastructure. The recent surge 
in Italian investment in the region has driven its share of 
total European flows from 3% in 1999-2005 to 16% in 
2006-2010 (see figure II.8). 
The Netherlands is a special case, with provisions 
of law that have led many transnationals to locate their 
tax domicile there and channel substantial investment 
resources to third markets. Statistics published by the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should 
therefore be contrasted with data from the central bank 
of the Netherlands. There are substantial differences in 
the statistical information (see box II.1). In recent years, 
Netherlands investment in the region has centred on 
Brazil and Mexico, in the form of major acquisitions in 
manufacturing sectors such as beverages and steel. 
Balance of payments statistics do not yield a sectoral 
breakdown of European Union FDI in the region, 
making it necessary to turn to information on corporate 
mergers and acquisitions in search of an indicator in 
this regard. In Latin America and the Caribbean, funds 
for corporate acquisitions by European transnationals 
during 2000-2011 went chiefly to the services sector, at 
66% of the total. Manufacturing and natural resources 
accounted for 24% and 10%, respectively. But there are 
differences between South America and Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean: while the share going to 
services in the two subregions was quite similar (in 
the area of 66%), the percentages for natural resources 
and manufacturing were not. In South America, natural 
resources and manufacturing accounted for 12% and 
22%, respectively; the breakdown in Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean is 3% and 31%, respectively. 
Beyond these figures, which are indicative, refer only to 
acquisitions and do not include greenfield investments, 
it is clear that European investment destination sectors 
have been determined by production structure and 
international insertion of the countries sending and 
receiving investment flows. As a result, the focus tends 
to be more on natural resources in South America 
and on manufactures in Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean. The largest sums of European FDI in 
manufacturing in the Southern Cone are going to Brazil 
(the country in this subregion with the most diversified 
and complex industrial structure).  
The European Union, then, has been the leading 
investor in Latin America and the Caribbean over the 
past decade, especially in the countries of South America. 
Despite these substantial investment streams, European 
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Union (above all, Spanish) interest in the region has 
waned over the decade as the investment focus shifted 
to other counties in the European Union bloc and to 
other developing regions. Nevertheless, the widespread 
privatization of State-owned assets in the region in the 
late 1990s was a one-time event in a particular historical 
context. Even so, it is also clear that aggregate FDI data 
at the balance of payments level are imperfect and, while 
indicative of general trends, are not conclusive and should 
be supplemented by looking at the strategies followed by 
the transnational companies that are the main drivers of 
these investment streams.
Box II.1 
THE STATISTICAL CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE ROLE  
OF THE NETHERLANDS AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE
There are several problems and 
inconsistencies regarding statistical 
information on FDI flows, making 
comparison at the international level difficult. 
This challenge is compounded by factors 
such as the increasingly complex financial 
operations of transnational companies, 
measurement methodologies and degrees 
of coverage that vary from one country to 
the next, the existence of tax havens and 
the impossibility of breaking FDI down 
into greenfield investments and mergers 
and acquisitions. 
First, only 12 countries of the region 
(the largest ones, which are also the ones 
that attract most of the total flows to the 
region) report data on the origin of FDI. 
There is therefore no way to conduct specific 
analyses of certain countries. In addition, 
some countries, like Brazil, do not report data 
on reinvested earnings. Second, the existence 
of tax havens makes it difficult to determine 
the origin and destination of FDI, both for 
European investment in the region and for 
Latin American investment in Europe. It is 
estimated that the developing countries lose 
hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenue 
as a result of tax shelter strategies followed 
by transnational companies in tax havens 
throughout the world (Oxfam, 2000 and 2011; 
Cobham, 2005). Third, aggregate data from 
EUROSTAT are sometimes inconsistent and 
cannot be disaggregated by country. Fourth, 
FDI data are adjusted over time, due to the 
way information is compiled and to timing 
adjustments to the balance of payments 
capital and financial account.
All the same, aggregate data from 
various sources on FDI between the 
European Union and Latin America are 
relatively consistent and show similar 
patterns (see figure 1). However, an 
especially sensitive aspect of FDI between 
the European Union and the region has 
to do with the Netherlands, which has 
rules that make it especially attractive to 
transnationals as a platform for investing 
in third countries. Some examples are (i) 
the so-called ‘participation exemption’ 
that exempts dividends and capital 
gains from subsidiary companies from 
corporate income tax ; (ii) the large double 
taxation treaty network; (iii) guarantees 
that provide certainty as to how income 
from subsidiaries will be taxed; and (iv) 
the special tax regime for intra-company 
loans. These rules lead transnational 
companies to channel FDI, interest, 
dividend and royalty flows between the 
parent company in one country and its 
subsidiaries in other countries through 
entities located in the Netherlands (Van 
Dijk, Weyzig and Murphy, 2006). 
Figure 1 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA  
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2000-2010
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Latin America and the Caribbean
Data from EUROSTAT
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) and the 
central banks of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
These peculiarities call for caution 
when assessing FDI flows from the 
Netherlands. Figure 2 shows FDI flows 
from the Netherlands to Brazil according to 
information from the central bank of Brazil 
and the central bank of the Netherlands. 
The two series are completely different. 
The data compiled by the central bank of 
Brazil includes FDI through special financial 
institutions, completely distorting FDI from 
the Netherlands to Brazil. Contrary to the 
conclusion that could be drawn from the 
central bank of Brazil data, the flow of 
investment from the Netherlands to Brazil 
between 2005 and 2010 has been fairly 
stable, at about US$ 1 billion per year. 
FDI statistics are complex. And 
flows between the European Union and 
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Box II.1 (concluded)
Latin America and the Caribbean exhibit 
significant particularities, as the case of 
the Netherlands shows. This highlights 
the importance of supplementing FDI 
balance of payments statistics with 
other kinds of information —mergers 
and acquisitions, investment projects 
and business strategies— to better 
understand the issue.
Figure 2 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures from the central bank of Brazil and the central 
bank of the Netherlands (Der Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) [online] www.dnb.
nl/en/home/index.jsp).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
C. Business strategies followed  
 by european transnationals
European Union transnational companies operate in an 
array of production and service sectors in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Over the past decade, European 
companies have implemented different corporate 
strategies in the region (natural-resource-seeking and 
market-seeking) through a variety of mechanisms 
(greenfield investments, mergers and acquisitions and 
alliances with local companies). This section describes 
the main strategies followed by European companies, the 
investment mechanisms they use and the international 
and regional factors that have shaped their behaviour 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.    
1. In search of natural resources: the oil companies make their way  
 as they go, and mining investment and profits  
 continue to expand
Over the past few years European companies have continued 
to roll out active natural-resource-seeking strategies. The 
long tradition of European investment in such operations 
in the region has recently gotten an extra boost from 
favourable raw materials prices (see figure II.10) and 
high demand from emerging economies. The European 
companies that have most actively followed this strategy 
have been British hydrocarbon and mining companies and 
Spanish hydrocarbon firms. Oil and mining companies 
are among the largest European companies operating in 
the region: Anglo American PLC (United Kingdom/South 
Africa), Royal Dutch-Shell (United Kingdom-Netherlands), 
Repsol (Spain) and British Petroleum (United Kingdom) 
(see table II.3).   
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Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LARGEST EUROPEAN UNION TRANSNATIONALS BY SALES, 2010 
(Millions of dollars)
Ranking Company Country Sector Principal operations in the region Sales a
1 Telefónica de España Spain Telecommunications Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Panama, Peru 
34 530
2 Carrefour France Commerce Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 18 517
3 Volkswagen Germany Automotive/auto parts Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 17 858
4 Repsol Spain Oil/gas Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
16 865
5 Enel Italy Energy Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru
13 241
6 Fiat Italy Automotive/auto parts Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 12 405
7 Arcelor-Mittal Luxembourg Steel Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
11 065
8 Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecommunications Brazil 10 866




Agribusiness Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay
7 837
11 Anglo American Plc United 
Kingdom
Mining  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru
4 131




Tobacco Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico
5 407
13 Renault France Automotive/auto parts  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico 5 016





Oil/gas Argentina, Barbados, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago
4 486
15 Volvo Sweden Automotive/auto parts  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico 4 299
16 Iberdrola Spain Energy  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Honduras, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia
4 293
17 Bayer Germany Chemical Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay
3 337
18 BASF Germany Chemical/
Pharmaceutical
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
3 317
19 Siemens Germany Electronics Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Uruguay 
3 111
20 Bosch Germany Automotive/auto parts Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru 2 542
21 Peugeot Citroën France Automotive/auto parts Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 2 320
22 BHP Billiton Australia/United 
Kingdom 
Mining Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 2 013
23 Nokia Finland Electronics Brazil, Mexico 1 986
24 Philips Netherlands Electronics Brazil, Mexico 1 447
25 Danone France Food Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Uruguay
1 154
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of América economía magazine and annual reports of the respective companies.
 a
 The figure for sales refers to consolidated sales for operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Figure II.10 
RAW MATERIALS PRICE INDEX, 2003-2011  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund.
Natural-resource-seeking strategy has been especially 
forceful in the Southern Cone countries, although there 
have also been projects in Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean. FDI destination sectors in the Southern 
Cone countries have tilted more towards natural resources 
in a process known as “reprimarization” —a shift back 
towards primary production (ECLAC, 2011). Over the 
past few years, these countries, which traditionally have 
been recipients of substantial amounts of FDI in natural 
resources, have seen this pattern take further hold, above 
all in the mining sector. But the hydrocarbon sector and 
the mining sector have followed different paths. While 
the hydrocarbon transnationals were the most active in 
major acquisitions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is 
the mining companies that have implemented the more 
aggressive strategies over the past few years via large 
acquisitions and ambitious expansion plans in the region. 
There is a wide range of business strategies in the 
hydrocarbon sector, and they change in keeping with 
developments at the country level, regulatory changes 
(including nationalizations) and political developments 
because the sector is so important strategically and politically. 
The European companies need to position themselves in 
a sector dominated by large State-owned enterprises like 
Petrobras, PDVSA, Pemex and ECOPETROL. They have 
had to implement flexible strategies, adapt to regulatory 
changes and, in many cases, conduct important negotiations 
with the States. Marked price fluctuations have forced 
companies to constantly change their budgets and relocate 
assets in line with operating costs specific to each oil-
producing area. European transnationals have taken an 
active stance and stepped up investment both for their own 
account and in partnership with other companies, thus 
helping to fuel surging investment in natural resources 
in the region. Investment in the hydrocarbon sector has 
grown the most in Colombia and Brazil; Colombia is 
one of the countries most open to FDI in the sector.11 
On the other hand, nationalizations and changes in the 
regulatory framework and in contracts between the State 
and companies have hampered investment in Argentina, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (ECLAC, 2009).
Spain’s Repsol is one of the largest European 
hydrocarbon companies; it operates in 14 countries in the 
region, and its drive for internationalization has centred 
on Latin America and the Caribbean (46% of its 2010 
profits came from operations in the region). Although 
its investments in recent years are smaller than in the 
1990s (chiefly, the acquisition of YPF in Argentina), it 
has continued to position itself and consolidate operations 
in several countries via an active asset sale and purchase 
strategy.12 In 2005 Repsol started operating in Trinidad 
and Tobago by purchasing three oilfields and one gas 
field from British Petroleum, thereby consolidating its 
leadership position in the Caribbean. Over the past few years 
it has been part of a consortium for operating fields in the 
Carabobo block in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
and it sold a 25% stake in YPF to Argentina’s Petersen 
Group and a 40% holding in Repsol Brasil to Sinopec 
(ECLAC, 2011).13 In Peru, Repsol started up the first 
liquefied gas plant in South America; the plant is yielding 
substantial profits. And Repsol has embarked on new 
exploration and drilling operations, particularly in Brazil, 
that are expected to boost its oil reserves significantly. 
In April 2012 the Government of Argentina nationalized 
most of Repsol’s assets in the country.
Other European companies that are actively positioning 
themselves in this sector in the region are Great Britain’s 
British Petroleum and Shell, Italy’s Eni SpA, the French 
company Total and Spain’s Gas Natural and CEPSA. 
Greenfield projects and corporate acquisitions have been 
announced recently. CEPSA acquired 70% of the Caracara 
block in Colombia from Houston American Energy, of the 
United States. British Petroleum began extracting natural 
gas in Trinidad and Tobago, as did Shell in Peru through 
a consortium with a United States company. PDVSA 
is working on agreements with European companies 
(such as Italy’s Eni SpA and the French company Total) 
11
 Between 2005 and 2010, 30% of FDI in Colombia went to the 
oil sector. 
12
 In the mid-1990s Repsol, like other Spanish firms, began to expand 
internationally, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its 
strategy was based on the acquisition of firms with a dominant 
position, given its own experience in managing monopoly structures 
(ECLAC, 2000).
13
 Repsol-Sinopec is now the leading holder of exploration rights 
in the Espíritu Santo basin. There is widespread interest in oil 
exploration in Brazil. 
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to operate the Orinoco Oil Belt. It seems that in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, private participation 
is a priority for securing new investment and increasing 
the production of crude oil. However, several factors 
have made it difficult to reach agreements with European 
countries. For one thing, the nationalization of assets 
a few years ago impacted several transnationals in the 
sector.14 For another, the relatively high cost of exploiting 
crude oil in the area, coupled with funding problems at 
some companies because of the international crisis, is a 
constraint for new investment.
The mining sector has been booming over the past 
few years, and European companies are active players. 
Robust demand from the emerging economies (above all, 
China) and rising prices have spurred companies to step 
up their exploration efforts and launch new exploitation 
projects, especially in metal mining (see figure II.10). 
Companies have sought to secure access to funding and 
greater economies of scale. Investments in mining are indeed 
the main factor behind surging FDI in natural resources 
and the reprimarization of economies. In this sector, 
regulatory frameworks have been relatively stable, ensured 
favourable rules of the game for greenfield investment 
and, along with rising prices, increased profitability (see 
figure II.11). These levels of profitability have given rise 
to robust debate as to revenue from the region’s natural 
resources and national policies concerning management 
of non-renewable resources. 
Figure II.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RETURN ON ASSETS OF 



































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from América economía, December 2011 [online] http://
www.americaeconomia.com.
14
 Total was one of the firms affected by nationalization in 2007, along 
with Great Britain’s BP, Norway’s Statoil ASA and Chevron in the 
United States. 
Among the major European companies is Anglo 
American (United Kingdom), one of the largest mining 
companies in the world. It has operations in 11 countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, with stand-alone 
subsidiaries or joint ventures in Chile, Brazil Peru, Mexico, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia focused 
on copper, ferro-nickel and coal. Anglo-American’s largest 
operations in the region are in Chile and Brazil; they account 
for 20% of the company’s jobs. In Colombia, it has a 33% 
stake in the world’s largest open-pit coal mine (Cerrejón); 
in Venezuela it owns more than 90% of the firm Loma de 
Níquel. Anglo-American’s sales in South America stood 
at US$ 7.5 billion in 2010 —25% of its worldwide sales. 
Anglo American has recently scaled up its operations 
in the region through major acquisitions, projects and 
greenfield investments located above all in Brazil and 
Chile. Its investments in the region over the past decade 
top US$ 10 billion (Anglo American, 2011). One of its 
largest acquisitions is the purchase of IronX Mineração 
and Sistema-Minas Rio, both in Brazil, for more than 
US$ 4 billion. In Chile, Anglo American embarked on 
a massive expansion project at its Los Bronces Division 
in 2007 involving an investment of US$ 2.3 billion. The 
project includes new grinding facilities, a flotation plant 
and new pipe conveyors and pumping stations. It will 
boost production from a current output of 230,000 tons to 
400,000 tons a year and make the Los Bronces Division the 
fifth largest copper mine in the world in terms of output.15 
In 2011 Anglo American took legal action in Chile 
against the world’s largest mining company, Corporación 
Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO). The dispute involves the 
Chilean company’s call option on a 49% stake in Anglo 
American Sur, one of Anglo American’s subsidiaries in 
Chile, and dates back to the late 1970s when Compañía 
Minera Disputada was privatized, acquired by the United 
States company Exxon and subsequently sold to Anglo 
American. The conflict has captured considerable public 
and media attention and raised questions as to mining and 
tax policy in Chile. How the legal battle will play out and 
what the implications might be remain to be seen.  
FDI in some natural-resource-intensive manufacturing 
sectors has also soared over the past few years. The pulp 
and paper sector has recently seen major acquisitions, such 
as Finland’s UPM-Kymmene acquisitions in Uruguay 
for US$ 2.404 billion, as well as greenfield investments. 
The Swedish/Finnish firm Stora Enso has expanded its 
footprint in Brazil and Uruguay. Initially, its strategy 
was acquisitions-based and led to a broad network of 
subsidiaries in Brazil (1998), Argentina (1998), Chile 
(1999) and Mexico (2003) that also manage operations 
15
 Another major Anglo American operation in Brazil is the US$1.9 
billion Barro Alto ferro-nickel project.
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in other countries, including Peru, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Uruguay, and in the Caribbean. Stora Enzo 
has recently adopted a natural-resource-seeking strategy 
based on alliances and joint ventures with companies 
in the region, like Odebrecht and Aracruz in Brazil and 
Arauco in Chile and Uruguay. 
So, then, investments based on a natural-resource-
seeking strategy have surged in recent years, especially 
in the mining sector. As for the hydrocarbons sector, 
after a few years of tension and conflict sparked by 
nationalizations and changes in regulatory regimes in 
certain countries, significant efforts are under way to 
attract European participation in new projects. European 
natural resource companies will have to face the growing 
presence of Chinese firms in the region, which are starting 
to invest heavily in hydrocarbons and metal mining in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and are expected to step up 
such investment in the coming years (ECLAC, 2011). The 
prospects for European investment in this area are good, 
both for hydrocarbons and for mining. New exploration 
and exploitation projects are under way in both sectors. 
And major projects (especially in mining) are slated in 
Chile, Peru and Ecuador over the coming years; European 
countries will be active participants. 
2. In search of national and regional markets for manufactures:   
 seizing opportunities brought by economic growth and a    
 growing middle class with greater purchasing power
The region’s good economic performance has, generally 
speaking, encouraged European transnationals to follow 
strategies based on the search for national and regional 
markets for manufactures.16 While conditions and trends 
vary among countries and sectors, the region’s resilience in 
the face of the international crisis —and its economic growth 
in recent years— have spurred European companies to 
expand their operations under this strategy. The appreciation 
of several Latin American currencies against the dollar 
has boosted the purchasing power of the population and, 
coupled with a growing middle class, opened significant 
business opportunities for companies whose strategy is 
to seek local and regional markets for manufactures. The 
2008 crisis and the current financial situation in Europe 
have put the brakes on some investments, especially as 
the international markets see credit tighten. Companies 
have not cut back on production capacity, but they have 
postponed or halted some expansion projects. 
European companies following this strategy are 
found in a range of manufacturing sectors, especially the 
16
 Some European investments, particularly in the automobile and 
electronics sector in Mexico, can be regarded as driven by an export-
efficiency-seeking strategy. Unilever, Siemens, BASF, Nokia and 
Volkswagen provide examples of such operations. In this section, 
such investments are viewed as part of a market-seeking strategy for 
manufactures. These operations do indeed tilt towards a search for 
local and regional markets for manufactured goods: most of them 
aim to export to the United States and Canadian market under the 
umbrella of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Relatively few European investments in the region can really be seen 
as pursuing a low-cost-seeking strategy aimed at establishing global 
export platforms. One example of this is Volkswagen’s manufacturing 
plant in the State of Puebla that assembles the Beetle model.
automobile, food and beverage, electronics, chemical, steel 
and tobacco industries. Some of these companies are among 
the major European ones in the region, as is the case with 
Volkswagen (Germany), Fiat (Italy), Peugeot Citroën and 
Renault (France) in the automobile sector; Bayer and BASF 
(Germany) in the chemical industry; Phillips (Netherlands), 
Nokia (Finland) and Siemens (Germany) in electronics; and 
Danone (France), Parmalat (Italy), Heineken (Netherlands), 
Anheuser-Busch (Belgium), Carlsberg (Denmark), Unilever 
and British American Tobacco (United Kingdom) in food, 
beverages and tobacco (see table II.3). Many of these 
companies were early internationalizers and have been 
operating in the region for decades. European companies 
have tended to focus on the larger economies (Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina), but many of their operations there supply 
other countries in the region. In recent years, European 
firms following this strategy have benefited from the good 
economic performance and lower volatility posted by a 
number of countries in the region, such as Panama (8.8% 
average GDP growth over the past five years), Peru (7.1%), 
Argentina (6.9%), Uruguay (6.5%), the Dominican Republic 
(5.9%) and Paraguay (5.6%). Brazil, with its vast market, 
has been a preferred destination for these investments. 
One of the distinguishing features of European 
manufacturing investments in the region is that they are 
more slanted towards greenfield projects than investments 
from other countries are. Official data on FDI cannot be 
disaggregated between greenfield investments and acquisitions, 
but information on cross-border investment projects gives an 
idea of the share going to greenfield investment. Between 
2003 and 2006, European Union companies were involved 
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in 32% of greenfield projects; the percentage climbed to 
45% between 2007 and 2011 (see figure II.12).17 
Figure II.12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SUMS ASSOCIATED WITH 
NEW FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROJECTS ANNOUNCED  
IN MANUFACTURING, BY ORIGIN, 2003-2011 
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
The automobile sector has attracted considerable 
European investment over the past decade, especially in 
Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico and Argentina 
(ECLAC, 2010). At the forefront have been European 
companies that internationalized early in the region, like 
Volkswagen18 and Fiat; there are also relative newcomers, 
including Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citroën. In Brazil, 
where attractive innovations such as flex-fuel engines have 
been developed, automobile company strategy is to tap the 
local and regional market on the strength of their compact 
vehicles (ECLAC, 2010). Research and development 
activities at subsidiaries in Brazil are an increasingly 
important part of global innovation strategies pursued by 
their parent companies (see section D). There are many 
factors behind Brazil’s emergence as a destination for 
such investments; among the strongest are soaring local 
demand and regional integration through MERCOSUR. 
By contrast, European companies operating in Mexico 
(chiefly, Volkswagen) are following export-oriented 
strategies targeting, above all, the United States under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).19 
17
 Between 2003 and 2011, Brazil and Mexico received 38% and 
24%, respectively, of the new jobs associated with greenfield 
projects in manufactures. Argentina and Chile received 9% and 
6%, respectively.  
18
 Volkswagen turns out 1.3 million vehicles in the region 
—nearly 20% of its worldwide output— mainly in Brazil 
(11%) and Mexico (6%).  
19
 Fiat produces the Fiat 500 model in Toluca, Mexico.
Fiat and PSA Peugeot-Citroën have production plants 
in Argentina as well; these operations seek to leverage 
MERCOSUR and production complementarities with 
other subsidiaries in Brazil. 
European companies are investing heavily in the 
automobile industry in the region. Renault is to invest US$ 
285 million in expansion projects in Brazil between 2012 
and 2016. Volkswagen has announced US$ 400 million 
in projects for producing its new Beetle model at its plant 
in the State of Puebla in Mexico and will invest nearly 
US$ 4.5 billion in its four production plants in Brazil. 
Volkswagen announced it will invest some US$120 million 
in a new production line to make gearboxes in Argentina. 
PSA Peugeot-Citroën said that it plans to invest US$ 960 
million in Brazil during 2012-2015; this announcement 
underscored the increasing importance of the company’s 
operations in Brazil as it drastically restructures its European 
operations, cutting more than 6,000 jobs.
European companies have been very active in the steel 
sector, as well, especially in Brazil —drawn by that country’s 
ranking as the leading producer of iron ore in the world— 
and Mexico (ECLAC, 2010). Nevertheless, the 2008 crisis 
forced some firms to put off projects. ArcelorMittal, the 
leading European company in the sector, has made major 
acquisitions, including the Lázaro Cárdenas steel company 
in Mexico, as well as greenfield investments (especially in 
Brazil). ArcelorMittal is unique in the industry because it 
combines a high degree of internationalization with a widely 
diversified product mix. Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Steel 
and Franco/German Vallourec are other European steel 
companies with substantial operations in the region (mostly 
in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico). Among the high-
profile projects is the creation of Companhia Siderúrgica 
do Atlântico in Rio de Janeiro under a strategic alliance 
between ThyssenKrupp Steel and Brazil’s Vale, involving 
more than US$ 6 billion. The company’s production capacity, 
at five million tons of steel slabs, means that a large share 
of crude steel will be produced outside Germany for the 
first time. The 2008 crisis forced this company, too, to put 
off some investment projects (ECLAC, 2009). 
European transnationals have also made major 
acquisitions in the food and beverage sector in Mexico, 
Colombia and Brazil. Heineken (Netherlands) bought the 
beer operations of Mexico’s Grupo Femsa, and Interbrew 
(Belgium) bought AmBev in Brazil; these operations 
totalled more than US$ 1 billion. Italy’s Parmalat and the 
French company Danone are two major players in the food 
sector. European company investments and operations in the 
electronics sector are concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. 
Some of these companies, such as Siemens (Germany) are 
leaders in innovation and R&D (see section D). 
Some European firms, including France’s Louis 
Dreyfus, have made acquisitions in the chemical industry 
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in Brazil. The cosmetics and cleaning product sector is a 
traditional target for European corporate investment in the 
region, both through acquisitions and through greenfield 
projects. Germany’s Henkel has two regional facilities 
(in Mexico and Brazil); it is following an acquisition-
based strategy focused on Mexico. Over the past decade 
Henkel bought Salgado, Desc, Mas and Alba Adhesivos 
(Henkel, 2011). France’s L’Oréal has followed a strategy 
combining acquisitions and greenfield investments. Over 
the past decade it has acquired several companies in the 
region (Colorama in Brazil and Miss Ylang in Argentina) 
and has implemented significant greenfield projects as 
well. In 2001, L’Oréal announced a new manufacturing 
plant in Mexico that will supply the United States and 
Canadian market (L’Oréal, 2011).
European companies whose strategy is to seek local 
and regional markets for manufactures have, then, been 
very active in recent years. These firms have benefited from 
the region’s good economic performance, lower volatility 
and growing purchasing power. It bears noting that behind 
this generalization lie many national situations, as well as 
specificities at the sector and individual company level. 
3. In search of service markets: the region goes from loss-maker to  
 lifeline during the crisis
Starting in the 1990s, structural reforms and, above all, 
the wide-ranging privatization of State assets ushered 
in a new era for FDI and for European companies 
operating in service subsectors in the region. Investment 
in telecommunications, energy, banking and infrastructure 
jumped, usually linked to the purchase of State assets or 
subsequent intra-company purchases of previously public 
assets. This was particularly relevant for Spanish firms,20 
but some Portuguese, French and Italian companies were 
involved as well. European companies were involved in 
some of the largest acquisitions in the region, making them 
leaders in their markets. Spanish firms in particular saw 
in the region an opportunity for needed growth as Spain 
faced new patterns of competition following its entry into 
the European Union (ECLAC, 2002). At the head of this 
process was a handful of major companies: Telefónica 
in telecommunications, Endesa in energy and the banks 
Santander and BBVA in the financial sector. Other European 
firms with a high profile in the region are Vivendi and 
Telecom Italia in telecommunications and Enel, Électricité 
de France (EDF) and Unión Fenosa in energy.  
But the early 2000s were rough for European companies 
—especially for Spanish firms. The Argentine crisis of 2001 
dealt a severe blow to companies that were operating in a 
regulated environment. Many were forced to consolidate 
20
 Between 2000 and 2010, 86% of Spanish FDI in the region went 
to the service sector. This process started in the 1990s, when large 
Spanish companies (medium-sized in European and global terms) 
were forced into an active international expansion strategy in order 
to become more competitive and avoid hostile takeover by their 
European competitors. To this end they drew on massive surpluses 
generated in the local market thanks to their natural monopoly status 
in some sectors and the booming stock market, enabling them to 
raise capital for funding ambitious expansion plans.
the heavy outlays they had made, by restructuring principal 
subsidiaries in the region. The decade also brought problems 
in the wake of regulatory changes that shifted patterns of 
competition in some sectors, especially in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and the Plurinational State of Bolivia; 
this impacted the operations and investments of some 
European companies. The situation has changed substantially 
in recent years, however. Companies have begun to benefit 
from the region’s good economic performance and growing 
political and regulatory stability, and from rising demand 
for services on the part of a population whose purchasing 
power is growing. Privatizations have come to an end; the 
acquisitions that are taking place are linked to corporate 
positioning strategies. The main problems in investing in 
service sectors have to do with the regulatory environment 
and patterns of competition in individual countries. This 
is increasingly challenging the capacity and objectives 
of the region’s regulatory agencies overseeing services 
such as telecommunications and energy.21  
The operations of major European companies in the 
service sector are now in a phase marked by greater stability 
and consolidation; most of them are following strategies for 
the long run. Instead of major acquisitions and subsequent 
sale of assets, the priority is to consolidate through long-
term strategies, develop economies of scale and gain market 
share with high profit margins in order to ensure a solid 
global position. For some companies (especially Spanish 
21
  See chapter IV for a more detailed discussion of the energy sector 
and new ventures on the part of European companies in the field 
of renewable and non-conventional energies. For an assessment of 
FDI and business strategies in the telecommunications sector, see 
ECLAC (2011 and 2008). For the tourism and software sectors, 
see ECLAC (2009 and 2011), respectively.
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ones), expanding in Latin America and the Caribbean was 
key for acquiring know-how and experience and becoming 
major transnationals. Firms like Telefónica were thus able 
to extend their internationalization to other regions. 
Map II.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRATEGIC HUBS AND 
DIRECTION OF INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION  









Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
The Latin American and Caribbean subsidiaries of 
major Spanish companies are highly independent, but they 
are also subject to stringent financing and local management 
requirements. The high profitability of their operations 
in the region is contributing a good deal to their global 
profitability, and it has helped their parent companies 
improve their balance sheets and better weather the financial 
crisis. For example, 60% of Telefónica’s approximately 
US$ 22 billion in operating income before depreciation 
and amortization (OIBDA) for 2010 came from operations 
in the region (see figure II.13). The OIBDA margin for its 
operations in Latin America was 53%; for its operations in 
Spain and the rest of Europe the figure was 45% and 26%, 
respectively (Telefónica, 2011). Operating income from 
the Latin American operations of the banks Santander and 
BBVA accounted for 54% and 48% of the total, respectively 
(see chapter III). Endesa (acquired in 2009 by Italy’s Enel) 
reported global operating income on the order of US$ 7 
billion in 2010; more than 50% was generated in the region. 
The situation varies among sectors and companies, 
but their operations in the region are positive for the major 
Spanish companies, especially in view of the current global 
economic environment and, particularly, the situation in Spain. 
The prospects for major Spanish corporate investments in 
the region are promising; Latin America and the Caribbean 
is likely to continue to account for a growing share of their 
operations (IE Business School, 2012). 
  
Figure II.13 
SPANISH TRANSNATIONALS: OPERATING INCOME BEFORE 
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION, 2010  
(Millions of dollars and percentages)














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of annual reports of the respective companies.
In recent years, several factors have led European 
companies to set up or expand operations in service 
subsectors in the region. Some of these factors are good 
economic performance, a young demographic structure 
and higher purchasing power in segments of the population 
where there is space for market growth, along with 
significant infrastructure gaps in the region. This process 
has taken place in sectors with a long-standing European 
presence, such as retail and tourism (ECLAC, 2011), and 
in relatively new ones that include construction, logistics 
and financial activities (insurance). The European presence 
has diversified in terms of sectors, and the number of 
companies with operations in the region has surged. 
The new companies are relatively small compared with 
those that first established operations in the region, and 
the amounts invested are smaller, too, but it is clear that 
Latin America and the Caribbean is well positioned as an 
attractive destination for European companies. 
French and Portuguese investments in the retail sector 
have a long history and a substantial footprint in the region. 
Key examples are France’s Carrefour and Casino, and 
Portugal’s Sonae. The Carrefour group has an extensive 
worldwide presence; in the region, it operates through 
more than one thousand stores in Argentina, Colombia 
and Brazil. The only regions where its sales grew in 
2011 were Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, 
particularly China. Sonae’s strategy has been to position 
itself globally based on alliances with local companies. 
In Brazil (the main destination for its investments in the 
region), Sonae has joined forces with Enplanta Engenharia 
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in managing shopping centres in several cities (ECLAC, 
2007). Studies show that this sector has good potential 
for investment growth in the coming years, especially in 
Uruguay, Chile and Brazil (ATKearney, 2011).  
In the construction sector, several European companies 
(mostly Spanish, such as Sacyr Vallehermoso, Acciona, 
ACS and Ferrovial, but some German ones, too) have been 
setting up operations in the region. Significant business 
opportunities and wide-ranging concession programmes 
in the region have drawn these Spanish firms to set up 
operations and thus offset the construction industry’s 
situation in their home market. In 2006, Sacyr acquired a 
50% stake in Europistas, a highway concession operator 
with operations in Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica.
Other service sectors that have been a significant draw 
for European companies are logistics, media, financial 
services (see chapter III) and casinos. The German global 
logistics firm DHL has a large footprint in the region. In 
recent years, facing substantial increases in the price of fuel, 
an essential input for its operations, DHL has restructured 
drastically and consolidated its operations worldwide. In 
Europe, it dramatically cut back its investment plans. By 
contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean DHL has 
stepped up its investments in the light of good prospects 
for market growth in the next few years. It has a pipeline of 
several greenfield projects in the region; in 2008 it opened 
two new operating hubs (one in Panama and one in Mexico), 
four sales centres in Brazil and a customer service centre 
in Argentina. In 2009, DHL opened, in Mexico, its most 
advanced dispatch port and call center in the region. And 
the media subsector is seeing investments from companies 
that are not global heavyweights but do, like Spain’s PRISA 
group, have a dominant position in the region. 
On the other hand, investments in certain financial 
sectors reveal the difficulties that some European companies 
have encountered in the region and that have, in a few 
cases, even forced them out of their market position. For 
example, the commercial banking, investment management 
and insurance group ING (Netherlands) had operations in 
Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Mexico and Chile and a positioning 
strategy including acquisitions, expansion projects and 
alliances with domestic firms (like Peru’s AFP Integra 
pension fund manager). In Argentina, ING acquired 
Orígenes AFJP and Orígenes Seguros de Retiro in 2007. 
But ING was hit hard by the crisis and decided to divest 
all of its investments in the Latin American insurance 
sector by 2013. The goal is to scale down and focus on 
the European market. ING assets in the region, including 
those in Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, 
were purchased by Colombia’s Grupo Suramericana for 
US$ 3.6 billion. ING’s decision is linked to the terms of 
a sizeable loan from the Government of the Netherlands 
during the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis, then, has 
forced the company to virtually withdraw from the Latin 
American market, although it will maintain its commercial 
banking operations in Mexico. 
In the gambling casino sector, the Spanish group 
Codere is pursuing an active expansion strategy in the 
region, issuing bonds to fund new acquisitions and, 
potentially, listing its operations in the region on the stock 
market. Noteworthy among its acquisitions is the takeover 
of CIE Las Américas in Mexico in 2012.
European transnationals have a large and, in some 
cases, long-standing presence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This makes it hard to list all of the economic and 
social impacts of their operations in the region, although 
some can be highlighted (see table II.4). Investments 
associated with natural-resource-seeking strategies have 
had a substantial impact on exports, especially in the 
countries of South America. Such operations promote job 
creation in non-urban areas and in related infrastructure, 
thus improving social inclusion in isolated communities. 
Among the issues that have surfaced are their minimal 
production integration with the local economy, problems 
with local communities and environmental pollution. 
European investments under a strategy to seek markets 
for manufactures also have socioeconomic impacts. They 
include rising exports (automobile industry), the creation 
of jobs and production linkages (food and beverages, 
chemicals, automobile industry), innovation, R&D and 
technology transfer (automobiles and electronics) (see 
section D), as well as enhanced production and export 
capacity thanks to European corporate investments 
in greenfield manufacturing projects. Many of these 
investments are associated with creating and building 
capacity and generating highly skilled jobs in the region, 
especially in Brazil. Challenges and issues have to do with 
insufficient linkages, dependence on imported inputs and 
low value added in some areas (assembly operations in 
Mexico, for example), low labour intensity (due in part to 
the nature of individual sectors, such as the steel industry) 
and environmental pollution (chemicals) (see table II.4). 
Investments under service-market-seeking strategies are 
increasing the population’s access to telecommunications 
(ECLAC, 2011) and electric power (see chapter IV). This 
has clearly boosted social inclusion (by, for example, 
widespread electrification and greater access to and use 
of information and communication technologies), but 
there are still marked divides because services such as 
telecommunications and banking are concentrated in medium 
and high socioeconomic segments. The main issues and 
difficulties here have to do with regulatory frameworks 
in individual countries and sectors (see chapter IV for 
the power and renewable and non-conventional energy 
sector) and negative impacts on the environment and on 
indigenous communities. In the banking sector, private 
investment is having a crowding-out effect on local and 
development banks (see chapter III). 
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Some of these traits show the nature of European 
FDI and the spheres in which it promotes social inclusion 
in the region. In those sectors where difficulties and 
issues arise, the countries need to improve their 
regulatory frameworks and the fit between European 
investments and reality in Latin America, promote 
the benefits and potential of FDI and the corporate 
stock of knowledge while ensuring environmentally 
friendly investment and compliance with environmental 
protection standards. 
D. European transnationals and research  
 and development
Transnational companies from the European Union have 
such a wide footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean 
that it is hard to catalogue them all. However, as seen 
below, their research and development activities are 
very important for the region. This section first discusses 
the internationalization of R&D, the role that European 
transnationals are playing in the process and how Latin 
America and the Caribbean is positioned. It then looks 
at European corporate R&D in the region as a key to 
assessing the most powerful and permanent impacts of FDI. 
1. Transnational companies and the internationalization of research  
 and development: the region is not the prime destination  
 for European companies
Over the past few decades, globalization has woven a 
tighter fabric of global interdependence; transnational 
companies and technological change are at the centre of 
the process. These companies are a driving force behind 
the internationalization of innovation and R&D (UNCTAD, 
2005).22 They are seeking to improve the use of existing 
assets so as to leverage their competitive advantages in 
response to international market scenarios. And they have 
a strategic rationale: boost their own capacities and thereby 
create, absorb or internalize new technological assets (Narula 
and Zanfei, 2008; Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen, 2004). 
In this setting, the factors that transnationals weigh when 
deciding where to locate their R&D centres, especially 
when developing countries are involved, include market 
potential and the quality of human resources, cooperation 
with other agents in the national innovation system and 
intellectual property regimes.  
In the past decade, transnational companies have stepped 
up investments in R&D outside their home country (Hall, 
22
 Corporate R&D may be defined as work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, and the use of this 
stock of knowledge to devise new applications. It includes basic 
research, applied research and experimental development (OECD, 
2002). It has been estimated that the 700 major transnationals 
account for 70% of private spending on R&D. 
2010), for a variety of reasons. Among them are stiffer 
global competition and the need for companies to acquire, 
generate and tailor their matrix of capacities as conditions 
change; the nature of and advances in information and 
communication technologies in various stages of development 
(which has helped scale back the minimum size of R&D 
laboratories), growing opportunities for companies to partner 
with other agents (such as universities) as they seek to tap 
into complementarities; and the increasing availability of 
skilled human capital in emerging countries (Moncada-
Paternò-Castello, Vivarelli and Voigt, 2011). 
The share of spending that European transnationals 
allocated to R&D jumped from 26% in 1995 to 44% in 
2004. Japanese transnationals went from 5% to 11% and 
United States transnationals from 23% to 32% (OECD, 
2005). Many greenfield projects associated with R&D 
centres are being located outside these companies’ home 
countries —increasingly in the emerging countries of Asia, 
especially China and India. R&D spending in Asian countries 
has surpassed European Union levels and is expected to top 
United States levels in the next few years thanks primarily to 
marked increases in China (Goldman Sachs, 2010). 
There are several ways to class R&D centres at 
subsidiaries of transnational companies in emerging 
countries. Borini, Oliveira and Guevara (2005) group them 
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as follows: (i) traditional subsidiaries, where decision-
making and innovation are more centralized at the parent 
company; (ii) subsidiaries with limited relevance, where 
innovation is implemented from the parent company 
but the subsidiary is more integrated in global business 
networks and has more potential for playing a strategic role; 
and (iii) strategically relevant subsidiaries with strategic 
competencies and more decision-making autonomy, 
where patterns of innovation can be parent-to-subsidiary 
or vice versa (global-local or local-global, respectively). 
Obviously, the flow of knowledge between parent 
company and subsidiaries (and thus the flow of benefits 
to FDI recipient countries) depends on the nature of the 
subsidiaries and on the rationale for internationalizing 
R&D. The more the rationale has to do with better using 
and exploiting technology assets and existing capacities 
at the firm, the greater the flow of knowledge from parent 
company to subsidiaries. Conversely, where R&D is being 
internationalized to create and absorb new knowledge, the 
greater the flow of knowledge from subsidiaries to parent 
company will be (Narula and Zanfei, 2008).    
The benefits of internationalizing R&D for the home 
country and the recipient country encompass several dimensions 
(see table II.5). Potential benefits for the recipient country 
include local technical capacity building, highly skilled jobs, 
human resource development and productivity spillovers 
(through demonstration and competition effects). Potential 
benefits for home economies involve access to new sources 
of knowledge and expertise, greater and better access to 
external markets, new knowledge to be harnessed in home 
markets and longer product life cycles. On a more general 
level, R&D at transnational companies is shaped by the 
nature of the subsidiaries —something that the empirical and 
theoretical literature on the impacts of FDI and transnational 
companies on developing countries has been examining 
more closely in the past decade (see box II.2). 
Table II.5 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES: DRIVING FACTORS AND MAIN IMPACTS OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION  
OF CORPORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
Potential impacts On host country On home country
Potentialities
- More linkages and increased local technical capability
- Productivity increase
- Highly skilled jobs and job training
- Increased R&D by domestic companies
- Sales growth
- Knowledge and economic spillovers (demonstration and 
competition effects)
- Access to other sources of knowledge and expertise
- Enhanced access to foreign markets (sales growth)
- Results of R&D done abroad may be exploited  
at home
- Longer product life cycle
Risks
- Foreign control over domestic R&D resources
- Delocalization of activities
- Decrease in R&D impact when/if their links with production 
get weaker 
- Loss of technical capability
- Loss of jobs in the short-term
- Negative impact on industrial diversification
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of P. Moncada-Paternò-Castello, M. Vivarelli and P. Voigt, “Drivers and impacts in the 
globalization of corporate R&D: an introduction based on the European experience”, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 20, No. 2, 2011.
Box II.2 
IMPACT OF FDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIARIES 
The impact of FDI in developing countries 
has always been a controversial issue 
involving the capacities and characteristics 
of transnational companies, the absorption 
capacity of recipient economies and 
their national innovation systems and 
complementarities with local investment, 
among other factors (Cohen, 2007).a This 
being the case, empirical and theoretical 
studies are focusing more and more 
on the characteristics of subsidiaries 
because they can determine how FDI 
impacts the generation of linkages and 
the enhancement of productivity in the 
local economy. These characteristics 
refer to key factors, such as corporate 
strategy and sector of activity, and to 
others that include technological capacity, 
interconnection with the global value chain 
and integration in knowledge networks. 
These characteristics of subsidiaries also 
apply to potential R&D activities, albeit in 
a broader sense and referring to company 
operations as a whole.  
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European transnationals have shown a strong 
preference for the countries of Asia and the Pacific in 
the process of internationalizing R&D. Between 2003 
and 2010, 39% of R&D investment went to that region 
(see figure II.14). The leading destinations are China, 
India y Singapore (see figure II.16). During that same 
period, the United States and Canada (chiefly, the 
United States), were at the receiving end of 22% of 
R&D investment. Latin America and the Caribbean 
were a minor destination for European transnational 
R&D investments, receiving just 10%.23
23
 Figure II.A-3 lists the most important reasons considered by European 
companies when locating R&D activities outside their home 
country: access to specialized services, availability of researchers 
and proximity to operations conducted by other companies. But 
the reason most often cited for locating R&D in the home country 
is the low cost of researchers. 
Figure II.14 
EUROPEAN UNION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a
 For a discussion of how to assess the impacts of FDI and transnational companies on developing countries, see box I.1 in ECLAC (2011).
Corporate strategies seeking local 
markets and those seeking export efficiency 
have different linkage effects. FDI with a 
market-seeking strategy generates more 
linkages and jobs because high-quality 
inputs are less relevant and companies 
following such a strategy generally operate 
in sectors with greater local-content 
requirements, such as the food industry. 
Firms following export-efficiency-seeking 
strategies generate relatively few linkages 
because their input quality and cost 
requirements are high (Tavares and Young, 
2005). But it is also intuitive to think that the 
linkages effectively generated by operations 
seeking efficiency tend to be deeper and 
thus yield more in terms of product and 
process upgrading. It is therefore useful to 
distinguish between the breadth of linkages 
generated (which is greater in a market-
seeking strategy) and their depth when 
they are generated (which is greater when 
the strategy is to seek export efficiency). 
Technological capacities at subsidiaries 
can also help explain the impacts of 
transnational companies. Subsidiaries 
are more than just a replica of the parent 
company; they have, just to a certain extent, 
some of the advantages of a transnational 
company on top of their own technological 
activities and their own capacities and 
competencies that shape any linkage 
creation, spillover or technology transfer 
process (Marín and Bell, 2004). 
The value chains of which subsidiaries 
are a part can be dispersed or concentrated. 
In dispersed value chains, transnationals 
configure their value chain as a mini-
replica of the parent company. The 
interdependence of subsidiary and parent 
company activities is likely to be low, as 
is the risk of enhancing local linkages, so 
the expectation would be greater creation 
of jobs and linkages. On the other hand, 
transnationals can have concentrated value 
chains, with few activities at each location 
(Hansen, Pedersen and Petersen, 2008). 
Here, there is little incentive to generate 
linkages. But if the linkages are indeed 
generated and inputs sourced locally, 
greater upgrading of employment and 
local content is to be expected. 
Transnational parent-subsidiary 
coordination and degree of subsidiary 
independence are also useful for 
determining the existence of linkages 
and job creation (Marín and Arza, 2009). 
The more autonomy a subsidiary has to 
set up a supplier and product development 
system, the greater the linkages and job 
creation will be. But once the linkages 
have been generated they tend to be 
stronger —and the flows of knowledge 
greater— when subsidiaries are more 
highly integrated and coordinated with the 
parent company (Fosgren, 2002).
 There is empirical evidence that 
these factors are useful for understanding 
the impacts of FDI and transnational 
companies in the region. For example, 
Marín and Bell (2004) and Giuliani and 
Marín (2007) show that the existence 
of subsidiaries in Argentine industry 
does not ensure spillovers for domestic 
companies, but rather that the capacities 
and knowledge accumulated at the 
subsidiaries themselves are the source 
of productivity spillovers. In a study of a 
small number of assembly operations in 
Mexico, Sargent and Matthews (2006) 
show that greater responsibility inside 
a transnational’s network is acquired 
through business effort by the subsidiaries’ 
managers rather than being guaranteed by 
the parent company. Giuliani (2008) looks 
at technology transfers in investments 
in high-tech sectors in Costa Rica. The 
results suggest that subsidiaries tend to 
not transfer knowledge to local companies, 
even if linkages are established. The 
greatest transfer of knowledge takes place 
between high-tech subsidiaries. 
In short, the factors to bear in mind 
are (in addition to the sector in which the 
transnational operates and the corporate 
strategy it follows) the capacities and 
characteristics of its subsidiaries in areas 
such as technological capacity and R&D, 
integration and independence in a global 
value chain, coordination with the parent 
company or other business areas, and 
integration with other knowledge networks. 
Box II.2 (concluded)
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2. Innovation and research and development at subsidiaries of   
 European companies in the region: Brazil consolidates  
 its leadership
Innovation and R&D at transnational companies, whether 
they are based in Europe or elsewhere, have varying degrees 
of relevance among the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Although statistical evidence at the microdata 
level is not strictly comparable from one country to 
another, covers different periods and sectors and has its 
own limitations, it does cast some light on the issue when 
larger economies are involved. Subsidiaries of transnational 
companies in Brazil and Argentina figure relatively heavily in 
manufacturing innovation and R&D. In Brazil, subsidiaries 
of transnationals account for 35% of sales and some 47% 
of spending on R&D. In Argentina, they make up nearly 
50% of R&D spending (De Negri and Laplane, 2009). In 
Brazil and Argentina, transnationals account for nearly 
42% of overall spending on innovation.24 By contrast, in 
Mexico and Chile transnational companies play a smaller 
role in innovation and R&D. In the case of Chile, statistical 
information for 2005 suggests that transnational companies 
are spending more on R&D but still account for a relatively 
low share, in the area of 12% (Vergara, 2012). In Mexico, 
subsidiaries of transnationals account for some 25% of 
R&D spending (De Negri and Laplane, 2009). 
Information from microdata on these countries does not 
show how much can be attributed to European transnationals, 
but information on cross-border R&D projects in the region 
yields some data in this regard: 64% of cross-border investment 
linked to R&D projects comes from the European Union (see 
figure II.15). These activities are important as a mechanism 
for generating technology and knowledge transfer to the 
production structure, enhanced local technical capacity, 
productivity spillovers and highly-skilled jobs, among other 
things. R&D is highly concentrated in Brazil (ECLAC, 2011), 
the only country in the region that European companies see as 
a prime location for such activities (see figure II.16). The chief 
destinations for European cross-border investments in R&D 
are the United States (18%), China (16%) and India (10%). 
Traditionally, R&D at Brazilian subsidiaries of 
transnational companies has focused on developing and 
tailoring products and technology for the local market and, in 
some cases, for the regional market. After the deregulations 
that took place in the 1990s, subsidiaries cut back sharply 
on local technology and innovation activities (Cassiolato, 
24
  Corporate spending on innovation breaks down into R&D, acquisition 
of machinery and equipment, purchase of knowledge from external 
agents (licenses are one example) and workforce training. 
Lastres and Szapiro, 2001). But over the past decade 
Brazil has been taking on an increasingly more prominent 
role in the global R&D strategies pursued by European 
transnationals. Compared with local companies, subsidiaries 
of transnationals in Brazil are more innovation-oriented 
and invest more in R&D (Franco and Quadros, 2004). New 
R&D projects are flowing into subsidiaries in the giant of 
Latin America, enhancing the technology content of their 
operations and yielding R&D that is more sophisticated and 
integrated with global innovation patterns at their parent 
companies, especially in the automobile and electronics 
sectors (Reddy, 2011).25 According to the classification 
devised by Borini, Oliveira and Guevara (2005), there 
are examples of traditional subsidiaries, subsidiaries with 
limited relevance and strategically relevant subsidiaries.  
Figure II.15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SUMS ASSOCIATED WITH 
NEW FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROJECTS ANNOUNCED IN 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, BY ORIGIN, 2003-2010 
(Percentages)







Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
The automobile industry is one of the sectors that have seen 
the largest increase in R&D in Brazil and where subsidiaries 
have made the biggest efforts in terms of capacity building 
for product innovation (Reddy, 2011). Assembly operations 
and auto parts manufacturers alike have enhanced local 
engineering, stepped up hiring, opened laboratories, formalized 
product development processes and ratcheted up workforce 
training (Costa, 2005). Subsidiaries of European companies 
25
 The pharmaceutical industry has followed a different path; only a 
handful of transnationals are doing R&D in Brazil.   
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have played a significant role in this and are increasingly 
involved in global product innovation. One example is the 
accumulation of capacities and competencies in developing 
suspension systems (Volkswagen is a case in point) and 
small flex-fuel engines (up to 1000 cubic centimetres) in a 
compact-car oriented market (ECLAC, 2010). 
Figure II.16 
EUROPEAN UNION: SUMS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN RESEARCH AND 


















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
For innovation, though, European subsidiaries in 
Brazil have followed different strategies. Firms that are 
relatively new to the market (like France’s Renault and PSA 
Peugeot-Citroën) have pursued a centralized innovation 
strategy. Their strategy depends on the technological 
capacities of the parent company, as happens with many 
traditional subsidiaries. Companies that have been in Brazil 
longer (such as Volkswagen and Fiat) have followed a 
relatively decentralized strategy where subsidiaries have 
begun to partner with their parent companies on strategies 
for worldwide product innovation. Over the past decade, 
Fiat has stepped up investments in laboratories, facilities 
and workforce and upgraded the technology used in its 
operations (Quadros and Consoni, 2009). Some of its 
activities are globally oriented. Volkswagen’s product 
development unit does not have a global mandate: its 
focus is on creating and tailoring models for emerging 
countries. Both examples fit the definition of subsidiaries 
with limited relevance, where R&D has been oriented 
towards designing regional products from global platforms.
The strategy followed by Volkswagen’s truck and bus 
division is among the examples of greatest product development 
and capacity-building autonomy.26 The Resende, Rio de Janeiro 
26 In December 2008, Germany’s MAN acquired the Volkswagen 
truck and bus division. In July 2011 Volkswagen bought a 54% 
shareholding in MAN. Volkswagen plans to merge Scania and 
MAN to create the largest truck manufacturing company.
plant is the group’s first completely independent operation; 
Volkswagen is in charge of product design, engineering, 
supply chain management, quality control and marketing. 
The plant is laid out in modular units, where the suppliers 
assemble not only the modules but the final product as well, 
with substantial process innovation (Quadros and Consoni, 
2009). Volkswagen’s truck division gains relevant global 
strategic positioning from its subsidiary.
In other manufacturing sectors, such as steel and 
chemicals, European companies are also making a considerable 
contribution to innovation and R&D. The Brazilian subsidiary 
of the British steel company Foseco plays a crucial role in 
the company’s global strategy. Foseco has operations in more 
than 30 countries and is well positioned in a range of industry 
segments. One of the company’s four global excellence 
centres is in Brazil; it has developed major innovations in 
smelting that exemplify the innovations that the Brazilian 
market has contributed to the global market (Borini Oliveira 
and Guevara, 2005). The French chemicals company Rhodia, 
which has two manufacturing plants in Brazil, has one of 
its five worldwide R&D centres there. These centres make 
up a global work network; many projects receive support 
from other centres. The overarching goal is to offer products 
tailored to the region’s markets, although some products 
developed in Brazil are for the rest of the world as well. 
The company works closely with universities, especially 
Campinas University (Reddy, 2011).  
Other European companies have been building up 
their operations in Brazil over long periods of time. One 
example is Germany’s Alpha, which manufactures specific 
applications and has subsidiaries in Brazil, Switzerland, 
Austria, the United States and China. Fourteen percent of 
its workforce is now in Brazil. At first, during the 1970s, 
the Brazilian subsidiary only assembled modular equipment 
and required minimal skills from its workers (Schreiber 
and Pincherio, 2009). As operations consolidated and the 
subsidiary built up its capacities, the company upgraded 
its operations technologically. By the 1980s the Brazilian 
subsidiary had become a domestic and regional supply 
hub, but it still did not conduct R&D. In the late 1990s, 
prompted by environmental requirements instead of a 
strategic decision, the company started investing in R&D 
in Brazil. This led to a substantial exchange of employees 
between the parent company and the subsidiary, boosting 
the company’s global capacity. The subsidiary has continued 
to take on greater responsibility and autonomy to face 
new R&D challenges (Schreiber and Pincherio, 2009).
In the telecommunications sector, subsidiaries of 
transnationals seem to be less involved in innovation. 
Several ICT sector initiatives have promoted local R&D 
and have attracted substantial investment on the part of 
European companies such as Ericsson and Siemens. But 
the subsidiaries of European transnationals have not been 
involved in implementing global innovations (Camillo, 
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Galina and Consoni, 2008, 2004).27 Siemens could be an 
exception in the industry: in 2005, Siemens Brazil had more 
than a thousand employees (direct and indirect) working 
on R&D and engineering; it is partnering with a number of 
universities and research centres. The prime objective is to 
develop and tailor products for the local market. However, 
these operations do not seem to be heavily integrated with 
the company’s global R&D efforts (Reddy, 2011). 
A number of R&D projects are currently under way; 
they are in high technology- and knowledge-content 
sectors such as chemicals, automobiles, biotechnology, 
and oil (see table II.6). Brazil has built up substantial 
apacities in these sectors; much of the R&D conducted 
by foreign firms is done jointly with local companies and 
universities. There is evidence that R&D at subsidiaries 
of transnationals encourages innovation and spending on
27
 The information technologies act of 1991, updated in 2001 and 2003, 
provides incentives for R&D for companies that meet requirements 
such as investing at least 5% of sales revenue in R&D and partnering 
with universities and research centres. It is estimated that between 
1998 and 2008 this law led to US$ 3.8 billion in R&D investment 
by some 280 companies. But it does not seem to have enhanced 
the value added of local supply chains or built up technological 
and scientific capacity.     
R&D by local companies, thanks to demonstration and 
competition effects (Araujo, 2004).
So, then, transnational companies —European 
transnationals in particular— account for much of the 
innovation and R&D activities and spending in Brazil.28 
They promote capacity building, technology transfer, 
human capital development and innovation among local 
companies. Transnational company operations thus have 
dynamic effects on the production structure. It is not by 
chance that out of all the countries of the region Brazil 
has the most proactive industrial policy for promoting 
capacity building and encouraging innovation and change 
in the production structure. Focusing on the link between 
industrial policy and innovation involving transnational 
corporate FDI should be a priority in order to promote 
the permanent benefits of these capital flows. 
28
 Among the problems that are holding back R&D at transnationals 
in Brazil are logistics and infrastructure issues and some shortages 
of skilled labour.
Table II.6 
BRAZIL: EUROPEAN COMPANIES WITH RECENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS  
(Millions of dollars)
Rank-ing Year Company Home country Sector Description Investment 
1 2011 BG Group United 
Kingdom
Oil and gas BG Group has plans to invest in a new R&D centre in São Paulo as part 
of a plan for investing US$ 10 billion in Brazil by 2020. 
1 900
2 2011 Siemens Germany Oil and gas A research centre to be set up in Rio de Janeiro will be operated jointly 
with the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. The project is part of a 
plan to invest a total of US$ 600 million in Brazil. Centre start-up date: 
late 2012.
50
3 2010 Merck Germany Biotechnology Merck, which supplies products, services and technology to 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms, opened a technology centre in 
Alphaville (São Paulo) to meet the research and training needs of 
laboratories in Latin America. 
45
4 2008 Mahle Germany Automobile The Mahle Group opened a new technology centre in Jundiaí (São 
Paulo). It will be the base for the firm’s R&D and engineering operations 
in Latin America; most of the staff will be engineers, researchers and 
highly skilled technicians. 
42
5 2011 Ericsson Sweden Communications A new innovation centre is to be set up to supplement R&D operations 
in the region. The centre will partner with Brazilian universities on 
general solutions, prototype design, personalization and mobile and 
fixed communications. 
30
6 2010 CGGVeritas France Software CGGVeritas opened a technology centre in Rio de Janeiro after signing 
a technology cooperation agreement with Petrobras. The centre will also 
seek alliances and joint projects with local universities specializing in 
geophysical studies. 
21
7 2009 Kemira 
Group
Finland Chemicals Kemira set up a new R&D centre in São Paulo. It will focus on water 
chemistry, bioethanol and mining and oil applications. The centre is 
similar to others that the company has in Finland, China, Germany and 
the United States. 
17
8 2010 Saab AB Sweden Aerospace The new centre will concentrate on aerospace, defence and urban 
innovation and will operate in cooperation with local companies, the 
Federal University of ABC and the FEI University Centre.
14
9 2009 Bayer Germany Pharmaceutical Bayer opened a new monitoring centre to supervise and assess the side 
effects of medicines following approval for marketing. 
1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
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E. Trans-Latin companies in the European Union
1. Latin America and the Caribbean joins the global trend
Over the past decade, the growing economic weight of the 
emerging economies has shaken up the world economic scene. 
The emerging economies (especially the BRIC countries) 
are increasingly relevant players in inward and outward FDI 
flows (ECLAC, 2011). Transnational companies in emerging 
economies are deploying aggressive internationalization 
strategies; their climb up global business rankings reflects 
their growing influence (Sauvant and Mc Allister, 2010). 
The region’s transnational companies —the trans-Latins— 
have ratcheted up investment over the past few years. The 
most extensively internationalized firms are based in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and, more recently, Colombia. 
Some of the main drivers of this international expansion 
of the trans-Latins, both in the aggregate and on the 
business level, are natural growth after becoming domestic-
market leaders; the need to diversify risk; the potential for 
turning national brands into regional ones (and tap into 
economies of scale); the opportunity to take advantage of 
privatization and deregulation in neighbouring countries; 
the potential for partnering with other companies that have 
more experience in third markets and gain new knowledge 
and capacities; preferential access to markets through 
subregional integration and free trade agreements; and, 
in some cases, enhanced legal guarantees for investments 
by signing national, bilateral and multilateral agreements 
(ECLAC, 2006). To some extent, geographical coverage 
has been limited to neighbouring countries or to Latin 
America and the Caribbean; investing in countries of the 
European Union has been lower than in other regions. 
Nevertheless, investment by trans-Latins in the European 
Union has jumped in recent years, from between US$ 2 
billion and US$ 2.5 billion during the period 2006-2009 
to a record US$ 12 billion in 2010 (see figure II.17).29 In 
just five years the region has invested upwards of US$ 20 
billion in European Union countries. Brazilian investments 
make up the bulk of this figure, at approximately 71% of 
Latin American investment in the European Union between 
2006 and 2010, followed by Colombia (18%) and Chile 
29
 The statistics show only FDI flows from Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
to European Union countries. Among the countries with substantial 
investments abroad, Mexico is the only one missing: it does not 
publish official information on outbound FDI by destination.  
(11%).30 In aggregate terms, 13% of the investments made 
by transnationals from Brazil, Chile and Colombia between 
2006 and 2010 went to the European Union (see figure 
II.18). The bulk went to the United States and Canada 
(29%) and Latin America itself (28%).31 
Figure II.17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS TOWARDS THE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates. 
a
 The information is on investments outside Brazil, Chile and Colombia. For Brazil, 
FDI flows refer only to capital contributions.
Investments heading from the countries of the region 
to the European Union have different targets. Brazil has 
the largest share of investments in Europe, with 16% of 
the total between 2006 and 2010 (see figure II.18); most 
of them were in the Netherlands, Portugal and France. 
For Chilean and Colombian companies, Europe was at 
the receiving end of just 8% and 5%, respectively, of their 
investments during that same period. According to official 
statistics, Chilean investment has been concentrated in Spain; 
30
 FDI flows from Brazil refer only to capital contributions and do 
not include intra-company loans. In 2010 Brazilian investment 
abroad in the form of capital contributions totalled US$ 26 billion, 
of which US$ 8 billion went to European Union countries. 
31
 In terms of FDI stock, Brazil has the largest investment footprint 
in Europe, followed by Mexico and Chile (see table II.A-6). 
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Colombia has invested heavily in the United Kingdom.32 
Mexican investments in the European Union account for 
a large part of outbound investment from Latin America, 
but the figures cannot be determined from official statistics. 
32
 From 1990 to date, more than 50% of Chilean investment in Europe 
has been in Spain (Openshaw, 2012). 
According to other information on new investment projects 
in the European Union announced by trans-Latins, Mexican 
companies account for more than 30% (see figure II.19). 
Figure II.18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OUTWARD FOREIGN 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and estimates. 
a
 The information is on investments outside Brazil, Chile and Colombia. For Brazil, 
FDI flows refer only to capital contributions.
Figure II.19 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
2.  Business dynamic of trans-Latins in the European Union
The handful of trans-Latins operating in the European 
Union mirror the production structure of the region and 
the sectors in which the leading companies have carved 
out competitive advantages worldwide.33 There is no way 
to disaggregate official statistics on investment target 
sectors in Europe, but other information at the company 
level (on mergers and acquisitions and investment projects) 
shows the overall patterns. Most Latin American FDI in 
Europe is in the basic industries (oil and petrochemicals, 
mining, cement and steel), in consumer goods sectors (the 
food industry). 
33
 The major Brazilian trans-Latins have internationalized on their 
own, without cooperation from financial institutions or government 
aid. It should, however, be borne in mind that many of them were 
originally State-owned, showing how important the State and industrial 
policy were in inception and in the accumulation of capacities. One 
of the distinctive features of their internationalization has been the 
combination of organizational capacities and management styles 
(Fleury and ohers, 2010). 
The trans-Latin companies operating in Europe have 
used entry mechanisms that include acquisitions, greenfield 
investments and corporate alliances, and they have followed 
different strategies or combinations of strategies (see table 
II.7). The first companies to internationalize in Europe 
pursued market-seeking strategies and, later, strategies in 
search of export efficiency and strategic assets. The sectors 
most targeted by market-seeking are cement, steel, food, and 
engineering and construction. Cemex, Grupo JBS, Andrade 
Gutiérrez, Cía. Siderúrgica Nacional, Odebrecht, Tenaris 
and Gerdau are representative examples. Natural-resource-
intensive firms like Brazil’s Vale and Petrobras, Chile’s 
SQM and Colombia’s Petrominerales also have operations 
in Europe seeking to win new markets. Strategies in search 
of export efficiency are seen above all in the automobile 
and aeronautics industries, where representative examples 
include Sabó, Nemak (Alfa Group) and Embraer. Strategic-
asset-seeking strategies are emerging in acquisitions of 
companies that have specific knowledge and capacities. To 
cite an example, in 2008 Gerdau acquired Spain’s Sidenor, 
which stood out for its R&D operations and its knowledge 
of the European market. That market was a vital one for 
the company’s positioning strategy (see box II.3). 
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The largest acquisitions by trans-Latins in Europe 
reflect the importance of the mining, food, cement and steel 
sectors, among others. Acquisitions in service subsectors 
have focused on banking and telecommunications, 
chiefly in Portugal and by Brazilian companies. Most 
acquisitions in the steel and cement sectors have taken 
place in Spain or Portugal. Some trans-Latins are using 
Spain as a gateway to the European market. The largest 
acquisitions include Votorantim’s stake in Cimentos de 
Portugal, Gerdau’s acquisition of Sidenor and the acquisition 
of Hormigones Ciudad Real by Cemex (see table II.A-7). 
The companies for which acquisitions have been the main 
Box II.3 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BY TRANS-LATINS IN EUROPE: GERDAU AND WEG 
The trans-Latins Gerdau and WEG are 
examples of two different reasons for 
conducting R&D abroad. Brazil’s Gerdau is 
a leading steel producer. For 2011-2015 it 
has announced plans to invest US$ 6 billion, 
25% of which will go to its production plants 
abroad. Gerdau’s diversified international 
presence encompasses 14 countries around 
the world, but its main production operations 
are in the United States and in other 
countries of the region, such as the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico. Its European operations are 
concentrated in Spain, where it acquired 
Sidenor in 2008 for US$ 286 million. The 
fact that Sidenor had an R&D centre was a 
major consideration for the acquisition. The 
centre had developed production capacities 
and had business partners elsewhere in 
Europe, including assemblers and suppliers 
for the automobile industry (Vasconcelos, 
2010). The acquisition enabled Gerdau to 
launch its quest for internationalization in 
Europe from a more competitive position 
and rapidly procure Sidernor’s knowledge, 
technical and production capacities and 
position in the European market. 
Product adaptation is another rationale 
for subsidiaries of trans-Latin companies to 
invest in operations abroad. For example, 
Brazil’s WEG, which makes electric motors, 
has a major subsidiary in Portugal dedicated 
to special lines of high value-added motors. 
This subsidiary plays an essential role in 
tailoring products to the local market and 
to European standards (Vasconcelos, 
2010). To this end it has an R&D unit that 
facilitates compliance with European product 
standards and certification requirements. 
These two examples illustrate the 
rationale that can lead trans-Latins to 
do R&D in Europe. Such operations can 
bring benefits for the home country, too, 
such as tapping into new sources of 
expertise, putting that expertise to work 
in the domestic market, lengthening the 
product life cycle and gaining a better 
foothold in external markets. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the websites of the companies [online] www.gerdau.com and 
www.weg.net/br.
path to internationalization in Europe include Friboi (Grupo 
JBS), Gerdau, Nemak and Brazilian engineering and 
construction firms (Andrade Gutiérrez, Camargo Corrêa).34
According to information on greenfield investments 
announced between 2003 and 2010, the most active sectors 
in this regard have been construction materials, at 28% of 
the total, followed by chemicals (16%), metals (9%), oil and 
gas (8%), food (4%) and the automobile sector (4%) (see 
figure II.20). The main destinations for such investments are 
Portugal (34%), Spain (21%) and Poland (14%). Petrobras, 
Sabó and Cemex are among the companies with major 
greenfield investments in the European Union. 
34
 Colombian companies have made acquisitions in the oil and mining 
sector and in some services, such as packaging.
Figure II.20 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
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Mexico’s Cemex is one of the most internationalized 
companies: more than 65% of its workforce and global 
sales are outside Mexico. From its first acquisitions in 
Spain in 1992 to major ones in developed countries in the 
2000s (Southdown in the United States, RMC in the United 
Kingdom and Rinker in Australia), Cemex is an early 
internationalizer among the trans-Latins. In Europe, Cemex 
has combined insertion through greenfield investments with 
corporate acquisitions (such as Hormigones Ciudad Real 
in Spain (see table II.A-7). It has stressed adopting and 
disseminating the best practices of acquiree companies as 
part of its capacity-building strategy. Europe has become 
one of Cemex’s most important markets, both in terms 
of production and in terms of asset location and sales. 
Cemex has production facilities in Austria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany and Spain; the European 
market has gone from 24% of the firm’s global sales 
to the current 35%. Twenty-five percent of its cement 
production capacity is in Europe (Cemex, 2011). Cemex 
recently opened a new 5,600-square-metre manufacturing 
plant in France at an investment of nearly US$ 3 million. 
Cemex is a good example of how a trans-Latin company 
has generated advanced organizational capacities, learning 
from growth and domestic and international expansion 
(Lucea and Lesard, 2010).
The current situation in Europe is impacting trans-
Latins with a market-focused strategy, but it can open new 
prospects, too, especially for acquisitions. Value loss and 
the need for capital at some companies, plus conditions 
in countries like Spain, can mean opportunities for trans-
Latins to continue internationalizing operations in Europe 
(see chapter I). Investment projects announced in 2011 
confirmed the trend for Latin American investments in 
the European Union (see table II.A-6). Projects are under 
way in the steel, metal, cement and oil sectors, especially 
by major trans-Latins from Brazil and Mexico. 
Table II.7 
MAJOR TRANS-LATINS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010a 
(Millions of dollars)







of entry into 
European Union








2 PDVSA Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of)
95 530 5.6 Oil and gas Natural-resource-
seeking
Sweden and United 
Kingdom
Acquisitions






4 Grupo JBS 
(Friboi)
Brazil 28 418 64.0 Food Market-seeking Italy Acquisitions




















8 Grupo Alfa 
(Nemak)









Brazil 10 895 9.7 Engineering and 
construction
Market-seeking Portugal Acquisitions
10 Grupo Camargo 
Corrêa
Brazil 9 698 22.5 Engineering and 
construction
Market-seeking Portugal Acquisitions
11 Grupo Bimbo Mexico 9 487 52.7 Food Market-seeking Spain and Portugal Acquisitions
12 Cía. Siderúrgica 
Nac.





Brazil 7 788 41.7 Food Market-seeking United Kingdom and 
Ireland
Acquisitions
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of entry into 
European Union
14 Tenaris Argentina 7 711 71.7 Steel and 
metallurgical





15 Odebrecht Brazil 5 500 48.6 Engineering and 
construction
Market-seeking Portugal Acquisitions 
and greenfield 
investments









17 Embraer Brazil . . Aviation Export-efficiency- 
and market-
seeking
Portugal and France Acquisitions 
and greenfield 
investments
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of America economía, No. 60, April 2011; A. Fleury and others, “El camino se hace al 
andar: la trayectoria de las multinacionales brasileras”, Universia Business Review, No. 25, 2010; and annual reports of the respective companies.
a
 The European countries mentioned are where the companies’ production operations are located.
Table II.7 (concluded)
F. Concluding remarks
The European Union invested, on average, nearly US$ 
30 billion a year in Latin America and the Caribbean 
over the past decade, accounting for 40% of total FDI 
and making it the largest investor in the region. The 
European Union has had a relatively higher profile in 
the countries of South America; the United States is 
the larger player in Mexico and the Central America. 
But Latin America and the Caribbean has been losing 
ground to other regions of the world as a location for 
European transnationals, for two reasons. The first is the 
end, in the early 2000s, of the sweeping privatizations 
that drew in many Spanish companies. The second is 
the shift in focus by Spanish transnationals (the main 
drivers of European FDI in the region) towards investment 
within the European Union economic bloc and in other 
developing regions, such as Asia. 
Nevertheless, the flow of European FDI to the region 
surged in the second half of the past decade even though it 
was distributed unevenly among subregions. The uptrend 
in European FDI centred on South America: Brazil was 
the leading recipient, with more than 50% of total FDI. 
Argentina, Colombia and Chile are also major recipients. 
South America’s rising commodity prices and growing 
economies attracted greenfield investments associated 
with strategies seeking natural resources and markets for 
manufactures. By contrast, European FDI towards Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean held relatively stable; 
this region was hit harder by the economic crisis in the 
United States and global financial turmoil, which had 
the most significant impact on investments, especially 
from Europe. 
The sectors targeted by European investment were 
determined by the production structure of FDI sending 
and receiving countries. Spanish (and, to a lesser extent, 
Portuguese) transnationals are major players in service 
sectors throughout the region; German, British and 
Netherlands companies have the larger footprint in 
manufacturing, especially in the larger economies (Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina). French and Italian firms, while less 
internationalized in the region, have a diversified presence. 
Most European investment in South America has gone to 
the service and natural resources sectors. Brazil is the only 
country where manufacturing has accounted for the largest 
share. In Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, 
European companies have a larger presence in services 
and manufacturing and a smaller one in natural resources. 
Spanish investment in the region has shifted over 
the past 10 years. Until the early 2000s, Spanish business 
internationalization focused above all on Latin America, 
especially services and hydrocarbons. Spanish companies 
were involved in major corporate acquisitions and positioned 
themselves as leaders in telecommunications, energy and 
banking. This investment pattern has changed over time. The 
amounts invested have become smaller, and the focus has 
shifted to the European Union. Smaller Spanish firms began 
to set up operations in new service sectors in the region, 
such as construction, tourism and finance, insurance and 
even manufacturing. As a result, even though the amounts 
are smaller, the Spanish presence is growing more diverse 
and consolidating its focus on the service sector. 
Germany, while not extensively internationalized in the 
region, is among the traditional investors and has targeted 
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specific sectors and countries. This historical focus has 
not changed over the past decade and is still on investing 
in Brazil, followed by Mexico and Argentina, in capital-
intensive sectors where German firms have competitive 
advantages and are world leaders (automobiles, chemicals, 
and machinery and equipment, for example). French 
investing is concentrated in Brazil and is associated with 
manufacturing and services. French investment is on the rise 
and has been topping US$ 5 billion since 2008. In recent 
years, French companies have made major acquisitions in 
telecommunications, energy and some manufacturing sectors, 
such as chemicals. Great Britain is the European Union 
country that has invested the least in the region; operations 
have focused on mining, hydrocarbons and manufactures 
like food and beverages. Italy has had a historical presence, 
too, especially in traditional manufactures like food and 
the automobile industry. Over the past decade, Italian 
investment has seen substantial growth, branching out from 
traditional manufacturing investments to services such as 
telecommunications, as well as energy and infrastructure. 
And investment from the Netherlands has centred above 
all on Brazil and Mexico in the form of acquisitions in 
manufacturing sectors such as food and beverages.
Investments associated with a natural-resource-
seeking strategy have surged in recent years, especially 
in mining. There is investing in the hydrocarbons sector 
as well, in many cases in cooperation with State-owned 
companies. Investments following this strategy have 
had a range of impacts, including higher exports, job 
creation in non-urban areas and growing fiscal revenue 
as tax receipts climb. The main issues are that these 
operations are in enclaves and have a low processing 
content. European companies whose strategy is to seek 
markets for manufactures have been very active, too, and 
have benefited from the region’s economic performance, 
lower volatility and growing purchasing power. But the 
international crisis has chilled some investing, especially 
because some transnationals are hard-pressed to secure 
financing. Some of the impacts of these investments are 
increased production capacity and exports, the creation 
of production linkages and employment and, in certain 
cases, technology transfer and capacity-building. 
Operations based on a service-market-seeking strategy 
are more consolidated than a decade ago; most have a long-
term vision. European investments in telecommunications 
and energy, for example, have entered a phase marked by 
greater stability where the priorities are to take advantage 
of economies of scale and grow market share, with profit 
margins that ensure a sound global position. For many 
firms (especially the Spanish ones), their operations in 
the region have contributed a good deal to improving 
parent-company balance sheets and helped them cope 
with the current situation in Europe. The potential for 
market growth and substantial gaps in infrastructure and 
other areas, on top of good economic performance, have 
encouraged new companies to set up operations, both in 
sectors with a traditional European presence (commerce 
and tourism) and in new ones (construction, logistics and 
finance). The European presence has thus grown more 
diverse in recent years, and the number of companies 
with operations in the region has grown.
European investment has a number of distinctive 
traits; two of them stand out. First, European transnationals 
account for a large share of greenfield investing in the 
manufacturing sector; this is where FDI does the most 
to increase production capacity and create production 
linkages. Second, these companies play leading roles in 
R&D, especially in Brazil and Argentina. For transnational 
companies, though, Brazil is the only country that has 
positioned itself as a prime location for internationalizing 
R&D; the R&D centres of subsidiaries operating in Brazil 
are increasingly involved in corporate global innovation 
strategies. This is having substantial impacts in terms 
of technology transfer, production capacity building 
and innovation. It is no accident that Brazil has a more 
diversified industrial structure and a more proactive 
industrial policy than other countries in the region. These 
two traits, then, attract transnational company R&D; this, 
in turn, deepens the process of structural change.
This chapter also brings an important analytical 
message: there are two increasingly meaningful factors 
for assessing the impact of transnational corporate 
operations. They are the capacity of subsidiaries and the 
nature of innovation and R&D. These characteristics 
are crucial for understanding the impacts in terms of 
linkages, innovation, technology transfer and capacity-
building. It is not enough to identify corporate strategies 
and target sectors; the characteristics of subsidiaries and 
of innovation and R&D operations are also part of the 
picture for gauging the sustainability of the dynamic 
benefits and more permanent nature that set FDI apart 
from local investment. 
Trans-Latin companies (above all, from Brazil and 
Mexico) have stepped up their investment in Europe over 
the past few years. This process involves a small number 
of companies whose operations reflect the region’s 
production structure and centre on sectors where leading 
Latin American firms have carved out global competitive 
advantages. This has been especially true in the basic 
industries (oil, petrochemicals, mining, cement and steel), 
mass consumption sectors (food) and some services 
(banking). While the situation in Europe is impacting 
trans-Latins with a market-seeking strategy, it can bring 
new opportunities for acquisitions. 
There are two factors behind the prospects for 
European investment. On the one hand, the European 
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crisis is opening new opportunities for transnationals. 
High profitability (especially for Spanish firms) in the 
region, along with Latin American market potential, 
points to broader positioning. The crisis could drive 
certain companies to move operations to lower-cost 
locations, which would mean ramping up their activities 
in the region. On the other hand, the current situation in 
Europe could reverse the flow of investments if the euro 
crisis balloons and the lack of financing grows more 
critical. This is not likely to trigger a wave of corporate 
disinvestment because their operations in the region are 
very profitable, but it could halt or delay some investment 
projects. Even so, the European companies that are likely 
to step up investing in coming years are those following 
natural-resource and market-seeking strategies. There 
are opportunities for greenfield investments in natural 
resources sectors in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, 
Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; in 
agribusiness in Chile and Brazil; in infrastructure and 
construction in Brazil, Peru and Chile; in commerce in 
Uruguay, Chile and Brazil; and in renewable energy in 
Mexico, Uruguay and Brazil. 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the European 
Union should promote cooperation that increases and 
enhances investment as a sustainable source of growth and 
development. The region should redouble its industrial 
policy efforts to promote the permanent, dynamic benefits 
of FDI. Beyond the need for an FDI promotion policy, 
strides should be made towards production development 
policies that take account of the operations of transnational 
companies, moving from FDI policy to policy geared 
towards what transnationals do in areas like human 
resource training, technology transfer, innovation and 
R&D. Latin America and the Caribbean could thus reap 
greater benefit from the stock of knowledge of European 
companies and their broad potential in the region. 
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Figure II.A-1 
EUROPEAN UNION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SHARE OF 
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Developing countries European Union 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).
Figure II.A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
RATIO OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures provided by the central banks of the respective countries.
Table II.A-1 
EUROPEAN UNION: STOCK OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 2010 
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Regions/Countries European Union Spain United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Germany France
Outside the European Union 5 505 488 306 484 88 6176 258 587 126 841 459 710 576 014
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
   Sum 510 343 200 194 23 805a 20 359b 13 280 27 162a 39 950
   Percent 9% 65% 3% a 8%b 10% 6%a 7%
Brazil
   Sum 248 942 70 079 9 766 10 802 7 166 14 810 29 785
   Percent 49% 35% 43% 51% 43% 46% 75%
Mexico 107 497 45 561 5 259 12 271 1 665 7 111 3 709
Argentina 65 702 39 946 ... 1 261 1 539 2 088 2 256
Chile 32 040 17 825 818 2 206 542 1 510 878
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) -6 479 3 172 ... 672 1 029 200 1 925
Colombia 20 031 … 3 933 464 ... ... 240
Uruguay 8 042 3 810 ... 95 274 155 541
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
a
 Data for 2008.
b
 Data for 2005.  
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Table II.A-2 
EUROPEAN UNION (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA  
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2000-2010 
(Millions of dollars)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
France 3 557 5 831 1 223 -1 267 421 2 138 2 632 2 168 5 257 5 353 5 251
Germany 2 512 -49 -396 -283 2 903 1 873 2 624 2 383 13 646 2 344
Italy 1 132 962 418 213 238 3 946 9 174 3 998 2 843 1 477 967
Netherlands 822 2 207 492 1 930 86 1 816 971 1 965 -1 630 1 830 744
Spain 21 001 9 123 4 884 2 519 11 376 6 870 9 169 18 273 19 945 5 779 2 887
United Kingdom 521 2 006 2 525 3 033 6 246 720 4 072 3 226 3 141 1 089 3 810
Total 38 577 25 143 7 399 5 052 23 690 17 582 17 932 33 484 34 592 17 955 18 147
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
Table II.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2000-2010 
(Millions of dollars)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 8 534 1 160 -878 -202 1 418 3 029 4733 4093 2717 1 232 3 356
Brazil 19 542 10 582 9 815 4 686 12 318 9 225 8 701 2 0582 19 866 14 470 14 477.2
Chile 1 097 2 040 1645 507 3 903 683 3 115 3 856 5291 4 347 5 883
Colombia 1 317 654 156 436 193 4 727 699 -469 334 152 297
Costa Rica 39 33 223 93 60 62 111 435 230 161 175
Dominican Republic 385 505 305 27 281 437 464 866 812 341 403
Ecuador … … 127 102 89 -4 77 231 366 -45 24
Mexico 3 248 6 475 9154 6141 12 996 7 943 7 001 13 615 9374 5 968 11 181
Paraguay … … 0 -7 59 -2 -89 66 63 8 43
Uruguay … 36 116 92 84 266 116 322 356 271 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures provided by the central banks of the respective countries. 
Table II.A-4 

































































Germany 1993 1990 1995 a 1999 1999 1998 1997 1990 1998
Austria 1995 2002 2000 2000
Belgium-Luxembourg 1994 2004 1999 a 1999 2004 2008 1999 2004
Denmark 1995 1997 1995 a 1995 1993 a 1995 1996
Spain 1992 2004 1994 2007 1997 1996 1996 1994 1997
Finland 1996 1995 a 1996 2001 1996 2004
France 1993 1996 1995 a 1994 1996 1980 1996 1997 2004
Greece 1999 a 2002
Italy 1993 1992 1995 a 1995 2005 1999 a 1995 1998 2001 a
Netherlands 1994 1994 1998 a 1998 a 2001 1994 1996 1991 1993
Portugal 1996 1994 a 1998 2001 1995 1999 1995
United Kingdom 1993 1990 1994 a 1997 2010 a 1995 1992 1994 1997 1996
Sweden 1992 1992 1995 2002 1994 1999 1998
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Organization 
of American States (OAS).
a
 Treaties signed but still not in force.
.
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Table II.A-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): STOCK OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2006-2010 
 (Millions of dollars)
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 1 806 1 981 2 342 2 455 …
Brazil …  56 306  56 549  65 618  79 919 
Chile 3 775 3 957 3 440 4 075 4 611
Colombia 378 2 536 2 862 …. …
Mexico 9 677 10 680 10 918 14 395 …
Uruguay 859 2 291 3 933 3 943 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 21 114 2 256 2 927 3 373 …
Others 8 745 11 783 12 882 18 431 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) 
and the central banks of the respective countries. 
Table II.A-6 
LATIN AMERICA: ACQUISITION OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPANIES OR ASSETS BY TRANS-LATINS, 2006-2011 
(Millions of dollars)
Year Acquiring company Home country Company or asset acquired Country Sector Value
2010 Vale SA Brazil BSG Resources Guinea United Kingdom Mining 2 500
2010 Votorantim Brazil CIMPOR Cimentos de Portugal Portugal Cement 1 183
2010 Telemar Norte Leste Brazil Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecommunications 961
2008 Magnesita Brazil LWB Refractories GmbH Germany Mining 943
2007 Grupo Aldesa Costa Rica Becosa Energías Renovables Spain Renewable energies 537
2009 Banco Itaú Brazil Banco Itaú Europa Portugal Banking 498
2008 Marfrig Brazil Moy Park Ireland Food 460
2010 JBS SA Brazil Inalca SpA Italy Food 424
2008 Gerdau Brazil Corporación Sidenor Spain Steel 286
2009 Suzano Petroquímica Brazil Basell Polyolefins BV Netherlands Peterochemicals 240
2010 Camargo Correa Brazil CIMPOR Cimentos de Portugal Portugal Cement 180
2009 Banco Bradesco Brazil Banco Espíritu Santo Portugal Banking 131
2010 Navieras Ultragas Chile Eitzen Bulk Shipping Denmark Shipping 92
2010 Petrominerales Colombia Pan Andean Resources PLC Ireland Oil 25
2011 Pemexa Mexico Repsol Spain Oil …
2006 Cemex Mexico Hormigones Ciudad Real Spain Cement …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters. 
a
 Pemex’s purchase of a 4.6% stake in Repsol brought its holding in the latter up to 9.6%. 
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Figure II.A-3 
MOST IMPORTANT LOCATION FACTORS FOR ACTIVITIES OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EUROPEAN TRANSNATIONALS 
(Percentages)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
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Proximity to suppliers
Market regulation
Public support for R&D
R&D cooperation opportunities
Access to markets
Proximity to technology hubs 
and incubators 
Political and economic stability
Intellectual property rights
High availability of researchers
Proximity to other company activities
Access to specialised R&D services
Most attractive country is home country Most attractive country is not home country
Source: European Commission, The 2009 EU Survey on R&D Investment Business Trends, Brussels, 2010.
Table II.A-7 
LATIN AMERICA: INVESTMENT PROJECTS BY TRANS-LATINS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2011 
(Millions of dollars)
Ranking Company Home country Destination Sector Description Investment
1 Petrobras Brazil Portugal Oil Petrobras set up a joint venture with Galp Energia 
to establish a biodiesel plant in Portugal that will 
produce 250,000 tons a year. It is expected to 
start operations in 2015.
530
2 Gerdau Brazil Spain Steel The subsidiary Sidenor is investing in expanding 
several production plants in Spain. 
71
3 Embraer Brazil Portugal Embraer is to build a new plant for producing 
structures and composite materials. The initial 
investment is expected to be US$ 60 million and 
increase to US$ 150 millon over the ensuing 
three years as a second plant for producing metal 
structures is built. Part of the investment will be 
funded by the European Union.
60
4 Alfa Mexico Slovakia Metals Nemak, a subsidiary of Alfa, is seeking to double 
its production capacity and therefore plans to 
increase its workforce from 600 to 900. The 
company manufactures cylinder heads and 
other aluminium components for the automobile 
industry. 
48
5 Camargo Correa Brazil Spain 
Portugal 
Italy France
Retail textiles The company is opening proprietary commercial 
offices for selling Havaianas brand garments.
  16
6 Banco do Brasil Brazil Germany Banking Banco do Brasil is expanding its operations in 
Vienna to serve as the parent company for its 
operations in Europe.
14
7 Cemex Mexico France Cement Cemex recently inaugurated a 5,600-square-
metre manufacturing plant in Grimaud. This 
expansion of an existing plant has a production 
capacity of 80 cubic metres of cement per hour 
—30% more than the old plant. 
3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of investment tracking information in “fDi Markets”, Financial Times.
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Chapter III
The international financial crisis, banking 
and foreign direct investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
A. Introduction
In the past few years deregulation and technological advances have produced sweeping changes 
in the financial sector, so central to economic development. The industry has burgeoned and 
become very rapidly concentrated. Financial markets have become increasingly integrated 
locally, regionally and globally and this, combined with proliferating financial innovation, 
has facilitated speculative behaviour.
The developed countries have the deepest and most 
sophisticated financial systems, whereas the developing 
economies have, broadly speaking, less developed financial 
sectors and industries. Yet this situation has changed 
significantly in recent times: a number of developing 
countries and their banking systems appear relatively stable 
and solvent and have begun to gain international stature, 
while the advanced economies have found themselves 
at the eye of the greatest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.
This chapter looks at the main changes in the 
financial industry and the factors which have led to the 
difficult situation today. The largest banks have deployed 
strategies which have, in various ways, driven the industry’s 
transformation: they have increased in size, diversified 
their activities, internationalized their operations and 
made heavy use of financial innovations to increase their 
profits. The Latin American and Caribbean region has 
been a key player in one of these aspects —the arrival 
of foreign banks in local financial systems. In fact, Latin 
America, together with Eastern Europe, is the developing 
region which has seen the most prolific local start-ups 
by foreign banks.
Accordingly, here the development of Latin America’s 
banking industry will be examined, along with the role of 
foreign banks in this process. The banking industry has 
grown very rapidly in the region in the past few years 
and, perhaps more importantly, has shown good, stable 
capitalization and liquidity indicators. This chapter will 
look at the entry strategies of the main foreign banks and 
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their significance in local banking markets, as well as how 
these banks behave and perform compared to local banks in 
terms of management, introduction of products and services, 
solvency, profitability, costs and so forth. Lastly, in view of 
the significance of European banks in Latin America, the 
chapter turns to an analysis of the destabilizing effects these 
banks could have as a result of the international financial 
crisis. The final section concludes. 
B. The global financial system: boom and bust
Properly channelled, the financial system is a key piece 
in long-term economic development. The links between 
financial activity —through savings and investment 
decisions— and economic growth are amply documented 
(Levine, 1997; Woodford, 2010). Nevertheless, despite 
their high correlation, causality between the two is not 
well established.  Generally speaking, inasmuch as income 
levels rise, so does demand for financial services and 
the role of borrowing systems grows within an economy 
(see figure III.1). When institutional conditions are right, 
moreover, the financial system can help to overcome 
capital restraints on business and sector expansion and 
thereby stimulate growth.
Figure III.1 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: INCOME LEVEL AND DEPTH OF THE 
BANKING SYSTEM, 2010 





































Domestic credit extended by the banking sector
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Financial systems perform key functions which enable 
and facilitate the generation, allocation and use of capital: 
they produce information about possible investments and 
allocate capital; monitor investments and exert corporate 
governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, 
diversification, and management of risk; mobilize and 
pool savings; and ease the exchange of goods and services 
(Levine, 2004). Financial sector development, then, 
broadens options for channelling savings and thereby the 
modalities of financing. This gives economic agents access 
to the resources they need for medium- and long-term 
enterprise, such as slow-maturing projects and housing. 
This in turn facilitates the emergence of new firms and 
the realization of investment opportunities, as well as 
better use of production potential.
The changes sweeping through financial systems 
in the past few years in the wake of deregulation and 
technological progress have brought new savings and 
credit opportunities for individuals, households and 
companies.1 Advanced economies, generally speaking, 
have the deepest and most sophisticated financial systems, 
of which the banking sector is a main —but not the 
only— component (see figure III.2). Banks have also 
diversified and expanded from their traditional role of 
taking deposits and extending loans into transactions 
that generate revenue from commissions, such as loan 
securitization2 and risk management products.3 In 
developing economies, the banking system is usually 
1
 Individuals and households have access to a broader range of 
borrowing options (credit cards, consumer loans and home equity 
loans) and can easily invest in a wide range of financial instruments, 
such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and derivatives. Firms have 
been able to increasingly diversify their financing away from banks 
through the issuance of bonds in capital markets (IMF, 2006). 
2
 Securitization is a financial practice consisting of pooling various 
types of contractual debt —residential and commercial mortgages, 
auto loans and credit card debts— and transforming them into 
transferrable securities, such as bonds or collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMO), which can be sold in an organized market. This 
transfers financial risk and converts illiquid assets into tradable, 
immediately transferrable assets. 
3
 The best known risk management products are credit default swaps 
(CDS), which are risk hedging operations that protect the holder of 
a credit instrument against default by the issuer. These hedges are 
usually applied to public and private debt and mortgage securities. 
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the largest component of the financial sector (see 
figure III.2).
Financial system development was expected to 
make the market function more efficiently and provide 
fuller information, enable agents to maximize their 
investments (depending on their risk propensity and 
wealth level), and allow asset prices to reach an optimum 
level (Fama, 1970). But multiple problems arose in 
markets, making price behaviour unstable and prone 
to large distortions, which increased systemic risk 
(Segura, 2010). A large-scale crisis thus began to brew, 
encompassing markets for equity, bonds, currencies 
and other financial instruments around the world, and 
with them a large chunk of the real economy. Today, 
amid the ongoing fallout and implications of the crisis, 
there is mounting consensus that the financial industry 
has operated in an incomplete and asymmetric manner. 
This is leading to efforts to strengthen regulation and 
oversight of financial markets to make them more 
transparent and minimize their frequent turbulence 
(Cihák and Podpiera, 2006). 
Figure III.2 



















































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of World Bank, Financial Development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: The Road Ahead, Washington, D.C., 2012. 
Note:  The data show total banking assets, bonds in circulation and stock market 
capitalization as percentages of GDP.
1. Regulatory and institutional change in the world’s financial   
 systems: similarities and differences with respect to the    
 experience in Latin America
The financial sector became very heavily regulated in the 
wake of the economic crisis of 1929. The Glass-Steagall 
Act passed in the United States provided measures for 
rebuilding confidence and preventing financial entities 
from speculating with savers’ deposits.4 During the next 
four decades, competition between financial institutions 
remained limited in most of the advanced economies, 
and interest rates and universal bank operations were 
regulated. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was set up and central banks began to act as 
lenders of last resort. 
4
 The most salient features of the Glass-Steagall Act of  1933 were: 
(a) total separation of banking and stock market activities, and 
of commercial banking and investment banking; (b) the creation 
of a banking system consisting of national, state and local banks 
subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act to prevent unfair competition 
between them; (c) banks’ prohibition from handling pension funds; 
(d) bankers were forbidden to sit on the boards of firms and utilities, 
and (e) the creation of independent oversight institutions  for stock 
markets and financial markets, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
Starting in the 1970s, however, interest rate controls 
began to be gradually relaxed, the restrictions preventing 
convergence between activities conducted by entities in 
different spheres were lifted, and investment bank operations 
were gradually deregulated (see diagram III.1). In the United 
Kingdom, financial deregulation (what became known as the 
“Big Bang”) began under Margaret Thatcher, encompassing 
both the stock market and the removal of controls on financial 
transactions. In the United States, under President Reagan, 
the Federal Reserve began to “reinterpret” the Glass-Steagall 
Act and to allow bank subsidiaries to engage in investment 
business. In the 1990s, the global economy was performing 
in a fairly stable manner; there were only a few crises of a 
largely regional nature and these were quickly resolved. In 
this scenario, liberalization and financial sector opening 
became surrounded by an “aura of optimism” and received 
explicit backing from international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and 
from senior figures in some of the world’s largest economies, 
and this helped to sweep them across the globe. 
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Diagram III.1 
EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, 1929-2012
Economic crisis of 1929
Strict financial sector regulation
- Limited competition between entities
- Deposit insurance
- Central bank: lender of last resort
  United States: Glass-Steagall Act (1933)
- External debt moratorium and isolation from 
international financial markets
- Endogenous development models
- Industrial policy support creation of 
development banks
- Local financial system became notable 
restricted to national sphere
Gradual liberalization of international capital movements and integration of financial markets
Flexibilization begins in 1970s:
- Interest rate controls
- Restrictions on convergence of activities
- Investment bank operations
In the 1980s:
- United Kingdom: thoroughgoing financial 
deregulation begins under Government of 
Thatcher 
- United States: Federal Reserve reinterprets 




- Structural capital shortage limits saving and 
investment and thus GDP growth
- Inefficient financial markets
- Large involvement of public sector
Reforms:
- Opening of capital account
- Flexibilization of interest rates
- Liberalization of banking sector: privatization of public 
banks and opening of market to foreign entities
Repeal of Glass-Steagall Act (1999)
Restrictions lifted on the convergence of activities
Financial innovations proliferate
Reform of equity, bond and derivatives markets
Financial systems very vulnerable to domestic 
macroeconomic instability and external shocks: 
Mexico and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(1994), Asia (1997) and Russian Federation (1996)
Deepening of financial reforms:
- Central bank autonomy
- Strengthening of institutions for regulation and 
prudential oversight
- Securitization of national public debt
- Development and deepening of capital markets (for 
both equity and bonds)
- Reform of pension systems
Argentine crisis (2001)
- Low dollarization of local financial systems
- Introduction of bank innovations such as 
protection from foreign-exchange crises
- Greater financial system transparency













- Broad range of products 
and services
- Lax lending criteria 
(mortgages)
- Risk transfer via financial 
innovations and structured 
products: loan securitization 









- Sale of new products
Risk rating agency
Insurance companies offer risk hedging against loan default 
(credit default swaps)
Information asymmetry, little 
prudential risk oversight, 
real estate bubble
Greater relative resiliency
International financial crisis (2007-?)
Broad backing for 
liberalization and 
opening of financial 
sector, led by the United 
States, the United 
Kingdom and the 
International Monetary 
Fund, and international 
spread of this model
INTERNATIONAL SPHERE LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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In the case of Latin America, which had been badly 
hit by the external debt crisis of the 1980s, the diagnosis 
offered was that the region suffered from a structural shortage 
of capital, which constrained saving and investment and 
therefore long-term economic growth. National banks 
and financial agents were considered to be functioning 
inefficiently, as well. Accordingly, an ambitious reform 
plan was devised, inspired by Anglo-Saxon liberal thinking 
and supported by international agencies: the Washington 
Consensus (see diagram III.1). In the financial sphere, the 
order of the day was capital account opening, along with 
liberalization of local capital markets and the banking 
sector. This was expected to increase domestic saving, 
which would be complemented by external saving, and 
favour efficient resource allocation. Among the most 
significant measures, interest rate controls were eased, 
public banks were closed or privatized, restrictions on 
entry of foreign firms were lifted and banks’ operating 
scope was broadened to increase competition.
However, difficulties in controlling national 
macroeconomic instability and in mitigating external 
shocks —such as the Mexican crisis (1994), the Asian 
crisis (1997) and the Russian crisis (1998)— showed 
up the fragility of Latin America’s financial systems. 
Shortcomings in bank management and oversight 
encouraged burgeoning consumption and a sharp 
rise in borrowing by economic agents, which led to 
frequent and severe financial crises, in which bank 
capital was eroded and multiple financial entities failed 
(Frenkel, 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005). 
New legal and institutional reforms were gradually 
implemented with the aim of strengthening the financial 
sector. Most important among these were central bank 
autonomy, the strengthening of regulation and prudential 
oversight systems, the development and deepening 
of capital markets for both stocks and bonds (backed 
by public debt securitization), and the privatization 
of pension systems and their migration to individual 
capitalization schemes. 
Towards the late 1990s, the changes occurring on 
the world stage gathered pace and deepened with the 
technological revolution. In this context, two emerging 
trends became highly relevant: 
• Rapid and intensive integration of financial markets. 
At the national level, links were strengthened 
between various entities through the interbank 
markets and the payment system. At the international 
level, the various financial markets became highly 
interconnected as a result of free movement of 
capital in most of the world’s economies and the 
rapid spread of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs).
• The emergence and proliferation of financial 
innovations and highly risk-prone operators. Notable 
among the first are what are known as structured 
products, and among the second are hedge funds 
(also known as alternative investment vehicles or 
high-risk funds), which by their nature and means 
of operating compromised market stability.5
In the United States, these accelerating changes were 
to become emblematic. In 1998 a merger was authorized 
between Citibank, the insurance company Travelers and 
Salomon Smith Barney, a major investment bank. In 
1999 the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed and a year later 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was passed, 
which limited the role of federal agencies (such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission) in the regulation 
and oversight of derivatives markets. This, in practice, 
sanctioned more risky financial transactions.
Soon after 2000, the rapid changes in the international 
financial system began to show potentially harmful 
effects. In fact, the stock market crash associated with 
information technology firms led to a sharp slowdown 
in the global economy. The central banks of the world’s 
largest economies responded by implementing expansionary 
monetary policies, ushering in a long period of very low 
interest rates and thereby facilitating liquidity, borrowing, 
consumption and, indirectly, speculative investment. In 
the United States, for example, the interest rate fell from 
6.5% in November 2000 to 1.8% in December 2001, and 
remained at those sorts of levels until mid-2004.
Ultimately, the consolidation of the ideological 
paradigms underlying market deregulation, together with 
technological change, began to entrench the traditional 
roles of the financial industry. In the United States and 
the United Kingdom the financial market gained greater 
significance, although it also left much of society, basically 
households and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), outside financing circuits. In continental Europe 
the banking system continued to fulfil a very important 
function, although it embraced many of the financial 
innovations. The banking network’s high capillarity enabled 
it to offer a wide range of services, including risk hedging 
and payments, and to cover most territory and agents.
As noted earlier, as a result of Latin America’s traumatic 
experiences in the wake of the Washington Consensus, 
5
  Structured products, also known as market-linked investments, are 
fixed-income financial investment vehicles whose value is derived 
from a single equity, a basket of securities, options, raw materials, 
debt issues or foreign exchange. These products are based on an 
underlying financial swap and are traded bilaterally outside the 
stock market, which makes them difficult to price. Some of the 
best-known structured products are collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). 
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many of the region’s governments were already aware of 
the need to channel financial activities by means of sound 
public policies and adequate regulation.  However, early 
in the new century, the bursting of the dot.com bubble, 
the financial crisis in Argentina and banking problems 
in Mexico prompted new reforms aimed at strengthening 
regional financial markets and making them more 
transparent. Since then, sound economic performance in 
the region, especially in South America, has underpinned 
rapid development in the banking sector. 
So, a sophisticated financial system may be an efficient 
mechanism to meet the financial needs of highly developed 
economies with a broad financial culture and large firms 
spearheading economic activity and maintaining strong 
links abroad. But in developing countries, with their 
specialization in primary sectors of production and incipient 
financial development, it seems necessary to have a strong 
banking system able to capture the savings produced by 
the economy, evaluate the risk associated with investment 
projects, generate the confidence of small savers and investors 
and manage the payments system efficiently. It would make 
little sense to seek rapid capital market development in a 
country which has only a narrow base of agents capable 
of accessing these borrowing mechanisms.
2. Transforming the global financial system: too big to fail?
Simply put, the traditional business of banks has been to 
capture funds from individuals or entities with a capital surplus 
and channel them to economic agents which need them. The 
basic premise of this process of financial intermediation 
is to obtain sufficient margin, i.e. an attractive difference, 
between the cost of deposits taken and the yield on funds 
lent. In the 1990s, banks in industrialized countries had 
large capital surpluses, but amid mounting competition 
pressure began to mount to lower costs and find ways 
to increase steadily shrinking profit margins. Moreover, 
their domestic markets, their main source of income, were 
reaching maturity and offering few new opportunities.
With deregulation of the banking industry, new 
possibilities began to emerge which transformed the very 
foundations of the sector. The largest banks, for example, 
began to forge new strategies to revert the tendency towards 
smaller margins and generate more profits. In most cases, 
this strategy rested upon three main elements: 
• Increasing market share and diversifying activities 
towards a universal business model, 
• Increasing global influence by taking advantage of 
the growing integration of financial markets, and 
• Making use of financial innovations based on 
heavily leveraged investment financing.6 
(a) Consolidating financial systems: the march 
towards universal banking aimed primarily at 
the domestic market
The financial sector, and particularly the banking industry, 
has grown hugely in the past 20 years, and never more so 
6
  As well as improving profits of shareholders capital, greater leverage 
helps to reduce financing costs, since the inclusion of debt on the 
balance sheet reduces capital costs (inasmuch as it generates a 
multiplier effect on investors’ own resources).
than in the first half of the 2000 decade. In that period, as well 
as increasing in size, the industry further swelled its profits 
(see figure III.3). The large banks in the advanced economies 
were the major players in this process. In fact, 600 of the 
world’s 1,000 largest banks, representing three quarters of 
the entire industry’s assets and profits, were in the United 
States, Japan and the European Union (see figure III.4). 
At the national and international levels, the banking 
sector underwent rapid consolidation, driven by competition 
and the quest for size, efficiency and synergies. In the search 
for economies of scale, mergers and acquisitions —not 
organic growth— became the instrument of choice and 
a common event in many countries. In fact, the banking 
sector has been one of the most active in such transactions 
at the global level, along with telecommunications, media 
and entertainment corporations, and energy companies (see 
figure III.5). The great majority of the largest operations 
have been mergers between firms in the same countries 
in the world’s principal markets (see table III.1).
As a result of this process, concentration in the sector 
increased and so did the power and importance of the largest 
banks. This occurred in both emerging and developed economies. 
In the European Union, notwithstanding differences between 
countries, the five largest banks had a market share of around 
40% (FBE, 2011). In the United States and Japan, concentration 
was even higher, with that figure over 60% (see figure III.6).
In the United States, financial industry mergers and 
acquisitions have multiplied in the past few decades and 
since the late 1990s such operations have taken place 
increasingly across different segments. Between 2000 
and 2010 the assets of the three largest banks (JP Morgan, 
Citigroup and Bank of America) rose from 19% to 43% as 
a proportion of GDP. Yet the significance of the banking 
sector did not change greatly within the economy (see 
figure III.7). This was also true of Japan, although here 
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the lack of overall expansion was due to a deep crisis in 
the banking industry in the second half of the 1990s.7 
Driven by the formation of a single market, the banking 
industry in the European Union rapidly became more 
concentrated and grew into a much larger component of the 
economy, especially in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom and some Scandinavian countries 
(see figure III.7). This process made the largest national 
banks even more powerful (EBF, 2011). The banking sector’s 
weight in the European economies also reflects their role 
as international financial centres, however, especially in 
the cases of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Figure III.3 
WORLD’S 1,000 LARGEST BANKS, 1990-2011 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of The Banker, “Top 1000 world banks”, several issues.
Figure III.4 
WORLD’S 1,000 LARGEST BANKS: NUMBER OF ENTITIES, 
ASSETS AND PRE-TAX PROFITS, BY ORIGIN  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of The Banker, “Top 1000 world banks”, several issues.
7
 In the mid-1980s, while the United States was becoming a net 
borrower, Japan was becoming the world’s largest creditor. In the 
1990s, Japan’s financial system suffered a severe crisis after the 
bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles, and this gave 
way to an intensive reorganization and concentration of the industry.
Figure III.5 
BANKING SECTOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
WORLDWIDE, 1985-2011 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from Thomson Reuters.
Figure III.6 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FIVE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of The Banker, “Top 1000 world banks”, several issues.
Figure III.7 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES (SELECTED COUNTRIES): NATIONAL 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the European Central Bank, European Banking Federation 
(EBF), Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), and the World Bank.
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Table III.1 
TWENTY LARGEST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE BANKING SECTOR, 1990-2011 
(Billions of dollars)
Date Buyer Country Entity bought Country Amount
1998 NationsBank Corp United States BankAmerica Corp United States 61 633
2004 JPMorgan Chase & Co United States Bank One Corp United States 58 663
2004 Bank of America Corp United States FleetBoston Financial Corp United States 49 261
2009 Bank of America Corp United States Merrill Lynch & Co Inc. United States 48 766
2001 Sumitomo Bank Ltd Japan Sakura Bank Ltd Japan 45 494
2005 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fin Grp Japan UFJ Holdings Inc. Japan 41 431
2000 Fuji Bank Ltd Japan Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd Japan 40 097
2000 Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom National Westminster Bank PLC United Kingdom 38 413
2007 Banca Intesa SpA Italy SanPaolo IMI SpA Italy 37 624
2006 Bank of America Corp United States MBNA Corp United States 35 810
1998 Norwest Corp United States Wells Fargo United States 34 353
1996 Mitsubishi Bank Ltd Japan Bank of Tokyo Ltd Japan 33 788
2000 Chase Manhattan Corp United States JP Morgan & Co Inc. United States 33 555
2000 Citigroup Inc. United States Associates First Capital Corp United States 30 957
2000 Fuji Bank Ltd Japan Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd Japan 30 760
1998 BANC ONE Corp United States First Chicago NBD Corp United States 29 616
2007 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy Capitalia SpA Italy 29 528
2006 Wachovia Corp United States Golden West Financial Corp United States 25 501
2009 Lloyds TSB Group PLC United Kingdom HBOS PLC United Kingdom 25 439
1990 Mitsui Bank Ltd Japan Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd Japan 23 017
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from Thomson Reuters.
Note:  Shading denotes a merger.
The heavy concentration of the banking sector in national 
economies made the world’s largest credit institutions even 
larger. Between 2000 and 2011, the 20 largest banks increased 
their share in the industry’s total assets from around 30% to 
40% (see table III2). In this concentration process, a small 
number of banks came to dominate national, regional and 
global markets. This is the group of institutions which has 
undergone the greatest changes in this period as a result of 
mergers and acquisitions and developments in the financial 
sector of the major global markets. Early in the 2000 decade, 
Japanese banks held one third of the assets of the 20 largest 
institutions, but this share halved during the deep, drawn-
out crisis in the sector in Japan. The three largest banks in 
the United States have maintained their preponderance, but 
European banks, especially in the United Kingdom and, to 
a lesser extent, in France, have secured much larger shares 
in total assets. However, in the course of the recent financial 
crisis, some of the traditional banks in advanced economies 
have been displaced by new institutions from developing 
countries, especially China (see table III.2).
Some banks in the developing world are now very 
substantial and are enjoying rapid growth (The Economist, 
2010). Chinese banks in the top 1,000 went from 15 in 
2001 to 111 in 2010, Indian banks from 20 to 35 and 
Russian Federation banks from 13 to 31. Brazilian banks 
in the top 1,000 fell in number from 22 to 15, following 
heavy consolidation in the industry. However, some of 
Brazil’s largest banks jumped up in the ranking: Itaú 
rose from number 87 to 34, Banco do Brasil from 98 to 
38 and Banco Brasileiro de Desconto S.A. (Bradesco) 
from 88 to 41 (The Banker, 2002 and 2011).
Local, regional and global consolidation in the 
financial sector has occurred both in specific segments 
and across the entire spectrum of the industry, resulting 
in the formation of large financial conglomerates offering 
commercial and investment banking, insurance and 
pension funds. This tendency, which has generally been 
justified on the grounds of efficiency and economies 
of scale, has led to mounting concern over the stability 
of the international financial system.
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Table III.2 
WORLD’S 20 LARGEST BANKS, BY ASSETS, 2000-2011 
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
2000 2005 2011
Bank Country Assets Bank Country Assets Bank Country Assets
Deutsche Bank Germany 844 USB Switzerland 1 533 BNP Paribas France 2 671
Citigroup United States 717 Citigroup United States 1 484 Deutsche Bank Germany 2 548
BNP Paribas France 702 Mizuho 
Financial 
Group









1 277 HSBC Holdings United 
Kingdom
2 455
Bank of America United States 633 Crédit 
Agricole
France 1 243 Barclays Bank United 
Kingdom
2 331
USB Switzerland 614 BNP Paribas France 1 234 Crédit Agricole France 2 314
HSBC Holdings United 
Kingdom
569 JP Morgan 
Chase & Co.





Fuji Bank Japan 531 Deutsche 
Bank
Germany 1 144 Bank of America United States 2 265




1 119 JP Morgan 
Chase & Co.
United States 2 118
HypoVereinsbank Germany 506 Bank of 
America










992 Mizuho Financial 
Group
Japan 1 934




Japan 980 Citigroup United States 1 914
ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands 460 Credit Suisse 
Group
Switzerland 963 ING Bank Netherlands 1 667
Credit Suisse 
Group




Japan 897 Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group
Japan 1 658




Crédit Agricole France 442 ABN AMRO 
Bank
Netherlands 829 Banco Santander Spain 1 628
Sanwa Bank Japan 429 Société 
Générale




China 428 Banco 
Santander
Spain 784 Agricultural 
Bank of China
China 1 561
Société Générale France 408 HBOS United 
Kingdom







United States 406 Groupe 
Caisse 
d’Epargne
France 741 Société Générale France 1 513
Share in total 
assets 
(percentages)
28.3 Share in total 
assets 
(percentages)




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of The Banker, “Top 1000 world banks”, several issues.
a 
 In 2000, Chase Manhattan Corporation merged with JP Morgan & Co. to form what is now JP Morgan Chase & Co.
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(b) Mature and competitive national markets: the 
hunt for “El Dorado” in emerging economies
Seeking to take advantage of economies of scale, 
banks hastened to adopt a universal bank model. 
Operating in mature economies, however, they began to 
find their sheer magnitude becoming incompatible with 
the shrinking profit margins in traditional intermediation 
activities. Many therefore began to seek opportunities 
outside their home markets through acquisitions, 
issuance of securities and structured operations, and 
their international business began to expand rapidly 
(Edwards and Mishkin, 1995).8 International banking 
activity expanded at a very fast pace in the past 
decade, reflecting expanding world trade, the rise of 
multinational firms, growth in financing of global 
payments imbalances, and the assimilation of transition 
economies into global banking system (World Bank, 
2008). Financial globalization has occurred even faster 
than trade and production globalization. 
The banking industry’s internationalization is 
evident in the sharp increase in external assets, mainly 
loans, of banks with overseas operations. Almost two 
third of such loans —whether extended directly by 
the parent bank or transacted by subsidiaries abroad— 
correspond to large banks in eight countries: France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States (see figure 
III.8). Today three quarters of those assets are held in 
developed countries: 63% are cross-border loans and 
37% are extended locally. Large banks with international 
interests have entered external markets directly by 
opening branches or buying local banks in order to 
broaden their client base and deposit pool, and thereby 
to finance lending activity. Between 2000 and 2011, 
loans extended directly by such banks through their 
local subsidiaries abroad increased from 27% to 37% 
of their total external assets. This marked a change 
from the previous strategy which, broadly speaking, 
consisted of maintaining a few subsidiaries abroad but 
8
 In the 1960s, with market liberalization, international banking 
began to take off and banks set about establishing offices abroad 
to support the business of their clients abroad. The role of banks 
in Japan grew in the 1980s as the Japanese government attempted 
to promote the international role of yen. This phase also coincided 
with the growth of syndicated bank lending and the expansion 
of currency and interest-rate derivatives markets that enhanced 
banks’ scope to expand their geographical reach in both funding 
and lending. This process continued with the development of 
financing lending activity by borrowing from the parent 
bank or in wholesale interbank markets.
Figure III.8 
EXTERNAL ASSETS OF BANKS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS).
Note: Cross-border assets include cross-border lending and loans extended 
locally by overseas subsidiaries, in both foreign and local currencies (BIS, 
2009a).
The industry is consolidating not only within 
economies, but between countries too. In the past few 
decades increasing numbers of foreign banks have been 
setting up in developing countries and more recently, 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions have multiplied 
in many developed country financial sectors, especially 
in Europe (see table III.3).9 In fact, banking sector 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions came to account 
for 60% of all cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 
up from 15% in 2002 (Deutsche Bank Research, 2011). 
Today, foreign bank market share is close to 30% in 
the European Union and the United States, and slightly 
less in Japan (BIS, 2010a; ECB, 2010). 
9
 For example, the Netherlands bank ABN Amro was bought by 
a consortium comprising Bank of Scotland (RBS) of the United 
Kingdom, Fortis of Belgium and Santander of Spain, and later Fortis 
was bought by BNP Paribas of France; and Santander acquired 
several United Kingdom banks. 
 institutional saving, spearheaded by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and the emergence of an ever broader range of 
financial derivatives in the final decade of the twentieth century 
(World Bank, 2008; ECLAC, 2002).
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Table III.3 
20 LARGEST CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND AQUISITIONS IN THE BANKING SECTOR, 1990-2011 
(Billions of dollars)
Date Buyer Country Entity bought Country Amount
2005 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy HypoVereinsbank (HVB) Germany 18 256
2004 Banco Santander Spain Abbey National PLC United Kingdom 15 787
2003 HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Household International Inc. United States 15 294
2001 Citigroup United States Banacci Mexico 12 821
2009 BNP Paribas SA France Fortis Bank Belgium 12 765
2000 UBS AG Switzerland PaineWebber Group Inc. United States 12 243
2008 Bank of America Corp United States China Construction Bank Corp (19%) China 11 428
2006 BNP Paribas SA France Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA Italy 11 106
2000 HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Credit Commercial de France France 11 100
2004 Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom Charter One Financial Inc. United States 10 530
2007 BBVA Spain Compass Bancshares Inc. United States 9 871
1999 Deutsche Bank AG Germany Bankers Trust New York Corp United States 9 082
2008 Toronto-Dominion Bank Canada Commerce Bancorp United States 8 638
2007 Citigroup United States Nikko Cordial Corp Japan 7 921
2011 Mitsubishi UFJ Fin. Group Japan Morgan Stanley (22%) United States 7 800
1999 HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Republic New York Corp United States 7 703
2000 Chase Manhattan Corp United States Robert Fleming Holdings Ltd United Kingdom 7 698
2001 HypoVereinsbank (HVB) Germany Bank Austria AG Austria 7 317
2008 Banque Federative du Credit Mutuel (BFCM) France
Citigroup (operations 
in Germany) United States 6 617
2011 Toronto-Dominion Bank Canada Chrysler Financial Corp United States 6 300
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Thomson Reuters.
Note:  Shading denotes a merger.
The establishment of the Single European Market, 
which allowed the free movement of capital and provision 
of banking services among the member countries of the 
European Union, and the subsequent entry into effect of 
the euro, increased the pressure on European banks. In this 
scenario, several entities began to seek opportunities to 
broaden their operations and revenues abroad, especially 
in developing countries (Calderón and Casilda, 2000). 
As of the mid-1990s, foreign bank presence in 
emerging economies began to increase significantly, 
particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
where they now have market shares of close to 40% 
and 90%, respectively (BIS, 2010a). Between 2000 
and 2011, credit extended by subsidiaries of banks 
with international activities increased from 27% to 
42% of their total assets. Latin America became the 
priority in the first phase of this process (Claessens 
and others, 2008). In developing Asia, international 
entities have a smaller market share of around 20%. 
European banks have been very active in this, with 
Spanish banks spearheading the process in the case 
of Latin America. In the case of Europe and Central 
Asia, Italian, Austrian, Swedish and Greek banks 
have played an important role in Albania, Bulgaria, 
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Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Rumania. 
Portuguese institutions account for around a third of 
bank assets in Angola and Mozambique (World Bank, 
2012b; El País, 2011). 
This process has been limited to a few large financial 
institutions in Europe and the United States, which fall 
into two clearly defined categories (The Economist, 
2010). The first consists of banks with a long history 
which have forged a limited presence in many countries, 
enabling them to service transnational corporations and 
local consumers. These include Citigroup, Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and Standard 
Chartered. The second group comprises entities which 
have established a large presence in the host countries’ 
retail banking segment in just a few years. In this case, 
the most important players were Santander and Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) of Spain in Latin 
America and UniCredit of Italy and Erste and Raiffeisen 
of Austria in Eastern Europe (see figure III.9). 
Figure III.9 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (SELECTED ENTITIES): 















BBVA HSBC Standard 
Chartered
UniCredit Citigroup Scotiabank
Spain United Kingdom  Italy United
States
Canada
Home country/region Europe United States
Latin America
Asia
Central and Eastern Europe Other
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the banks.
The outlook today for advanced-economy banks to 
enter or increase their presence in developing countries 
is rather more complicated. First of all, the institutions 
that now have large presences in emerging economies 
benefited from opportunities that were unique, such as 
the liberalization of the banking industry in Latin America 
after the debt crisis and the bank privatizations in Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Second, it would 
be very difficult to enter the most attractive markets with 
the greatest potential —those with an emerging and 
growing middle class (Kharas, 2010)— since massive 
sales of banking institutions are unlikely to occur in the 
foreseeable future in China, India or the Russian Federation. 
Third, the largest banks in developing economies have 
suddenly become the industry’s elite, thanks in part to 
the difficulties being experienced by developed country 
banks and to their home economies’ strong, steady growth. 
Lastly, as local regulations have tightened, the traditional 
internationalization strategies employed by the largest 
developed country banks have ceased to be feasible. In 
this light, it is unlikely that new dynamic agents will irrupt 
on the international stage. 
(c) Reliance on financial innovation: a risky strategy
In the late 1990s, executives in some of the largest 
banks began to design innovative strategies to strengthen 
traditional banking business and increase the return on 
assets (RoA) in order to meet shareholders demands for 
higher returns on equity (RoE). 
This strategy was aided by the regulatory changes 
that enabled banks and financial institutions to operate 
as universal banks, since these diversified hitherto fairly 
limited business options. The real estate market offered 
the ideal arena for this sort of strategy. Banks invested 
their incoming short-term resources (sight deposits) in 
long-term assets (mortgage loans) and, in the expectation 
of being able to service their liabilities, borrowed more 
in the interbank monetary markets.
A highly leveraged balance structure has a multiplier 
effect on asset returns (Eraso and Urra, 2011). In other 
words, if a bank can generate returns on its activities, the 
more leveraged it is, the greater the returns on equity. 
This strategy was refined using innovative financing 
mechanisms, by issuing securities collateralized by a pool 
of underlying assets (loans), which raises resources while 
keeping debt off the balance sheet. This sort of leveraging 
can be highly effective during the boom phase of the 
business cycle, but can become an irreversible burden if 
conditions take a turn for the worse.  
During the long economic boom, many financial 
institutions —mainly investment banks and entities 
operating as universal banks— became over-leveraged. 
Essentially, two factors encouraged this behaviour: 
• The possibility of recording certain balance sheet 
entries as capital, which strengthened banks’ solvency 
indicators. Structured products were central in this. 
Banks used these financial innovations, such as 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to securitize 
some of their lending and turn it into instruments 
that could be transferred to other investors, along 
with the associated risk. Banks thus removed 
loans which could be readily securitized from their 
balance sheets, which allowed them to continue 
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lending while still meeting the capital requirements 
established in domestic legislation and thus raise 
additional revenues. In the first half of the 2000 
decade, this sort of operation, especially residential 
mortgage-backed securities, increased rapidly in the 
United States and the European Union, particularly 
in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom (ECB, 2011). 
• The procyclical nature of risk assessment.10 
During boom periods, over-confidence on the part 
of regulators, financial entities and risk rating 
agencies led to excessively low risk weightings on 
certain investments (Gual, 2009). In the real estate 
sector, for example, mortgage loans were extended 
to clients with poor solvency. High-risk mortgage 
loans went from 8% of the total mortgage market in 
2001 to 20% in 2007, and over 80% of these were 
securitized (Gorton, 2008). Risk rating agencies 
also operated procyclically, assessing assets and 
structured products as a function of the ease of 
trading them on (Medina Ávila, 2008).
During a downturn, a financial institution with such 
a highly leveraged business structure can find its solvency 
seriously threatened if even a relatively small proportion 
of its assets perform under par. Term mismatches between 
assets and liabilities can leave even a solvent bank in 
serious trouble if deposits and other short-term financing 
instruments are withdrawn en masse. Very often, far from 
evaluating and distributing risk more efficiently among 
financial agents, these innovations make certain assets, 
institutions and markets increasingly opaque, and spread 
the perverse effects of those inefficiencies very rapidly.
In sum, financial entities managed their borrowing 
procyclically as a function of expected risk: highly 
leveraged during the upswing of the cycle and less so 
during contractions. Thus, the more banks financed their 
assets by borrowing, the more profitable —but also the 
more risky— their operations became. 
Financial institutions and operations became too large 
and complex for regulation and oversight schemes and 
exceeded the capacity of private risk rating agencies to 
assess them. For this reason large banking entities came 
to the attention of governments and international agencies; 
however, it was now apparent that they were too big to fail.
10
 Risk management is fundamental for financial sector performance 
and profitability. Banks with diversified portfolios need to monitor 
the evolution of individual risks, in terms of both loans extended 
and other investments, especially variable returns instruments 
and structured products. Risk also has an indirect effect that is by 
no means negligible, since it affects the cost of borrowing, a key 
variable in such a highly leveraged industry.
(d) Bursting of the property bubble and rapid global 
contagion: a small fraction of the market unleashes 
an unstoppable chain reaction
The situation began to change in 2004 when the 
United States Federal Reserve started raising interest 
rates to curb inflation. As a result, interest rates rose 
from 0.98% in 2003 to 5.25% in 2006. Many borrowers 
thus began to find it hard to meet repayment obligations, 
which led to a sharp drop in real estate prices and 
sales. A number of financial entities began to struggle 
to find the liquidity to service their debts and to raise 
new financing. In 2006, the real estate crisis spread to 
the stock exchange (BIS, 2009).
In mid-2007 circumstances combined to make 
the precarious situation unsustainable: the bursting of 
the real estate bubble, high household and corporate 
indebtedness, a high rate of consumption, overvaluation 
of financial assets, heavily leveraged banks, huge growth 
in transactions outside the formal markets, little control 
of speculative transactions, serious risk assessment 
failings and financial systems with a high degree of 
international exposure. As the serious global imbalances11 
worsened, the subprime mortgage problem detonated a 
crisis of vast proportions which compromised the very 
foundations of the financial systems in the world’s 
largest economies (Titelman, Pérez-Caldentey and 
Pineda, 2009). The banks’ leveraging strategy could not 
be sustained by indefinite expansion of credit, because 
this unfettered process was increasingly distorting real 
economy parameters. The value of derivatives was 
three times stock market capitalization in 2000 and 10 
times stock market capitalization by 2007 (see figure 
III.10). This contrasted with a stock market value of 
6.5 times the value of derivatives in 1990 (Morgan 
Stanley, 2007).
The errors made by large financial institutions in 
asset valuation and risk assessment, added to the lack 
of transparency as regards securitization and holdings 
of structured products —later termed “toxic assets”— 
generated spiralling mistrust and panic among the market’s 
main agents and a sharp fall in stock markets worldwide 
(see figure III.10). In the second half of 2007, interbank 
borrowing and intermediary credit operations began to 
grind to a halt.
11
 Basically, what is understood by global imbalances is the large and 
persistent external deficit of the United States, on the one hand, 
and the huge current account surplus of certain Asian economies, 
especially China and, to a lesser extent, some Middle Eastern 
economies, on the other.
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Figure III.10 





















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Global value of derivatives traded in non-organized markets (left scale)
Capitalization of stock markets worldwide (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
and the World Federation of Exchanges.
The losses generated by the sharp fall in real estate 
prices were not limited to the subprime mortgage 
segment, but spread rapidly to some of the world’s 
largest financial institutions (see table III.3). Between 
September 2007 and September 2008 serious liquidity 
and solvency problems became public in some of the 
largest banks in the United States (Citigroup, Bank 
of America, JP Morgan and Wachovia), the United 
Kingdom (HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) and Northern Rock), Switzerland (UBS and 
Credit Suisse) and France (Crédit Agricole), as well 
as prominent investment banks in the United States, 
such as Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers. In the final months of 2008, 
the worsening financial situation reached its darkest 
point with the failure of Lehman Brothers. All this 
unleashed massive problems in the economies of the 
countries concerned and gravely damaged the financial 
institutions involved. 
For several months, the wholesale credit markets 
ground to a halt and only massive intervention by national 
governments and central banks to provide the necessary 
resources prevented the financial system from collapsing 
completely (CRS, 2009; ICB, 2011).12 Injections of 
liquidity by the main central banks, which have been in 
a state of alert ever since, have averted paralysis of the 
12
 Between 2008 and 2011, governments in the European Union 
authorized 4.5 billion euros in assistance for financial systems: the 
equivalent of 36.7% of combined European Union GDP (European 
Commission, 2011a). Between 2008 and 2010, 1.609 billion euros 
of this amount were used (13.1% of European Union GDP and 
2.9% of the total assets of the financial system). 
international financial system, but have not resolved the 
underlying problem: the solvency of financial entities. 
The need was now obvious for a thoroughgoing reform 
of the rules governing the financial sector, including the 
regulators and oversight institutions, the markets and 
main agents (both the banks and the credit risk agencies), 
and risk capital funds. Several reforms were enacted in 
the United States, notably the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.13 Once the role 
that investment banks had played in the gestation of the 
crisis had become established, under the new legislation 
these institutions practically disappeared or were turned 
into commercial banks subject to the regulation and 
oversight that this implies.14 
In the European Union, in late 2009 the Commission 
proposed replacing the oversight scheme in order to restore 
confidence and improve financial system governance. At 
the end of 2010, following agreement by all the member 
States, the European Parliament and the Council for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN Council) 
adopted the new regulatory framework, which came into 
force on 1 January 2011.
International debates began in various forums, 
including the Group of Twenty (G20), the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) (see box III.1). Nevertheless, 
although these deliberations have been treated as urgent, 
their outcomes have been fairly insubstantial.
Despite all efforts, before the recovery was well 
under way new factors began to drive global economic 
conditions back into negative territory. Doubts quickly 
surfaced over the ability of some advanced economy 
States to service their obligations, particularly in the 
European Union, whose expansionary fiscal policies during 
the preceding years had swelled public indebtedness. 
Within a few months Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
received bailouts and Spain and Italy were left in very 
delicate situations which have yet to resolve (Davies and 
Ng, 2011). As financial instability persisted, concerns 
mounted over the sustainability of public finances in 
other euro zone countries, including the largest (Vause 
and von Peter, 2011).
13
 In July 2010 a joint proposal of the United States Congress and Senate 
was adopted: the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, which is considered the greatest financial reform 
in the United States since the Great Depression. The legislation 
includes certain initiatives proposed by extra-parliamentary bodies, 
such as the separation of banking activities (known as the Volcker 
Rule), which strictly limit commercial banks’  investment in stock 
markets and risk assets, and limits the size of entities.
14
 In March 2008, JP Morgan, with support from the federal government, 
bought Bear Stearns for US$ 270 million, 93% below its valuation 
price. In September 2008, Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch 
for US$ 44 billion, in advance of the Lehman Brothers collapse.
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Box III.1 
WHAT PROGRESS IN REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM?
The financial crisis has dominated the 
agendas of the most prominent international 
forums. In November 2008, the first Leaders’ 
Summit of the Group of Twenty (G20), held 
in Washington, D.C., laid down key aspects 
of financial system reform, with a view to 
making it more transparent, solid and stable 
(Group of Twenty, 2008). Since then, the 
G20 has met many times and summits of 
political leaders have gradually given way 
to more technical meetings attended by 
ministers of financial affairs and central 
banks. The discussions have revolved 
around the following issues:
(a) Strengthening the transparency and 
accountability of market agents and 
financial products.
(b) Enhancing sound regulation, making 
regulatory regimes more effective 
over the economic cycle, stimulating 
innovation and responsible trading in 
financial products and services.
(c) Promoting integrity in financial 
markets, bolstering investor and 
consumer protection, avoiding 
conflicts of interest and preventing 
illegal market manipulation.
(d) Reinforcing International Cooperation 
across all segments of financial 
markets, including with respect 
to cross-border capital flows and 
crisis prevention, management, and 
resolution.
(e) Reforming international financial 
institutions to more adequately reflect 
changes in the world economy in 
order to increase their legitimacy 
and effectiveness. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in collaboration 
with the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) and other bodies, should work to 
better identify vulnerabilities, anticipate 
potential stresses, and act swiftly to 
play a key role in crisis response.
Many specific measures have been 
taken in each of these areas of reform (Group 
of Twenty, 2009). The most significant of 
these include the lifting of bank secrecy in 
countries committed to transparency, the 
regulation of high-risk operations (such as 
over-the-counter (OTC) transactions and 
short selling), the creation of new international 
coordination bodies (such as the Financial 
Stability Board, FSB) and a strengthened 
role for IMF and the World Bank.
In addition, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has produced 
agreements for strengthening international 
rules regarding banking systems in order 
to reduce the risk of contagion from the 
financial sector to the real economy. In 
December 2010, the Committee issued 
Basel III, a global regulatory framework 
for strengthening banking institutions and 
systems. Basel III is intended to enhance 
the previous versions (Basel I and Basel 
II, also known as the New Basel Capital 
Accord) and make capital and liquidity 
requirements more stringent. This initiative 
has received firm backing from the G20 
leaders and will be implemented gradually 
starting on 1 January 2013. 
Essentially, Basel III is intended to 
broaden banks’ capital base, improve the 
quality of their resources, impose a ceiling 
on leverage ratios, create countercyclical 
and capital conservation buffers, and 
impose special requirements on banks 
of systemic importance: those whose 
size and interconnectedness with other 
intermediaries is such that they warrant 
special attention. In addition, the new rules 
establish a global liquidity standard for the 
first time (BIS, 2011).
Under the calendar adopted, the 
aggregate of the minimum capital 
requirement plus the conservation buffer 
must rise from 8% in 2013 to 10.5% 
by 2019 (BIS, 2011). It remains to be 
seen what effects these new standards 
may have on bank performance or the 
macroeconomy. According to estimates 
carried out by international agencies and 
private institutions, in principle there should 
be no significant implications for long-term 
GDP growth. Conversely, the impacts on 
financial institutions and the banking sector 
are unclear, aside from a fairly evident fall 
in the rate of return on equity. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Bank for International Settlements.
In sum, the current crisis appears to be rooted in both 
macro- and microeconomic factors. The macro factors 
include problems stemming from mounting disequilibria 
in international balances and the difficulties caused by a 
long stretch of low interest rates. The micro factors fall 
into three areas: regulation, incentives and risk appraisal. 
Lack of regulation, heightened competition and the quest 
for ever increasing returns led financial entities to grow 
immoderately and leverage their balance sheets to the extent 
of endangering the entire system. The growing integration 
of financial systems and the proliferation of innovative 
instruments that facilitated risk trading and diversification 
made banks into extremely complex institutions that were 
hard for governments and regulators to monitor.
When conditions changed and a massive financial crisis 
broke out, national, regional and multilateral authorities 
went to tremendous lengths to cushion its effects and 
contain the contagion. Given the catastrophic economic 
and social consequences if the financial system were to 
collapse, burdensome rescue plans were deployed; these 
have had only partial effects, however. The financial crisis 
which began in the subprime mortgage segment and the 
Lehman Brothers failure, and worsened with the European 
sovereign debt problem, has shown no signs of relenting. 
Many of the industry’s agents are therefore still trying to 
operate in highly uncertain conditions. 
Lastly, the pressure, depth and cost of new regulatory 
requirements and the short time available for preparing 
for them could force major shifts in the strategies of the 
industry’s principal agents. Transborder activities could 
certainly be impacted, perhaps leading some banks to 
withdraw from certain markets. This could be particularly 
relevant for Latin America, where international banks 
play a key role in national financial systems.
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C. Foreign banks in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Relative performance of Latin America’s banks: learning the   
 lessons of the past?
Latin America’s financial markets have developed a great 
deal in the past decade, but they are still shallower than 
those in developed economies (see figure III.2). Domestic 
savings have been insufficient to finance investment needs, 
so access to external financing and its vagaries have done 
much to determine growth and volatility (Manuelito and 
Jiménez, 2010). Since a large percentage of the population 
still have difficulties in accessing financial services, the 
financial culture remains limited.
The region’s financial systems are dominated 
by the banking industry. Capital markets, i.e. equity, 
bonds and other debt instruments, are little developed 
and consist mainly of government securities and other 
types of public debt instruments. With the exception of 
countries which have developed pension funds, such 
a limited capital market has little to offer institutional 
investors. This largely explains the shortage of medium- 
and long-term financing.
As a consequence of all this, Latin American markets 
are underdeveloped in terms of sophisticated financial 
products and services such as derivatives and other structured 
products. Nevertheless, in light of earlier considerations 
with respect to developed countries, a cautious approach 
to financial innovation may be considered a strength of 
the region’s financial systems (Marshall, 2011).
Although the financial crisis struck the region, its 
banking systems remained solid and the economy recovered 
relatively quickly, contrasting with the more traumatic 
episodes of the past. Except for a drop in returns at the 
height of the crisis, assets, especially lending, continued 
to expand throughout the period (see figure III.11). 
Given the weight of bank lending in GDP, the level 
of development of Latin America’s bank markets today 
is about a third of the average for the countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (Manuelito and Jiménez, 2010). In the United 
States, Japan and the European Union, bank credit was 
well in excess of 150% of GDP, compared to just over 
70% of GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean (see 
figure III.12). 
Figure III.11 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITE PERFORMANCE OF THE 250 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of América economía, “La banca latinoamericana en 2011”, Santiago, 
Chile, October 2011.
Figure III.12 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS: DOMESTIC CREDIT 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
[online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
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Banks are the predominant actors in intermediation 
activities in the region and the main source of credit for 
individuals and companies.  Bank credit has burgeoned 
in the past decade, but broadly speaking loan portfolios 
lean heavily towards short-term lending, especially in 
the consumer segment. Longer-term lending, especially 
for housing, is much less developed in all the countries 
of the region except Chile. Latin American banks thus 
have a markedly different credit structure from banks 
elsewhere, both in developing countries and in other 
emerging economies in Asia and Eastern Europe (World 
Bank, 2012a). What is more, most of the Latin America 
economies are quite financially shallow for their levels 
of per capita GDP (CAF, 2011).
The counterpart to this is that commercial banks in 
the region retain much of the risk associated with their 
lending in their own portfolios and finance their credit 
activities basically from deposit-taking and the issuance 
of standardized bonds; a few banks also obtain resources 
from the international financial system (Manuelito 
and Jiménez, 2010). In general, Latin American bank 
portfolios contain a high percentage of public debt 
securities, because previous crises left a legacy of high 
liquidity requirements and the propensity to seek safe 
investments (BIS, 2007). 
In the past decade, the banking market has developed 
most in Brazil and Chile —though with great differences 
between them— and has grown rapidly in Colombia, 
as well. Brazil has the largest banking system in the 
region,15 of which the country’s public banks form a 
large part. The key role played by Brazil’s public banks 
in boosting credit during the financial crisis, together 
with other measures, may be thanked for the country’s 
rapid economic recovery (see figure III.13).16 The depth 
of banking markets in Latin America countries varies 
greatly, and not only as a function of economy size or per 
capita GDP. Some large economies, such as Argentina and 
Mexico, have small banking systems in relation to their 
level of economic development, owing to the lingering 
impacts of the severe financial crises they experienced a 
decade ago (BIS, 2007; CAF, 2011). This situation appears 
to be changing in Mexico, however, owing among other 
factors to the economic recovery, more stable household 
income, growing consumer confidence in the banks and 
the consolidation and positioning of large, mostly foreign, 
financial entities (see figures III.14 and III.15).
15
 With almost a third of the 250 largest banks in Latin America, Brazil 
accounts for almost half of assets, loans, deposits, equity and profits 
in the region’s banking industry (América economía, 2011).
16
 During the recent international crisis, Brazil deployed a countercyclical 
monetary policy and slashed interest rates to historic lows. Along 
with other monetary policy measures, this pushed public banks to 
greatly increase lending, to such an extent that the share of public 
banks in the market increased, reversing the trend hitherto. 
Figure III.13 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from the Central Bank of Brazil.
Figure III.14 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DOMESTIC CREDIT 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Figure III.15 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INCOME LEVEL AND 
DEPTH OF THE BANKING SECTOR, 2010 
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the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator.
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Generally speaking, Latin America’s banks have 
maintained good, stable capitalization indicators over the 
past decade—much higher, in fact, than those of banks in 
the rest of OECD, the euro zone and Japan, although lower 
than those in the United States. Higher capitalization rates in 
the United States are the result of the government’s massive 
injection of resources to ease the fallout from the subprime 
mortgage crisis (see figure III.16). In Latin America, the most 
highly capitalized banks are those of Colombia, Argentina, 
Peru and Mexico. Chilean banks have the lowest capitalization 
rates and Chile is also the only country in which these rates 
have fallen in the past decade (see figure III.17). This has 
to do with sharp growth in lending, funded by increased 
external borrowing and issues of capital and subordinated 
bonds, which has enabled Chile to maintain good solvency 
and liquidity indicators (Central Bank of Chile, 2011).
Figure III.16 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS: CAPITAL OVER TOTAL 
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the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
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Figure III.17 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): CAPITAL OVER TOTAL 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Latin American banks have much higher liquidity 
indicators than banks in advanced economies (see 
figure III.18), which is the result of certain aspects of 
monetary policy. Because capital markets in the region 
are quite shallow, several countries still use legal reserve 
requirements as liquidity controls. This type of measure 
directly impairs the efficiency of banking systems by 
imposing an additional cost on credit provision, thus 
limiting the rate at which banks can turn deposits into 
loans (Manuelito and Jiménez, 2010). Such policies 
do, however, tend to force banks to preserve a cautious 
liquidity position. 
Figure III.18 
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the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Conversely, in economies with more developed debt 
markets, the monetary authority can regulate liquidity by 
varying the supply of monetary instruments, essentially 
bonds, in order to influence interest rates and, through 
these, aggregate demand. In these circumstances, banks 
tend to adjust their liquidity positions to the lowest legal 
level, since liquid assets are usually less profitable than 
alternative investments.
The recent growth in the Latin American banking 
market has taken place largely through infrastructure 
development and technology absorption (branches, 
cash dispenser machines, electronic banking, mobile 
banking, and so forth). This has afforded the population 
greater access to financial services, at the same time as 
capturing a larger proportion of the savings generated in 
the economy and assigning scarce financing resources to 
profitable investment projects. 
The number of bank branches in the region has soared 
in the past few years, almost doubling between 2004 and 
2010, yet still remains far short of the number in more 
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advanced economies (see figure III.19). The gap may narrow 
quite rapidly, however, given technological advances that 
bring banking services closer to people, such as automatic 
cash dispensers, remote access via Internet and mobile 
banking. The rapid increase in cash dispensers, albeit 
with some lag with respect to the number of branches, 
could help to shorten distances between the region and 
the more advanced economies in this regard (see figure 
III.20). Technological progress is also greatly alleviating 
the client pressure on branches, which is helping to lower 
the banks’ operating costs.
Figure III.19 
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the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Access Survey.
Figure III.20 
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In past few decades, the expansion of the banking sector 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, the establishment of 
foreign banks, increasing competition and rising investment 
in physical infrastructure and technology have helped, even 
if only a little, to reduce costs and intermediation margins. 
Be that as it may, these margins are still much larger than 
in more advanced economies and the region continues 
to display large internal inequalities (see figure III.21).
Figure III.21 
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Lastly, the international financial crisis affected 
confidence in the sector very little and the business volume 
and penetration rate of the banking industry have in fact 
increased (América economía, 2011). Rates of arrears 
portfolios are declining, in sharp contrast to the situation 
in advanced economies, where this indicator has risen by 
a factor of 3.5 since 2007. 
In short, the institutional reforms of the 1990s 
seem to have borne fruit, especially as regards financial 
system stability and soundness. Yet, despite the notable 
growth, financial systems are still lagging behind those 
of industrialized countries. With few exceptions, bank 
coverage in the region’s economies is smaller than in 
other countries with similar levels of per capita income 
and leans towards short-term lending —increasingly so as 
modern practices of consumer lending management have 
spread. As a result, banking services are not meeting real 
needs and have yet to reach a large portion of households 
and firms in the region, especially SMEs.
Yet, notwithstanding the lags in financial intermediation, 
it is encouraging that banks in the region have come 
through the first blow of the international financial crisis 
relatively unscathed, since this suggests that they have 
learned the lessons of the past. Today Latin America’s 
banks are better regulated, better capitalized and more 
efficient, which should form a basis for more orderly 
and sustainable development of the sector in the future.
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2. Establishment of foreign banks in Latin America: seizing  
 a one-off opportunity
In the past two decades, the growing presence of foreign 
banks has become one of the hallmarks of the banking 
industry in Latin America. Governments in the region, 
backed by a number of international agencies, expected 
that foreign banks setting up operations in the their 
economies would help to recapitalize local banks, drive 
modernization and increase competition in the industry, 
and thereby reduce the possibilities of new financial crises 
breaking out (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Ballescá, 
2007; Minda, 2007; Jeon, Olivero and Wu, 2010). The 
sector was reformed, removing most of the barriers that 
previously prevented the entry of foreign banks and 
allowing the privatization of State banks, which were 
also allowed to operate in a broader range of activities. 
Thus business strategies began to shift towards universal 
banking (ECLAC, 2003). Reforms were also aimed at 
adapting the region’s banking systems to international 
solvency standards, freeing up working capital and 
boosting efficiency and productivity.
The share of foreign banks in the industry’s total in 
Latin America rose from 11% in 1995 to 31% in 2000, 
then to 37% by 2005 (Claessens and others, 2008). But 
between 2008 and 2010, foreign-held assets in the Latin 
American banking systems fell from 40% to 35% (see 
figure III.22). Foreign banks have much larger presence 
in Latin America and the Caribbean than they do in more 
mature banking markets, such as in Europe or the United 
States. Latin American markets are significant for banks 
with international operations: loans extended in the region 
by the subsidiaries of foreign banks rose from 36% of their 
total external assets in 2000 to 57% in 2011. 
Throughout this process, the financial sector has 
been one of the most important destinations for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the region, especially in 
Chile and Mexico (see table III.4). An analysis of 
projects announced in the banking industry shows 
over 450 schemes worth a total of US$ 8.74 billion for 
2003-2011 (see figure III.23). Spanish banks account for 
42.5% of this figure, followed by banks from the United 
States and the United Kingdom with around 12% each. 
Latin American banks investing in other counties in the 
region are also beginning to claim a significant share.17 
The largest economies, Mexico and Brazil, have been 
the most favoured destinations, since they account for 
almost 50% of all investments announced in the sector, 
followed by Chile with 12% (see figure III.23). 
17
 Itaú of Brazil has been particularly active in this regard. Itaú 
bought BankBoston’s assets in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Other 
examples are Davivienda of Colombia, which bought the operations 
of HSBC in Central America, Bancolombia, which bought Banco 
Agrícola of El Salvador, and Banco de Bogotá, which acquired 
BAC Credomatic in Costa Rica. Lastly, CorpBanca of Chile bought 
Banco Santander’s Colombian assets for US$ 1.225 billion in the 
second largest acquisition abroad by a Chilean company. 
Figure III.22 
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During the phase of international expansion, Latin 
America was a prime destination for a select group of 
banks that were seeking out new business opportunities 
in developing countries (see figures III.9 and III.22). 
Foreign (especially Canadian, Spanish, United States and 
British) banks flooded into the region, with their main 
entry strategy being to buy up local financial institutions 
(see table III.5). The experiences of the region’s two 
largest economies –Brazil and Mexico– have differed in 
this respect, however. In Brazil, given the powerfulness 
of local private groups, the size of the market and 
the central role played by public banks in financing 
investment and economic development, fewer foreign 
institutions entered the market, and a number of them 
17
 Itaú of Brazil has been particularly active in this regard. Itaú 
bought BankBoston’s assets in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Other 
examples are Davivienda of Colombia, which bought the operations 
of HSBC in Central America, Bancolombia, which bought Banco 
Agrícola of El Salvador, and Banco de Bogotá, which acquired 
BAC Credomatic in Costa Rica. Lastly, CorpBanca of Chile bought 
Banco Santander’s Colombian assets for US$ 1.225 billion in the 
second largest acquisition abroad by a Chilean company. 
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were unsuccessful (see figure III.13).18 The involvement 
of private Brazilian banks in State-run operations, their 
access to prime clients and the major efficiency gains 
made possible by the introduction of new technologies 
were some of the reasons why a number of foreign 
banks ended up pulling out of Brazil (Solorza, 2009). 
18
 In December 2011, the five largest banks in Brazil —which 
accounted for 77% of the system’s total assets— included two State 
banks (Banco do Brazil and Caixa Económica Federal), two private 
Brazilian banks (Itaú Unibanco and Bradesco) and one foreign 
bank (Banco Santander). The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (BNDES), Brazil’s development bank and the 
main provider of investment financing in the country, is not included 
in this group because it is not a deposit institution.
In Mexico, on the other hand, the outbreak of a series 
of financial crises within a fairly short period of time 
combined with other factors to alter people’s views 
about foreign banks, and Mexico is now one of the 
Latin American countries in which foreign banks 
maintain the greatest presence (see figure III.22).
Figure III.23 




































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from “fDi markets” [online] http://www.fdimarkets.com.
Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, 2000-2010 
(Percentages)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2000-2010
Argentina 3.7 -5.8 2.6 20.4 3.8 1.4 4.2 5.9 5.9 25.3 4.5 5.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) … … … … … … … … 1.4 2.3 4.3 2.5
Brazil 21.3 12.4 7.4 4.0 4.8 8.1 13.0 18.4 9.7 12.5  13.4
Chile       11.4 37.4 25.7 9.8 21.9 22.2
Colombia 32.5 22.0 13.7 14.1 8.1 2.4 7.0 14.6 10.3 10.1 18.1 11.6
Costa Rica 6.6 9.4 2.6 0.4 2.8 4.8 23.4 3.9 1.4 6.5 5.0 6.3
Mexico 24.6 53.7 27.6 17.2 22.4 9.4 19.1 20.7 16.0 15.4 9.8 22.8
Source: Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Spanish banks have been some of the most active 
financial institutions in the region. In the 1990s, they (and 
especially Banco Santander and BBVA) saw Latin America 
as offering a unique opportunity. Nearby options, such as 
other European countries, had mature, high-priced markets 
that offered few openings for acquisitions (Calderón, 
2005). For major Spanish banking institutions, Latin 
America offered a venue in which they could consolidate 
their internationalization drive by moving along four 
main vectors: (a) a focus on scale and competitiveness; 
(b) a shift away from mature markets (as Spain’s was 
beginning to be) and into expanding markets; (c) the global 
sourcing of organizational and technological capacities 
and resources; and (d) proper risk diversification as a 
function of profitability.
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Table III.5 
LATIN AMERICA: LARGEST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS UNDERTAKEN BY FOREIGN BANKS, 1990-2011 
(Millions of dollars)
Date Buyer Country Institution acquired Country Amount
2001 Citigroup United States Banamex Mexico 12 821
2004 BBVA Spain Bancomer (38.4%) Mexico 3 888
2000 Banco Santander Spain Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo (30%) Brazil 3 581
2006 Banco Itaú Brazil BankBoston (operations in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay)
United States 2 829
2008 Royal Bank of Canada Canada RBTT Financial Holdings Ltd Trinidad and Tobago 2 235
1998 ABN-AMRO Holding NV Netherlands Banco Real SA (40%) Brazil 2 100
2006 HSBC United Kingdom Grupo Banistmo SA Panama 1 781
2002 Banco Santiago Chile Banco Santander Chile SA Chile 1 678
2000 Banco Santander Spain Grupo Financiero Serfin SA de Mexico 1 543
2007 Citigroup United States Grupo Cuscatlan El Salvador 1 510
2000 BBVA Spain Bancomer (20.5%) Mexico 1 400
2004 HSBC United Kingdom Bank of Bermuda Ltd Bermuda 1 199
2001 Banco Santander Spain Banco do Estado de Sao 
Paulo (63.7%)
Brazil 1 162
2002 HSBC United Kingdom Grupo Financiero Bital SA Mexico 1 135
2012 Scotiabank Canada Banco Colpatria Red Multibanca Colombia 1 008
2000 Banco Santander Spain Banco Bozano Simonsen SA Brazil 1 000
1997 HSBC United Kingdom Banco Bamerindus do Brazil Brazil 1 000
2006 Canadian Imperial 
Bk Commerce
Canada First Caribbean Intl Bank Ltd Barbados 999
1996 Banco Santander Spain Banco Osorno and la Unión Chile 881
1998 BBVA Spain Banco Excel Economico SA Brazil 878
2000 Banco Santander Spain Banco Meridional do Brazil SA Brazil 835
2007 Scotiabank Canada Banco del Desarrollo Chile 829
2007 Bancolombia SA Colombia Banagricola El Salvador 790
1997 HSBC United Kingdom Roberts SA de Inversiones Argentina 688
2000 Banco Santander Spain Banco Rio de la Plata (26.5%) Argentina 675
1998 Credit Suisse First Boston United States Banco de Investimentos Garanti Brazil 675
2002 Banco Santander Spain Banco Santiago (35.5%) Chile 657
2007 Banco Itaú Brazil BankBoston Uruguay Uruguay 650
1997 Lloyds TSB Group PLC United Kingdom Banco Multiplic-Consumer (50%) Brazil 600
1999 Banco Santander Spain O’Higgins Central Hispano (50%) Chile 600
1997 Banco Santander Spain Banco Río de la Plata S.A. Argentina 594
2001 BBVA Spain Bancomer (9%) Mexico 555
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
Generally speaking, Latin American banking markets 
were fairly undeveloped and had wide spreads and high 
potential levels of profitability, and this, together with the 
improvements that were being made in banking supervisory 
and regulatory systems, was opening up attractive business 
opportunities. At the same time, there was clearly a 
shortage of capital and a lack of new products to meet 
a growing demand for financial services. And all of this 
was found in the context of a shared language, culture 
and history; while this was a limiting factor in other 
situations, here it was conducive to the transfer not only of 
capital but also of technology and management expertise 
(Calderón and Casilda, 2000). These banks launched an 
ambitious strategy focusing on the acquisition of big 
national financial institutions that had large amounts of 
local deposits, thereby positioning themselves as leading 
players in most of the region’s economies (Pozzolo, 2008) 
(see table III.6). This approach led to such an increase in 
the concentration of Latin America’s banking market that, 
today, the three largest institutions account for over 50% 
of the system’s total assets, and the 10 largest account for 
85% (see table III.7).
119Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2011
Table III.6 
ASSETS OF MAJOR FOREIGN BANKS OPERATING IN LATIN AMERICA, BY COUNTRY, JUNE 2011 
(Hundreds of millions of dollars and percentages)
Santander BBVA HSBC Citigroup Scotiabank Deutsche Bank Itaú Other Total (Percentages)
Brazil 2 706 ... 907 322 ... 150 ... 953 5 038 43.9
Mexico 677 959 423 970 180 144 ... 262 3 614 31.5
Chile 525 161 26 ... 117 30 77 14 949 8.3
Argentina 100 78 59 44 ... ... 15 58 353 3.1
Colombia 39 130 13 41 ... ... ... 111 333 2.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 154 129 ... 10 ... ... ... 31 324 2.8
Panama ... 21 108 10 16 ... ... 145 301 2.6
Peru ... 144 12 15 103 ... ... 0 275 2.4
Uruguay 45 25 9 13 ... ... 22 26 141 1.2
El Salvador ... ... 19 21 18 ... ... 0 58 0.5
Costa Rica ... ... 14 ... 20 ... ... 23 58 0.5
Honduras ... ... 12 ... ... ... ... 0 12 0.1
Dominican Republic ... ... ... ... 12 ... ... 0 12 0.1
Guatemala ... ... ... 10 ... ... ... 0 10 0.1
Other ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0 11 0.0





Percentages 37.0 14.3 14.0 12.7 4.1 2.8 1.0 14.1 100 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of América Economía, “La banca latinoamericana en 2011”, Santiago, Chile, October 2011.
Table III.7 
LATIN AMERICA: CONCENTRATION OF THE BANKING MARKET, 1994-2010 
(Percentages)
1994 2000 2010
3 largest 10 largest 3 largest 10 largest 3 largest 10 largest
Argentina 39.1 73.1 39.8 80.7 44.8 79.6
Brazil 49.9 78.8 55.2 85.6 60.4 88.3
Chile 39.5 79.1 39.5 82.0 58.8 94.5
Mexico 48.3 80.8 56.3 94.5 54.8 87.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 43.9 78.6 46.7 75.7 47.3 93.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Barbara Stallings and Rogerio Studart, “Financial regulation and supervision 
in emerging markets: The experience of Latin America since the tequila crisis”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 9 (LC/L.1670-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 2001. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.205 [online] http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/
xml/4/9084/lcl1670i.pdf; and BankScope.
Initially, apart from Brazil and Mexico, foreign banks 
focused on medium-sized countries (see box III.2). Once they 
had consolidated their position in local markets, however, the 
major Spanish institutions embarked on new diversification 
plans. An important factor in this respect was the possibility of 
gaining access to pension fund administrators and insurance 
companies. In the early 2000s, Banco Santander and BBVA 
made a forceful entry into the region’s largest markets (Brazil 
and Mexico) and established what was to be their new global 
strategic approach (see table III.6). At the same time, they 
were making new acquisitions in Mediterranean Europe and 
the United Kingdom (see table III.3). The Brazilian market 
proved to be an especially difficult one for Spanish banks; 
in fact, fierce competition with local institutions forced 
BBVA to pull out of that market very quickly, while Banco 
Santander has been working extremely hard to hold on to 
and expand its market share.
Mexico thus became one of the main focuses for Spanish 
banks’ operations in Latin America after restrictions on 
foreign capital in the banking system were lifted in 1998 
(Suárez, 2010) (see box III.2). Once they had gained control 
of some of Mexico’s largest financial institutions, Spanish 
banks turned their attention to the United States market. 
They used a number of different entry strategies for this 
purpose. Seeking to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the large population of Mexican immigrants 
living in the United States and the large volume of 
remittances that they send back home, BBVA acquired a 
number of banks in the southern part of the country and 
consolidated them into BBVA Compass (Calderón and 
Machinea, 2008). Banco Santander bought Sovereign 
Bancorp as a means of entering the competitive market 
in the north-eastern United States. It was helped in this 
attempt not only by its presence in the Mexican market 
but also by its prior experience in the United Kingdom, 
where it had bought up Abbey Bank and part of Royal 
Bank of Scotland and NatWest in Scotland (Santander, 
2011).19 This initial stake in Latin America on the part of 
the larger Spanish banking institutions enabled them to 
gain access to more competitive markets in Europe and 
North America and, in a few years’ time, they have been 
able to position themselves among the leading banks  not 
only in Europe but also globally (see table III.2).
19
 In continental Europe, Banco Santander has operations in Germany, 
Poland and Portugal. In late 2010, it purchased Zachodni WBK 
Bank in Poland and the commercial banking operations of the 
Swedish Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB Group) in Germany 
(Santander, 2011).
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Box III.2 
FOREIGN BANKS’ SWIFT ENTRY INTO MEXICO
The Mexican banking system has undergone 
sweeping changes in a relatively short 
amount of time, and the part played in this 
by foreign institutions has been assessed 
differently at different times. The fact of 
the matter is, however, that the State-run 
industry was ultimately handed over to the 
private sector in Mexico and wound up 
being largely dominated by foreign banks.
Throughout almost all of the twentieth 
century, banking was the sole province 
of local institutions. The only foreign 
bank operating in Mexico was Citibank, 
which had set up its operations in 1929 
—long before the passage of legislation 
restricting foreign banks’ involvement 
in 1966 (Beck and Martínez, 2010). In 
1982, in the aftermath of the debt crisis, 
the sector passed from private (mainly 
Mexican) hands to the State, which paid 
out some US$ 500 million in compensation 
to prior owners. In the early 1990s, as 
part of the country’s structural reform 
effort, the financial sector underwent 
a fast-paced liberalization process and 
the banking sector’s reprivatisation was 
announced. Even while negotiations were 
being pursued in connection with the 
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
(FTAA), which entailed a more flexible 
approach to foreign investment in the 
industry, it was determined, as part 
of the reprivatisation process, that a 
controlling interest in these institutions 
should remain in Mexican hands.  In all, 
18 banks (a number of which fetched very 
high prices even though their finances 
were not in very good shape) were 
auctioned off, with the Government of 
Mexico taking in approximately US$ 12 
billion from the sales. After the new 
owners had taken possession of these 
institutions, authorization was given for 
the establishment of new banks as well, 
thereby spurring competition, particularly 
for market share. 
This triggered a credit boom at a time 
when trade liberalization was sparking a 
dramatic shift in the country’s production 
structure against a backdrop of weak 
financial supervision and regulation and 
major shortcomings in the banking system 
in terms of capitalization and loan-risk 
assessment. Between 1988 and 1994, 
bank credit rose from the equivalent of 
38% to 49% of GDP. By 1994, the steady 
increase in the deficit on current account, 
the loss of reserves and the overvaluation 
of the exchange rate had made the 
macroeconomic situation untenable. A 
severe adjustment plan was then launched, 
with a 50% devaluation, which sparked 
a deep banking crisis that drove up the 
volume of non-performing loans to the 
equivalent of 15% of GDP. Those loans 
were then absorbed by the State-run Bank 
Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA). 
The State stepped into the banking sector 
once again and put a drastic bail-out plan 
into place at a cost of nearly 19% of GDP. 
In addition, many of the recently privatized 
institutions folded (Avalos and Hernández-
Trillo, 2006; Suárez, 2010). 
In 1995, although the decision to keep 
the largest banks —Banco Nacional de 
Mexico (Banamex), Bancomer and Serfín— 
in Mexican hands remained in place, the 
regulations on FDI in the banking sector 
were loosened and the pace at which 
the sector was being opened picked up, 
with foreign banks’ share of the national 
market expanding from 6% to 25%. Banco 
Santander bought Somex, and Citibank 
bought Confia. The banks remained in a 
weakened position in the wake of the crisis, 
however, and the government came under 
pressure because of the cost of the bail-
out. This, together with the pressure being 
exerted by some international organizations 
and foreign governments for a greater 
liberalization of the sector, pushed the 
government into moving ahead more rapidly 
with the elimination of all remaining legal 
restrictions on the acquisition of Mexican 
institutions by foreign banks (Haber and 
Musacchio, 2005).
Between 2000 and 2001, the Spanish 
banks BBVA and Banco Santander acquired 
a controlling interest in Bancomer and 
Serfin, respectively, and Citicorp bought 
Banamex. In addition, HSBC acquired 
Bital, and the Canadian Scotiabank bought 
Inverlat. With these transactions, foreign 
banks came to control more than 80% of 
the banking system’s assets (Claessens 
and others, 2008). Mexico thus went 
from being one of the countries whose 
banking sector was the least accessible to 
foreign investment to one in which foreign 
institutions had one of the largest market 
shares in the system. However, owing to the 
difficulties that it has faced in overcoming 
the impact of two major banking crises 
in little more than a decade, Mexico’s 
banking sector is quite small relative to the 
country’s level of development. Between 
2000 and 2005, while the country’s per 
capita income climbed from US$ 5,800 to 
almost US$ 8,000, the volume of credit 
granted by the banking system slipped 
from 34.1% to 32.1% of GDP (see figures 
III.1 and III.14).
Starting in 2000, banks embarked 
upon an intensive effort to reorganize and 
clean up their accounts. Their strategies 
focused on boosting efficiency, making 
staff cuts (especially senior positions), 
targeting middle- and upper-income 
sectors, and attracting funds at the lowest 
possible cost in the country’s depressed 
credit market so that they could widen their 
spreads and increase their commissions 
and administer the payments system. This 
strategy proved to be very effective, and 
banks began to turn a large profit. During 
the Administration of President Calderón, 
various reforms were introduced that made 
the system more transparent, which led to a 
slight reduction in commissions, and credit 
activity, especially in the case of consumer 
credit, began to surge.
Mexico was hard-hit by the 2008 crisis 
because of the impact that it had on its 
production of exports for the United States 
market. The portfolio of non-performing 
loans swelled, and business and household 
credit shrank. The federal government 
implemented an expansionary monetary 
policy which, in combination with price 
stability, staved off a greater decline in 
household income and a spike in borrowing 
costs. As the economy began to make a 
comeback in 2010, and given the sturdy 
financial position of banks operating in 
Mexico, consumer lending also began 
to rebound, but this was not the case for 
investment loans. In fact, the banks were 
well-capitalized before the crisis erupted, 
obtained funding from local deposits, and 
did not engage in high-risk investments 
or issue high-risk paper (BBVA Research, 
2011). The banks continue to concentrate 
on consumer loans, however, while non-
bank agents are accounting for most of the 
volume of mortgages and business loans 
(Mundo ejecutivo, 2011; Fenton and Padilla, 
2012). According to the authorities, Mexican 
financial institutions are very well positioned 
for the adoption of Basel III, but the industry 
remains somewhat underdeveloped, and 
bank loans amount to the equivalent of 
45% of GDP, which is still a far cry from the 
levels seen in the largest Latin American 
economies (see figure III.14). 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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BBVA has recently begun to explore opportunities in 
the Orient for entering into strategic  alliances with some 
of the biggest banks in China and India: China CITIC 
Bank (CNCB) and Bank of Baroda, respectively (Casilda, 
2011).  It has also acquired a controlling interest in the 
Turkish Garanti Bank (Cinco días, 2011).
Two of the banks that have had the most ambitious 
plans for global expansion for the last few decades, 
Citigroup and HSBC, then began to strengthen their 
presence in the region in response to regulatory changes in 
their home countries. These institutions gradually moved 
into more and more different segments of the industry, 
operating at one and the same time as both investment 
and commercial banks, until they reached the point of 
becoming universal banks that receive deposits, extend 
credit and market securitized products. As noted earlier, 
this has shown itself to be a successful survival strategy 
in a market where the investment banking segment is 
growing exponentially, and it has led to a high degree 
of consolidation between commercial and investment 
banking (ECLAC, 2003).
These large, increasingly well-regarded universal 
banks expanded their international operations and began 
to offer a wide array of services. After a century of 
catering to businesses and private high-end clients, in 2001 
Citigroup made the leap to consumer banking by buying 
Banamex in Mexico for US$ 12.821 billion. This was the 
largest acquisition in the entire history of the banking 
industry in Latin America (see table III.5). Although 
this transaction placed Citigroup among the elite of the 
Latin American financial system, Citigroup continued 
to use a selective strategy, waiting for opportunities to 
take over new institutions with a more suitable structure 
for retail banking. This strategy led it to undertake major 
acquisitions in El Salvador that strengthened its position 
in Central America and to enter into an alliance with 
the Luksic conglomerate in Chile for the marketing of 
banking services and products via three different brand 
names: Banco de Chile, Banco Edwards and Citibank. 
HSBC is one of the world’s largest financial institutions, 
with operations in over 80 countries. In the mid-1990s, it 
decided to strengthen its position in Latin America, which 
until that time had been very limited. First it acquired 
minority holdings in banks in Brazil, Mexico and Peru 
to complement some small holdings that it already had 
in Argentina and Chile. It then began to expand more 
aggressively, buying up new assets in Argentina, Bermuda, 
Brazil, Mexico, Panama and Central America. These 
acquisitions turned it into the third-largest international 
financial institution in Latin America, after Spain’s Banco 
Santander and BBVA (see table III.6).
Canada’s Scotiabank has been operating in the region, 
especially in the Caribbean, for a long time (ECLAC, 
2008; IMF, 2009a). Its internationalization strategy has 
focused on rapidly growing markets and economies with 
favourable demographics in which bank penetration is 
still low. In the early 2000s, its regional operations were 
mainly in Argentina and Chile, but when the financial 
crisis erupted in Argentina, it withdrew its capital from that 
country and began to build up its operations in Mexico, 
where it bought Inverlat, and in Central America, the 
Dominican Republic and Panama. In South America, it 
continues to be quite active in Chile, Colombia and Peru.
In sum, the presence of foreign banks in Latin 
America has been spurred by two main factors: (a) the 
quest by banks in developed countries for new options 
as they see their revenues begin to shrink in their mature, 
highly competitive home markets; and (b) the changed 
institutional and macroeconomic situation in Latin 
America as the region emerged from the succession 
of deep economic and financial crises of the preceding 
decades, which opened the door to entry into markets 
with a high growth potential in which the level of bank 
penetration was still low.
3. The behaviour and performance of foreign banks: are they really   
 so different from national institutions?
The empirical evidence concerning the impacts of the entry 
of foreign banks is not entirely conclusive. There does seem 
to be a consensus that their presence has stoked competition 
in Latin American markets, but, apart from this point of 
agreement, the effects of foreign institutions’ participation 
in the banking system in the region has been a heatedly 
debated subject about which there are sharply differing views.
• Those who advocate the entry of foreign institutions 
contend that their presence makes local banking 
markets more competitive; boosts the operating 
efficiency of national institutions by promoting 
the incorporation of technology, new management 
techniques and new products and services; and 
narrows local banks’ profit margins and prompts 
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them to become more efficient, which translates into 
lower-cost financial services. They also argue that 
foreign banks have access to capital and financing 
on better terms than local banks do, that the loans 
granted by foreign banks are more dependable, that 
their lending activity is less influenced by local 
financial cycles, that foreign banks behave more 
prudently than their national counterparts, that 
they foster economic growth by making resource 
allocation more efficient and that they reduce the 
banking system’s vulnerability to internal and 
external economic shocks. It has also been said that 
the regional banking system’s high profits can be 
accounted for primarily by the efficient structure 
hypothesis rather than by market power theory 
(Levine, 1996; Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1998; Martínez and Schmukler, 1999; 
Dages, Goldberg and Kinney, 2000; Clarke and 
others, 2003; Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, 2002; 
Levy and Micco, 2007; Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007; Wu, Jeon and Luca, 2010; Olivero, Li 
and Jeon, 2011; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and 
Girardone, 2011). 
• The opposing camp argues that foreign banks display 
a selective pattern of behaviour and edge out local 
banks by luring their best (and, hence, lowest-risk) 
clients away. This forces local banks to specialize 
in providing services to higher-risk clients, which 
makes them less profitable, less efficient and less 
competitive. Others have asserted that foreign banks 
may boost capital outflows and that the integration 
of capital markets magnifies the impact of external 
financial shocks on credit and interest rates. It is 
also argued that foreign banks usually use wider 
net interest-rate spreads than local ones do and 
behave like rentier capitalists, which means that 
local banking markets become less competitive 
(ECLAC, 2003; Moguillansky, Studart and Vergara, 
2004; Green, Murinde and Nikolov, 2004; Haber 
and Musacchio, 2005; Galindo, Izquierdo and 
Rojas-Suárez, 2010; de la Torre, Martínez Pería 
and Schmukler, 2010). 
While the literature on the subject is voluminous 
and includes a vast number of empirical studies, it 
focuses on particular aspects of the subject and fails to 
encompass a long enough period of time to permit an 
overall assessment of the effects of the move to open up 
Latin America’s banking market to foreign institutions. 
Data on the 450 largest commercial banks, which are 
highly representative of the market as a whole in terms 
of geographical location, size and capital sources, will 
be used to analyse the differences in the behaviour of 
national and foreign financial institutions, below.
(a) Regulation and earlier crises have given rise to a 
more conservative business model
One of the reasons why the banking systems of Latin 
America and the Caribbean were opened up was to permit 
the diversification of financial services and products. This 
should have been reflected in a more diversified balance 
structure. Figures for the period from 2001 to 2010 
indicate, however, that traditional loans and deposits have 
continued to figure very prominently in the balances of 
Latin American institutions as a whole (see figures III.24 
and III.25). In the case of loans, the Argentine crisis and 
the impact of the shocks created when the dot-com bubble 
burst at the start of the 2000s led to a slight contraction 
in credit activity on the part of both local and foreign 
institutions. Once those shocks had dissipated, however, 
credit rebounded and remained strong until the outbreak 
of the subprime mortgage crisis. The resulting credit 
squeeze was especially severe for foreign –and particularly 
European– banks, which were more severely affected by the 
international crisis. Meanwhile, local bank lending made 
a strong recovery from 2003 on and, by 2010, local banks 
had increased their portfolios by nearly six percentage 
points; this is by no means a negative development, since 
bank funds continue to be the main source of financing in 
Latin America’s economies. In fact, this increase in the 
share of local bank balances represented by credit can 
be interpreted as being indicative of increased access to 
financing for businesses and households (see figure III.24). 
In Brazil, the situation is somewhat different. Although 
foreign banks behaved in virtually the same way there as 
in other countries of the region, local banks, which had 
more options and for which the effects of macroeconomic 
imbalances were still fresh in their memory, maintained 
balances in which credit played a much smaller role. In 
fact, high interest rates acted as a disincentive for lending, 
to some extent, and influenced the strategies employed 
by financial institutions, which opted for short-term 
government assets and for the local bond market, which 
was expanding thanks to Brazilian firms’ increased access 
to international credit markets (Solorza, 2009) (see figure 
III.24). Nonetheless, the country’s macroeconomic stability 
enabled Brazilian institutions to increase their lending 
activity substantially. This has not been dampened by 
recent disturbances in international markets, with the 
public banking system playing a key role in stabilizing 
and buttressing economic activity.
As occurred earlier in the European and United 
States banking systems, deposits have been declining in 
importance as a financing instrument for Latin American 
institutions, although the rate of decline has been very 
gradual, and traditional deposits still represent nearly half 
of the claims on local banks and somewhat more than 
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that for foreign banks in the region. This, in combination 
with the large share accounted for by own resources, 
leaves little room for the development of other sources 
of financing —such as bonds, other types of securities 
or interbank operations— by deposit-taking institutions 
(see figure III.25). 
Figure III.24 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CREDITS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN 
BANKS, 2001-2010 
(Percentages)








2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
Figure III.25 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DEPOSITS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS OF LOCAL  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
The international financial crisis that broke out 
in the third quarter of 2007 had a stronger impact on 
the use of traditional financing instruments by foreign 
banks and greatly reduced the percentage share of bank 
portfolios represented by deposits; nonetheless, the 
previous trend reasserted itself just a few months later. 
In Brazil, deposits behaved in much the same way as 
loans did (see figure III.25).
Unlike other components of the business structure, 
the trends in own resources (capital and reserves) and the 
interbank assets of local and foreign institutions have been 
fairly similar (see figures III.26 and III.27). The level of 
local banks’ own resources soared following the regional 
and international upheavals of the early 2000s, but then 
subsided to their former levels in the aftermath of the 
subprime mortgage crisis. This last crisis sparked a move 
to deleverage that greatly improved foreign institutions’ 
capitalization indicators. In the closing years of the decade, 
both local and foreign banks converged towards a capital 
ratio of around 14%, which is slightly above the ratio seen 
in advanced economies. Both public and private Brazilian 
banks, which had capitalization indices well above the 
global average, contributed a great deal to this result.
Figure III.26 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CAPITAL AND RESERVES 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS OF LOCAL AND  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
Figure III.27 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LIQUIDITY COEFFICIENTS 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
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The percentage of national and foreign banks’ assets 
that is made up of interbank assets, which can be used as an 
indicator of liquidity, has stood at around 10% throughout 
the decade —except in the case of Brazilian banks, which 
have greatly increased their asset position in the interbank 
market, especially since 2005 (the proportion of the total 
balance for all local banks in the region has climbed by 
some 10 percentage points).
In general, the strategies deployed by the Latin 
American banking system have been conservative ones 
based on past crises, the size of the financial market 
and borrowers’ behaviour. Foreign banks have behaved 
quite similarly across countries. This situation reflects 
the fact that their parent companies’ strategies are also 
quite similar, as well as the fact that the number of 
international groups that maintain a major presence in the 
region is quite limited. The behaviour of local banks, on 
the other hand, has differed from bank to bank. The big 
Brazilian banks, for their part, have been buttressed by a 
countercyclical monetary policy and the application of an 
expansionary credit policy by the public banking system. 
These institutions have been heavily capitalized and have 
been more risk-averse —an approach which has enabled 
them to withstand recent financial shocks and exert a 
stabilizing influence on economic activity as a whole.
(b) Efficiency and profitability: major advances by 
local banks
Another of the expected effects of the entry of foreign 
banks into Latin America and the Caribbean was an increase 
in efficiency and productivity for the sector as a whole as 
a result of greater competitiveness and the technological 
and managerial improvements that they were likely to bring 
along with them. This greater competition was expected 
to trigger a significant reduction in the spread between 
borrowing and lending interest rates, and the efficiency and 
productivity gains were expected to drive down operating 
costs to such an extent that they would more than make 
up for the narrower spreads and thus boost profits. And, 
in point of fact, the performance of both local and foreign 
banks has, on the whole, borne out the projections made 
when the sector was just beginning to open up. 
The breakdown of the spreads between lending and 
borrowing rates is one of the most important factors to 
take into consideration when analysing the influence of 
competition, particularly with regard to foreign banks, in 
Latin American markets. Except in Brazil, where interest 
rates have systematically been high, although they are 
declining, local banks have charged somewhat higher 
interest rates on loans than foreign banks have (see figure 
III.28). Both types of institutions have followed the lead of 
government-established interest rates, but the advantages 
that foreign banks have enjoyed (in terms of management, 
technology, the cost of money and other factors) have tended 
to dissipate with time, and the rates charged by local and 
foreign banks have therefore begun to converge. In Brazil, 
in addition to an overall decline in rates, the convergence 
of local and foreign banks has been significant, especially 
since the subprime mortgage crisis. The trend in rates on 
deposits has been quite similar to the trend in lending rates, 
and this is particularly true in relation to the differing modes 
of behaviour seen in Brazil (see figure III.29).
Figure III.28 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS LENDING 
INTEREST RATES CHARGED BY LOCAL  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
Figure III.29 
LATIN AMERICA AND THTE CARIBBEAN: INTEREST RATES PAID 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
While bank spreads have behaved as expected following 
the entry of foreign banks, the impact on operating costs 
has been considerably greater, at least for the countries 
of the region as a whole (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005). 
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Unit costs have fallen steeply throughout the period under 
review for both local and foreign banks (see figure III.30). 
Generally speaking, foreign banks have had lower unit 
operating costs than local institutions have, but the gap 
between the two then began to narrow until it disappeared 
completely in 2010, while unit operating costs have 
actually been slightly lower for local banks since 2008 
(Zahler, 2008). The case of Brazil is especially interesting 
in that local banks have clearly had lower costs than their 
foreign counterparts —a fact which bears witness to the 
difficulties that foreign banks have had in breaking into 
the region’s largest market. A similar trend has been seen 
in differences between operating costs, especially since the 
financial crisis, with local banks outpacing their foreign 
counterparts thanks to the larger spreads that they are 
able to command (Gelos, 2009).
Figure III.30 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE OPERATING 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
Risk assessment is another facet of operations in 
which the entry of foreign banks was expected to have a 
constructive influence on local banking. Foreign banks’ 
greater experience in this field, their use of the standardized 
statistical assessment techniques that are so firmly 
embedded in advanced countries’ financial management 
systems, and the large banking groups’ greater pool of 
knowledge about borrowers and international operations 
are some of the factors that have been expected to bring 
about improvements in this area. 
The arrears index is a good indicator of banks’ ability 
to assess the risks of different financial operations. Between 
2001 and 2010, a significant improvement has been seen 
in this indicator throughout the region, both for local 
and for foreign banks, and that improvement has been 
particularly rapid since the upheavals of the early 2000s 
have been overcome (see figure III.31). Throughout the 
period under review, foreign banks have outperformed 
their local counterparts thanks to their greater experience, 
but also thanks to the fact that they have targeted  middle- 
and upper-income segments of the market for short-term 
consumer loans, while local banks have been serving a 
larger proportion of higher-risk sectors, such as small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), mortgage holders and 
low- and middle-income groups. 
The subprime mortgage crisis sparked an upsurge 
in arrears, however, especially for foreign institutions, 
although they still had lower indices than local banks did 
(see figure III.31). This was especially evident in Brazil, 
but the situation was turned around quite quickly, thanks 
to the government’s countercyclical policies and the credit 
stimulus packages that the public banking system rapidly 
put into place. In the rest of the region, arrears indices 
remained low and stable, and the indices for local and 
foreign banks swiftly converged. This appears to indicate 
that this is one of the facets of institutional behaviour in 
which the greatest improvement can be seen since the 
entry of foreign banks into the region. A more in-depth 
study will be needed to confirm this hypothesis, however.
Figure III.31 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ARREARS INDICES FOR 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
As a result of all of the above factors, taken together, 
the Latin American banking system became more profitable 
in 2001-2010 (see figures III.32 and III.33). Once they 
had absorbed the impact of the external and regional 
financial shocks of the early years of the decade, local 
and foreign banks began to see their returns on assets 
and their profit/capital ratios rise (Pérez-Caldentey, 
2009). The international crisis of 2007-2008 temporarily 
altered this trend, but the banks soon resumed their former 
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growth path. In recent years, asset yields for both types 
of banks have been quite symmetrical throughout the 
region, although this indicator does show slightly more 
favourable results for foreign banks (with the exception 
of the period immediately after the subprime mortgage 
crisis). In Brazil, however, the situation is just the opposite, 
since local institutions have systematically outperformed 
foreign banks (except during the early years of the decade, 
owing, in all probability, to the Argentine crisis and the 
recent entry of foreign banks), all of which goes to show 
how strong their position has been all along. In the rest of 
the region, local banks used to have a lower asset yield 
than foreign banks, but they soon converged towards more 
or less the same level (see figure III.32). 
Figure III.32 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ASSET YIELDS FOR 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
As in the case of asset yields, profit/capital ratios 
have been better for foreign banks, except in the wake 
of the recent international financial disturbances (see 
figures III.32 and III.33). As mentioned earlier, as a 
result of strong competition among the major local banks, 
foreign institutions’ capital/profit ratios in Brazil have 
been somewhat lower than the average for the region 
as a whole; they have, however, followed a very similar 
trend, except during the early years of the 2000s (see 
figure III.33). 
In sum, the entry of foreign banks into Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which took place primarily during 
the second half of the 1990s, has galvanized the regional 
financial market. Foreign banks spurred competition within 
the market, which led to narrower spreads and lower costs. 
They also helped to modernize the Latin American banking 
system by improving in-house procedures, refining risk 
assessment (credit rating) systems and expanding the range 
of services offered, and they fostered financial inclusion by 
making the financial system and their expanded portfolio 
of products and services accessible to more and more 
formerly unserved sectors of society (although local banks 
are actually the ones that deal with the great majority of 
the persons in these sectors).
Figure III.33 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROFIT/CAPITAL RATIOS 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from BankScope.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
however, foreign banks appear to be growing less 
rapidly and becoming significantly less influential, 
which may be attributable to the fact that the market 
has matured, efficiency and productivity indicators for 
the banking industry as a whole have levelled off, and 
foreign institutions’ market share has been shrinking 
(see figure III.22). The regional and global shocks of 
the early 2000s and the international financial crises 
that have broken out since 2007 are also likely to have 
been factors in this loss of ground, along with the more 
cautious attitude adopted by foreign banks. Local banks 
have responded to these circumstances with alacrity by 
boosting their efficiency and productivity levels and 
have regained much of the market share they had lost 
during the preceding decade. In addition, the strength and 
size of local banks in Brazil and other countries of the 
region enable them to maintain slightly wider spreads. 
These advantages, together with their efficiency gains, 
have allowed local banks to begin to outperform foreign 
institutions in terms of profit ratios, especially since the 
most recent international financial crisis.
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D. The complexity of the international financial crisis   
 and the position of European banks in Latin America  
 and the Caribbean
Because foreign banks have played such an active 
role in the banking system of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, they can also serve as a vector for the 
negative effects of the international financial crisis in 
the region. And, in fact, at one point there was a danger 
that, as has happened in the past on several occasions, 
bank credit would be abruptly cut off, which would 
have destabilized the macroeconomic situation and 
thwart economic recovery efforts (Canales-Krijenko 
and others, 2010).
1. Impact of the crisis in the European banking sector
Increases in sovereign risk have led to huge losses for 
European banks, with the direct impact on them being 
estimated at some 300 billion euros (IMF, 2011a). 
The French, British, Italian and Spanish banks are 
in an especially delicate position (see figure III.34). 
In response to this adverse outlook, the European 
authorities took steps to contain the crisis and to 
cope with the deterioration in economic conditions as 
best they could. A stress-test exercise was conducted 
with the major banks as a means of monitoring their 
performance more closely and assessing their response 
to difficult conditions (see box III.3). The European 
Central Bank (ECB) also began to buy up the debt of 
the hardest-hit countries on secondary markets and 
offered new liquidity facilities to the most distressed 
financial institutions.
In late 2011, the European banking system’s solvency 
position worsened as the Franco-Belgian bank, Dexia (one 
of Europe’s largest), found itself in dire straits only a few 
months after having turned in a strong performance on 
the stress test. In order to contain the damage that would 
be caused by an outright failure, the governments of 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg quickly stepped in and 
nationalized it.  This situation highlighted the urgent need 
to speed up the system’s recapitalization, which called 
for political decisions at the highest level.
Figure III.34 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: SOVEREIGN DEBT EXPOSURE OF 
EUROPEAN BANKS, 2010-2011 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the European Banking Authority (EBA).
Note: Spanish and Italian banks’ exposure to their own countries’ sovereign debt 
is included in the “home country” category.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)128
 Box III.3 
STRESS TESTS FOR MAJOR BANKS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
“Stress tests” are simulations that are run 
in order to assess banks’ capacity to cope 
with deteriorating economic conditions 
and some of their after-effects, such as 
rising unemployment, loan defaults and 
a decline in the value of investments. In 
general, in a scenario of this kind, banks 
see a reduction in business volume and 
start to sustain losses, especially in their 
loan portfolios, but also because of the 
devaluation of assets such as real estate 
holdings. In order to be able to weather these 
adverse conditions, banks must exhibit a 
certain level of solvency, which is measured 
on the basis of their tier-1 capital. This 
indicator reflects banks’ holdings of capital 
plus reserves, undistributed earnings and 
perpetual preference shares that will enable 
them to cover their risk assets (loans, stock 
and other investments). In other words, it 
is a measurement of the guaranteed own 
funds which they can use to cover their 
investments in risk assets.
The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
is in charge of monitoring implementation 
of the Basel III framework in the European 
Union. It does so by applying a stress and 
solvency test to nearly a hundred European 
banks and by supervising compliance with 
capital adequacy rules under an adverse 
scenario. In July 2010, it published the 
results of the first of these tests. Those 
results showed that 7 out of the 91 banks 
that were tested (which constitute two 
thirds of the European banking sector and 
account for at least 50% of each country’s 
local market) failed the test and that the 
European banking system as a whole 
needed a fresh cash injection of 3.5 billion 
euros so that the more vulnerable institutions 
could reach the minimum standard of 
5% of tier-1 capital (EBA, 2011a). The 
European Central Bank (ECB), the European 
Commission and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision all emphasized that 
the results confirmed how strong a position 
the European banking system was in to 
withstand adverse macroeconomic effects 
and financial shocks, but the market reacted 
with scepticism.
In July 2011, the results of the second 
stress test (which was carried out after 
the downturn in expectations regarding 
an economic recovery had become 
consolidated and European banks had 
begun to recapitalize) shed light on just 
how difficult the situation facing many 
banks was. In order to gauge their capacity 
to meet capital adequacy requirements 
in 2012 and how that had changed since 
2010, two scenarios were used: a baseline 
stress scenario and an adverse stress 
scenario (EBA, 2011a). Of the 90 banks 
that took these tests, EBA found capital 
shortfalls in only eight: five in Spain, two 
in Greece and one in Austria (which would 
need 2.5 billion euros in fresh funds). It 
also recommended the recapitalization of 
16 banks that had passed the test but had 
exceeded the 5% 1-tier capital cut-off by 
just one percentage point (EBA, 2011a). 
Under the parameters used for the test in 
the adverse stress scenario, none of the 
major European banks would have serious 
solvency issues, with their scores coming 
in at: BBVA (9.2%), BNP Paribas (7.9%), 
Deutsche Bank (6.5%), Barclays Banks 
(7.3%), RBS (6.3%), Santander (8.4%), 
Lloyds TSB Bank (7.7%), Société Générale 
(6.6%), HSBC (8.5%), ING Bank (8.7%), 
UniCredit (6.7%), Commerzbank (6.4%) 
and Crédit Agricole (8.5%).
Although Spain was one of the 
countries which had the largest number 
of troubled banks, it should be noted 
that it was the only member country of 
the European Union in which 95% of the 
country’s financial institutions were tested. 
The average coverage was 65%, and the 
threshold figure set by 
EBA was 50% of each country’s 
financial system. If only four financial 
institutions in Spain had been examined 
(Santander, BBVA, La Caixa and Bankia), 
there would have been no major difficulty. 
The problematic institutions in Spain are 
its savings and loan associations, which 
are undergoing sweeping reforms.
Even so, in most cases, when faced 
with adversity, banks can fall back on access 
to loan-loss provisions made available by 
their governments. In fact, without the aid 
of public capital inputs, nearly one third of 
the banks that took the stress test would 
have failed and would be faced with the 
prospect of sustaining heavy losses if the 
economic situation were to deteriorate. In 
this type of case, those that would be the 
hardest-hit under an adverse scenario 
would include British banks, led by Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS), Allied Irish Banks 
and Lloyds Banking Group, all of which 
passed the solvency test with the help of 
hefty inputs of government capital. At the 
other extreme, Santander and BBVA, which 
did not receive government help, were the 
leading profit-makers. As in the first test, 
the supposedly good health of the banking 
system prompted many analysts to view 
the results with scepticism and thus to 
abstain from making any effort to refute 
negative expectations and the prevailing 
lack of confidence. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the United States 
Federal Reserve.
In another bid to restore confidence in the markets and 
come up with an across-the-board response to the crisis, 
the Heads of State and Government of the European Union 
countries met in Brussels in late October 2011 and agreed 
to provide Greece with debt relief, ensure that sovereign 
debt could be financed by leveraging the European 
Financial Stability Facility and recapitalize the banks.20 
20
 In March 2012, following intensive negotiations on the restructuring 
of Greece’s debt and avoidance of a disorderly default another bailout 
plan amounting to 130 billion euros was approved. In order to make 
these funds available, the Greek authorities convinced a majority 
of the debt holders to participate in a “private-sector involvement” 
These elements are closely related, since the availability 
of the resources needed to recapitalize European banking 
institutions depends, in large measure on the financing 
of sovereign debt and the discounting of the securities 
issued by the countries in the greatest distress. 
plan. Under this voluntary restructuring arrangement, the country’s 
206 billion euros of debt would receive a 53.5% “haircut” in nominal 
terms (Financial Times, 15 March 2012). However, uncertainty 
began to mount again in Europe as Greece faced difficulties in 
forming a government and called fresh elections, and as concern 
grew that Greece could leave the euro zone.
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Under the plan devised for the banking system’s 
capitalization, banks were required to meet the 9% 
tier-1 capital ratio by June 2012. In December 2011, 
the European Banking Authority estimated the capital 
required by Europe’s 70 largest banks to meet the new 
standards at 114.685 billion euros (EBA, 2011a); some 
private analysts put the number at double that. The deficit 
was mainly accounted for by banks in Greece, Portugal, 
Italy and Spain (see figure III.35). At the level of these 
new standards, nearly 60% of the banks would not have 
passed the stress test, which had used the pre-existing 
standard of 5% (see box III.3). If a bank does not reach 
the target figure, it must submit a recapitalization plan 
and is not allowed to pay dividends or bonuses to its 
shareholders. It will also be offered public guarantees 
on other financing options. 
Figure III.35 
EUROPEAN BANK RECAPITALIZATION REQUIREMENTS, BY 
HOME COUNTRY, 2011 
(Percentages of capital)








Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the European Bank Authority (EBA), 2011 EU 
Capital Exercise, London, 8 December 2011 [online] http://www.eba.europa.eu/ 
capitalexercise/2011/2011-EU-Capital-Exercise.aspx.
Realistically, however, European banks have very 
few ways of quickly generating own funds. Under 
the current circumstances, it is difficult to convince 
the market that the banks can pull out of the crisis 
by selling off assets, cleaning up their loan portfolios 
or paying out shareholders’ dividends in the form of 
securities rather than cash. In fact, in early 2012, the 
financial sector was in worse shape than any other 
sector in European markets, with the Italian bank 
UniCredit, Societé Général of France and the Spanish 
banks Bankia, Bankinter, Banesto and Caixabank faring 
particularly badly.
To deal with this situation, ECB has used its long-
term refinancing programme to auction off fresh funds 
to banks at 1% interest and a three-year maturity. The 
European banks flooded into the first auction, and 
523 banks applied for a total of 489.2 billion euros; in 
the second, nearly 800 banks received a total of 529.5 
billion euros (The Wall Street Journal Americas, 2012a). 
The banks have used these funds to cover maturities and 
to invest in new bonds issued by distressed countries 
(mainly Spain and Italy) at higher interest rates, with 
this margin helping them to improve their balances. 
This money also helps them to cover their debts and, in 
some cases, to make deposits in central banks around 
the globe (but especially in ECB), although their yield 
is lower. This injection of almost 1.2 billion euros has 
helped to stabilize the European banking system, lessen 
the risk of bank failures and save the banks from having 
to divest themselves of large sums of loans or other 
assets in order to cover their financing requirements. 
This measure has been less effective, however, in 
spurring a reactivation of bank lending to businesses 
and households in troubled economies.
The overall thrust of these reforms has been to shore 
up liquidity and bank solvency in order to reduce the 
likelihood of further systemic crises. It is also very possible 
that, as a result of the reduction in bank leveraging, banks 
will play a less central role as intermediaries.  There is, 
however, no broad consensus concerning the potential 
effects of these measures.
• The implementation of Basel III could influence 
global economic growth. Some analysts, financial 
institutions and national authorities believe that 
increased own-capital requirements and the 
proportional increase in more liquid, but less 
profitable, investments will drive up the cost of 
credit, lead to credit rationing and make corporate 
and household saving less profitable.  This, in turn, 
would hurt the real economy (BIS, 2010a and 2010b). 
• The austerity plans unveiled by banking institutions 
are far from enough to cover their capital 
requirements. There seems to be a vicious circle 
whereby, since private investors are not willing 
to provide the funds needed for recapitalization, 
governments have to obtain the necessary funds, 
which further exacerbates the public debt problem. 
This chain of events heightens the complexity of the 
situation and jeopardizes the stability and growth 
of the global economy.
• The steps taken to inject liquidity into the banking 
system do not resolve the underlying problem, but 
instead merely provide temporary respite to the 
countries and institutions that have been hardest-hit 
by the sovereign debt crisis. What is more, they 
have temporarily blunted the incentives for banks 
to reduce their sovereign bond holdings generated 
by the steep reduction in the profitability of these 
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instruments on the market. However, they have 
not managed to spur bank lending, and this has 
deepened the recession. As long as the crisis 
remains unresolved, credit demand will remain 
depressed, and this will, in turn, hurt the banks’ 
main business operations.
For the authorities who are moving this process forward, 
however, the expected benefits in terms of macroeconomic 
stability outweigh the problems associated with higher 
intermediation costs (see box III.1). Nonetheless, there 
is still a great deal of uncertainty about the outcome, and 
more definitive results are expected in the next few months.
2. The European banking crisis and Latin America and the    
 Caribbean: possible vectors of contagion
Banks that operate internationally extend loans in external 
markets through two very different channels: directly, from 
the bank’s headquarters to a borrower abroad, and indirectly, 
via one of its subsidiaries or associates in a foreign country. 
In Latin America, foreign banks tend to use the second option 
more often, and the volume of this type of lending is quite 
large, given the major role played by these institutions in 
local banking systems (see figure III.22). The effects may be 
very different depending on what strategies these institutions 
adopt in relation to their subsidiaries abroad. If banks 
manage their foreign operations on a centralized basis from 
their headquarters, any capital or liquidity squeeze in their 
home market could have the effect of making their foreign 
subsidiaries cut back on lending activity in the local market 
in order to shore up the business group’s asset position or to 
transfer liquidity to the main office. On the other hand, while 
some decisions may be centralized, local subsidiaries may 
use a business model of their own, and their lending activity 
may therefore vary independently of the problems troubling 
their parent company or headquarters. This last option is 
the one that has been chosen by many of the subsidiaries of 
foreign banking institutions in Latin America, notably in the 
case of Spain’s Banco Santander and BBVA.
Lending by foreign banks in Latin America has risen 
sharply in the 2000s (see figure III.36). The only breaks in 
this trend have been seen in the wake of the bursting dot.
com bubble and the Argentine crisis of 2001, the subprime 
crisis of 2008 and the deterioration in Europe’s position 
in the third quarter of 2011. And in fact, subsidiaries of 
foreign banks have cut back on credit more swiftly and 
more deeply than local private banks (IMF, 2010b). The 
recovery during the first two crises was robust, however. 
In absolute terms, the Brazilian, Mexican and Chilean 
markets have been the major attractions for foreign banks 
(see figure III.36). In the third quarter of 2011, these three 
countries accounted for nearly 80% of all existing foreign-
bank loans in the region. When measured in terms of GDP, 
this type of credit has been especially significant in Chile 
and somewhat less so in Mexico. These two countries have 
the heaviest exposure to European banks after Estonia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Albania and Mozambique 
(World Bank, 2012b). By contrast, thanks to the strength 
and size of the major local banks, Brazil’s exposure is much 
lower (see figure III.37).
Figure III.36 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN BANK 






























Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico
Peru Uruguay Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Other
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Between 2000 and 2005, the percentage of local-
currency loans extended to residents via local subsidiaries 
jumped from 36% to nearly 60% of total loans, and this 
percentage has held steady up to the present day (see 
figure III.38). Given the strong deposit base that these 
subsidiaries have had ever since the start-up of their 
operations in Latin America (thanks to their strategy of 
buying up large local institutions), most foreign banks 
do not have to rely to any great extent on other types of 
financing. In fact, the loans granted by subsidiaries of 
foreign banks are primarily funded with local deposits, 
and this gives them a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis 
their parent companies. This strong base in local markets 
may also explain why the percentage of credit extended 
by foreign banks in Latin America is so low (with most 
of the lending that does take place being accounted for 
by interbank operations) and is much less than it is in 
other developing regions (IMF, 2009a). Finally, almost 
half of all transborder foreign-currency credits have a 
term of less than one year, although the percentage of 
longer-term loans is on the rise. While these types of 
credits are still just a fraction of the total credits granted 
by foreign banks, the fact that they are increasing may 
be a reflection of the lower risk rating that is being 
assigned to the region.
Figure III.38 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the Bank for International Settlements.
A few of the world’s largest banking institutions 
dominate the foreign banking industry’s operations in 
Latin America (see tables III.2 and III.6, and figure III.22). 
As mentioned earlier, five institutions (Banco Santander, 
BBVA, HSBC, Citigroup and Scotiabank) hold 80% of 
the assets of foreign banks in the region (see table III.6). 
In addition, Canadian, Spanish, United States and British 
banks account for nearly 75% of the credit granted by 
foreign lending institutions (see figure III.39).
Figure III.39 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the Bank for International Settlements.
Thanks to the growth, structure and behaviour of 
foreign banks, together with their credit strategy in Latin 
America, the credit squeeze triggered by the international 
financial crisis was less severe than it would otherwise have 
been. In fact, although they have not been immune to that 
contraction or to the deterioration of liquidity in interbank 
markets, these institutions have exhibited resilience and 
stability, and these traits have made it less likely that they 
might act as vectors for the transmission of external shocks. 
Some of the main reasons for this are as follows:
• Most of the credits granted by foreign banks are 
in the local currency and are channelled through 
their local subsidiaries. 
• A large part of foreign banks’ financing comes from 
local sources, with the largest one being a stable 
deposit base. This situation has been leveraged by 
macroeconomic stability and growth, combined with 
the institutional strength displayed by Latin America.
• The subsidiaries of foreign banks do not rely heavily 
on their parent companies for foreign-currency finance 
or on international interbank markets for clearing 
their credit operations. In addition, although there 
are differences across countries, foreign-currency 
bank financing is less significant for the region as 
a whole, which makes the region less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the international financial sector.
• There has been a relative increase in long-term 
loans, which reduces the region’s exposure to any 
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sharp reversal in short-term bank financing.
• The transborder operations of the banks with the 
greatest exposure in Latin America, particularly in the 
case of the Spanish ones, are highly decentralized, 
with their subsidiaries being managed quite 
independently of their parent companies. 
• The institutions with the greatest presence in Latin 
America have two traits that have made them more 
resilient in the face of recent financial disturbances. 
On the one hand, Spanish and Canadian banks’ 
operations in the region are highly specialized and 
are coupled with their operations in mature markets, 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, the more globalized banks, such 
as Citigroup and HSBC, have a highly diversified 
international presence which helps them to weather 
regional crises more easily. In addition, none of 
the banks operating in Latin America maintains a 
presence in the emerging markets that have been 
hardest-hit by the current financial crisis, such as 
those of Eastern Europe (IFI, 2012a). Lastly, the 
Spanish banks Santander and BBVA have been able 
to meet the requirements set forth by the Government 
of Spain thanks to the sound performance of their 
foreign operations, particularly in Latin America.
The strength shown by foreign banks in Latin 
America has also been underscored by the swift recovery 
of their lending activity after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. These procyclical outcomes are largely 
attributable to the region’s (and Brazil’s, in particular) 
robust economic performance (see figure III.36). The 
deterioration in Europe’s situation has set off alarm bells, 
however, given the possibility that the subsidiaries of 
European banks might act as a vector of contagion. And 
in fact, the strong pressures associated with sovereign 
borrowing could trigger deep losses and, owing to the 
constraints affecting recapitalization efforts, could force 
banks to deleverage in order to boost their capital ratios 
(IMF, 2011b). Given this prospect, concerns about the 
possible effects of asset sales or liquidity transfers have 
been on the rise (IMF, 2010a). 
In Latin America, however, it was thought that if 
European banks were suddenly to retreat, the adverse impact 
would be mitigated by the presence of well-capitalized local 
banks and, to a lesser degree, by the arrival of institutions 
from other countries that would rapidly take up where the 
Europeans had left off (IFI, 2012b). And this appears to 
be what is actually happening in the region, especially in 
Brazil (World Bank, 2012b). In late 2011, in line with this 
scenario, the Chilean CorpBanca acquired the assets of 
Banco Santander in Colombia for US$ 1.225 billion. On 
the other hand, tight bank regulation has helped to avert 
large capital transfers to foreign banks’ headquarters. In 
Brazil and Mexico, for example, regulations are in place 
that limit the size of the loans that can be made between 
a parent company and its local subsidiary and that restrict 
parent companies’ ability to draw down the capital reserves 
of local subsidiaries below prudential levels. In Chile, 
banks established in the country, whether Chilean- or 
foreign-owned, are treated as Chilean, have their own 
capital and are subject to the oversight of the banking 
regulator. Accordingly, the capital backing their loans 
and deposits is Chilean and the only means by which 
capital could be repatriated would be through the sale of 
the shares that carry the right to administer the business 
and receive its profits. Yet, even in that case, the whole 
structure of deposits, capital and loans would remain 
unaltered in Chile under new ownership. 
This is especially significant for Latin America, 
given the extremely important role played by Spanish 
institutions in the region’s banking markets. These 
institutions’ solvency indicators have, however, been 
good (strong capitalization and high levels of loan-loss 
provisions) thanks to the fact that Spanish regulators 
take the phase of the business cycle into consideration 
and view it as a crucial factor in determining the proper 
level of provisions. This was borne out by the stress test 
carried out by the European Banking Authority in mid-
2011 under an adverse scenario, in which both BBVA 
and Banco Santander achieved good solvency indicators, 
without government help, that were very close to the 
new European requirement of a 9% tier-1 capital ratio 
(BBVA had a ratio of 9.2% and Banco Santander one 
of 8.4%) (see box III.3). Nonetheless, since they are 
ranked as systemically important financial institutions, 
and given their estimated capital requirements as of 
December 2011, both banks had to increase their levels 
of own resources (EBA, 2011b). These Spanish banks 
have used varying means of complying with the demands 
of the European authorities:
• In late 2011, six months before the deadline, Banco 
Santander had reached a 9% tier-1 capital ratio 
(Santander, 2012). The 15.302 billion euros that 
it needed to be ranked as a systemically important 
financial institution were cut to less than half that 
sum by counting the convertible bonds that were 
to be swapped in October 2012. It also exchanged 
preferential stock for new shares and decided to pay 
part of its dividend in shares as well. It also carried 
out some divestitures in Chile and Colombia and 
moved forward the sale of 4.41% of its Brazilian 
subsidiary (El País, 2012a).
• BBVA needed 6.329 billion euros for the same 
purpose.  It shored up its capital ratio by exchanging 
preferred stock for mandatory convertible subordinate 
bonds, thus saving itself from having to sell off 
133Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2011
any strategic assets (BBVA, 2012). The European 
Banking Authority actually does not consider 
preferred stock as tier-1 capital, whereas it does 
place bonds that are convertible into shares in that 
category. In December 2011, this operation brought 
the tier-1 capital ratio for BBVA up to 8.7%; the 
ratio would then rise somewhat more thanks to 
accounting adjustments on its operations in the 
United States (BBVA, 2012). BBVA also took 
advantage of the cheap loans available under the 
long-term refinancing programme of the European 
Central Bank, taking out 11 billion euros in credits 
in December 2011 and a similar amount in February 
2012 (The Wall Street Journal Americas, 2012a). 
In late May 2012, BBVA announced that it was 
considering selling its pension funds in Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, with combined assets 
of US$ 69 billion and a client base of 11 million. 
BBVA stated that this decision was unrelated to 
the turbulence in the Spanish banking system and 
was, instead, a response to the interest shown by 
various agents in the pension fund market (El País, 
25 May 2012). In any case, the decision could take 
some time and would not be made before 2013. 
According to analysts, the value of BBVA pension 
fund activities in the region could be as much as 
US$ 5 billion (El Mercurio, 25 May 2012). 
Thus, at least in the short run, the major foreign players 
in Latin American banking markets will comfortably meet 
the Basel III capital requirements, thereby consolidating their 
solvency, and the new minimum leverage ratios will not pose 
a problem (Terrier and others, 2011). What is more, thanks 
to the degree of independence that these banks’ subsidiaries 
enjoy, the higher cost of credit to be borne by the parent 
companies because of the new, stricter requirements are 
not likely to be transmitted to operations in Latin America. 
E. Conclusions
The financial industry has changed a great deal in recent 
decades in response to stronger competition, deregulation, the 
technological revolution and demands for higher profits. All 
of this has induced major financial institutions in advanced 
countries to adopt ambitious growth and diversification 
strategies. These changes have also been spurred by the 
rapid and deep deregulation of the industry, which was 
itself prompted in large part by a long period of low interest 
rates and ample liquidity. The swift consolidation of the 
financial sector at the national and international levels 
has been evident both in specific segments and across 
the entire industry, as enormous financial conglomerates 
have taken shape that offer commercial and investment 
banking services, insurance, pension fund schemes and 
other services. This approach, which has usually been 
justified on the grounds of efficiency and economies of 
scale, has led to heightened concern about the stability 
of the global financial system, however.
Banks intensified their traditional leveraging strategy, 
but on the basis of a dangerously procyclical management 
model, in response to expected risk levels. As the 
proportion of assets that were financed with debt rose, 
the banks became more profitable, but their operations 
also became much more risky. In addition, the growing 
integration of financial systems and the proliferation of 
new types of instruments, which facilitated transactions 
and risk diversification, turned banks into extremely 
complex institutions that are difficult for regulators and 
governments to control.
When the upswing in the business cycle came to 
an end, this trend was reversed, and the resulting chain 
reaction was difficult to control, despite all the efforts of 
national, regional and multilateral authorities to contain 
the contagion.  The financial crisis that was triggered by 
the subprime mortgage crisis and the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in the United States has now been exacerbated by 
Europe’s sovereign debt troubles, and the outlook shows 
no convincing signs of brightening. As a result, many 
stakeholders in the industry are in a precarious position. 
Reforms are being adopted in an attempt to bolster the 
industry’s solvency and liquidity that will surely have major 
implications for the performance of the main banking 
institutions, especially in terms of increasing difficulties 
in offering readily available, low-cost financing. And all 
of this will no doubt have repercussions on the world 
economy’s growth and stability. 
The higher intermediation costs generated by the 
new regulations and standards will increase the cost 
of borrowing and reduce the returns on saving. This is 
particularly daunting for economic agents for which 
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the banking sector is the only source of financing and 
the only repository for surpluses. This means that small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and middle- 
and lower-income households will be the hardest-hit. 
Geographical asymmetries could be equally stark. The 
impact of reduced banking activity will be the greatest 
in countries and regions of the world, such as continental 
Europe and Latin America, in which funds channelled 
through the banking system play a greater role in total 
financing for the economy. Under these circumstances, 
governments and their institutions, particularly public and 
development banks, will no doubt have a more active role 
to play in generating and allocating the financing needed 
for development. In normal times, public banks should 
promote credit activity, facilitate access to information 
and make up for marketing failings but should not enter 
into open competition with private banks. In difficult 
times, development banks are called upon to play an 
important countercyclical role and to help to deal with 
information asymmetries. 
These changes could also have an effect on transborder 
activities, which, in some cases, could cause some 
institutions operating internationally in certain markets 
to pull back or redeploy. This could especially be the case 
for Latin America, where international banks play a key 
role in local financial systems. One encouraging factor 
in this respect is the great resilience shown by the Latin 
American banking system during the recent international 
crisis and, above all, the strength displayed by foreign 
banks’ subsidiaries, which, despite being sensitive to 
liquidity problems in international interbank markets, did 
not reduce their credit activity to any significant degree in 
markets within the region. This outcome is attributable to 
the great degree of autonomy enjoyed by the subsidiaries 
of the main foreign banks and to the fact that most of their 
loans are denominated in the local currency and financed 
locally, primarily from deposits.
In the past decade, the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries’ financial system has grown rapidly and 
performed well. It is still far behind the financial systems 
of the advanced economies, however, and it continues 
to display considerable limitations, both in terms of the 
banking system and in relation to its stock, bond and 
insurance markets.
However, although the international financial 
crisis did have a strong impact on the region’s financial 
systems, these negative effects were soon overcome 
and, in just over a year, the region’s stock and banking 
markets had regained their pre-2007 levels of activity. 
This performance was made possible by the measures 
taken following the crises of the 1990s and early 2000s to 
put the countries’ banking systems on a sturdier footing, 
the opening of the market (particularly with respect 
to the entry of foreign enterprises), the incorporation 
of prudential measures into national regulations, the 
alignment of solvency requirements with international 
standards and the prolonged time span during which 
the region has had a strong macroeconomic showing.
Be this as it may, banking markets in Latin America 
and the Caribbean are less developed than would be 
expected, given their levels of per capita income. The 
reforms that have been introduced have yielded good 
results in terms of the stability of the system, but they 
have not been so successful in extending banking services 
to a large group of businesses and individuals. In the past 
decade, the system’s assets have increased significantly 
in all of the countries, although the various indicators 
(credits and deposits over GDP, offices and ATMs over 
total population, etc.) still lag considerably behind those 
of advanced countries. Latin American financial systems 
also lag behind in offering sophisticated financial services 
and products, such as derivatives and other structured 
instruments —although, in view of the experiences of 
developed countries, their cautious approach to adopting 
financial innovations could be regarded as a strength 
rather than as a weakness.
In theory, financial innovations should make it possible 
for markets to operate more efficiently (by, for example, 
lowering transaction costs) and should make them more 
complete by paving the way for better risk distribution. 
While it is true that financial innovations have helped 
to drive the growth of international markets in recent 
decades, many questions have been raised since the recent 
international crisis as to the role that such innovations 
played in bringing about and propagating that crisis. In 
that sense, especially for a region such as Latin America 
and the Caribbean, where the banking industry has shown 
itself to be very resilient and has made major advances in 
terms of capitalization and liquidity, the wisest course of 
action seems to be to continue taking a prudent approach 
to the use of these types of products. It is important for 
the region to continue to build an effective institutional 
structure for risk management, regulation and supervision 
in line with best international practices (Basel III).
Foreign banks’ entry into Latin America and the 
Caribbean has galvanized the regional financial market, 
spurring competition within that market and pushing the 
sector to narrow its spreads and lower its costs. They have 
also helped to modernize the banking sector by improving 
in-house procedures, refining risk-rating systems and 
expanding the range of products and services on offer. 
Finally, although this effect has been less marked than 
the other two just mentioned, they have also contributed 
to efforts to reach new and growing segments of Latin 
American society, especially  the emerging middle classes. 
They continue, however, to exhibit a strong preference 
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for higher-income (and, generally, lowest-risk) sectors 
of the population.
While it has made progress, over the past decade the 
banking industry in Latin America and the Caribbean has 
had a relatively less diversified business structure. While 
loans and deposits account for a very large percentage of 
business volume, especially in local institutions, which 
signals some reticence to introduce additional products 
and services. But loan institutions in the region are better 
capitalized and have higher levels of liquid investments 
than such institutions do in advanced economies, and this 
is especially true in the case of foreign banks. 
The region’s banking industry, which has very 
probably been buttressed by its macroeconomic stability, 
has sharply reduced its lending and deposit interest rates, 
and its operating costs have also decreased, especially in 
the case of foreign banks. Furthermore, the latter have 
steadily been making efficiency gains, whereas their local 
counterparts have been making steady progress in boosting 
their profit ratios. In both cases, substantial reductions in 
default indices have also been seen.
More recently, as the industry has continued to mature, 
the driving force which foreign banks have injected into 
the market appears to be beginning to wane, to judge from 
the stagnation of efficiency and productivity indicators 
for the banking industry as a whole and the foreign 
banks’ progressive loss of market share. The crises that 
broke out in Argentina and Mexico in the early 2000s, 
the external shocks of 2001 and 2007, and the increasing 
strength and power of private local banks, especially in 
Brazil, have all contributed to this relative decline in the 
role of foreign banks.
The local banking system has responded flexibly and 
rapidly to the international financial crisis by significantly 
raising its levels of efficiency and productivity and regaining 
part of the market share that it had lost with the arrival 
of foreign banking institutions. The powerful position of 
Brazilian, as well as Chilean and Colombian, banks has 
allowed them to maintain slightly wider spreads and this, 
together with their efficiency gains, has enabled local 
banks to surpass foreign institutions in terms of own-funds 
profitability, most notably since 2007. A more in-depth 
analysis would be worthwhile, however, especially one 
that focused on the impact of different national regulatory 
systems on efficiency and productivity. In some cases, 
public banks also maintain a major presence, and further 
study in this respect would also be warranted.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
generally are at a midway point in terms of their development 
and have a limited financial culture, with SMEs accounting 
for a large part of their production activity. Under these 
circumstances, the approach being taken by the region’s 
governments, which focuses on helping to strengthen their 
banking systems by introducing regulatory systems that will 
ensure that they are in a more solid position, in combination 
with a public banking system that provides financing for 
more underprivileged segments of society, can be expected 
to lead to increased economic growth in the medium term. 
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Chapter IV
Foreign direct investment in electric energy 
in Latin America and the Caribbean
A.  Introduction
The electricity sector is of strategic importance in all modern economies, because the ability 
to supply electric energy reliably and at reasonable cost is crucial to any productive activity 
and a basic element in family well-being. Its economic, social and environmental importance 
can be divided into five parts:
(i) The sector itself contributes between 1% and 2% of 
global GDP, and is present in all countries without 
exception.1 As it is highly capital intensive, its share 
of investment is even larger.
(ii) Given the scale of the investments required, the 
electricity sector has major spillovers in other sectors, 
ranging from construction and associated industries 
to high-tech component manufacture. As a result, 
energy policy can have a significant influence on 
a country’s industrial development.
1
 Total worldwide energy expenditure is estimated at 8% of GDP, of 
which electricity represents 17% (the remainder corresponds mainly 
to the combustion of hydrocarbons and biomass (IEA, 2011a). The 
Datamonitor consultancy estimates in 2008 the global electricity 
sector had total sales of $1.7 billion (see “‘Electricity: Global Industry 
Guide [online] http://www.bizjournals.com/prnewswire/press_ 
releases/2012/01/25/SP41578).
(iii) The availability, quality and cost of electricity 
has a direct impact on the economy’s systemic 
competitiveness. Although the price of electricity 
mainly affects energy-intensive sectors, a continuous 
and uninterrupted supply of electricity is fundamental 
for nearly all sectors, and particularly for small firms 
that are unable to invest in their own generating 
systems.
(iv) From the social standpoint, access to electricity is 
considered a basic service, and extending coverage 
to excluded population sectors is a key element of 
poverty-reduction and territorial-integration strategies.
(v) Thermal-based electric power generation is a highly 
polluting activity (in particular CO2 emissions), so 
there is a special responsibility to move towards more 
environmentally sustainable production methods.
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The strategic importance of the sector and its natural 
monopoly characteristics (particularly in the transmission 
and distribution segments) has meant that it has traditionally 
been dominated by State-owned enterprises, generally 
national or local monopolies. Following the 1990s reforms 
in most Latin American countries, the sector was opened 
up to competition, particularly in the generating segment, 
and also to foreign direct investment (FDI). Today it 
is shared between State-owned firms, which in some 
countries continue to have a monopoly over the activity; 
large transnational enterprises from Europe, the United 
States or other countries of the region; and, to a lesser 
extent, domestically owned private enterprises.
The electricity sector has been one of the largest FDI 
recipients in the region over the last few years, and in 
nearly all countries its configuration has been determined 
by the degree of openness and facilities given (or not 
given) to transnationals. As in other regulated sectors 
(telecommunications, water and sanitation, transport), the 
regulatory framework is the main determinant of private 
investment —including FDI— in the transmission and 
distribution segments; whereas in the generating segment, 
the key factors are risk sharing mechanisms and price 
setting. In addition, there are expectations of growth in 
electricity consumption in each market, normally linked 
to GDP growth, but also affected by the economy’s sector 
composition, and the international situation, which influences 
the global strategies pursued by transnational corporations.
This chapter analyses investment flows in the 
sector, the strategies of transnational enterprises and 
the degree to which economic conditions, the different 
regulatory frameworks and the global economic context 
determine investments in this sector. Section B presents 
an overview of the sector, focusing particularly on the 
business dynamic. Section C analyses the electricity 
market in the region’s countries and the influence that 
the sector reforms implemented in the 1990s have had on 
its current configuration. The following section provides 
an overview of the transnational enterprises in the sector, 
their investment strategies in the region and the effect of 
the European and global situations. Section E analyses 
electric power generation from renewable sources, and 
particularly the exponential growth of wind power in 
Brazil, Mexico and other countries of the region. The final 
section sets forth a number of conclusions and analyses 
the policies implemented by the countries of the region 
to develop the sector in accordance with the multiple 
objectives mentioned above.
B.  Global overview of the electricity sector
The electricity sector is highly capital-intensive, has 
natural monopoly characteristics (particularly in the 
transmission and distribution segments) and is poorly 
internationalized —although there are increasing 
international connections in the transmission network, 
the exportation and importation of electricity remains 
very marginal in most countries and is only important 
in very specific cases. It is also a strategic sector with a 
large weight in the economy, whose correct functioning 
is crucial for all other sectors and the population’s 
well-being. For all of these reasons, the sector is highly 
regulated in all countries, and in many cases controlled 
directly by the State.
World electricity demand (and production) grew by 
an average of 3.4% per year from 1973 to 2009, when, 
in the wake of the economic crisis, demand dropped by 
0.7% —the first fall since records began. In 2010, demand 
rebounded vigorously by 6%, and growth is expected to 
continue in 2011. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
is forecasting demand growth of 2.4% per year between 
2009 and 2035.
The behaviour of demand has differed between 
developed and emerging economies. In countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) electricity consumption fell by 3.8% in 2009, 
while growing by 3.2% in the rest of the world. In 2010, 
OECD countries increased their production by 3.6%, 
without regaining the 2008 level, while growth in developing 
countries continued. To meet the demand growth (and 
replace obsolete assets) estimated annual investments of 
US$ 675 billion will be needed, 60% of which will take 
place in emerging economies (see table IV.1).
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Table IV.1 
PROJECTED INVESTMENTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR, 2011-2035 
(Billions of dollars)
Generation Transmission Distribution Total Annual average
World  9 791  1 839  5 252  16 882  675 
OECD countries
 4 336  626  1 936  6 898  276 
Other countries  5 456  1 214  3 316  9 986  399 
Source: Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, 2011.
While OECD countries still accounted for 52% of 
world electricity consumption in 2009, 80% of future 
growth is expected to occur in the emerging economies. 
The four largest of these (Brazil, China, the Russian 
Federation and India) account for 63% of all electricity 
consumed outside the OECD. In advanced countries, 
the growth of electricity demand will be dampened, 
firstly by slower economic growth and secondly by 
improvements in conservation and energy efficiency. Per 
capita consumption in developing countries will grow 
from 1,450 kWh in 2009 to 2,750 kWh in 2035 (in Latin 
America, the average is 2,150 kWh), but will still remain 
well below the current consumption of OECD countries 
of 7,500 kWh (IEA 2011a).
The four segments of the electricity sector (generation, 
transmission, distribution and marketing) have very 
different business models.2 While transmission is a natural 
monopoly that requires a large initial investment but has 
very few variable costs, the generating segment is more 
easily adapted to competition between producers if the 
market is large enough; and, when thermal power plants 
are used, it has to absorb potential variations in fuel prices. 
The distribution segment is a highly regulated business 
in close contact with consumers, which sometimes puts 
firms in this segment at the centre of social conflict 
regarding the price and quality of the services provided. 
Although each segment has very different business models, 
electricity companies tend towards vertical integration and 
generally operate in more than one of segment.3 In some 
2
 Electricity can be generated in thermal, hydroelectric or nuclear power 
plants, or in plants fuelled by other renewable resources (see box IV.1). 
Transmission involves the transportation of energy from generators to 
the distributors through high-voltage power lines. Distribution is the 
transportation from the latter stage to final customers, normally at lower 
voltages. Commercialization is the sale of this energy to the consumer, 
and in most countries is combined with distribution. Roughly half of 
the investments received in the sector are in the generation segment, 
about 15% in transmission, and 35% in distribution, although these 
proportions can vary from country to country.
3
 This trend reflects coordination economies between different segments 
and the specific nature of the sector’s assets in. Generating plants 
have no value without transmission lines, which in turn have no value 
without distribution networks. This increases the risk for firms making 
large investments in one segment without being certain that the other 
firms will make appropriate investments in the other segments.
countries, this concentration is restricted, to generate as 
far as possible a market between the different segments 
and to prevent monopolies from developing.
In most countries of the world, with the notable exception 
of United States, the electricity sector has been dominated 
by State enterprises often operating as monopolies. This 
situation has been changing gradually, particularly since the 
1990s, when many countries wholly or partially privatized 
their electricity companies, while liberalizing the sector 
with measures to foster greater competition. These reforms 
attracted FDI into the sector, firstly because liberalization 
opened up space in many countries for the entry of new 
players; and secondly, because the new privatized firms 
pursued an international expansion strategy to increase 
their size and enhance competitiveness. 
Nonetheless, even in cases of total privatization, 
governments never cease to be involved in the corporate 
strategies of large electricity companies, particularly in 
relation to potential mergers and acquisitions that dilute the 
supposed national nature of the firm. For example, national 
governments in the European Union have often maintained 
an exclusive “golden share” in electricity companies, giving 
them veto power on key corporate decisions.
The world’s 10 largest electricity companies, 
measured by sales in 2010, are dominated by European 
firms. This partly reflects the fragmentation of the 
market in the United States, but it is also the result of 
processes of concentration and international expansion 
of the sector which stemmed from the creation of the 
single European market in 1993. Following regulatory 
changes that introduce greater competition in the 
European Union, electricity companies were forced 
to scale up through mergers and acquisitions. Mergers 
occurred firstly inside each country, thereby increasing 
concentration in national markets. The next step was 
international expansion, when these firms could exploit 
the advantages acquired in this concentration process, 
mainly their size and financial capacity. The result has 
been the creation of large firms, some of them highly 
diversified geographically, but still with a strong presence 
in their country of origin and often still controlled by the 
respective national States, such as Electricité de France 
(EDF), GDF Suez and Enel.
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Table IV.2 
THE WORLD’S LEADING ELECTRICITY COMPANIES BY SALES, 2010 
(Billions of dollars)
Firm Country Sales a
1 State Grid China 226
2 E.ON Germany 125
3 GDF Suez France 112
4 Enel Italy 97
5 EDF France 86
6 RWE Germany 67
7 Tokyo Electric Power Japan 63
8 China Southern Power Grid China 54
9 Scottish and Southern Energy United Kingdom 44
10 Iberdrola Spain 40
Source:  Fortune Global 500.
a The figures shown correspond to the total sales of the group are not exclusively to sales in the electricity business. In the case of GDF-Suez, electricity represents just 50% of 
group sales.
From the technology standpoint, electricity companies 
usually purchase the technology they use rather than 
create it internally. A study of the world’s 2,000 most 
innovative firms ranked electricity 39th out of 46 sectors, 
with research and development (R&D) expenditure 
accounting for 0.67% of the budget, close to the figures 
of sectors such as forestry products or the drinks industry 
(ECLAC, 2010a). Although electricity generation and 
distribution are technologically complex and continuously 
developing processes, progress is the result of research 
by engineering firms and equipment manufacturers, 
which sell their products and build infrastructures for 
electricity companies. The latter restrict their R&D to the 
maintenance of the equipment they possess, improving 
processes, and marketing energy.
Another key characteristic of electricity firms is 
their relative specialization. Despite being large firms 
that are usually present in all segments of electricity 
sector, very few of them diversify into other branches of 
infrastructure or services. In fact, a number of experiments 
in this regard, undertaken by firms such as Endesa and 
Iberdrola of Spain in the 1990s, were subsequently 
reversed, when the firms in question refocused on the 
electricity sector. 
The most common possibilities for business 
diversification are engineering and construction, and 
the extraction and distribution of hydrocarbons. The 
Colombian firm Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA), Spain’s 
Iberdrola and the French enterprise GDF are among the 
few electricity companies with dedicated engineering and 
construction branches; but even in these cases, vertical 
integration with the rest of the group is limited. This 
underscores the general strategy of electricity firms not 
developing their own technology. The combination of 
the electricity business with hydrocarbons is more an 
exception than the rule, despite clear connections between 
the two sectors, and the fact that, less than a decade ago, 
there were business trends towards convergence between 
the two sectors in southern cone countries (ECLAC, 
2005). The most significant case currently in Latin 
America involves the Brazilian State-owned oil company 
Petrobras, which has 15 generating plants with over 5GW 
capacity, which it supplies directly with natural gas (of 
which is the country’s sole provider). Another important 
example is the merger between Gas Natural and Unión 
Fenosa (Spanish companies with numerous branches in 
the region) with the aim of exploiting synergies in the 
distribution and marketing of gas and electricity (see 
point 1 in section D).
There are several firms in the non-conventional 
renewable energies segment which are simultaneously 
electric power generators, equipment manufacturers, and 
technology developers. This segment (see the definition 
in box IV.1) still represents just 3% of the world total 
(IEA, 2011a), but over the last 20 years it has grown faster 
than the rest of the industry (see figure IV.1). In 2010, 
the last year for which global data have been compiled, 
investments in renewable energies worldwide increased 
by 32% to US$ 211 billion.4 Growth in that year was 
concentrated particularly in wind power in China and 
small-scale (rooftop) solar power in Europe.
Over the last 20 years, there has been an FDI trend 
in the sector, which is the only growth path for many 
firms, since the exportation of electricity is a very limited 
alternative, and in most cases large electricity firms have 
reached the maximum size in their countries of origin 
permitted by the regulators. This is also true of most firms 
in the services sector.
4
 Including biofuels (Bloomberg, 2011).
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Box IV.1 
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 
The main electric power generation 
technology worldwide uses thermal power 
plants burning fossil fuels, followed by 
hydro and nuclear plants (see figure 
below). Each of these technologies has 
specific characteristics in terms of cost 
structure, required scale, operational 
flexibility, construction time or social and 
environmental impacts.















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, 2011.
Hydroelectric energy and power 
generation from fossil fuels are the oldest 
technologies; both date from 1882 during 
the earliest days of electricity. Hydroelectric 
power achieved its maximum expansion 
following the Second World War: the 
construction of new power plants peaked 
in Europe and United States in the 1960s, 
in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, and 
in Africa in the following decade. Thermal 
power plants burning fossil fuels (coal, 
gas or oil derivatives) have developed 
over time. A major innovation was the 
introduction of combined-cycle plants in the 
1990s, the process for which consists of a 
gas that fuels a turbine, and the resultant 
heat produces steam which drives a 
second turbine. Nuclear technology was 
born in 1956, and achieved its greatest 
expansion between 1965 and 1975, when 
most experts predicted that this electricity 
generating source would be dominant by 
2000. Subsequently however, its growth 
has been held back by burgeoning costs 
and lengthy power-plant construction times, 
partly caused by the additional security 
measures required following accidents, such 
as those of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl 
and, more recently, Fukushima.
Renewable generating sources, apart 
from hydropower, are geo-thermal, biomass, 
wind power, photo-voltaic solar panels, 
thermodynamic solar power and wave power. 
Geo-thermal generation (which harnesses 
hot water or steam from underground) and 
biomass (which consists of burning plant 
material in thermal power plants) have a 
long tradition; wind and photo-voltaic solar 
power have been developed in the last few 
years, while thermodynamic solar and wind 
power are still very incipient.
Hydroelectric and nuclear generation 
are the most capital intensive. The power 
plants in question can have several GW of 
capacity or else can be very small. Those 
with less than 30 MW are classified as 
“small hydroelectric plants”, and are usually 
given preferential treatment, together with 
other renewable energies, given their 
smaller social and environmental impact. 
Nuclear plants are usually above 1,000 MW, 
coal-fired plants range between 300 MW 
and 1,000 MW, and gas-fired plants are 
usually around 500 MW. Oil fuelled power 
plants are typically less efficient and more 
polluting, but they are also quicker to set 
up and can be much smaller. This makes 
them preferable for small-scale electric 
systems or for increasing capacity rapidly.
Hydroelectric, wind and solar energies 
have lower operating and maintenance costs, 
but high capital costs (about 80% of the total). 
For nuclear power plants, the current costs 
(including uranium consumption) absorb 
one third of the total. Fuel consumption 
represents one third of total costs in coal-
fired and two thirds in gas-fired plants, 
which are less capital-intensive. 
Electricity generation with fossil fuels 
emits large amounts of CO2 and other 
environmentally polluting gases; and 
there are large disparities in emissions 
intensity between plants: 0.9 tones of CO2 
per megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity in 
the case of coal, and 0.33 tons of CO2 per 
MWh in the case of gas. Carbon capture 
and storage capacities exist that would 
make it possible to eliminate most of these 
emissions, but thus far none has been 
implemented on a commercial basis.
It difficult to compare the costs of each 
of these technologies, because they depend 
greatly on the local circumstances of each 
plant. A study made of various plants in 
OECD countries estimated a median cost 
of US$ 99 per megawatt hour in nuclear 
plants, US$ 82 in combined-cycle plants, 
and US$ 56 in coal-fired plants (using a 
discount rate of 10%, and excluding CO2 
emission costs) (IEA, 2010). Nonetheless, 
these parameters (calculated in Europe) are 
highly sensitive to the availability and price 
of the different fuels in each country.a The 
following table provides another estimate 
of the cost of renewable energies, using 
2008 data and a discount rate of 7%. 
Hydroelectric energy has the largest range, 
because it depends more on the specific 
circumstances of plant location.
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COSTS AND PLANT FACTORS WITH RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES, 2008
US$ / MWh Plant factor
Hydro 18-110 40-60
Geothermal 38-110 60-90
Wind (on land) 44-140 20-40
Biomass 63-150 …
Photo-voltaic solar (with rotating axis) 110-520 15-27
Thermo-solar 160-250 35-42
Wave 180-240 23-29
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Special Report on Renewable 
Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation”, 2011 [online] http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de
Another important factor when analysing 
capacity data is each technology’s plant 
factor, which measures the percentage of 
time for which the plant in question operates 
at capacity, and is essential for calculating 
how much energy the plant can contribute 
to the system throughout the year. Nuclear 
and thermal plants have a high load factor 
(about 85%); but in the case of renewable 
energies, which usually depend on the 
availability of water, wind or sun, this factor 
is much lower. Accordingly, their contribution 
to electricity generation (measured in MWh) 
is nearly always less than their percentage 
of installed capacity (expressed in MW).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
2011, Paris and Vaclav Smil, Energy in Nature and Society: General Energetics of Complex Systems, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 2007.
a  In 2011 natural gas distributed through gas pipelines in North America cost less than US$ 2 per ton, while liquefied natural gas transported by ship cost US$ 16 per ton.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), “2010 Renewable 
Energy Databook”, U.S. Department of Energy [online] http://www.nrel.gov/
analysis/pdfs/51680.pdf.
The fact that regulations differ from country to 
country means that the subsidiaries of electricity firms 
have to adopt a different strategy in each market: a firm 
that distributes in one country may specialize in generation 
in the neighbouring countries; or a firm that specializes 
in combined-cycle plants in one country, may choose 
hydroelectric energy in another, depending on local 
conditions. Despite a lack of integration between the 
operations of different subsidiaries, the firms interviewed 
identified a number of specific advantages of having a 
presence in several countries:
(i) Although each subsidiary has a differentiated 
strategy, there are operational synergies within the 
Box IV.1 (concluded)
group that make it possible to share costs (central 
services for example).
(ii) A large firm with a presence in several markets 
always finds it easier to obtain financing, which is 
a very important advantage in an industry that is so 
capital-intensive.
(iii) International firms transfer knowledge and best 
practices between their subsidiaries, often through 
exchanges of staff. For example, ISA, which in 
Colombia developed a globally unique capacity to 
repair transmission lines rapidly (following damage by 
guerrilla attacks) is now able to exploit that intrinsic 
advantage in other markets.
(iv) Larger size affords bargaining power with key suppliers, 
such as engineering or construction firms, equipment 
manufacturers, and suppliers of hydrocarbons.
(v) Being present in different markets dilutes the risk of 
unfavourable regulatory change. This is clearly one 
of the biggest risks faced by electricity firms and, 
unlike the case of direct expropriation, there is no 
national or international legislation that adequately 
protects against it. 
(vi) A presence in several countries dilutes hydrological 
risk, in terms of the effect on hydroelectric production 
of a shortage of rainfall during a certain period. Given 
the importance of this energy source in Latin America, 
it is a particularly relevant risk in the region. 
On the other hand, international firms face a number 
of disadvantages compared to local enterprises, normally 
stemming from their lack of knowledge of local regulations 
and institutions, and their reduced bargaining capacity with 
the political authorities. International firms are also often in 
a weaker position when interacting with local communities 
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for building new infrastructures. For this reason, many 
firms do not build new assets outside their country of 
origin, although they do purchase already existing firms.
As is true of most services, there is no global 
electricity market, but a number of national markets 
with their own technical and regulatory specifics. 
The transnational enterprises in the sector tend to 
have assets in several markets as part of an expansion 
and risk-diversification strategy. Globally, the sector 
remains poorly internationalized and, in many countries, 
particularly developing ones, it is still totally shielded 
from international competition. Among emerging 
economies, however, Latin American countries are the 
most open to FDI in this industry, which goes a long 
way towards explaining why firms from mature markets 
such as Europe are keen to invest in the region.
C. The electricity sector in Latin America
As occurred in Europe, Latin America implemented reforms 
to the electricity sector in 1990, which created regulatory 
frameworks that are generally friendly towards private 
investment. Moreover, in the last few years there has been 
a sustained in demand, driven by burgeoning economic 
growth, along with favourable international context for 
attracting capital into the region. This minor investment 
boom in the sector has not affected all economies equally, 
so there are still countries with supply problems owing 
to low investment in capacity. 
1.  The privatization and reform process 
As is true of other public utilities, such as telecommunications, 
gas and water distribution, or transport, the electricity sector 
in Latin America was traditionally the exclusive preserve 
of State-owned monopolies (and municipal monopolies 
in the case of many distributors). This model changed 
rapidly in the 1990s, when most countries in the region 
introduced far-reaching changes in the sector, combining 
privatization of State assets with regulatory reform, the 
main features of which were as follows (Maldonado and 
Palma, 2004):
(i) separation of the different segments of the production 
chain (generation, transmission and distribution);
(ii) competition in the generating segment, subject to 
centralized dispatch;
(iii) regulated transmission and distribution, operated by 
private enterprise under concession contracts;
(iv) free, non-discriminatory, access to electricity 
transmission lines;
(v) the obligation for distributors to supply their concession 
area, and
(vi) a marginal-cost-based pricing system for generation 
and transmission.
All of these reforms aimed to introduce principles 
of competition in the electricity sector, particularly in 
the generating segment; but while all shared the same 
principles, they were applied differently. While privatization 
was complete in Chile, other countries stopped halfway 
(Brazil and Colombia); others opened the sector to 
private capital under a single-buyer model (Costa Rica 
and Mexico); while some, such as Uruguay, maintained 
the vertically integrated monopoly (Altomonte, 2002).
The first privatization process in the region was 
undertaken by Chile in the early 1980s, a decade before 
other countries. This helped the development of privately 
owned Chilean firms which, as from 1992, took advantage 
of the reforms in other countries in the region to invest 
in them. ENERSIS S.A. was particularly active in this 
regard, acquiring assets in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru. This regional network made ENERSIS highly 
attractive to transnational corporations which were 
looking to expand in the subcontinent in the late 1990s. 
In 1999, the Spanish firm Endesa made a full takeover 
of ENERSIS S.A., and in the following year, the United 
States firm AES purchased Gener, another Chilean firm 
in the sector (see point 1 of section D). 
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The ENERSIS S.A. and Gener takeovers represented 
a common feature in the region’s privatization processes: 
the preponderance of foreign firms compared to domestic 
ones, either in the privatization directly, or else through 
subsequent takeovers (ECLAC, 2005). In both Chile and 
Argentina, the electricity sector attracted very large flows 
of FDI in that period. In 2002, when the privatization 
process had been completed, 10% of the cumulative FDI 
stock in Argentina and 15% in Chile was concentrated in 
the water, gas and electricity sectors.5
Brazil also launched an ambitious privatization process 
in the electricity sector in the 1990s, which attracted large 
FDI inflows in the second half of that decade. This process 
was broadly complete in the distribution and transmission 
segments, but was interrupted in the generating segment 
by a major energy supply crisis that occurred in 2001 and 
2002, caused by drought that reduced hydroelectric output 
(72% of installed capacity). There were also a number of 
design failings in the privatization process, and the adverse 
effect of the 1998 devaluation on plans for new-capacity 
investment. As a consequence of this crisis, which caused 
outages and had a high economic and political cost, the 
privatization of electric power generation was halted, 
and the importance of State enterprises (Eletrobras and 
Petrobras) as generators strengthened (d`Araújo, 2009).
Colombia also suffered an energy crisis caused by 
rainfall shortage between 1992 and 1993; and this triggered 
the reform of the sector, including the privatization of many 
of the country’s electricity firms in the period 1995-2000. 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama also 
implemented reforms in the 1990s, resulting in the entry 
of foreign investors. In the first three of these countries, 
reform and privatization occurred after a decade of minimal 
investment in the electricity system as a consequence of 
civil wars; and for this reason the new private managers of 
the firms had to cope with crisis situations that hampered 
the success of these privatizations.
In fact the reforms affected most Latin American 
economies, radically changed the panorama in the 
electricity sector, and allowed transnationals to enter the 
sector, as described in the following section. Very large 
amounts of FDI entered the region, but the new regulations 
were poorly suited to the structure of electricity industry, 
particularly in cases where the productive chain was 
segmented in markets that were too small. This led to 
collusion or the reintegration of entities in certain cases 
and generally resulted in low levels of investment in new 
5
 In FDI data by sector, the figures for the electricity sector are combined 
with those for water and gas distribution. Although in Chile and 
Argentina privatization affected these sectors, it can be assumed 
that most of that FDI was channelled into the electricity sector.
capacity (Altomonte, 2002). The FDI that entered the 
region in the sector was used to purchase pre-existing 
assets; and total investment in the electric sector declined 
as a result (Rozas, 2010). While the public sector cut its 
energy infrastructure investment as a percentage of GDP 
to one tenth (including hydrocarbons) between the start 
of the 1980s and the first decade of the new century, the 
private sector, which it was assumed would fill the gap 
left by the public sector, only grew its investment in the 
last few years of the century, and actually reduced it 
below its initial level in the new decade (see figure IV.2).
Figure IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INVESTMENT IN 
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE, 1980-1985, 1996-2001  










Source:  Patricio Rozas, “Latin America: problems and challenges of infrastructure 
financing”, CEPAL Review, No. 101 (LC/G.2455-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), August 2010.
a  The figures represent the average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
The economic crisis in Argentina in late 2001 marked 
the end of this period of reforms, privatizations, and the 
incursion of foreign enterprises in the electricity sector in 
Latin America. This was partly because the devaluation 
of the Argentine currency had an extremely adverse effect 
on the conditions under which electricity companies (and 
other public utilities) operated in the country;6 but also 
because it coincided with an exhaustion of the easiest 
privatization possibilities and a global financial crisis. With 
6
 The crisis in Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002 meant the 
breakdown of the exchange-rate parity between the peso and the 
dollar which had prevailed throughout the previous decade. In 
that period concession contracts on privatized utilities (including 
electricity firms) set their rates in dollars, indexed to prices in the 
United States. With the breakdown of this parity, the government 
set rates in pesos and eliminated indexation as a way of controlling 
inflation. The electricity firms considered this a breach of contract, 
and most of them appealed the decision in international tribunals.
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a backdrop of relative disenchantment with the results of 
privatization, compounded by macroeconomic instability 
in Argentina and Brazil, and a reduced appetite for risk 
among European and United States transnationals, the 
arrival of foreign firms dried up, not to be resumed until 
2006, and then at a much lower level (see figure IV.3).
From 2001 onwards, the privatization process stalled 
almost entirely, and since then the spaces for public 
and private enterprises have remained defined with few 
changes, except in the cases of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. In both 
of these countries, the decision to nationalize was not 
based on reasons exclusively pertaining to the electricity 
sector, but formed part of a policy to increase the State’s 
role in strategic sectors of the economy, and was matched 
by similar processes in other sectors.
Figure IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL VALUES OF CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 





















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the 
basis of data provided by Thomson One.
2.  Determinants of private investment in the sector
The outcome of the privatization process in Latin America 
was an electricity sector that divided between State firms 
and private enterprise — the latter mostly transnational 
corporations, as a result of the acquisitions that occurred 
between 1996 and 2001. Nowadays, the few nationally 
owned private electricity companies operating in the 
region are generally subsidiaries of large groups that also 
operate in other sectors, such as Colbún in Chile (part 
of the Matte group) and CPFL in Brazil (controlled by 
Votorantim, Bradesco and Camargo Corrêa). These private 
firms do not currently have expansion plans outside their 
country of origin; and the trans-Latin enterprises in the 
sector (Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), ISA, 
Eletrobras) are State-owned (see point 2 of section. D).
With the exception of Chile, all countries have State-
owned firms in some segment of the electricity sector, often 
coexisting with private firms (see table IV.3). In addition, 
in a large group of countries, electricity is in State hands. 
Apart from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (which 
re-nationalized the private firms), the public sector tends 
to dominate in the smaller economies, where monopoly 
situations are also more likely to exist, owing to the difficulty 
of introducing competition between participating agents. 
In Ecuador and Paraguay, State domination is complete, 
whereas in the case of Uruguay, the public enterprise 
Administración Nacional de Usinas y Trasmisiones Eléctricas 
(UTE) controls transmission, distribution and all generation, 
except that using biomass and wind power. Nonetheless, 
some small countries in the region have a large number 
of private electricity firms, such as the Central American 
republics of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.
The distribution of electricity markets between public 
and private enterprises has not varied much over the last 
few years, and there are no prospects for change in the 
short and medium terms. Although no new privatizations 
or nationalizations of electricity firms are foreseen, in many 
economies of the region private investment has increased 
in the markets that were open to receive this, encouraged 
by promising sector growth prospects and stable regulatory 
frameworks that are attractive for investors. Moreover, the 
emergence of new renewable energy sources has also opened 
up new opportunities for private participation (see section E).
As is the case in other developing regions, electricity 
demand in Latin America has grown on a sustained basis 
over the last few years, outpacing the expansion in developed 
countries. This largely reflects the region’s strong economic 
performance and, in some countries, a shift in the sector 
composition of GDP towards more electricity-intensive 
activities.7 Current per capita electricity consumption in the 
region (2,150 kW), while still far below the level in developed 
countries, suggests sustained growth of consumption in 
the next few decades, as has happened in other developing 
regions such as Asia or Africa (IEA, 2011a). 
7
  On the other hand, greater energy efficiency in processes could 
offset this effect and reduce demand in the future.
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Table IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA (MAIN ECONOMIES): PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR, 2011
Country Generation Transmission Distribution and marketing
Argentina   
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)   
Brazil   
Chile   
Colombia   
Costa Rica    
Cuba    
Ecuador   
El Salvador    
Guatemala    
Honduras    
Mexico   
Nicaragua    
Panama    
Paraguay   
Peru   
Dominican Republic   
Uruguay   
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of )   
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of official data.
 Wholly State-owned.
 Public and private firms coexist.
 Wholly private.
Apart from expectations for demand growth, it is 
regulatory frameworks that determine the pace of private 
investment in the sector. These differ widely between 
countries, and it is impossible to analyse each one in 
this chapter; but certain key measures are highlighted 
which have contributed to investment in new capacity, 
particularly in the generating segment, in the region’s 
largest economies.
In Brazil, the most important change involved 
the introduction of auctions to build new generating 
capacity as from 2004. Under this system, the firms that 
bid the lowest electricity prices are awarded a contract 
to sell energy to the distributors.8 With the resulting 
20-year income guarantee, the firms constructed 
generating plants with good financing conditions, 
which, together with the availability of good hydro and 
wind resources in Brazil, enabled them to make auction 
bids to supply energy at 67 reais (US$ 59) per MWh 
for large hydroelectric plants in 2010, and 102 reais 
(US$ 59) per MWh for wind and hydro and gas energy 
in 2011. Most projects in the system were submitted 
by private operators, although the large hydroelectric 
projects were bid in association with Eletrobras, to 
ensure implicit government backing. Nonetheless, 
Eletrobras has cut its share of generating capacity from 
71% in 2003 to 36% in 2001. Thermal generation (13% 
of capacity) is not developing at the same pace owing 
8
 This contract is known in the industry as a power purchase 
agreement (PPA).
to a shortage of natural gas on the market, except in 
the plants owned by the public-sector gas distributor 
Petrobras, which is Brazil’s second largest generator 
with 5GW installed capacity.
Favourable regulatory conditions for private investors 
in electricity generation are supported by good prospects 
in the transmission segment (through tenders) and in 
distribution (in which nearly all the market is now 
private), given the size of the Brazilian electricity market 
and its growth prospects. Alongside economic growth 
generally, the most energy-intensive sectors in Brazil 
(not only electricity) are growing particularly vigorously 
(Altomonte and others, 2011). As a result, the world’s 
leading electricity companies are very interested in the 
Brazilian market; and those already in the country have 
plans to expand.
In Chile, where the entire electricity sector had been 
in private hands since the 1990s, investment incentives 
have come from demand growth, which has benefited 
greatly from the boom in the mining sector (which already 
accounts for 39% of total electricity consumption).9 
Between 2007 and 2011, electricity projects that have 
obtained an environmental permit total US$ 32.7 billion 
— a very large amount compared to the US$ 3.9 billion of 
9 In 2010, mining consumed 16% of all of the country’s energy and 
39% of its electricity, whereas in 1980 the figures were 6% and 2% 
respectively (IEA, 2011b). This means, firstly, a large increase in 
the country’s mining activity; and secondly, that its energy needs 
were mainly covered with electricity
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the previous five years. In Peru, average annual investment 
in the sector grew from US$ 310 million between 2001 
and 2005 to US$ 903 million between 2006 and 2010, the 
vast majority of which was private investment.10
Argentina is a different case, where electricity 
consumption grew at an annual rate of 4.4% between 2006 
and 2010, but without matching growth in generating capacity, 
which remained at 3.2% in that period.11 This mismatch 
is a cause for concern owing to the risk of energy outages, 
which are already occurring in certain industries during 
the winter. The problem stems from the 2002 devaluation, 
when the government converted rates into pesos but did 
not allow them to be indexed to inflation. The electricity 
companies considered that decision equivalent to a unilateral 
change in the conditions of their concession contracts and 
nearly all of them filed complaints against Argentina at 
the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).12 Over the last few years, electricity 
rates have been held too low to encourage investment in 
new capacity; although in the first few months of 2012 
the government has started to correct the distortions 
by reducing subsidies to consumers. Thus far, firms in 
Argentina have not announced expansion plans, leaving 
capacity expansion in government hands, either directly or 
else through programmes that provide incentives for firms 
to expand capacity through direct subsidies.
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, electricity 
constraints have been more serious and affected industry 
in particular in the last few months of 2009 and first half 
of 2010; the problems stemmed from the drought which 
reduced hydroelectric production (ECLAC, 2010b). Having 
privatized most of its electricity sector in the 1990s, the 
country then dismantled the process by nationalizing 
all private firms in 2007 — including Electricidad de 
Caracas, owned by AES, which produced 10% of the 
country’s electricity (EIU, 2004).13 These nationalizations 
should be seen in the context of an economic strategy to 
increase State ownership of assets in many sectors that 
are considered strategic, ranging from banking to iron 
and steel, and including oil. In the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia the possibility of supply outages also arose in 
2011. Over the last few years, the sector has underinvested 
10
 Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru.
11
 Latin American Energy Organization  (OLADE).
12
 The following electricity companies have filed complaints against 
the Argentine State with the ICSID: CGE (Chile), Endesa (Spain), 
EDF (France), AES, Enron and El Paso (United States). Most of 
these cases were still unresolved in late 2011.
13
 The other private electricity firms that were nationalized were: 
Electricidad de Valencia (ELEVAL), Compañía Anónima Luz 
Eléctrica del Yaracuy (CALEY), Compañía Anónima Luz y Fuerza 
Eléctricas de Puerto Cabello (CALIFE), Electricidad de Ciudad 
Bolívar (ELEBOL), Sistema Eléctrico del Estado Nueva Esparta 
(SENECA) and Turboven.
in new capacity owing to the uncertainty surrounding its 
status, and generating firms were finally nationalized in 
2010. Current plans to increase capacity will not bear 
fruit until 2012 at the earliest. In the case of Ecuador, 
capacity problems have largely been resolved in 2011, and 
the country will probably have an energy surplus when 
the 1,500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant 
comes on stream, representing one third of the country’s 
total capacity.14 
In contrast to the situation in South American countries, 
Mexico has excess electricity generating capacity resulting 
from overly optimistic estimation of demand growth in 
the first few years of the new century, which attracted a 
large inflow of private capital to that segment (see figure 
IV.4). Mexico opened the electricity sector to private 
investment in the generating segment in 1994 (while 
keeping the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) as sole 
buyer,15 through various modalities. The most important 
have been contracts with independent energy producers, 
whereby the CFE awards the building and operation of a 
generating plant to the firm that bids the lowest electricity 
price in auction. All plants set up in this way have been 
combined-cycle thermal plants, in which the risk of an 
increase in the gas price is borne by the CFE, since the 
private generator can pass this cost increase on in the price 
of the electricity it sells. This situation, compounded by 
the fact that the CFE signs power purchase agreements 
(PPAs) lasting 20 years, means that the investments are 
particularly safe and easy to finance for private investors 
and, consequently, the auctions arouse great interest. A 
total of US$ 14.991 billion of investment was attracted 
under this modality, although the vast majority of this 
was for contracts announced between 1999 and 2004 for 
power plants that came on stream between 2005 and 2010. 
More recently, the self-supply modality has gained 
ground in Mexico, in which one or several large consumers 
enter into partnership with an electricity generator to build 
and operate a plant to supply them with electricity. This does 
not require CFE participation, which would only receive 
payment for transmission and distribution. The investments 
made in these plants total US$ 10.172 billion and are 
concentrated essentially in wind power (see section E). 
Less important have been co-generation alternatives 
(projects that exploit energy left over from other processes 
to generate electricity) totalling US$ 3.484  illion, and 
14
 This plant is being constructed by the Chinese firm Synohidro, 
although it will be owned and operated by the Ecuadorian State.
15
 The CFE was created in 1937 as a monopoly, with a mission to 
extend electrification throughout the country. It is the only firm in 
Mexico operating in the transmission and distribution segments, 
following its takeover in 2009 by Luz y Fuerza, another public 
enterprise that distributed electricity in the centre of the country. 
Its articles of association explicitly prohibit any investment abroad.
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also export projects (US$ 3.115 billion), which enable 
firms to build plants to sell electricity to the United States. 
Under these modalities, the private sector share has 
gradually expanded to account for 45% of all electricity 
produced in 2010.
Owing to the slowdown in the Mexican economy over 
the last decade, electricity consumption did not attain the 
growth expected of it; and in 2010 there was idle capacity of 
47%. In 2011, this slack was reduced to 33%, as a result of 
delays in the entry of new plants, a revival of consumption 
and the withdrawal of the oldest and most inefficient plants 
of the CFE. Although all transnational firms in Mexico 
have plans to expand their investment, these will depend 
on the government’s decision to open more contracts 
for independent energy producers and continue with the 
self-supply model, which in turn depends on retiring CFE 
capacity. In the short and medium terms, there are no 
prospects for opening up the electricity transmission and 
distribution segments to private investment.
Figure IV.4 
















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the Energy Regulatory Commission.
In Central America, private firms have also grown 
their market share in generating segment in the last 
decade and now account for 62% of total electricity 
production in the subregion. In the distribution segment, 
transnational enterprises such as EPM and AES play a 
key role, along with Gas Natural Fenosa (which recently 
sold its holdings in Guatemala). The largest distributors 
also include the State enterprises ICE-CNFL and ENEE 
of Costa Rica and Honduras, respectively. Since 2004, 
generating capacity has grown slightly faster than 
maximum demand, reversing the contrary trend that 
had prevailed since 1990. In most Caribbean countries, 
the sector is dominated by a single State-owned firm, 
except for the three largest economies: the Dominican 
Republic, where the generating segment is in private 
hands, and Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, where 
the Japanese firm Marubeni is a major player.
In Latin America, the space left for private investment 
in the electricity sector has mostly been exploited by 
foreign investors; but, for various reasons, the trends of 
this industry are hard to discern in each country’s FDI 
data. Firstly, Mexico is the only country that publishes 
data on FDI in the electricity sector specifically, while 
information for the other countries is aggregated with gas 
and water distribution. Secondly, although information 
on the acquisitions made by trans-boundary firms is 
generally well reflected in the FDI data, investments 
in new plant are recorded incompletely, since often a 
large proportion of such investment is financed by loans 
obtained in the country that receives the investment.16 
Despite these limitations, a number of trends can be 
discerned in the per country FDI data (see table IV.4). 
In the first place, nearly all countries have large FDI 
inflows in this sector, except those where the electricity 
sector has remained entirely in State hands. Small 
economies that receive a relatively large amount of FDI in 
the sector include the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. In general, FDI flows were greatest between 
1999 and 2001, when the privatization process is were 
still under way and the concomitant wave of mergers 
and acquisitions. In the later years, FDI declined, before 
reviving somewhat between 2008 and 2010, but this 
general trend is greatly affected by the volatility of flows 
from year to year, reflecting mergers and acquisitions 
in this industry. In many cases, particularly Colombia, 
where there are strong local firms, the balance of FDI is 
negative, since these firms have purchased assets from 
transnational enterprises.
16
 Although this problem is common to all industries, it is a particularly 
sensitive issue in electricity and other infrastructures, since projects 
are very often financed with debt. In markets where long-term 
power purchase agreements are established, many firms prefer to 
undertake generation using the project finance modality, in other 
words through a subsidiary devoted exclusively to the project; and 
they use the agreement as a loan guarantee. Under this modality, 
up to 80% of project financing can be debt, with as little as 20% 
obtained from equity.
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Table IV.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER, 1999-2010 
(Millions of dollars and percentages of the total)





Argentina 951 446 197 -57 n.a. n.a. 95 -54 -312 -10 19 n.a. 1.5
Brazil 2 970 7 116 1 442 1 534 649 1 180 1 571 2 332 826 238 -1 234 1 705 6.4
Chile 445 1 067 216 230 97 177 236 1 057 90 1 380 2 031 993 7.9
Colombia -306 13 -71 135 68 88 -251 -141 -79 156 -977 35 -2.1
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of ) 72 42 41 42 36 74 10 14 7 52 n.a. n.a. 7.3
Ecuador n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 1 6 7 7 12 -7 1 -6 0.3
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Mexico 149 122 305 445 338 235 197 -76 183 458 55 6 1.0
Dominican Republic 631 282 402 140 1 -58 117 -52 59 113 121 123 11.5
Panama n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -3 -46 280 211 2.8
Nicaragua n.a. 115 5 8 1 5 24 20 73 215 222 n.a. 17.9
Honduras n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  ‐0,4 2 17 0.3
Guatemala n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89 160 91 106 59 n.a. 9.2
Belize 22 0 25 0 5 16 24 4 5 3 5 2 10.7
Total 4 934 9 203 2 562 2 478 1 197 1 722 2 118 3 271 950 2 657 585 3 086 4.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Note: n.a. = Data not available.
The rising trend of the last few years can be seen more 
clearly in information compiled by the World Bank on 
electricity infrastructure projects with private participation.17 
Figure IV.5 shows that the increase in the value of investment 
projects in the second half of the 1990s was dominated 
by State contributions (through privatizations), and was 
followed by a period of lower investment levels. Since 
2006, however, investment projects in the region have 
increased again, in 2009 reaching a level of nearly 5 times 
the average for the period 2001-2005. The difference in 
magnitude compared to FDI data is explained by the fact 
that the information represents investments that were 
announced (but not necessarily executed), and includes 
all private investment (domestic and foreign) but does not 
deduct the dis-investments made by transnational firms. 
Irrespective of the type of firm that undertakes them, 
investments in new capacity in the electricity sector are 
subject to the legal, political and social difficulties faced 
by all large infrastructure projects. In addition to the social 
and environmental requirements they have to fulfil, and 
which are usually specified in advance in regulations, 
there are reactions from the affected communities and 
civil society at large. These are increasingly active, and 
often succeed in overturning administrative decisions 
and achieving modifications or even the cancellation of 
already-approved projects. There are many examples 
of major projects that have been cancelled (such as the 
Barrancones thermal power plant in Chile, or the Porce IV 
17
 The figures represent the investment commitments expressed 
by firms interested in electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution projects, in which private enterprises (both domestic 
and foreign) participate. For further information, see [online] http://
ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi_methodology.aspx.
hydroelectric plant in Colombia), or which have suffered 
delays and major design changes and are still awaiting 
resolution (such as Hydroaysen in Chile or Belo Monte 
in Brazil). Although this trend affects all investments in 
generation and transmission one way or another, large-
scale hydroelectric plants come under the greatest pressure 
because of their impact on the life of local communities 
and the fact that they have little room for manoeuvre.18 
Figure IV.5  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INVESTMENT 






























Total investments Payments to the government 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the 
basis of data provided by the World Bank.
Note: An estimated 85% of these projects pertain to the electricity sector.
18
 One of the results of this social protest has been a reduction in 
the size of reservoirs in many of the major hydroelectric projects 
of recent years. While this considerably reduces the land directly 
affected, it makes hydroelectric energy far more dependent on the 
rainfall regime.
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3. Composition of electricity generation
The composition of a country’s electric power generation 
depends firstly on the natural conditions prevailing in it 
and the size of its electricity market. Apart from these 
circumstances, there are regulatory and investment decisions 
made by governments which push electric power generation 
towards one technology or another. No electricity firm 
has a defined strategy that favours or excludes generation 
with a given technology; and each decides to invest in the 
technology that market signals suggest.19
Despite losing ground in recent years, hydroelectric 
power continues to dominate electricity generation in 
the region, with 50% of installed capacity (see figure 
IV.6). This is an exceptional case in the world (the global 
percentage of hydroelectric energy is 16%), which means 
that electricity production in the region has a small carbon 
footprint (measured by CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour 
(KWh) produced), and reduces reliance on fossil fuel 
imports in many countries. Nonetheless, this supply 
structure means that the region’s electricity systems are 
highly dependent on rainfall regimes.
Rain-dependency varies from the extreme case of 
Paraguay —which not only produces all of its energy 
consumption from hydroelectric plants, but also exports 
much of it to Brazil— to countries such as Chile or Mexico, 
which have small hydro percentages; but in general 
most countries in South America and Central America 
generate over half of their electricity with hydropower 
(see figure IV.7).
Unlike the situation in South American countries, 
in Mexico combined-cycle thermal power plants are 
the priority alternative (representing 52% of installed 
capacity and 100% of private investments until wind 
power emerged), mainly owing to the low cost of gas 
in the United States, to which Mexico is connected by a 
gas pipeline. The country has an open and competitive 
gas market which guarantees fuel supply to generators. 
Hydroenergy, which in Mexico has less potential than 
elsewhere the region, is in the hands of the CFE, as also 
is geothermal and nuclear energy. The other expansion 
path involves non-conventional renewable energy sources, 
particularly wind (see section E). The leading economies 
of the region with a larger proportion of thermal power 
plants include Chile (60% of total). This country depends 
very heavily on hydroelectric energy (at least in the central 
zone where most consumption takes place), and in 1988 
19
 As an exception, AES does not include nuclear energy among its 
alternatives.
there was a crisis in the sector owing to a lack of rain. At 
that time, the authorities decided to diversify generation 
towards natural gas power plants and provided incentives 
to build gas pipelines from Argentina. This model also 
entered into crisis in 2004, when Argentina cut off gas 
exports to Chile, which made it necessary to consume 
diesel in combined-cycle power plants, more generation 
with coal, and the construction of liquefied gas terminals.
Figure IV.6 
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Source: Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).
Figure IV.7 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INSTALLED 
HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY, LATEST YEAR  

















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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The smaller countries mainly use liquid-fuel thermal 
power plants, which are more flexible but much more 
costly to operate, particularly with the current level 
of oil prices. In Central America, these plants were 
built following privatizations, to deal with emergency 
situations (they can be built much more quickly than 
any other alternative) in the context of much lower oil 
prices than currently prevail. The result is an electric 
power generating structure that is excessively biased 
towards liquid fuels, with high electricity prices and 
total energy dependence. At the present time, the 
possibility of installing combined-cycle power plants 
is being studied,20 together with a return to building
20
 In September 2011, AES announced the investment of US$ 970 million in 
a natural gas plant in El Salvador. See [online] www.centralamericadata.
com/es/article/home/AES_anuncia_inversin_de_970_ 
millones_en_El_Salvador.
hydroelectric plants (such as Tumarín in Nicaragua) 
and the incipient entry of wind power (see section 
E). Electricity prices are generally higher in Central 
American countries than in South America; and, 
although heavily influenced by taxes and subsidies, the 
structure of electric power generation and the size of 
the market are decisive factors (see figure IV.8). This 
also occurs, in more extreme form, in the Caribbean 
countries, particularly the smaller economies. Average 
prices for industrial consumption in these economies 
are consistently above those prevailing in the rest of 
the region, with levels of US$ 0.4 per kilowatt hour in 
Haiti, US$ 0.36 in Barbados, and US$ 0.25 in Jamaica.
Figure IV.8 








































































































A. Latin America B. Central America
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).
Apart from large-scale hydroelectric plants, renewable 
sources remain marginal in the region. Small-scale 
hydroelectric, biomass, and geothermal energy plants have 
traditionally been important in certain countries in the 
region, and remain so within this segment. Nonetheless, the 
burgeoning growth of wind power over the last two years is 
driving the renewable energy segment in the region. Brazil 
now has 1,500 MW capacity installed and another 6,700 MW 
in project, whereas in Mexico there is 569 MW operating 
today and another 2,609 MW under construction or about 
to be built. As a proportion of new capacity being planned, 
wind energy represents 3.7% in Brazil and 10% in Mexico 
(SENER, 2010). This phenomenon is not exclusive to large 
countries, however: Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay also developed considerable wind energy capacity 
in 2010 and 2011.
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D. The strategies of transnationals in Latin America
As the growth of electricity demand worldwide is concentrating 
on emerging markets, it is rational for electricity firms from 
Europe, the United States or Japan to attempt to increase 
their share in these markets. Among them, Latin American 
countries are generally more open to foreign investment, 
so nearly all large transnationals have investments in the 
region and, almost without exception, currently intend to 
strengthen their positions in these markets (see table IV.5).
Table IV.5 





















































GDF Suez France ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enel Italy ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
EDF France ‐ ‐
Iberdrola Spain ‐ ‐ ‐
Gas Natural Fenosa Spain ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Duke Energy United States
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
AES United States ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
EPM Colombia ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
ISA Colombia ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Privatizations and market liberalization in the 1990s 
provided the big opportunity for transnationals to enter the 
Latin American electricity sector. At that time, European 
firms were best placed to invest in the region, given their 
size, financial capacity and the outward orientation which 
the process of creating the single European market had 
encouraged them to adopt. This explains their current 
dominance of the sector in the region, led by Spanish firms 
such as Endesa (now part of Enel), Iberdrola and Unión 
Fenosa, which had grown thanks partly to heavy investment 
in infrastructure in Spain since the second half of the 1980s.
Nearly all of them have participated in takeovers 
and major restructuring processes in Europe, such as the 
mergers between Suez and Tractebel, Enel and Endesa or 
Gas Natural with Fenosa, which have often had implications 
for the restructuring of their assets in Latin America. All of 
them have suffered major operational crises in the region, 
particularly companies with assets in Brazil (devaluation in 
1999 and energy crisis in 2001-2002); Argentina (devaluation 
and renegotiation of contracts in 2002); and Chile (drought 
in 1998 and gas supply cut off in 2004). In response to 
these crises, most of the companies had to embark on asset 
restructuring programmes, which generally involved the 
divestment of certain enterprises, concentration of their 
operations in electricity sector, and the abandonment of 
diversification towards other services and infrastructures. 
Despite these obstacles, no company decided to withdraw 
from the region, with the partial exception of EDF (which 
maintained just a single generating plant in Brazil).
The financial effort of the takeovers in the late 1990s, 
and the difficulties encountered in these markets in the 
early years of the new century, meant that for several years 
most transnationals adopted a cautious attitude towards 
undertaking new investments. This situation has now 
changed, however, and in recent years these companies 
have announced ambitious investment projects in the 
region, generally targeting the organic growth of the 
markets in which they were already present — except for 
Argentina, where transnationals operating in the country 
(Enel, Duke Energy and AES) have not announced any 
expansion plans. The projects in question cover transmission, 
distribution, and generating businesses alike, and include 
a substantial increase in renewable energy projects (apart 
from hydroelectric power plants).
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Investment expansion plans in the region are being 
hampered by the adverse economic situation in Europe, 
where, to a greater or lesser extent, these firms have most 
of their assets. This means that Latin American assets are 
now extremely important for the firms in question, since 
they are in markets with growth prospects offering generally 
high returns. Most of these firms earn more than 10% of 
their revenues in Latin America, and in fact much more 
than this in the case of smaller firms such as Gas Natural 
Fenosa or AES (see figure IV.9). In many cases, their profit 
percentage is even higher, which suggests that operating 
returns in the region are higher than the group average. 
Moreover, the economic and financial conditions prevailing 
in their markets of origin, particularly for the Spanish firms 
and Portugual’s EDP, mean that the firms have difficulties 
in financing very ambitious expansion operations. 
In keeping with this general desire to gain presence 
in Latin America, one of the largest European electricity 
firms, the German E.ON, has recently entered the market 
announcing in early 2012 that it had taken a 10% stake in 
the Brazilian generator MMX for US$ 471 million. This 
will make RWE, also based in Germany, the only large 
European electricity company without a presence in the 
region (Diario Financiero, 12 January 2012).
In recent years, these transnationals have also been 
joined by new trans-Latin companies in the sector, ISA 
and EPM (of Colombia) and Eletrobras (from Brazil). 
These are all State-owned and have a long track record in 
their respective countries; they embarked on international 
expansion only very recently, and always within the region. 
In the last few years a number of Asian companies have 
also entered the market, such as the Japanese Mitsui, 
Kepco from Korea and the Chinese enterprises State 
Grid and Synohidro. 
Electricity transnationals also face competition 
from firms in other sectors, which are attracted by the 
profitability and stability of investments in electricity 
assets. In this connection, there has been a significant 
increase in investment funds with controlling interests in 
electricity companies (see box IV.2), a trend that looks 
set to continue in the future. Lastly, traditional electricity 
firms have seen new groups enter the generating market 
with wind energy and other non-conventional renewable 
energy sources. This is still a young and expanding 
segment with many relatively small firms, but, as the 
sector develops, a process of consolidation is likely, in 
which the traditional large electricity firms will no doubt 
play an important role.
Figure IV.9 
LATIN AMERICA: INCOME OBTAINED BY THE MAIN ELECTRICITY 
TRANSNATIONALS IN THE REGION, 2010 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official data.
1.  European and United States transnationals
(a) Enel: the firm with the largest market share in 
South America
The State-owned Italian firm, Enel, is the largest 
transnational in the electricity sector in Latin America.21 
Most of its assets in the region come from the Spanish 
enterprise Endesa, which Enel took over in 2007. At the time 
21
 Its total assets in the region are less than those of the two largest 
State-owned firms: CFE and Eletrobras.
of the merger, the two firms were highly complementary 
in their geographic scope: whereas Endesa focused on 
the Iberian peninsula and Latin America, Enel dominated 
Italy and the markets of eastern Europe, mainly. For 
this reason, the Italian enterprise has not completed its 
consolidation with Endesa, and most of its assets in Latin 
America operate under that brand.
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Box IV.2 
INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
Investment funds special izing in 
infrastructure represent category of financial 
market agent that has grown substantially 
in recent years; and several funds of this 
type have acquired electricity firms in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
Their strategy involves purchasing 
infrastructure assets (generally already 
built) that generate a predictable and stable 
income flow. In the last few years, they have 
benefited from a low interest-rate environment 
and rising expectations of inflation, which 
makes them an attractive investment 
alternative for savers seeking less volatile 
assets than variable income instruments but 
with a higher return than can be earned on 
public debt. Within the electricity sector, they 
mainly invest in assets that yield regulated 
returns, such as transmission lines. Non-
conventional renewable energies, involving 
high fixed capital investments and relatively 
low and predictable operating costs, are also 
suitable as investment fund assets when 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) can be 
signed that offer a stable long-term income. 
Some funds with active investment 
strategies purchase firms in distress with the 
aim of strengthening their financial position 
and then selling them on. Most have a more 
conservative attitude and purchase pre-
existing assets with relatively stable operating 
expectations. In these cases, the fund usually 
keeps the existing management team in place.
The largest operation undertaken 
by an investment fund in the region thus 
far has been the takeover of Transelec, 
which dominates the transmission 
segment in Chile. This firm was purchased 
for over US$ 2 billion in 2006 by a 
consortium of Canadian investment funds 
led by Brookfield Asset Management 
(BAM). BAM has US$ 121,558 million in 
assets, distributed between hydroelectric 
generation in North America and Brazil 
(where it has 451 MW capacity), real estate 
in the commercial offices segment, and 
regulated infrastructure assets, arising 
from its stake in Transelec. In addition, 
20% of its capital is applied in more 
cyclical activities, such as residential real 
estate or privately owned firms.
More recently, in 2011, two electricity 
distribution and generating firms in Guatemala 
were purchased for US$ 345 million by Actis, 
of the United Kingdom. Actis is a private capital 
enterprise that invests in emerging- market 
infrastructure projects or in those that capture 
the growing purchasing power of the new 
middle classes. It has US$ 4.6 billion in its 
portfolio, invested in 65 firms. Only 9% of its 
assets are in energy, and 5% in Latin America. 
The monies it manages mainly come from 
pension funds, investment funds, and sovereign 
wealth funds. Actis is also the sole owner of 
Globeleq, which has electricity generating 
assets in Costa Rica, Honduras and Peru.
Contour Global and Southern Cross 
are examples of investment funds with 
more active strategies, that purchase 
ailing firms with the aim of regenerating 
them and selling them on at a higher price, 
and also participating in development 
and construction. The first of these has 
generating assets in Brazil and Colombia, 
while the second owns a 780 MW gas plant 
in the north of Chile, and the Campanario 
power plant, also in Chile, which declared 
a suspension of payments in 2011.
Electricity sector assets controlled 
by investment funds are still isolated 
cases, although their presence has 
grown significantly in recent years. Their 
comparative advantage is their ability to 
obtain funding, which is important in such 
a capital-intensive industry. In contrast, 
when electricity firms are controlled by 
investment funds, rather than forming part 
of transnational companies, there is less 
opportunity for operational synergies and 
knowledge transfers within the enterprise. 
If the presence of investment funds in the 
sector were to expand, it could produce 
a business model in which ownership of 
the assets (by the investment funds) is 
separated from their management ( in 
the hands of the electricity firms), in a 
system similar to that operated by some 
hotel groups.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the firms in question.
Endesa’s expansion in Latin America began in 1992, 
when it was still owned by the Spanish State. In that year, 
it purchased 38% of EDENOR, one of the leading energy 
distributors in Argentina. Later it increased its interests in this 
country with other transmission and generating companies. 
In Peru, it participated in the privatization of the energy 
distributor EDELNOR in 1994, as a minority shareholder 
in conjunction with Chilean firms; and in the two following 
years it purchased the generators Empresa de Generación 
Termoeléctrica Ventanilla S.A. (Etevensa) and Empresa 
Eléctrica de Piura S.A. (Eepsa). In Brazil, where it faced 
competition in the privatization process from local and Chilean 
groups, Endesa was a minority partner in the consortia that 
acquired two major distributors in 1996 and 1998. In 1997 
and 1998, also in consortium with other firms, it purchased 
Cachoeira Dourada, the country’s first privatized generating 
company (658 MW). Later, it increased its stakes in all of these 
companies. In Brazil, it also constructed the interconnection 
line with Argentina (Compañía de Interconexión Energética 
(CIEN)), which began commercial operations between 2000 
and 2002, with an investment cost of US$ 700 million. In 
1997 it entered Colombia in a consortium with Enersis 
purchasing the Bogota energy distributor (CODENSA) 
and the country’s largest generator, Empresa Generadora 
de Energía S.A. (EMGESA).
In 1997 Endesa took a stake in Enersis, the Chilean 
firm that had been privatized in the 1980s, and which 
since 1992 had built a network of subsidiaries in other 
countries of the region. Lastly, in 1999, it took over 
100% of Enersis (including Endesa Chile), thus not only 
consolidating its position as the leading firm in Chile, 
but also considerably expanding its market shares in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
Following these acquisitions, Endesa launched a 
group rationalization plan, with selective dis-investments 
to focus its strategy.22 Devaluation processes and energy 
crises, particularly the Argentine crisis in 2001 and 2002, 
undermined the firm’s results in the region and led to a 
new round of asset sales to reduce the debt. As part of this 
process, Endesa sold most of its assets in other sectors, 
such as the Autopista del Sol highway in Chile, to focus 
on the electricity sector. Its strategy of diversification into 
22
 The largest dis-investment was the Chilean transmission company 
Chilectra, sold to Hydro-Quebec in October 2000 for US$ 1.076 billion.
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the telecommunications business, which had started in 
March 2000, was also later abandoned.23 
Today Endesa has a presence in five large South American 
markets, with total installed capacity of 14,832 MW and 
9 million customers in its distribution businesses. It is the 
largest firm in the sector in Chile (a 35% market share in 
generation and 32% in distribution), Colombia (22% and 
25%, respectively), and Peru (28% and 19%, respectively).
Having moved on from the phase of asset consolidation 
and stalled growth in Latin America, Endesa now hopes to 
consolidate its position in these markets through organic 
growth. In Chile, Colombia and Peru, it has 980 MW 
of new capacity under construction, with an investment 
estimated at 1.66 billion. In Brazil, where it only has 
a 1% share of total generating capacity and 5% of the 
distribution market, it is building a portfolio of future projects 
amounting to 2,803 MW (albeit without an environmental 
impact assessment); and it is considering the possibility of 
further acquisitions.24 In Argentina (where it has 22% of 
the generating market and 20% of distribution), Endesa is 
not considering new capacity investments, while it waits 
for changes to be made to the regulatory framework, 
although it anticipates organic growth in its distribution 
business broadly matching that of the market as a whole. 
23
  Under this plan, the firm aimed to exploit synergies in its installations 
and customer bases and also enter a faster growing segment. Endesa 
took controlling stakes in several telecommunications firms in Spain 
and Chile, but was unable to achieve the desired objectives. In 2005, 
it brought this strategy to an end and sold all of its shareholdings 
in this sector (Rozas, 2009).
24
 Endesa operates the interconnection line between Argentina and 
Brazil, which is about 1,000 km long and had earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of around 
US$ 110 million in the last year.
In its distribution businesses, the company aims to 
grow its customer base by 14% between 2010 and 2015.25
In addition to Endesa, Enel has other assets in the 
region owned by its renewable energy subsidiary Enel 
Green Power. These include small hydroelectric plants 
in Brazil (with total capacity of 91 MW), Chile (90 MW) 
Costa Rica (32 MW) Guatemala (77 MW) and Mexico 
(36 MW). It also has a 20 MW wind power plant in Costa 
Rica, and it is in the process of launching geothermal 
energy operations in Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua.26 
In addition, the company’s plans to expand its wind power 
operations in Brazil and Mexico are at advanced stage.
Although the activities of Enel Green Power are 
dispersed among a large number of countries, its assets 
under the Endesa brand are concentrated in the main markets 
of South American; and, except for the atomized Brazilian 
market, in all cases it enjoys a position of leadership that 
enables it to pursue an organic growth strategy. Within 
the Enel group, Latin America accounts for 12% of total 
revenue; and this proportion is expected to continue 
growing in the next few years, probably thanks to organic 
growth rather than new acquisitions (in the generating 
segment alone, Endesa has announced a project portfolio 
amounting to over 12,000 MW).27
25




 See [online] http://www.enelgreenpower.com.
27 Endesa’s net earnings in the first half of 2011 amounted to 1,283 
million, of which 320 million was obtained from its operations in 
Latin America (if the special  effect of  the wealth tax in Colombia 
is excluded, its net earnings would have grown by 14.7%).
Table IV.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ACQUISITIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 1990-2011 
(Millions of dollars)
Year Asset acquired Country Buyer Country Amount
2011 Elektro Brazil Iberdrola Spain 2 897
1999 Endesa Chile Chile Endesa Spain 2 125
2010 Expansion Transmissão Itumbiar Brazil State Grid China 1 702
1996 Light Brazil Iberdrola Spain 1 700
2000 Electricidad de Caracas Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ) AES United States 1 658
1997 COELBA Brazil Iberdrola Spain 1 597
2006 HQI Transelec Chile Chile Investment funds Canada 1 514
2010 Natural gas plants Mexico Mitsui Japan 1 465
2007 EDF power plants Mexico Gas Natural Spain 1 451
1999 Enersis Chile Endesa Spain 1 412
1997 Companhia Centro Oeste Brazil AES United States 1 373
2000 Gener Chile AES United States 1 319
1998 Electrificadora del Caribe Colombia Endesa United States 1 311
2008 Saesa Chile Investment funds Canada 1 287
1997 CODENSA Colombia Endesa Spain 1 220
2000 Eletropaulo Metropolitana Brazil AES United States 1 084
2007 Jamaica Public Service Jamaica Marubeni Japan 1 082
1997 Cemig Brazil AES United States 1 052
2000 Companhia Energética de Pernambuco Brazil Iberdrola Spain 1 004
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by Thomson One.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)162
(b) AES: heavy commitment to Latin America
The United States enterprise AES, founded in 1981, 
undertook a rapid international expansion between 1994 
and 2000, when its stockmarket capitalization increased 
twentyfold, and it grew from just nine plants in three 
countries to over 110 generating plants and 17 distribution 
systems in 27 countries.
It first entered the Latin American market in 1993, 
purchasing a power plant in Argentina. In 1996 it formed 
part of the consortium involving the Brazilian distributor 
Light, EDF and other firms; and the following year it 
acquired an equity stake in Companhia Energética de 
Minas Gerais and it gained control of the Rio Grande do 
Sul distributor. In the same year, it was selected to build 
the Uruguaiana power plant, Brazil’s first gas-fired plant. 
In 1998, it participated in privatization of the São Paulo 
distributor (Eletropaulo), and in 1999 it acquired the Tiete 
hydroelectric plant. In 2000, it purchased the distributor 
Electricidad de Caracas for US$ 1658 million, the Chivor 
hydroelectric plant in Colombia, and the Chilean firm 
Gener, which had various assets in Argentina, for US$ 
1,319 million. These acquisitions gave AES control over 
a large capacity generator in Chile and Argentina, and 
afforded it a strong presence in energy distribution in 
the large urban centres of Brazil. In addition, in 1998, it 
bought an 80% stake in a distributor in El Salvador for 
US$ 109 million; and in 1999 it paid US$ 110 million for 
50% of a generator in the Dominican Republic.
In 2001, the energy crisis and devaluation that occurred 
in Brazil coincided with an international loss of confidence 
in energy companies triggered by the electricity crisis in 
California and the Enron bankruptcy. All of this caused 
major difficulties for AES (its share price plummeted from 
US$ 68.51 in 2000 to US$ 2.51 in 2002), and the firm 
was forced to restructure to be able to service its debts. 
In addition to selling many of its non-strategic assets,28 it 
had to renegotiate the debt acquired by its subsidiaries in 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, in agreements that meant a 
reduction in its shareholding. These operations did not reduce 
the importance of the Latin American market for the firm, 
but actually slightly increased it to 57.5% (ECLAC, 2005).
As a result of the crisis and restructuring, the pace of AES 
investment slackened during the last decade, although it built 
two coal-fired thermal plants in Mexico (460 MW) which 
came on stream in 2007. Today, Latin America accounts for 
72% of the firm’s income (the rest is obtained mainly from 
the United States and Europe), with Brazil and Chile its most 
28
 AES divested assets in Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Oman, Pakistan, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
important markets (see figure IV.9).29 In countries such as 
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, the firm 
is a dominant player; it is the leading generator in Panama 
(369 MW) and the second largest in Chile (1,621 MW), with 
major assets also in Argentina (3,222 MW capacity), Brazil 
(637 MW), Colombia (1,000  W), the Dominican Republic 
(800 MW) and Mexico (710 MW).30 In the distribution 
segment, it is the leading player in El Salvador (81% of the 
market) and has a large share in Brazil, where it is the owner 
of Sul (1.3 million customers) and holds 16% of the capital 
of Eletropaulo (6.1 million customers). Its assets in the 
Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela were nationalized in 2007.
Following a phase of downsizing and debt reduction, 
the firm is once again seeking organic growth alternatives 
in the region. It is currently building two coal-fired power 
plants in Chile (788 MW) and a hydroelectric plant in 
Panama (223 MW).
(c) Iberdrola: focused on Brazil and Mexico
Like Endesa, the Spanish firm Iberdrola began its 
international expansion by participating in Latin American 
privatizations. In 1992 it bought a generating plant in Argentina; 
in 1995 it acquired the main distributors in Plurinational State 
of Bolivia; and in 1996 it entered the Chilean market by 
purchasing the Tocopilla power plant from Chile’s National 
Copper Corporation (CODELCO) and the Colbún enterprise 
which was still State-owned. Between 1996 and 2000, in 
Brazil it took over the distributors Companhia de Eletricidade 
do Estado de Bahia (COELBA) and Companhia Energética 
do Rio Grande do Norte (COSERN), along with the Itapebí 
hydroelectric plant. In 1999, it was awarded the US$ 270 million 
contract for a 489 MW combined-cycle plant in Mexico. 
In this period, Ibderdrola’s expansion in the region was not 
limited to electric energy, since it also purchased assets in 
the sanitation sector in Chile, telecommunications in Brazil, 
and gas distribution in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, as 
part of a diversification strategy that aims to turn the firm 
into a multiple-service provider
The strategic plan launched in 2001 changed this 
vision and retargeted the firm’s expansion on electricity 
generation in Spain (combined-cycle plants and renewable 
energies) and in Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Brazil.31 
To focus on these segments, Iberdrola sold assets it owned 
29
 Although 72% of its sales are in Latin America, only 50% of the 
firm’s total assets are in the region. In 2010, it earned US$ 4.3 billion 
in Latin America from energy generation and US$ 7.2 billion in 
the distribution segment. 
30 In Brazil, the firm also owns 46% of the Uruguaiana thermal 
power plant (639 MW) which has been idle since Argentina cut 
off gas supplies.
31
 In contrast to the dis-investments made by  Endesa, the plan pursued 
by Iberdrola was not motivated by the economic and energy crisis 
in the region, but responded to the firm’s internal needs.
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in Spain in the electricity transmission, telecommunications, 
gas distribution, real estate and water sectors. Outside 
the electricity business, Iberdrola would henceforth only 
invest in the gas sector to supply its own combined-cycle 
power plants. Nonetheless, it is currently one of the 
few electricity firms with an engineering subsidiary. In 
addition to dis-investments in other sectors, in 1999 the 
firm sold its assets in Argentina, and in 2000 it divested 
its electricity generating firms in Chile.32 
Since then, Iberdrola has targeted its international 
expansion outside the region, buying ScottishPower in 
United Kingdom between 2006 and 2007, and Energy 
East in the United States in 2008. In conjunction with 
its operations in Latin America, these acquisitions make 
it a very geographically diversified enterprise. It is the 
world’s largest wind energy producer, with an installed 
capacity of 62,613 MW in 20 countries, including Brazil 
and Mexico (Iberdrola, 2010). 
In 2011, 13% of Iberdrola’s sales and 16% of its 
EBITDA came from Latin America (not including 
its renewable energy operations), where it has 5,893 
MW capacity and 11.65 million customers (the same 
as in Spain).33 Although it maintains its distribution 
subsidiaries in Plurinational State of Bolivia (37% of 
the market), its Latin American business is targeted 
on Mexico, where it is the leading private generator 
with 5,000 MW capacity, and, in particular, on Brazil. 
In January 2011, it purchased 100% of the Brazilian 
distributor Elektro (2.17 million customers) for US$ 
2.4 billion. In addition, it plans to continue developing 
hydroelectric projects and is participating in the 
construction of Belo Monte (over 11,200 MW capacity). 
To reinforce this specialization in the larger markets, in 
2010 it sold its assets in Guatemala to the Colombian 
enterprise EPM.34
(d) Gas Natural Fenosa: the search for synergies 
between gas and electricity distribution
This enterprise was formed in 2009 when the Spanish 
gas distributor Gas Natural took over the Spanish electricity 
company Unión Fenosa. The outcome, Gas Natural 
Fenosa, is the only enterprise analysed in this section 
which explicitly seeks synergies between the electricity 
business (particularly distribution) and gas distribution. 
The firm’s assets in the electricity sector come almost 
entirely from Unión Fenosa.
32
 Total disinvestments amounted to US$ 2,155 million in 2002 alone.
33
 See 2011 results.
34
 In 2010 it sold the following assets to EPM: its stake in Distribución 
Eléctrica Centroamericana II for US$ 300 million; its holding in 
Generadores Hidroeléctricos SA de CV for US$ 19 million; and 
its share in Gestión de Empresas Eléctricas SA for US$ 12 million.
The electricity firm started to participate in the region’s 
privatization processes several years later than Endesa and 
Iberdrola. In 1997 it purchased the transmission company 
Transportadora de Electricidad (TDE) in Plurinational State 
of Bolivia; in 1998 it took over Empresa de Distribución 
Eléctrica de Metro-Oeste and Empresa de Distribución 
Eléctrica Chiquirí in Panama, which between them supplied 
70% of the market; and in 1999 it gained control of the 
distributors DEOCSA and DEORSA in Guatemala, and 
EDENORTE and EDESUR in the Dominican Republic, 
along with a gas distribution concession in Uruguay and 
a concession on a power plant in Mexico (250 MW). 
En 2000, Unión Fenosa acquired the two distribution 
companies operating in the Caribbean zone of Colombia 
(1.3 million customers) and Empresa de Energía del 
Pacífico S.A. (EPSA), which operates in energy generation, 
transmission, and marketing; in Costa Rica it was awarded 
the concession to build and operate Central Hidroeléctrica 
La Joya; in Nicaragua it took over the country’s two largest 
distributors (DISNORTE and DISSUR), which together 
serve 90% of the population; in Mexico it consolidated 
its operations by taking over two other combined-cycle 
power plants; and in the Dominican Republic it built two 
diesel-fired generator plants.
 In later years, the firm divested assets that did not fit 
into its strategy. In 2002, it sold Red Eléctrica de España 
(REE) the electricity distributor in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia; and it sold its holdings in the Dominican 
Republic’s energy distributors to that country’s government. 
The purchase of Unión Fenosa by Gas Natural, decided 
on shortly before the recent financial crisis, required it 
to sell assets in the region to comply with competition 
regulations; and it also had to reduce the level of its debt. 
As a result, a new round of sales was launched, including 
EPSA in Colombia, for US$ 1.1 billion (2009); the 
combined-cycle power plants belonging to Gas Natural in 
Mexico, for US$ 1,465 million (2010), and the distribution 
companies in Guatemala for US$ 345 million (2011). 
The firm’s total installed capacity today amounts to 
2,182 MW and it has nearly 3.5 million customers in Latin 
America, from which it earns 39% of its profits. In Mexico, 
it is the second largest private generator with 1,900 MW 
capacity in combined-cycle plants; in the Dominican Republic 
it has 198 MW; in Costa Rica 51 MW; and in Panama 33 
MW. In the distribution segment, it has 2 million customers 
in Colombia, 800,000 in Nicaragua and 500,000 in Panama.
As of late 2011, the debt reduction process had 
been completed and Gas Natural Fenosa again started to 
consider expansion possibilities in Latin America, with a 
declared growth plan of reaching 2,600 MW capacity in 
2012. Its most important project in the region is currently 
the construction of a wind farm in Mexico, with 230 MW 
capacity, and a 50 MW hydroelectric plant in Costa Rica.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)164
(e) GDF Suez: vigorous expansion of generating 
capacity
GDF Suez is the result of a merger between Gaz de 
France (GDF) and Suez in 2008, and is controlled by 
the French State which holds 36% of the shares. Half 
of its business consists of electricity generation, while 
the rest is divided between sale and distribution of gas, 
infrastructures, and environmental services. 
Its presence in Latin America stems from the Belgian 
firm Tractebel, which later merged with the French enterprise 
Suez. Tractebel stated to invest in Argentina in early 1990s, 
in Chile in 1996, and in Brazil in 1998 by purchasing 
Gerasul. In 2002, it strengthened its presence in Chile by 
taking over EDELNOR, and it entered the Peruvian market 
by buying ENERSUR. Its expansion strategy in the region, 
combining electricity and gas assets, made it one of the 
firms worst hit by the Argentine government’s decision 
to cut off natural gas supplies to Chile (ECLAC, 2005).
GDF Suez is currently the largest private-sector 
generator in Brazil, with 6,900 MW installed capacity. 
In Peru, it is the second-largest private generator with 
1,043 MW (14% of the country’s total generating capacity) 
and an investment programme of US$ 2 billion (GDF 
Suez, 2011). In Chile it is the leading power generator 
in the north of the country, with 1,739 MW capacity. In 
2010 the firm inaugurated the Mejillones liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) terminal, with an investment of US$ 500 
million, making it possible to import liquefied gas for the 
thermal power plants in the north of Chile. In the same 
year, it inaugurated the Monte Redondo wind farm, with 
48 MW capacity; and it currently has 330 MW of thermal 
generating capacity under construction.
The GDF Suez strategy consists of integrating its 
businesses in Europe and North America, and expanding 
into emerging markets, where it expanded its generating 
capacity by 2.6 times between 2007 and 2011. In Latin 
America, it is currently building 5,900 MW of new 
capacity — more than what it is building in any other 
part of the world, and more than any other transnational 
is building in the region. Of this new capacity, 4,400 MW 
consists of hydroelectric projects in Brazil, including the 
3,750 MW Jirau plant, in which it has a 50% stake in 
partnership with Eletrobras and Camargo Correa. This 
provides an example of the importance of entering into 
partnerships with local firms, particularly State-owned, 
to reduce political and regulatory risks. GDF Suez is 
also one of a few electricity firms with major capacity in 
the engineering and construction area as a comparative 
advantage (through its Tractebel Engineering subsidiary).
In total, the firm currently has 10,282 MW installed 
capacity in the region (115,000 MW worldwide) representing 
5% of its global sales. Its current strategy of aggressively 
expanding its generating capacity in Brazil, Chile and Peru 
will certainly increase this sales percentage in the coming 
years. In 2011, a total of 323 MW came on stream in Brazil, 
Chile and Panama, and its income in the region grew by 15%.
(f) Électricité de France (EDF): disinvestment and 
tentative return
Électricité de France, which is 85% owned by the 
French State, is one of the largest European electricity 
companies. In 1992 it joined the consortium that was 
awarded the tender for the EDENOR distributor in Buenos 
Aires, in conjunction with Endesa. In 2001, EDF bought 
out Endesa’s stake, which the latter was forced to sell as 
a result of its merger with Enersis. In 1996, it entered 
the Brazilian market purchasing the distributor Light, in 
partnership with AES and other firms, and UTE Norte 
Fluminense; in Mexico it participated in tenders to construct 
a combined-cycle plants. 35
Like all firms operating in Argentina and Brazil, the 
energy and exchange-rate crisis impaired the performance 
of its subsidiaries, but EDF was the only large electric 
power company that decided to withdraw from these 
countries: in 2002, it sold it distribution assets in Brazil 
(its stake in Light) to AES, and then divested its holding 
in EDENOR in Argentina. Lastly, in 2007, it sold all of 
its generating plants in Mexico to Gas Natural de España 
for US$ 1.450 billion.
Currently, EDF still owns 90% of the Brazilian thermal 
plant UTE Norte-Fluminense (869 MW capacity), which 
represents less than 1% of its global activity. Among 
transnationals with a presence in the region, EDF is 
probably the one that has concentrated its business most 
in Europe, with few prospects for aggressive international 
expansion. In Latin America, it is developing the renewable 
energies segment (it has wind farms in Mexico with 
67 MW installed capacity, to which a further 324 MW 
will be added in 2013); 36 and it has signed a co-operation 
agreement with Eletrobras to evaluate opportunities in 
Hydro and nuclear energy. 
35 Central Anáhuac (Río Bravo II) (495 MW), Central Lomas del Real 
(Río Bravo III) (495 MW), Central Valle Hermoso (Río Bravo IV) 
(500 MW), Central Electricidad Águila de Altamira (495 MW) and 
Central Saltillo (248 MW).
36
 See Bloomberg [online] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
04-19/edf-acquires-two-mexico-wind-projects-amounting-to-324-
megawatts.html.
165Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2011
2.  The new trans-Latin electric power companies
The first trans-Latin enterprises in the electric power 
sector were the Chilean firms Enersis and Gener, which 
took advantage of the reforms and privatizations in other 
countries of the region to start their international expansion 
in the 1990s, before being absorbed by Endesa and AES in 
1999 and 2000, respectively (ECLAC, 2005). No private 
enterprise from the region has attempted international 
expansion since then, but in the last few years a group 
of State-owned electricals have invested in several other 
markets in the region, such as the Colombian enterprises 
EPM and ISA, or are preparing plans to do so, such as 
the Brazilian Eletrobras. 
(a) Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) and 
Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA): the new 
Colombian trans-Latin enterprises
Following the reform of electric power sector in 
Colombia, which began in 1985, some of the firms in the 
sector were privatized, and a very competitive market was 
created, with one dominant transmission firm (ISA), but 
many others in the generating in distribution segments. 
Today Colombia has three large transnationals: AES, in the 
generating segment; Gas Natural Fenosa, in distribution, 
and Endesa in both segments. The other large firms in 
the sector are State- or municipal-owned, including EPM 
and ISA, which have embarked upon an international 
expansion process in the last few years 37.
EPM is wholly owned by the municipality of Medellín, 
and, apart from its electricity businesses (62% of group 
sales) it also provides water and gas services in that city, 
and has telecommunications businesses in Colombia and 
abroad. In the electricity sector, it owns 23% of Colombian 
generating capacity, 25% of the distribution market and 
6% of transmission. Its first investment abroad involved 
the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric plant in 
Panama, a project that encountered major difficulties 
and is still under construction. Following this experience, 
EPM decided to purchase already constructed assets in 
its international expansion, a process that has gathered 
pace over the last two years.
In 2010 EPM bought DECA II, GESA and Genhidro 
in Guatemala from Spain’s Iberdrola, to become the 
country’s leading energy distributor serving nearly one 
37
 Another Colombian electricity company with investments abroad is 
Empresa de Energía de Bogotá, which belongs to the municipality 
of Bogotá and owns the energy distributors TRECSA in Guatemala 
and CTM (with a 40% stake) in Peru.
million customers. In 2011 it acquired the distributors 
DELSUR in El Salvador and ENSA in Panama from 
AEI of the United States, making it the second-largest 
distributor in both countries. These subsidiaries increased 
EPM’s customer base by 1.6 million, and produced 
US$ 1,597 million in revenue in 2011. EPM has thus 
become the second-largest player in the Central American 
electricity market, accounting for 21% of subregional 
demand by country; and it supplies a large portion of the 
electricity demand in the three countries mentioned: 51% 
in Guatemala, 39% in Panama and 22% in El Salvador 
(ECLAC, 2011b).
For its part, ISA is an enterprise listed on the stock 
market in which the Colombian State holds 54% of the 
shares (the remainder are owned by EPM and pension 
funds). At the present time, in addition to dominating the 
transmission markets in Colombia (81%) and Peru (82%), 
it has a large stake in Plurinational State of Bolivia (34%) 
and in Brazil (16%). In total, it operates a 38,989 km-
long high-tension transmission network, together with 
international connections between the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Colombia, Colombia and Ecuador, 
and Ecuador and Peru. It also has a construction and 
engineering subsidiary which sometimes implements its 
own projects or else acts as a contractor for other firms.
ISA is a special case among electricity firms, firstly 
because it focuses exclusively on the transmission segment 
and has not acquired generating or distribution assets;38 
secondly, because it has targeted its expansion outside the 
electricity sector in telecommunications and highways. 
In telecommunications, ISA began its international 
expansion in 2009 through the INTERNEXA enterprise, 
which has consolidated an 18,500 km fibre-optic network 
throughout Brazil, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In 2010, ISA purchase 
60% of the highway concession is owned by Spanish firm 
Ferrovial in Chile (900 km) for US$ 290 million. These 
investments, and its plans to enter the gas pipeline market, 
make ISA a specialist provider of linear infrastructures, 
which, despite a presence in different sectors, operate 
under a similar business model, involving major initial 
investments, expropriation of many land plots and regulated 
income that is constant in the long-term.
38
 The law prevents this expansion in Colombia, since firms cannot 
operate in several segments of the electricity sector, unless they 
were already operating in them prior to the 1995 electricity reform 
(such as EPM).
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Both EPM and ISA have invested abroad with the main 
objective of gaining size to increase their profitability, since 
it was impossible for them to expand further in Colombia 
for regulatory reasons. They have grown rapidly, often 
taking advantage of the departure of European or United 
States firms that abandoned their assets in the region. 
While ISA has focused its expansion in the transmission 
segment and other linear infrastructures, EPM has targeted 
the more open markets of Central America, where it has 
consolidated a robust position in the distribution segment. 
(b) Eletrobras: in pursuit of electricity integration
Eletrobras was created in 1961 as the leading enterprise 
in Brazil’s electricity sector in all segments. During the 
deregulation and privatization processes of the 1990s, 
the firm had several of its functions taken away from it, 
but the State remains the majority shareholder. It has a 
total of 12 subsidiaries in generation, transmission and 
distribution, with 42,302 MW installed capacity, including 
Brazil’s half of the Itaipú binational power plant. In all, it 
is responsible for half of Brazil’s electric power generation 
and 56% of transmission lines (its distribution business 
is relatively minor).
Eletrobras does not yet have assets operating outside 
Brazil, but since 2008 it has pursued an internationalization 
strategy targeting new hydroelectric projects, mainly 
those that can sell part of their output to Brazil. In South 
America, there are six projects in portfolio: in Peru 
(Inambari, 2,200 MW), in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
(binational, 2,000 MW, and Cachoeira Esperança, 900 MW), 
in Guyana (the Potaro River project) and in Argentina (the 
Garabí-Panambí 2,200 MW binational power plant). All 
of these are currently still at the feasibility study phase. 
Given the complexity of hydroelectric projects on this 
scale (the announced investment in the Peruvian project 
is US$ 4.8 billion) and the political problems that can 
arise along the way, this is a very long-term investment 
programme, in which it is unlikely that all projects will 
ultimately be implemented.
The most advanced project is the Tumarín power 
plant in Nicaragua (253 MW), on which construction work 
began in late 2011; it is expected to come on stream four 
years later, with a total investment of around US$ 1 billion. 
Moreover, the firm does not rule out expansion into other 
markets outside the region, and in fact in 2011 it attempted 
to achieve this by bidding for the Portuguese State’s share 
in EDP, which in the end was sold to a Chinese firm.
Apart from seeking to improve the firm’s financial 
sustainability, Eletrobras’ international expansion plans 
fulfil a policy function as the executive arm of international 
agreements on electric energy, specifically the Brazilian 
government’s plans to promote hydroelectric capacity 
in neighbouring countries, part of whose production 
would be consumed in Brazil. In Central America, 
its investments have gone hand-in-hand with political 
cooperation agreements. In addition to this diplomatic 
function, the firm has other roles in its own country, 
including responsibility for implementing the parts of 
energy plans that private firms do not find profitable 
(expansion of electricity coverage to remote areas) or 
excessively risky (nuclear generation). It is also the 
preferred partner of private generators in the larger and 
more complex hydroelectric projects, such as Belo Monte.
3.  The arrival of new Asian firms
The recent expansion of Asian FDI into Latin America 
(see chapter I) has also been reflected in the electricity 
sector. Electricity firms from Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and China have entered the region since 2006; and 
although their market share in Latin America is still small 
and confined almost exclusively to Brazil and Mexico, 
they have major growth potential. In general, they have 
adopted a strategy of acquiring assets that other European 
and United States firms have sold. 
The Japanese enterprise Mitsui entered the Mexican 
generation market by purchasing the Valladolid III power 
plant in 2006 (563 MW). In 2010 it acquired Gas Natural’s 
plant in that country for US$ 1,465 million, which the 
latter was forced to sell when it merged with Fenosa in 
the previous year. Its share of these assets represents total 
capacity of 1,646 MW, making it the country’s third-
largest private generator. Similar generating capacity is 
held by the partnership between Mitsubishi and Kyushu, 
two other Japanese firms with three generating plants that 
came on stream between 2001 and 2006.
Mitsui and Mitsubishi are large highly diversified 
conglomerates with a presence in many countries across 
the world, whereas Kyushu is exclusively an electricity 
firm with its business centred in Japan, but with generating 
assets in China, the Philippines, Taiwan Province of 
China, Singapore and Viet Nam, in addition to Mexico. 
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The three are private enterprises, unlike the other Asian 
firms with a presence in the region. The first of these is 
Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO), a firm with few 
investments abroad, basically in other Asian countries. 
In Latin America, they are building a 433 MW capacity 
combined-cycle plant with a total investment estimated at 
US$ 430 million, in partnership with Samsung, another 
Korean company, and the Argentine enterprise Techint. 
In 2011 KEPCO acquired 40% of the distributor Jamaica 
Public Service Company for US$ 288 million.
In the case of Chinese firms, the only asset owner 
in Latin America is State Grid, the largest electricity 
transmission and distribution enterprise in China (in fact 
the largest electricity company in the world by sales), 
which in 2010 spent US$ 1.7 billion to obtain various 
electricity distribution concessions in Brazil (ECLAC, 
2011a). This has been State Grid’s largest acquisition 
outside China to date; and the firm has confined itself to 
acquiring ownership, while leaving the previous managers 
in their posts. The other firm with activity in the region is 
Synohydro, which thus far has been limited to building 
power plants for third parties (always with financing from 
the Chinese State bank), although it has also announced 
its intention to purchase assets.
Lastly, the Chinese State enterprise Three Gorges 
Corporation in late 2011 paid US$ 3,516 million for the 
21% stake in EDP that was still owned by the Portuguese 
State. Although most of EDP’s assets are in Europe, this 
transaction, motivated by the financial difficulties faced 
by the Portuguese Government, made the firm a major 
player in the Brazilian market, where it has 2.6 million 
customers in the distribution segment and 1,746 MW 
generating capacity. In fact two Brazilian firms in the 
sector Eletrobras and Cemig, also bid for that share.
4.  New renewable energy firms
All of the large electricity firms discussed thus far have 
developed some generating capacity using new renewable 
energy sources. Nonetheless, the special characteristics of 
this segment (strong growth, rapid technical progress, and 
highly changeable regulatory frameworks) mean that the 
business model still differs from the rest of the sector, and it 
is largely controlled by specialized firms. Many of the large 
electricity firms that invest in this segment do so through 
specialist subsidiaries, such as Enel Green Power, CPFL 
Renováveis or Iberdrola Renovables, which recently has 
been reabsorbed by the parent company for financial reasons.
The first characteristic that distinguishes the new 
renewable energies from the rest of the sector — specifically 
wind power, which is the most developed — is the smaller 
scale of the projects (see box IV.1), which lowers entry 
barriers. These barriers are lowered still further if the 
project is mainly financed with debt, as is usually the 
case, thereby reducing the capital contribution necessary 
from the firm in question to no more than 30% of the total 
cost. This level of leverage is possible because most wind 
farms have been developed with long-term PPAs, and 
because nearly all of the production cost is fixed capital 
which is invested at the start of the project.
In addition, a very large proportion of this initial 
investment represents the cost of components, which makes 
manufacturers extremely important.39 In a young industry 
39
 In the case of photo-voltaic energy, the panels represent 60% of 
the cost of installation of a solar park. In terms of wind power, the 
turbines account for 70% of the cost (BNDES). The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates between 71% and 76% 
subject to rapid technical progress, these manufacturers 
have a growth strategy that enables them to lower costs 
and attempt to internalize the technical progress that they 
themselves are making. For that reason, many component 
manufacturers are also entering the power generation 
segment, such as Vestas, Alstom or ACCIONA in the 
wind power market. In the photovoltaic solar segment, 
panel manufacturers such as Sun Tech Power started to 
invest in generation in 2008, and the trend continues 
today (REN21, 2011).
Low entry barriers, combined with a trend among 
component manufacturers to also invest in generation, 
have produced a highly atomized sector. In terms of 
wind power investments in Latin America, the leading 
firms are SN Power (Norway), ACCIONA, Abengoa 
and Gamesa (Spain) and IMPSA (Argentina), alongside 
Brazilian enterprises such as Renova Energia or CPFL 
Energia, in addition to most of the traditional electricity 
firms mentioned in the foregoing subsections. 
This pursuit of scale among equipment manufacturers 
is generating excess capacity in the industry, which favours 
project developers and makes it possible to reduce the 
final cost of the energy produced. In contrast, it imposes 
difficulties on the manufacturers as shown by the weak 
performance of the shares of these firms in stock markets. 
In 2010 the WilderHill index, which tracks the return on 
shares in firms specializing in this segment, performed 
for the turbine, between 10% and 12% for connection, and between 
7% and 9% for civil works (IPCC, 2011).
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20% worse than general stock market indices. In January 
2012, the Danish firm Vestas, the largest producer of wind 
turbines in the world, announced redundancies among 10% 
of its workforce, and the closure of one of its factories.
The global dominance that Europe has held in 
renewable energy industry, in terms of investments in 
generation and in component manufacture, is now being 
threatened by China. In the wind power segment, China 
is not only installing more generating capacity than any 
other country, but it has become the leading component 
manufacture (largely serving the domestic market). In 
the case of solar energy, this country has developed a 
components industry targeting the export market (see table 
IV.7), because with an installed capacity of just 893 MW 
(compared to Germany’s 17,193 MW) it already makes 
59% of the world’s solar panels (NREL, 2011).
Table IV.7 
LEADING WORLD MANUFACTURERS OF WIND POWER AND PHOTO-VOLTAIC COMPONENTS 
(Percentages)
A. Wind power components B. Photo-voltaic components
Manufacturer Country of origin Share Manufacturer Country of origin Share
Vestas Denmark 14.3 Suntech Power China 6.6
Sinovel China 10.7 JA Solar China 6.1
GE United States 9.3 FirstSolar United States 5.9
Goldwind China 9.2 Yingli Green Energy China 4.7
Enercon Germany 7.0 Trina Solar China 4.7
Suzlon India 6.7 Q-Cells Germany 3.9
Dongfang China 6.5 Gintech
Taiwan Province 
of China 3.3
Gamesa Spain 6.4 Sharp Japan 3.1
Siemens Germany 5.7 Motech
Taiwan Province 
of China 3.0
United Power China 4.1 Kyocera Japan 2.7
Others 20.2 Others 55.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), “2010 Renewable Energy Databook”, 
Department of Energy, 2011 [online] http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/pdfs/51680.pdf
Despite this migration of component manufacturing 
activity from Europe to China, R&D expenditure in this 
industry remains concentrated in the developed countries. 
Of the US$ 9 billion of R&D invested in this industry in 
2010 (including biofuels), US$ 8.2 billion was targeted 
on developed countries.40 This global investment grew by 
40% in 2010, even though the economic crisis caused a 
drop in private financing. More than half of the investment 
in Latin America, or US$ 110 million, was concentrated 
in Brazil (Bloomberg, 2011).
By technologies, solar energy received the largest 
amount of R&D investment (US$ 3.6 billion) while wind 
power, which is considered a more mature technology, 
received US$ 1.3 billion. Technological development in 
wind power has now shifted towards the construction of 
marine wind farms, which, given their higher installation 
cost, require more powerful generators to achieve an 
economically acceptable rate of return.41
40 Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea and  Australia) invested US$ 4.7  billion, 
Europe US$ 2.0 billion and United States US$ 1.5 billion (Bloomberg, 
2011). 
41
 The most powerful wind turbine currently operating has 5 MW 
capacity, but several manufacturers are developing models that 
will reach a capacity of 10 MW.
In fact, the renewable-energy segment, particularly 
wind and solar power, is still a young fast-growing 
industry, with many small and medium-sized firms and 
still decreasing costs, particularly in solar energy and 
marine wind power. This makes the sector susceptible to 
medium-term consolidation, although it is still unclear 
whether the large electricity firms or some other type of 
enterprise will be the protagonists of this.
Moreover, this is the only segment of electricity 
sector in Latin America that is completely dominated by 
private enterprises, with a clear majority of European 
firms and some Latin American ones, mainly from 
Brazil. Although State enterprises only have a marginal 
presence, this does not mean that the development of 
renewable energies in the region is unrelated to explicit 
government policies in some countries, as discussed 
in section E.
41
 The most powerful wind turbine currently operating has 5 MW 
capacity, but several manufacturers are developing models that 
will reach a capacity of 10 MW.
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E. The recent development of renewable energies in   
 Latin America and the Caribbean
Renewable energies, particularly wind power, have taken 
off in Latin America in the last two years, somewhat later 
than in the European countries that are the pacemakers 
in this industry. The vigorous growth of generating 
capacity has been concentrated in Brazil and Mexico, 
and has mostly been promoted through investments by 
transnationals, particularly European ones.
The previous section showed that the renewable 
energy business model means that electricity firms see it 
as different from the rest of electricity sector. For most of 
the region’s governments, it is also a special sector that 
requires incentives and support policies (Coviello, Gollán 
and Pérez, 2012). The reasons for this support, more or 
less intensive depending on the case, are as follows: (i) 
a desire to reduce reliance on imported fuels to produce 
electricity; (ii) the commitment to reduce CO2 emissions 
and other atmospheric pollutants; and (iii) the intention 
to develop local capacities in a highly dynamic industry 
with a high R&D content. These considerations have 
motivated policies to support renewable energies which in 
some economies of the region have facilitated investments.
Brazil promoted wind power in 2004 with the programme 
of Incentives for Alternative Energy Sources (PROINFA). 
Under this programme, capacity was auctioned to the 
best bidder in each of the technologies (biomass, mini-
hydroelectric, and wind power) and this guaranteed the 
entrepreneur a long-term return to justify the investment. 
Although the programme initially had difficulties in 
attracting projects, these were overcome and the targets 
set for installed capacity are now close to being attained.
Although implementation of PROINFA ended in 2011, 
since 2009 wind power generation has been promoted 
mainly through energy auctions open to all technologies 
in which it gained an increasingly large share. In these 
auctions, wind power enterprises have benefited from the 
shortage of gas in Brazil, which makes thermal plants 
uncompetitive, and the fact that the auction reserves a quota 
for power plants that could come on stream within three 
years, a period that is too short for the large hydroelectric 
plants. With these conditions and considerable support 
from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which 
finances virtually 90% of the country’s wind farms, wind-
power capacity in early 2012 amounted to 1,500 MW of 
installed capacity (1% of the total) with 6,700 MW under 
construction and development.
The leading wind power firms are Renova Energia, CPFL 
and Dobreve (Brazil), IMPSA (Argentina), ContourGlobal 
(United States), Martifer (Portugal) and Elecnor and Iberdrola 
(Spain). As in many other countries, this is a highly atomized 
sector, where small firms from other segments, and even private 
individuals, have built wind farms. A large portion of these 
new undertakings could face problems in implementation 
within appropriate timeframes: the Brazilian government 
estimates that 77% of planned wind power capacity faces 
some type of obstacle to its development, compared to just 
8% in the case of hydroelectric energy.42 Development of 
this sector is expected to concentrate ownership in a smaller 
number of larger firms, which achieve greater efficiency in 
maintenance of the wind farms.
The fact that the development of wind power in Brazil 
does not depend on a government subsidy means it is 
considered sustainable in the future;43 and this, together 
with local content regulations in the construction of the 
wind farms,44 has encouraged nearly all of the world’s 
major component manufacturers to set up assembly 
plants in the country, except for the Chinese firms that 
are concentrated in their local market. Major investments 
in turbine assembly plants have been made by Alstom 
(France, US$ 28 million), General Electric (United States, 
which expanded its hydroelectric turbine plant to also run 
wind turbines), Gamesa (Spain, US$ 29 million), IMPSA 
(Argentina, US$ 78 million with expansion plans for a 
further US$ 169 million), and the ENERCON group of 
Germany. All of these companies were set up in 2011 
or are in the process of expansion; Vestas, Siemens and 
Suzlon are considering setting up plants also in Brazil.
Mexico has not implemented an explicit programme 
to support the wind power sector, but, since its energy 
42
 National Electric Energy Agency  (ANEEL) [online] http://www.
aneel.gov.br/area.cfm?idArea=37. 
43
 Despite not providing an explicit subsidy, there are two features of 
the Brazilian regulatory framework that give an advantage to wind 
power. Firstly, the charge for reliability — an extra cost that firms 
pay to have greater capacity in the system — is distributed equally 
between all generators, ignoring the fact that wind power, given its 
intermittent nature, ought to contribute more than other sources. 
Secondly, electricity transmission costs are also distributed equally 
between all generators, even though most wind power plants and 
large-scale hydroelectric plants are in places that require greater 
investment in the transmission network.
44
 These regulations are particularly stringent for the project to receive 
financing from the BNDES.
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sector reform in 2008 it has developed a number of 
mechanisms that facilitate investment in wind farms, 
such as the “postage stamp” rate, net energy metering or 
the energy bank.45
In late 2011, there was 569 MW capacity on stream 
and 1,333 MW under construction, with work set to begin 
on another 1,277 MW. The vast majority of these projects 
adopted the self-supply modality, which means that the 
generator firms promoting the project enter into partnerships 
with large consumers to generate the energy that the latter 
purchase. Although the first major wind farm in Mexico 
(Venta I, of 85 MW) belongs to the State enterprise CFE, 
subsequent ones were built mainly to supply large-scale 
customers such as the cement producer CEMEX (250 
MW Eurus wind farm project) or Wal-Mart.
Unlike what happened in Brazil and elsewhere, in 
Mexico, wind farms have almost exclusively been large-
scale, all of them owned by large firms. This has partly 
reflected regulatory factors (self-supply is used in Mexico, 
but capacity auctions in Brazil), but also owing to different 
development conditions of the wind farms on the ground 
and, in particular, in terms of relations with the affected 
communities. Unlike Brazil, where land is generally owned 
by large-scale proprietors which sometimes are the same 
as those who are promoting the construction of a wind 
farm, in the centre and south of Mexico, land ownership 
is normally communal, with very incomplete titling. For 
this reason, the process of obtaining land-use permits and 
management of the affected communities poses a potential 
obstacle to the development of wind farms in one of the 
zones of Mexico with the most wind resources.46
The potential for developing renewable energies 
in Mexico can also stem from electricity demand in 
the United States. Mexican sector regulations allow the 
construction of plants (under any technology) to export 
electricity, and currently there are several thermal plants 
set up for this purpose. Renewable energies also benefit 
from the regulations prevailing in California, which 
require electricity distributors to use a certain percentage 
of renewable energies; and, in fact, Mexico exports much 
45
 The energy bank is perhaps the most important of these mechanisms: 
it consists of a system in which wind energy that is not consumed 
by the user (typically at times of high wind) is absorbed by the 
CFE and delivered when necessary (when the wind subsides). The 
generator can store this virtual energy in its “‘bank”‘ for a 12- 
month period. As a large public enterprise, the CFE can absorb the 
intermittent nature of this energy through the energy bank, but this 
role might prove unsustainable in the event of a major expansion 
of wind power.
46
 It is estimated that more than half of all wind power projects that 
participated in the latest tender (open season) will not go ahead, 
because they have not obtained the necessary land-use permits. The 
installation of large-scale wind farms entails negotiating permits 
with up to 400 different owners, many of whom do not have their 
ownership titles in order.
of the output of the Cerro Prieto geothermal plant to the 
United States.
The leading investors in wind power in Mexico are 
ACCIONA and Gas Natural Fenosa of Spain, and EDF 
of France, while the State enterprise CFE has a small-
scale project under construction. This makes wind power 
the only segment of the Mexican electricity industry that 
is clearly dominated by transnational private investors.
Uruguay is the country in the region that has invested 
most enthusiastically in wind power with a view to reducing 
the proportion hydrocarbons in energy generation. Its 
objective is to have a generation structure that is 90% based 
on renewables by 2015, including 15% wind power and 
13% biomass. Since 2009, the government has held two 
wind power tenders for long-term PPAs with a capacity 
of 150 MW each. Both were fully subscribed by a group 
of consortia, including many transnational firms. In the 
first tender, the winning bids were in a range of between 
US$ 80 and US$ 85 per megawatt; but in the second, the 
prices fell to a range of US$ 62 to US$ 65 per megawatt. 
Most of these projects are still in the construction phase, 
so wind-power capacity in late 2010 was just 40 MW.
In Central America, wind power is developing 
relatively strongly. Costa Rica has 119 MW installed and 
Nicaragua 63 MW,47 representing 5% and 6%, of each 
country’s generating capacity respectively. In Honduras, 
the Globeleq firms, owned by the Actis Investment Fund 
(see box IV.3), in December 2011 started to operate the 
Cerro de Hula wind farm (102 MW, 6% of the country’s 
capacity). The same firm has a majority holding in PESRL 
(Plantas Eólicas S.R.L.) and a 23 MW power plant in Costa 
Rica (see [online] http://www.globeleq.com). In addition, 
there are major plans for the construction of wind farms 
in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama.
Chile was one of the first countries in the region 
to operate a wind farm, and thus far 202 MW has 
come on stream. Despite the high price of electricity 
in Chile, which made wind power competitive, the 
development of this sector has been held back by the 
energy--contracting system. The first wind farm to win 
a tender in Chile was Monte Redondo owned by GDF 
Suez, which was awarded a 14-year PPA, at a price 
of US$ 108 per megawatt; and in early 2012 another 
150 MW wind farm signed an PPA with a mining 
company. The fact that the zones of the country with 
an abundance of wind are not well connected to the 
transmission network considerably raises the costs 
of wind power projects. In any event, wind farms are 
expected to be built as legislation comes into force 
making it compulsory to generate 10% of energy using 
non-conventional renewable sources by 2024. The lack 
47
 2010 data. 
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of wind resources, compared to hydro resources, has 
also held back development in Colombia, which only 
has one 110 MW wind farm that was developed more 
as a research project than as a business prospect.
In fact, wind power in 2011 has consolidated its position 
as a competitive alternative in a many of the region’s 
countries. Unlike what happened in Europe, where this 
technology was developed on the back of public subsidies, 
Brazil, Mexico and other Latin American countries have 
offered the conditions needed for it to compete on price 
with other energy sources. The most recent wind power 
projects presented in Mexico, Uruguay and Brazil have 
undertaken to sell their electricity at US$ 67, US$ 62 
and US$ 56 per MW, respectively. The reasons for this 
success are summarized below.
(i) Natural resource: wind power has only taken off in 
countries with zones of strong winds that are also well 
connected to the transmission grid. As Brazil has a 
grid that connects the entire country, it has been able 
to exploit its wind resources; Chile in contrast does 
not have such zones, and has thus far been unable 
to do so.
(ii) Technical progress. Wind power generators have 
become much more efficient over the last few years, 
and Latin American countries that have developed 
wind power in the last two years have been able to 
take advantage of this improvement better than their 
European counterparts that had started earlier.48 Also 
important has been progress in measuring winds in 
zones with potential, a key process for developing the 
industry, which in many Latin American countries 
is still incipient.
(iii) Idle capacity in the industry, owing to less investment 
in Europe and the expansion of capacity among 
component manufacturers. This has triggered a 
component price war which, in conjunction with the 
aforementioned technical progress, has substantially 
lowered the per-MW price of installed capacity. In 
Brazil, for example, it is estimated to have fallen by 
up to 50% in local currency terms.49
(iv) Availability of financing: Countries that have developed 
wind power offered project financing facilities to wind 
farm developers, particularly through long-term PPAs, or 
access to privileged official financing. The counterexample 
would be Chile, where, despite investor interest, the 
functioning of the electricity market does not make it 
possible to put forward projects that banks could finance.
(v) Regulatory measures. Albeit without direct subsidies, 
Brazil and Mexico have created a regulatory framework 
48
 Progress from now on is expected to be relatively more modest, 
or merely aimed at developing mega-generators for offshore wind 
power production.
49
 Source: Interview with BNDES.
that encourages the development of wind power. The 
cornerstones are long-term contracts that guarantee 
an income to the generator and considerably facilitate 
project financing, together with mechanisms that 
make it possible to cushion the variability of energy 
production. In Mexico, this has been achieved through 
the energy bank, whereas in Brazil, the variability 
of supply is assumed by all generators through a 
reliability charge. Both cases conceal an indirect 
subsidy to producers of this type of energy, since 
they do not fully internalize the intermittent nature 
of their production.
Other technologies have had much less spectacular 
development, although some have gained relative 
importance in the region.
Biomass generation is present, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in nearly all countries, but has developed most 
in Brazil (5% of electricity generation) and Guatemala 
(11%), and also in other Central American countries. 
In the vast majority of cases, electricity is produced by 
burning the residues of sugarcane, for which reason its 
development is linked to this crop in particular, and, to a 
lesser extent, to the timber industry. Development plans 
in this segment aim to keep generating plants operating 
throughout the year.
Small-scale hydroelectric plants, like biomass 
generators, have been developed continuously in many 
countries the region; but in some cases, such as Brazil or 
Uruguay, the development of this technology has faltered 
in the last two years because it has been unable to compete 
with wind power. In countries where wind resources are 
scarce however, such as Chile or Colombia, this technology 
has continued to receive investment.
Geothermal energy is another energy source with a 
long track record. It has good development potential in 
Latin America (the resource is concentrated in zones of 
high seismic activity), but thus far it is only important 
in a few Central American countries and Mexico (2% of 
total generating capacity). Mexico has the world’s largest 
plant (owned by CFE), with an installed capacity of 645 
MW. Although there are no major expansion plans on a 
regional scale, it could become an important energy source 
locally. In this regard, a key project is the construction 
of a biomass plant in Saint Kitts and Nevis, which in 
an initial stage will have a 10 MW capacity, but has the 
natural resources needed to expand considerably (see 
[online] http://www.westindiespower.com).
Photo-voltaic solar energy had hardly developed at all 
in Latin America by the second half of 2011, when the first 
parks were connected to the grid in Brazil and Argentina. 
This segment is being driven by a fall in the price of solar 
panels. Although in 2009 prices had dropped by 38%, in 
2010 they fell a further 14%, and the trend in 2011 has 
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continued in the same direction, thanks to a considerable 
expansion of production capacity, particularly in China 
(REN 21, 2011, p. 21). In Europe, solar panels have 
recently reached a level of 1.2 Euros per watt (US$ 1.6) 
— a cost reduction of 70% compared to 10 years ago 
(EPIA, 2011). At the end of 2011 Tsolar of Spain raised 
the financing to begin building a 44 MW plant in Peru, 
which will be connected to the grid in late 2012. By that 
time, it is estimated at 131 MW of photo-voltaic plants 
will be functioning throughout the region, and by 2016 
the figure could rise to 1,600 MW (Bloomberg, 2012).
Many Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
official targets for electric power generation using non-
conventional renewable sources that will require them to 
promote these energy sources over the next few years: 
Peru will attain 5% of its capacity in 2013, Chile 10% in 
2024, Mexico 35% in 2026, and the Dominican Republic 
will produce 500 MWh of wind energy in 2015 (15% of 
its current capacity).50 With or without specific targets, 
many of the region’s countries have taken steps to boost 
the development of new renewable energies in the last 
few years.51 In addition to the region’s renewable energy 
projects, countries can benefit from emissions reduction 
certificates issued under the Kyoto Protocol, which enable 
them to receive emissions credits that can be traded on 
European Union markets.52
Another factor promoting non-conventional renewable 
energies is the desire among certain private companies 
to reduce the carbon footprint of the electricity they 
consume. The firms’ intention is, firstly, to improve their 
public image as major polluters and, secondly, to protect 
themselves against possible trade barriers on projects 
with a large carbon footprint. The first case could include 
Wal-Mart in Mexico; the second includes CEMEX in 
Mexico and CODELCO (with a 1 MW solar park) and 
the Los Pelambres mining company in Chile. Small-scale 
consumers could also have the opportunity to reduce their 
50 Mexico’s production will use clean energy sources, including large-scale 
hydroelectric and nuclear energy. Nonetheless, given the timeframes 
involved in constructing nuclear power plants (there is no planning 
yet) and the difficulties in setting up large-scale hydroelectric plants 
in Mexico, nearly all of the investment needed to reach this level 
will come from non-conventional renewable energy sources.
51
 Although Ecuador has not yet received investments in renewable 
energies, in 2011 it adopted a system of regulated rates to promote 
them (see [online] http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/17982/
ecuador-adopts-feedin-tariffs/).
52
 The Eurus project of ACCIONA in Mexico earned 6 million tons of 
CO2 credit in 10 years, which, depending on the price at which it 
can be sold on the fluctuating emissions market, could earn between 
US$ 5 million and US$ 10 million per year (the investment cost of 
the project was estimated at US$ 295 million).
carbon footprint if “green tariffs” were implemented in 
the region. This provides the opportunity to consume 
electricity generated with renewable sources, for which 
a higher price is normally paid. Worldwide there are over 
6 million customers with these systems, of whom 2.6 
million are in Germany.
More important could be the trend of international 
agreements on climate change mitigation and the potential 
inclusion of Latin American countries — thus far exempt — 
from emissions reduction obligations. The reduction in 
CO2 emissions being achieved by using renewable energies 
is still a very small part of what the world’s governments 
have stated as their objective. Although the details of 
emission reduction programmes in Latin America and 
other developing regions are poorly known, there is an 
unequivocal trend towards containing emissions that can 
only favour the medium-term expansion of renewable 
sources of electricity.
This expected growth of renewable energies will 
have implications throughout the electricity system, 
mainly in terms of backup capacity for intermittent 
sources and the adaptation of distribution grids. The IEA 
estimates that for each 5 MW of capacity in variable 
renewable sources, 1 MW of flexible capacity is needed 
to ensure the system can deliver electricity at times of 
high demand (IEA, 2011a). Worldwide, it is estimated 
that this will represent 8% of all non-variable capacity 
additions until 2035, and that this additional capacity 
(which will remain partly idle) will add between US$ 3 
and US$ 5 to the per-MW cost.
The need for idle capacity in the system could be 
reduced by improving transmission grids and interconnection 
between regions and countries. This will be all the more 
necessary the greater the distance separating production 
and consumption zones: for example, in the case of wind 
power in Brazil, concentrated in the north of the country, 
while consumption is mainly in the south. Estimates of the 
additional cost vary between US$ 2 and US$ 13 per MW. 
In addition, there is a further US$ 1 to US$ 7 per MW 
needed to improve the systemic balance through flexible 
generation, energy storage, or smart grids. To contextualize 
these investments, it is worth noting that just 3% of all 
investments foreseen in transmission and distribution 
from now until 2035 will be destined for adjusting the 
increase in intermittent renewable energies. These smart 
grids (in reality a continuous improvement in distribution 
grid possibilities) pose a challenge for transmission firms, 
which will need to make large investments in the future 
to deal with these changes (see box IV.3).
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Box IV.3 
SMART GRIDS
Smart grids use advanced technologies 
(mainly digital) to monitor and manage 
the flow of electricity. This is not a specific 
technological solution, but a set of solutions 
that allow for greater information exchange 
at all levels of the system. There are two key 
components of smart grids: transformation of 
the distribution network from unidirectional to 
multidirectional, which allows for distributed 
generation; and management that is better 
adjusted to electricity supply and demand, 
which makes it possible to introduce 
intermittent energy sources, such as wind, 
solar, and pass-through hydroelectric, in a 
more reliable way.
The many potential advantages of 
introducing smart grids include: (i) a more 
reliable electricity service and better quality; 
(ii) lower labour costs in the distributor 
firms as a result of increased automation; 
(iii) smaller distribution and transmission 
losses; (iv) the possibility for customers 
to adapt their consumption according to 
systemic needs and thus reduce their 
expense; and (v) greater systemic capacity 
to incorporate energy produced through 
distributed generation and intermittent 
energy sources. Given their ability to increase 
efficiency in consumption and promote 
electricity generation with non-conventional 
renewable energies, smart grids are one 
of the most promising tools for making the 
electricity system more sustainable.
Although the distributors will be 
responsible for leading the necessary 
investment, the smart grid system will 
require collaboration from firms in other 
sectors, such as manufacturers of equipment 
for electricity grids, the information and 
communications technologies industry, 
and construction firms (IEA, 2011b). Apart 
from the electricity system, the presence 
of smart grids in increasing numbers of 
markets will have a significant impact on 
the expansion of electric-powered vehicles 
and the manufacture of “smart” electrical 
appliances, the market for which, according 
to the European Commission (2011), is set 
to grow from US$ 3.06 billion in 2011 to 
US$ 15.12 billion in 2015.
Smart meters have been the tool most 
widely used in smart grid components 
thus far. In Europe, 75% of the ‐5.5 billion 
invested in smart grids over the last decade 
was applied to projects to introduce smart 
meters. As the use of such meters spreads, 
other solutions will gain importance, and it is 
estimated that just 15% of future smart grid 
investments in will be on meters (European 
Commission, 2011).
The development of smart grids will 
represent a major additional investment 
effort for the distribution companies. Part 
of this will be recoverable through smaller 
losses and service quality improvements, 
which can be passed on to consumers 
through price increases. Nonetheless, 
other benefits of smart grids, such as the 
capacity of the system to include intermittent 
energy sources, will have repercussions on 
the other system players. For this reason, 
a regulatory incentive or public subsidy will 
be needed to ensure optimal investment.
The development of smart grids has a 
long way to go in Latin America, and will be 
driven largely by the desire to reduce losses 
in electricity distribution. As is the case in 
other innovative technologies, transnational 
enterprises with experience in this field will 
have a competitive advantage that they 
can exploit in the region. Enel is in a key 
position in this regard, since it is the firm 
that has developed the expansion of smart 
meters most in Europe, with almost 9 million 
customers in its distribution businesses in 
Latin America.
Enel stresses this aspect in its 
strategic plans and identifies Brazil 
and Chile as markets where smart 
meter implementation will begin. In 
both countries, the firm is implementing 
pilot “smart cities” projects, combining 
the distribution of smart meters with 
other measures, such as automatic 
remote control of the medium-voltage 
grid, installation of more efficient street 
lighting and recharging systems for 
electric automobiles. Thus far, the largest 
project for installing smart meters in Latin 
America is being undertaken by another 
Enel subsidy in Brazil (Ampla), with an 
investment of US$ 432 million, covering 
over 540,000 customers in Río de Janeiro 
state. As a result of this intervention, the 
firm has cut its energy losses by 5.6%.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of Michele De Nigris and Federico Bernardelli, “Redes inteligentes de energía 
(smart grids) en América Latina y el Caribe: viabilidad y desafíos”, paper presented at the Regional Conference on smart energy grids (Santiago, Chile, 12 and 13 
October 2010), Santiago, Chile, 2010; European Commission, “Smart Grids: from innovation to deployment”, 2011; International Energy Agency (IEA), “Technology 
Roadmap: Smart Grids”, 2011; Michele de Nigris and Manlio F. Coviello, “Smart Grids in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), forthcoming. 
F.  Challenges and prospects
In the next few decades Latin America’s electricity 
sectors will have to make major investments to expand 
and improve the service they provide and upgrade their 
infrastructure. The IEA estimates that the region will need 
to invest US$ 404 billion in generation, and US$ 313 
billion in transmission and distribution by 2035.53 The 
challenge is to make these electricity systems more secure, 
competitive, sustainable and inclusive.
53
 This estimated investment does not include Mexico. The figures 
are expressed in dollars at constant 2010 prices (IEA, 2011a).
The electricity sector has received very large FDI flows, 
and transnational companies have a very important role 
in most of the region’s markets. Nonetheless, unlike what 
is happening in telecommunications infrastructure, these 
transnationals do not completely dominate the industry, but 
coexist with a number of large public-sector enterprises. 
In view of this, and the strict regulatory control exerted 
by governments on the electricity sector, the investment 
decisions that will need to be taken to ensure systemic 
expansion need to be the responsibility of both sectors.
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The sector’s reform and privatization processes 
attracted major FDI flows between 1996 and 2001, but 
most of the investment was used to buy existing assets, 
which merely involved public enterprises being replaced by 
private firms. The reform programme called for increased 
investment by the private sector, but the firms in question 
did not always expand capacity at the expected rate, and, 
in many cases in later years, there was a reduction in total 
investment in energy infrastructure.
This process involving the sale of certain assets and 
deregulation of market segments came to an end in 2001, 
since when there has been no new large-scale privatization 
and very few nationalizations. The public enterprises, 
which all countries have preserved to a greater or lesser 
extent, with the single exception of Chile, have become 
a tool of energy policy that is very useful on several 
fronts. In some countries, these firms play a social role 
by distributing electricity in rural and remote areas that 
are of no interest to private investors. Others operate 
as catalyst partners for private investors by implicitly 
offering political support for certain projects. In other 
cases they are a tool to undertake investments that do not 
have assured profitability, but could be worthwhile from 
the standpoint of balance in the generating structure or 
technology policy.
In the last few years, three of the largest State-owned 
electricity firms, the Colombian ISA and EPM, and Brazil’s 
Eletrobras, have embarked on the internationalization path. 
In the first two cases, the strategy reflects a need for the firm 
itself to grow, which is impossible in the local market; in 
the case of Eletrobras, however, the strategy forms part of 
government policy on electricity integration with neighbouring 
countries and development cooperation in Central America. 
FDI by State firms is not exclusive to Latin America: many 
of the largest transnational electric power companies, such as 
GDF Suez or Enel are State-owned, as is State Grid, Kepco 
and most of the Asian firms in the sector. 
Apart from public investment, governments act in the 
electricity market through regulations aimed at encouraging 
private investment. The behaviour of this investment, most 
of which is in the hands of transnationals, varies greatly 
between the different countries of the region, since the 
regulatory frameworks governing such investment vary 
widely. The Latin American experience shows that private 
ownership and management of electricity assets is not 
necessarily synonymous with greater investment, universal 
quality service or low prices; but private investors have 
helped to increase generating and distribution capacity 
in most countries. Although private investments slumped 
between 2001 and 2006, transnational firms have since 
resumed their plans for investment in new capacity, attracted 
by the sustained increase in demand and stable regulatory 
frameworks that are generally private-investment-friendly. 
The proportion of private generation has grown in Brazil, 
Mexico, Peru and Central America. In Chile, the number 
and size of investment projects undertaken has also 
increased. This expansion does not affect all countries 
equally: whereas investment in Mexico has been held back 
by excess capacity, in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, private 
firms have not yet found the incentives needed to invest 
and in some cases have been nationalized.
The international situation of stalled demand for 
electricity in the developed economies, and many emerging 
markets that are closed to FDI in this sector, is helpful for 
attracting FDI into the sector in Latin America. Although 
the European companies were affected by economic 
problems in their domestic markets, owing to smaller 
profits and more difficult access to credit, the expansion 
opportunities offered by Latin American markets would be 
exploited by Asian firms or those from the region itself, as 
to some extent has been happening in the last two years.
In general, FDI may continue to be channelled into 
the region’s electricity sector, and may even increase, 
boosted by a possible process of asset restructuring 
of and enterprise consolidation. In Latin America, the 
nine largest transnationals between them have less 
than 50,000 MW generating capacity, 16% of installed 
capacity in the region, which shows that the sector is less 
concentrated than others, such as telecommunications 
or the automotive industry for example. In the short 
run, however, consolidation will probably be confined 
to specific countries and market segments, such as wind 
power generation, which is currently highly fragmented.
Investment in new capacity is likely to maintain the 
pace of the last few years, driven by good prospects for 
demand growth, which in some South American countries 
depends largely on growth in the mining sector and other 
natural resource-based industries. The expansion of non-
conventional renewable energies and smart distribution 
grids will also tend to promote private investment in the 
sector. In some economies thus far dominated by State 
firms, certain generating projects might be opened up to 
private investment; and, as a result, the role of transnational 
corporations as builders of generating plants could extend 
to ownership and management.
As noted above, a large proportion of the FDI in the 
electricity sector was used to acquire existing assets, in a 
corporate restructuring process that demonstrates the interest 
that exists among transnationals to expand their presence 
in the region, but does not add new capacity to electricity 
systems. To increase this capacity, apart from a regulatory 
framework that enhances the profitability of existing assets, 
conditions are needed that make it easier to implement 
new projects. These include offering investors a system for 
assessing and mitigating environmental and social impacts 
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which, without neglecting due care of the environment and 
the rights of affected communities, affords certainty to 
the decision-making process and provides guarantees on 
acquired rights. Electricity firms perceive that the risk of 
large generating and transmission projects being derailed 
by protests in the affected communities, even in projects 
currently under construction, has increased significantly 
in the last few years; and this could hamper investment in 
new capacity which the region’s economies need.
Apart from attracting investments to expand generating 
and distribution capacity, governments have a special 
role to play in promoting a balance in the electricity 
generation structure, which reflects the country’s natural 
conditions and ensures electricity can be produced at a 
reasonable price with secure long-term supply. Restricting 
investments in generating capacity to sources that offer 
the best financial return at a given moment has long-term 
implications for the country’s energy security and for the 
value chain of technologies that are momentarily ignored. 
For this reason, the governments of Brazil and Uruguay, 
for example, are considering specific measures to support 
biomass, which is in danger of extinction owing to the 
recent success of wind power.
Climate-change-mitigation measures will be decisive 
for the future of the sector. Apart from policies that promote 
efficient electricity use, the most important measures in this 
regard will seek to replace the most polluting generating 
sources by cleaner alternatives and, where possible, by 
renewable energies. Both unilateral measures taken by the 
region’s governments, and a future multilateral agreement 
on climate change mitigation that includes developing 
economies, will almost certainly tend to raise emissions 
reduction targets and, therefore, encourage electricity 
production using renewable sources (and nuclear energy). 
At the present time, many Latin American countries are 
implementing specific policies to increase the use of 
renewable energies. These regulatory incentives will be 
supported by decreasing production costs, as has happened 
in the last few years with wind power, and is currently 
happening with solar power, rendering projects in regions 
with good natural resources competitive.
This technical progress, in conjunction with support 
policies, will underpin the growth of renewable energies 
over the next few years. The IEA estimates that in the 
coming decade, the use of renewables will increase on a 
broadly uniform basis, irrespective of the political scenario 
in question; but in 2020-2035, growth will be much 
greater if governments adopt measures to restrict global 
warming to a tolerable range (AIE, 2010 and 2011a).54 
54 This is  the “450 Scenario”, because it limits the concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere to 450 particulates, which climate models 
equate to a rise in temperature of 2°C.
In fact, although the growth of renewable energies thus 
far (2.9% per year from 1990 to 2008) has outpaced all 
other energy sources, it is small compared to energy 
transformations in the past: the use of coal grew by 5% 
per year between 1850 and 1870, and oil use expanded 
at a rate of 8% between 1880 and 1900. The new energy 
transformation involving a move towards clean energy 
sources, which would have to be the fastest ever to achieve 
the accepted climate change mitigation targets, is the 
slowest thus far (UNDESA, 2011).
Although the regulatory framework has successfully 
launched the industry in some countries, tools will need 
to be adapted as the sources gradually develop. Some of 
those which serve to develop an incipient technology such 
as wind power could create tensions in the system when 
this exceeds 10% of electricity generation for example. 
An example are mechanisms to absorb the intermittent 
nature of these sources in the system. Another area of 
adjustment to the spread of new renewable energies is 
the trend towards smart distribution grids, which will be 
more necessary the greater the pressure to improve energy 
efficiency or the greater the proportion of intermittent 
energies such as wind power, solar, or pass-through 
hydroelectric energy in the generating matrix.
Alongside efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, industrial 
and technology policy will also be a reason for many 
governments to support technologies that are not currently 
competitive but are expected to be so in the future, such as 
thermodynamic solar energy. The developed economies 
are in a technological race to develop more efficient 
electricity generating systems without CO2 emissions; 
and governments are providing major support to R&D 
in this sector. The United States Energy Secretary has 
recently said that the country could either develop the 
next generation of clean energy technologies, which 
would help to create thousands of new jobs and export 
opportunities in the United States, or else it could wait 
for other countries to take the lead (see [ online] http://
energy.gov/articles/energy-department-takes-first-step-
spur-us-manufacturing-small-modular-nuclear-reactors). 
Clean energy technology transfer is one of the negotiating 
points in international conversations on climate change 
mitigation, and although no specific proposal has yet 
emerged in this regard, FDI in renewable energies can be 
expected to be one of the main vehicles for this transmission 
(Peterson, 2008).
In Latin America, some governments have made a 
major effort to develop local capacities in the nascent 
wind power industry —particularly in Brazil, where 
local content requirements in tenders and, particularly, 
conditions of access to BNDES financing, have led all of 
the world’s 12 largest component manufacturers for the 
wind power industry to set up a production plant in Brazil. 
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In Mexico, in contrast, there are no component production 
plants, even though wind power is developing strongly. In 
fact, the development of a domestic components industry 
for renewable energies is likely to depend more on the 
expansion of these energy sources in the United States than 
in Mexico itself. In the region’s smaller economies, which 
cannot create capacities throughout the value chain of the 
industry, it will also be important to develop suppliers and 
services associated with new renewable energies, with a 
view to reducing the investment cost of generating plants 
and increasing their local content.
The rapid development of wind power in Latin 
America clearly reflects the adoption of support policies 
in certain countries. Nonetheless, unlike what happened 
in Europe, which has the leading countries in wind 
power generation, in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, this 
has happened without recourse to large-scale direct 
subsidies. Nonetheless, the region has benefited from the 
development of renewable energies in Europe at various 
levels —firstly, through FDI in wind power generation 
by many European firms (Iberdrola, ACCIONA, 
Fenosa, SN Power, Enel, GDF Suez and others) and 
in component manufacturing capacity, particularly in 
Brazil (Vestas, Siemens and Alstom, among others). 
Direct investment by these firms, which have more 
than a decade of experience in wind power in their 
countries of origin, have driven the development of the 
wind power industry at a pace that would have been 
impossible without this knowledge transfer. Moreover, 
the opportunity to develop wind power in Latin America 
has given these European firms an area of expansion 
that they needed when the sector was going through a 
major crisis in Europe.
In the public-policy domain, the countries of the 
region have been able to learn from the European 
experience and avoid making the same policy errors, 
such as setting regulated rates for renewable technologies 
that prove too high and which, although they rapidly 
promoted the industry, entailed a high fiscal cost that 
later had to be revised.
Lastly, the new renewable energies have opened up 
an area for bilateral development cooperation between 
Europe and Latin America, which although perhaps not 
very significant for the largest economies of the region, 
is important in specific cases and in the smaller countries. 
The proportion of worldwide development assistance 
targeting energy, which had shrunk by half since the 
1980s, grew substantially between 2003 and 2008 (the 
latest period for which figures are available) at a rate of 
16% per year —mainly as a result of the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which generated additional assistance for 
renewable energy projects.55 After Japan and the United 
States, the largest donors in this area would Germany and 
Spain, countries with a large number of firms specializing 
in this segment. In 2010 German cooperation targeted 
30% of its funding (US$ 1.333 billion) on the energy area, 
with renewable energies accorded a very important role.56 
Another key donor for many of the region’s countries 
is the European Investment Bank, whose criteria for 
approving loans for projects in Latin America include the 
project’s contribution to environmental sustainability and 
participation by European firms through FDI.
In the electricity sector, therefore, economic relations 
between Europe and Latin America will remain close over 
the next few years, both because of European investments 
in the region and because of technological and political 
efforts to reduce atmospheric CO2 emissions, in which 
the European Union has thus far played a leading role.
With its abundant water, solar, wind, and geothermal 
resources, Latin America has an opportunity to harness its 
natural resources to productive activities that generate local 
capacities in high-productivity sectors. Achieving this requires 
overcoming ideological attitudes towards public or private 
control of the sector’s assets, and seeking public-private 
partnerships that make it possible to continue attracting 
private investment through a fair distribution of the risks 
and benefits. Energy policy must also be reconciled with 
industrial and science and technology policies, that make it 
possible to develop capacities today to be able to continue 
producing electricity during the twenty-first century.
<?>
 Figures provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).
56
 This refers to the funds of  Instituto de Crédito para la Reconstrucción 
(KfW) or financial cooperation, which is recorded in separate 
accounts from technical cooperation.
55
 Figures provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).
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